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The purpose of architectural theory is to provide a paradigm, or episteme, from which 
one can address contemporary design issues within the broader cultural context. It 
comprises any written system of architecture and may be either partial or comprehensive, 
but it must encompass a framework of cognitive categories that inevitably provide criteria 
for judgment. If not explicitly stated, it nevertheless implies an epistemology, a 
substructure for architectural knowledge.  
Previous studies of tectonics have tended to treat it as an autonomous architectural 
discourse, focusing on an individual writer and theory, or on a thematic concern such as 
the relationship between ontology and representation. This study approaches tectonics 
differently, relating it to the broader shifts within the discourses of architecture and 
philosophy, thereby sanctioning a more synergistic, as opposed to autonomous, 
examination. In exploring the epistemological parameters of tectonics theories in the 
West it isolates three major periods in its development: Classical Tectonics- derived from 
ancient philosophy, Rational Tectonics- emerging from the epistemology of science and 
Poetic Tectonics- developed out of concerns raised by the German Counter-
Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement. At each stage in its development tectonics 
has served to provide key principles that collectively constitute its ground.  
The study reveals that Poetic Tectonics was a reaction against the duality of mind and 
abstract rationalism- so central to Cartesian thought and the epistemology of science- and 
its impact on architectural thought. In response Poetic Tectonics while accepting the key 
principles of Rational Tectonics sought to redirect it along the philosophical lines of the 
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German Enlightenment and Romanticism while also re-presencing the ethical 
substructure of Classical Tectonics.    
This study recognizes that through the course of time, the epistemology upon which 
cultures are formed have and will continue to change and as they do new tectonic theories 
will need to be negotiated; rendering tectonics in a continual state of ‘becoming’. If there 
is to be a conclusion it lies in the fact that in its historical persistence and continuity 
tectonics represents a tradition within Western architecture on par with the likes of the 














 “. . . upon closer inspection, the fundament of 
tectonics reveals a turbulent substructure. This 
layer is the excess of the rational tectonic project, 
tectonics as discourse.” 
 
Mitchell Schwarzer 





Tectonics has been an important part of architectural discourse for the last two 
hundred and fifty years. Yet research into tectonic theory has been limited and 
fragmentary, with the vast majority of texts on the subject coming in the form of brief 
essays and articles. A cursory survey of the terms use over time reveals that even its 
definition has been a problem in its scholarship. Its’ first architectural use appeared in 
Karl Otfried Muller's Handbuch der Archaologie der Kunst (Handbook of the 
Archeology of Art) of 1830, where he defined tektonische as applying to a series of art 
forms including such objects as pottery, utensils and buildings. These he claimed form 
and develop ". . . on the one hand due to their application and on the other due to their 
conformity to sentiments and notions of art."ii The German theorists of the 19th century 
used it to refer to the relationship between constructional details and ornamentation. In 
the 20th century it has been used as a support for arguments surrounding the production 
and engagement of craft detailing. More recent deconstructions of the tectonic discourse 
have concerned themselves with 'its insinuation of a logic of continuity and integration'.iii 
The result has been a plurality of definitions and the subsequent application of the term to 
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a diverse group of issues with little clarification of its core principles. This study is 
intended to provide such clarification by examining the epistemological parameters of 
tectonic theories of architecture that serve as the foundation of the contemporary 
discourse.  
 
Assessing the Scope of the Contemporary Discourse 
 
Contemporary commentators on tectonics generally accept that tectonics is a 'form- 
making strategy' where, as Thomas Fischer claimed, ' . . . the form emerges out of the 
nature of their materials and the methods of their construction or fabrication'.iv As a 
form- making strategy, tectonics is seen as distinct from mere structural expressionism. 
Eduard Sekler made that clear when he defined tectonics as an expressivity arising fr
the statical resistance of constructional form where the expressivity could not be 





v More recently, Kenneth 
Frampton has referred to this expressivity as "the poetic manifestation" of constructio
For these theorists, it is through this 'poetic manifestation of construction' that mea
and significance in architecture are to be fou
It is this interest in making, and its cognitive and symbolic implications, that have 
connected such diverse practitioners as Carlo Scarpa, Louis Kahn, Tado Ando, 
Morphosis, Frank Isreal, Steven Holl, Hertzog and DeMeuron and Mario Botta. For 
many, the significance of tectonics lies in the belief that it is through the process of 
making that meaning emerges. This position is not without its philosophical grounding. 
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Philosophers from Vico to Cassirer have argued the importance of artistic production as a 
foundation of both cognition and meaning.  
The registered concern with meaning in contemporary tectonics has coincided with a 
growing concern with the influence of corporate modernism, consumer capitalism and 
Post-modern historicism. For many of architects and theorists, tectonics and the 
'significant detail' are seen as vehicles for both resistance and cultural critique. As a 
'form- making strategy' tectonics posed as a counter- hegemonic position from which to 
produce an 'authentic' architecture, one in opposition to the reigning fads and isms of 
style and theory. In a postmodern, post-industrial world, of consumer capitalism and 
cultural consumption, tectonics is held out as the savior of a dying art. 
While there have recently been many writers entering into this discourse, the texts of 
four prominent writers, Vittorio Greggotti, Marco Frascari, Juhani Pallasmaa and 
Kenneth Frampton, have had significant impact in establishing the contemporary tectonic 
debate. 
For Greggotti, all things that are made are given form and it is through this form that 
they are endowed with the capacity to communicate. Architectural form is not a single 
monolithic image, but rather a composite made up of components or details. It is the 
detail that reveals architectural language and meaning. Greggotti states "Obviously 
detailing does not necessarily depend on an overall guiding concept; even if it has 
inherent relations with such a concept, it is not simply a declination of general decisions; 
but gives them form, rendering them recognizable and articulated in their various 
parts."vii The emergence of meaning within the language of architecture, for Greggotti at 
least, occurs through the process of making, encoded within the construction process at 
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the location of the detail. The concept itself is dependent upon the articulate statements 
made by the details, and not the other way around. The detail and detailing present 'a 
system of articulation in architectural language' that is the source of its eloquence. For 
Greggotti this eloquence can never be achieved successfully via the application of 
historical quotation or abstract concepts applied to architectural form. 
Frascari also locates the significance of architectural meaning in the detail, put places 
an even greater emphasis upon it. "Details are much more than subordinate elements; 
they can be regarded as the minimal units of signification in the architectural production 
of meanings."viii Like Greggotti, Frascari believes that the detail imposes order upon the 
whole. The detail is the location, or locus, of meaning in man- made objects, as such it is 
that point at which knowledge, finds its own logos. With Frascari's writings, tectonics is 
firmly tied to theories of both cognition and ontology, or being in the world. As such, the 
detail replaces the plan as architectural generator.  
Accordingly, the architectural detail becomes the location of both constructing and 
construing, what Frascari refers to as the 'techne of logos' (i.e., the production of 
discourse or construing) and the 'logos of techne' (i.e., the production of man- made 
objects or constructing). He finds historical precedence in this definition of the detail as 
the meeting of mental construing and actual construction in the theory of Leon Battista 
Alberti. It was Alberti who identified architecture as 'the art of the selection of 
appropriate details whose result was beauty', or rather 'concinnitas'. Frascari interprets 
Alberti not as applying this to the actual built object as a whole, but rather the mental 
construct. He reads the facade of the Palazzo Rucellai as an incomplete object, but one 
whose details, nevertheless produce a unified whole that produces concinnitas within the 
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mind. The details become the juncture between the actual and the imagined. As a result, 
tectonics becomes the ground within which the two realms of the theoretical and 
empirical merge. It is "the understanding and execution of details [that] constitute the 
basic process by which the architectural practice and theories should be developed."ix  
According to Frascari, the detail is not solely a construction joint, but also potentially 
a formal joint; between interior and exterior, between building and ground or sky, etc. 
What in one instance is seen as an edifice; a round Ionic temple, can also be a detail if 
used as a lantern upon a dome. Consequently the dictionary definition of 'detail' is 
meaningless to architecture. "Details are the result of the multifold reality of functions in 
architecture. They are the mediate or immediate expressions of the structure and the use 
of buildings."x Frascari identifies 'functions' with repeated usage and custom and thereby 
grounds the detail in tradition, culture, and the sensus communis.  
For Pallasmaa, tectonics becomes the seat of a larger intellectual critique of modern 
epistemology, one that began in the Renaissance and continues until the present day. In 
his book The Eyes of the Skin, Pallasmaa argued that modern thought began to place an 
ever growing emphasis on the visual interpretation of the world at the expense of bodily 
interpretation.xi He traces this emphasis to Descartes and his now famous cogito ergo 
sum, which formally divorced the mind from the body. The resulting duality within the 
epistemology of science then led to the ever increasing rejection of the sensual in the 
realm of knowledge, having a significant impact on the arts and their relationship to it. 
The most prominent theorist of the tectonics has been Kenneth Frampton. His 
concern with capitalist economies and global cultures lead him to first propose an 
architecture of 'Critical Regionalism'xii, and then in 'Rappel L' Order'xiii  to launch an 
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attack on the predominance of Scenographic architecture. In the latter he claimed, the 
success of Robert Venturi's theory of the decorated shed had lead to a condition in which 
shelter was packaged like a giant commodity.  
He then insisted that 'architecture must of necessity be embodied in structural and 
constructional form'. It was made clear that what he was referring to was not a 
'mechanical revelation of construction' but rather the 'poetic manifestation of structure'. 
Frampton challenged modernism’s concerns with functional necessity, structural 
expressionism, and its emphasis on an architecture of space. He claimed that the act of 
making, specifically the act of making an architectural construction, comes first rather 
than the discourse of surface, volume and plan.  
‘Rappel L' Order’ established a taxonomy of architecture breaking it into three 
classifications; the 'Technological object', the 'Tectonic object' and the 'Scenographic 
object'. According to Frampton, the 'Technological object' was one that "arises directly 
out of meeting an instrumental need", as opposed to the 'Scenographic object' that "may 
be used equally to allude to an absent or hidden element". The former dominated by 
utility, necessity and function, the latter by symbolism, and representation. Frampton's 
allusion, though not clearly stated, is that the 'Tectonic object' lies suspended between 
these two poles.  
This taxonomy was complicated when Frampton went on to argue that the "Tectonic 
object" appears in two modes; the ontological and representational, which he likened to 
Semper's distinction between the structural- technical and the structural- symbolic. 
According to him, the doctrines of Modernism (not necessarily the architects or the works 
themselves, as his selection of architects in Studies in Tectonic Culture indicates) placed 
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too great an emphasis on the representational mode at the expense of the ontological. For 
Frampton, this was what eventually led to the rise and influence of representational 
theories of architecture such as Venturi's 'Decorated Shed'. As a means to counteract this 
influence, ‘Rappel L' Order’ called for a revised account of the history of modern 
architecture, interpreted through the lens of techne.  
In his seminal book Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, Frampton concentrated on exploring the 
representational mode of 20th century tectonics in an attempt to redirect it toward the 
ontological. In the end, it proposed an alternative view of modern architecture as called 
for in 'Rappel L' Order'. Today it remains the only large scale attempt to produce a 
framework for tectonic theory.  
While illuminating and an essential first step in the articulation of tectonics Studies in 
Tectonic Culture was far from definitive. The conceptual framework of the book placed 
too great a concentration on representation (which Frampton defined as the intellectual 
problem), neglecting key avenues through which tectonics might engage and open up 
architectural discourse,  including those that Frampton himself identified, such as the 
corporeal metaphor, ethnicity and topography. 
 If Studies in Tectonic Culture was to be a revised account of architectural history 
interpreted though the lens of techne as espoused in ‘Rappel L' Order’, it failed to provide 
a definition of techne or to answer the question of how a tectonic techne might differ 
from other forms of techne, and thus what the curvature of its’ 'lens' might be. This was a 
significant shortcoming particularly in light of the assertion that making and ontology are 
central issues of theoretical concern in tectonics.  
 9
The greatest defalcation of the book came in the failure to provide a cultural context 
for tectonic theory as promised in the title. The book began with a survey of the term 
‘tectonics’ and its use in Architectural history in an attempt to establish the scope of the 
project. This survey also included an etymological examination of the roots of the term in 
the word tekton. The intention was to establish the origin of tectonics in the work of the 
carpenter and wood construction, notably the frame, which Frampton associated with the 
modern tradition and contemporary construction practices. Frampton then provided some 
case studies that would help to explain his understanding of the concept.  
There is a significant problem with Frampton’s etymological study. It only traced the 
word tekton to the Hellenistic age, but its true origin dated from the Homeric age of 
Ancient Greece where its usage was substantially different. This is complicated by the 
fact that the linguistic distinction between the tekton and the architect occurred earlier in 
the Classical age. Thus, the study failed to accurately identify cultural context that 
constituted the origins of the tekton and how such a ‘tectonic culture’ might have shaped 
the earliest conception of architecture, a condition that permeated the entire book.  
As Tim Culvahouse has noted; the book "assumes the existence of a tectonic culture, 
rather than articulating the manifold interactions of institutions, theories, practices, and 
influences that make up that culture. . . . This tension carries certain undeclared 
assumptions about the boundaries of tectonic culture and how such a culture develops, 
maintains, and disseminates knowledge."xiv As he pointed out, there are many junctures 
between architecture and other cultural institutions that would have to be explored in 
order to properly define a 'culture' of tectonics.  
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To be fair, the third chapter of Studies in Tectonic Culture, entitled the entitled 'The 
Rise of the Tectonic: Core Form and Art Form in the German Enlightenment, 1750-1870' 
did provide a glimpse of the role tectonics might play in the broader role of cultural 
inquiry. In it Frampton explored the interrelationship between the philosophy of the 
German Enlightenment, its impact on aesthetics and its eventual translation into both 
architectural theory and practice. Nevertheless, while indicating the distinction between 
two antithetical impulses (what Frampton refers to as the ‘rationalist’ and the 
‘expressivist’), this highly informative chapter failed to interrogate the epistemological 
framework of the German Enlightenment.xv A period that was fraught with contradiction.  
Studies in Tectonic Culture made no attempt to outline the epistemological ground of 
tectonic theory, nor did it attempt to outline the cognitive assumptions that Frampton 
himself often alluded to in his writings. The lack of a real epistemological investigation 
was curious given that while maintaining tectonics as a counter hegemonic strategy, 
Frampton recognized it as a condition of knowledge.  
As Mitchell Schwarzer claimed; "Tectonics is a product of ideas as much as a 
construction of products".xvi What Marco Frascari referred to as 'the construing of 
constructions and the construction of construing'.  It is an epistemological construction 
that defines the boundaries of constructional knowledge, as well as the framework for its 
development, maintenance and dissemination.  
The current body or research on tectonics leaves several important questions largely 
unanswered. Among them are the following; ‘What is the distinction between the 
‘mechanical revelation’ and the ‘poetic manifestation’ of construction and structure?’, 
‘What are the ramifications of such distinctions?’, ‘How do differing definitions of techne 
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affect the discourse of tectonics?’, ‘Why is the question of ontology important?’, ‘What is 
the basis of the claim that meaning emerges in the process of making?’ And lastly, ‘How 
is tectonics a vehicle for both resistance and cultural critique?’ Such questions reveal the 
fundamental necessity to interrogate the cultural context of tectonic theory and the need 
to explore the epistemological parameters and cognitive assumptions upon which it is 
based.  
In hopes of providing answers to some of the above listed questions, the parts of this 
work that follow are intended as investigations into the cultural context of tectonic 
theory. Taking a cue from Frampton’s Studies in Tectonic Culture, they are organized 
around three distinct periods in the development of ‘tectonic culture’; Classical, Rational 
and Poetic. The first, the Classical, returns to the idea of origins in an attempt to excavate 
a more authentic ground from which to base a ‘tectonic culture’. The Rational and Poetic 
are derived from the two antithetical impulses Frampton identified in the architectural 
debates of the nineteenth century; the rationalist and the expressivist. 
  
Part 1I: The Origins of “Tectonic Culture” 
 
Part II, ‘The Origins of Tectonic Culture’ raises the issue of origins reexamining the 
etymology of the term tekton in an attempt to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the cultural context of tectonics in the Classical age and how that helped 
to determine the conceptualization of architecture in the work of the Roman architect 
Vitruvius.  
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It argues the origins of ‘tectonic culture’ can be found in the Tectonic Myths of the 
Homeric age- the myths surrounding the tekton and the gods who governed their actions, 
Prometheus, Hephaestos and Athena. Those myths established a series of relationships 
between tectonics, ethics, and production that provided the framework of a broader 
‘tectonic culture’. That framework conceived of tectonics as a series of interrelationship 
between the concepts of creation, making, poetry and ethics. The Tectonic Myths 
provided a foundation for a culture of tectonics that also served as a basis for the later 
development of philosophy and eventually the discourse of architecture.  
This work asserts that the distinction created between tectonics and architecture, 
tectonike and archi- tectonike, was not one of kind, but of degree. Both tectonike and 
archi-tectonike where part of a cultural framework that concerned itself with the 
interrelationship of doing: understood through the idea of making (techne) and acting: 
understood through the idea of praxis (phronesis), and their relationship to wisdom. The 
addition of the prefix arche did not disturb the original cultural context, but rather sought 
to provide a more theoretical framework that allowed for the incorporation of the 
discourse into the emerging philosophical context of classical Greece.  
Part II concludes that the classical period developed an epistemological structure that 
set operable parameters for tectonics in the form of a dialectic between techne and 
phronesis. It was within that dialectic that a definitional stance on cognition was 
elaborated, as well as a means of grounding production in the concrete reality of lived 
experience while resisting the potential instrumentalization inherent in techne. 
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Part III Architecture and the Epistemology of Science: 
The Formulation of a Rational Tectonics 
 
 
Most social critics and analysts have identified a major shift in the worldview of the 
West that began in the Renaissance and continued into the early 1800’s. That period saw 
the concretization of a new epistemological structure; the epistemology of science and its 
metaphysics.  Part III investigates the impact of the new epistemology on the intellectual 
culture of France. It explores how art and architecture began to embody not only its new 
causality, but its definitions of reality, nature and the human mind. The most obvious 
effect of this shift was the gradual dissolution of the classical notion of mimesis and the 
Vitruvian tradition.  
By the mid sixteen hundreds, new definitions of beauty derived from the 
epistemology of science emerged. The Cartesian duality of mind and body developed into 
‘Subjective’ and ‘Objective’ aesthetics, which transformed the framework for aesthetic 
and architectural judgment. One result was the development of a theory of imitation 
where architecture sought to embody the universal ideals of an idealized model. The best 
known of these was Laugier’s ‘Primitive Hut’, but the Greco-Gothic Ideal and Neo-
Classicism also embody this tendency. In the process architectural theory and practice 
were brought in line with the goals of science. The result was the development of what I 
have termed Rational Tectonics. 
By the end of the 1700’s the new system of ordering proffered by the epistemology of 
science was increasingly marked the domination of a technological intentionality- 
something Heidegger, Mumford and Ellul have identified as the most distinguishing 
feature of the modern era.xvii Part III concludes that this new intentionality brought about 
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an increased focus on means in the means/ ends equation that resulted in a completely 
new approach to evaluating architecture and conceiving of the design process. Such that 
by the end of the century architecture was increasingly seen as an autonomous language, 
dominated by what I have termed the Mechanism of Structure; the representation of 
statical forces, and the Mechanism of Disposition; the representation of spatial 
organization and use, effectively transforming architectural practice from a form of 
techne into a form of technique. This transformation was best exemplified by the writings 
of Jean- Nicolas- Louis Durand, and the design pedagogy of the Ecole Polytechnique. 
 
Part IV- Architecture and Idealism: 
The Emergence of Poetic Tectonics 
 
 
The epistemology of science, while widely accepted and growing in dominance, was 
not without its' critics. In the writings of Giambattista Vico in Italy and Johann Georg 
Hamann, Johann Gottfried von Herder and the Idealist philosophers in Germany, a new 
epistemology context emerged. Its’ underlying propositions and definitions of Nature, 
reality, truth and the human mind proved to be radically different from those of the 
epistemology of science. Its’ proponents argued poetry was the novum organum and a 
means of resisting abstract reason and overcoming the Cartesian duality.xviii 
Part IV investigates this alternate epistemological context beginning with Vico’s 
impact on Lodoli and Piranesi in Italy. It then traces the impact of the German writers, 
particularly Hegel, Goethe and Schiller, on the theory of mind, definitions of nature and 
aesthetic theory. It argues that it was out of this new epistemology that Poetic Tectonics 
developed in the work of Gilly, Schinkel, Hubsch, and Botticher. It concludes that the 
proponents of Poetic Tectonics did not reject Rational Tectonics. They were still 
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committed to notions of function, structure and representation, but they challenged the 
idea that architecture was a practical science in the service of utility. Rejecting the theory 
of imitation, they saw the design process as a manifestation of human ideals; a means of 
creating a uniquely human world. For them, architecture was an advanced civil 
institution, whose history revealed a truth of human socialization, cognition and ‘being’ 
where the detail became the locus of signification and meaning; a microcosm of human 
intelligibility. 
Through the course of history we have come to confuse the epistemological context 
that brought about Poetic Tectonics with a Romantic ‘state of mind’; one often associated 
with emotionalism, subjectivity and a disengagement from the world.xix This has tended 
not only to negate the existence of any real challenge to the epistemology of science, but 
also the veracity of the questions posed. The result has been a lack of clarity of the real 
issues that have shaped tectonics over the last 250 years.  
Collectively, these three cultural investigations identify the often contradictory, and in 
some cases incommensurate, epistemological parameters and cognitive assumptions that 
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Chapter 2: Studies in Tectonic Mythologies 
 
 “. . . the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of 
Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders.” 
Aristotle 
Metaphysics Bk. I Chap. 2 18- 19 
 
Discontinuity and Continuity: Tectonic Genesis and Ritual 
 
Karvouni makes the following insightful observation about the tectonic crafts: 
"Unlike the continuity of molding, tectonics is defined by discontinuity, by cutting first . . 
. then joining. . . . This kind of seemingly antithetical dual activity (division and 
reconstitution) is what defines the core of tectonics. This 'tectonic' pair seems to be the 
same with the primordial pair that operates in any creation- genesis."i Virtually all the 
creation myths including the Pelasgian Creation Myth, the Olympian Creation Myth and 
Hesiod’s Theogony, begin with an act of cleaving.ii The division of Chaos was then 
followed by the emergence of the primordial beings that unite to form the kosmoi or 
ordering principles of the world. iii It is the act of division and reconstitution that brings 
the world into being.  
In his book The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture, George Hersey pointed out 
that the central tenet of Greek ritual was just this concept of division and reconstitution. 
Following Burkert, he noted that once the animal was sacrificed it was carved up. Its 
heart placed on the altar and the liver interpreted. Then certain parts were roasted and 
eaten, the rest preserved and placed back on the altar. The bones and skull were then laid 
out on the altar in the configuration of the sacrifice’s original form and draped in the skin. 
He states that the 'Greek sacrifice thus involved deconstruction and reconstruction of the 
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victim's body.'iv For his part, Burkert noted that the act of sacrifice, dismemberment and 
reconstruction was a communal act of defiance of life over death.v This action was 
always accompanied by the presence of fire, a central ingredient both mythically and 
physically, in the transformation of the world.  
The origins of the Greek sacrificial rituals can be found in the Bronze Age religions 
of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations.vi Ever recurrent in the archaeological sites 
was the Double Axe, known as a diplous pelekys. vii Symbolizing the power of life over 
death, it was the most common element associated with the sacrifice.viii "That the axe was 
used for the sacrifice of oxen is beyond doubt; in the shape of the double axe practical 
efficacy is joined to an impressive ornamental form which doubtless assumed a symbolic 
function at a very early date."ix It was clearly an object formed and developed 'on the one 
hand due to [its] application and on the other due to [its] conformity to sentiments and 
notions of art' to use Muller's words.x  
The sacred ritual was encapsulated in the image of the ceremonial pelekys, the Double 
Axe, which stood not only as a necessary instrument in the sacrifice, but as a conscious 
reminder of the artistic work of the tekton. xi Tectonic re-genesis found its representation 
in two strong and powerful images both from the point of view of mythical symbolism 
and historical production; the image of fire and the Double Axe, the ceremonial pelekys. 
Both of these images are powerfully associated with what I would term the ‘Tectonic 





"There is one race of men, one race of gods; both 
have breath of life from a single mother. But 
sundered power holds us divided, so that one side 
is nothing, while on the other the brazen sky is 
established a sure citadel forever." 
Pindar,  
Nemean Ode VI 
 
Prometheus and the Three Transgressions 
 
The ritual form of dismemberment and reconstitution found its most prophetic form 
in the Greek myth of the first sacrifice. According to which, in a dispute at Sicyonxii as to 
what was to be done with the carcass of the sacrificed ox, the Titan Prometheus was 
called in as arbiter. He took the sacrificed carcass and divided it into two portions, one to 
be offered to the gods, Zeus in particular, and the other to be eaten by man. In one bag, 
made from the skin of the animal, he placed the flesh, which he covered with the 
stomach, the most unappealing part of the animal. The second, he filled with the bones 
covered in a layer of fat. Zeus chose the latter.xiii  
The myth of the first sacrifice was actually part of a trilogy of three Promethean 
transgressions. xiv Collectively, they reveal a theme in ancient Greek culture concerning 
man’s acquisition of techne and its application. That theme is central to our attempt to 
reconstruct the foundations of tectonic culture. What follows is a recounting of the key 
components of the trilogy necessary for understanding how Homeric Greece came to 
terms with the application of techne.  
Prometheus' first transgression actually occurred before the sacrifice when he was 
ordered by Zeus to create man.xv According to the myth, Zeus was unhappy implying that 
he saw in man a flaw in need of correction. Blinded by love for his own creation, 
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Prometheus failed to see this. Having no fear of Zeus, he refused and released humanity 
into the world. Prometheus' name means forethought, Donald Phillip Verene translates it 
as "he who knows in advance, who provides", this was the proper domain of his power.xvi 
His defiance was owing to his knowledge that just as the gods before, so too might Zeus 
fall.xvii Prometheus' hybris led him to mistake his power of forethought for fate, he was 
incapable of conceiving of a realm beyond his own. 
The second transgression, the unequal division of the sacrifice at Sicyon, was even 
more of an affront. According to Hesiod, Zeus was aware of this transgression. 
Prometheus' cunning and power were no match for that of Zeus who stated "Son of 
Iapetos, distinguished of all gods, sir, how unjustly you divided the portions."xviii Zeus 
cunningly played to Prometheus' arrogance and conceit, while discretely reminding him 
of Moira, the regulating principle that governs all things in nature.xix Prometheus so 
consumed in proving his own power and deceiving Zeus, failed to realize this. For the 
dishonor Zeus did nothing, it was the domain of Moira (the law of the whole, the 
interconnectedness of all things) to set right the balance. For man's actions in this affair 
retribution must occur and did in the withholding of fire. When relating this story, Hesiod 
referred to it as the moment when gods and mortal men parted.xx The myth symbolizes 
the primordial moment of discontinuity between the divine and the human, the natural 
and the manmade.  
The second transgression also reveals a quantitative distinction between the power of 
the Olympian Zeus, god of all things, and that of the Titan Prometheus, god of 
forethought. Both use cunning and trickery in their interplay back and forth. The Archaic 
Greek term used was techne. In its Homeric usage up to the classical period, including 
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the writings of both Plato and Aristotle, techne was conceived of in relationship to the 
concept of cunning, implying a form of subterfuge or deception. In Hesiod's version of 
the myth the Olympian’s techne is far more discrete and in the end more powerful than 
that of the Titan. This subtle and often overlooked aspect of the myth implies that techne 
was not seen by the ancient Greeks as a fixed ability. Instead, it was viewed as 
qualitatively different in relationship to how and by whom it was used and with what 
ends in mind, a point that I shall return to later on.  
Prometheus' third transgression took place after Zeus decided to withhold fire from 
man in retaliation for the deception of the sacrifice. In defiance, Prometheus stole fire and 
gave it to man. This transgression proved too much for Zeus who then ordered 
Hephaestos to chain Prometheus to the Caucasus, where he would have his liver eaten 
each day by an eagle, and then re-grown each night for ten thousand years. For our role in 
the third transgression humanity received the evils of Pandora’s box.  
In the play Prometheus Bound, Aeschylus revealed the true impact the theft of fire 
had upon the community of gods. In the play Hephaestos claims "For thou, a god not 
fearing wrath of gods, in thy transgression gav'st their power to men." and Strength asks 
"Why dost not hate a god to gods a foe, who gave thy choicest prize to mortal men?"xxi 
Fire was the choicest prize not only for its ability to create, but also for its symbolic 
power to restore. While Prometheus acknowledges stealing fire and giving it to man, he 
can only view the theft solely from the point of view of his cherished benefactor. He 
cannot conceive why Honors are not bestowed upon him for his philanthropy.  
Aeschylus reveals the darker side of forethought, its obsessive desire for Honor and 
its ignorance of Moira. As soon as the Titan is left alone on the Caucasus he calls out to 
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the Chorus of Ocean Nymphs. "For I, poor I, through giving great gifts to mortal men, am 
prisoner made in these fast fetters; yea, in fennel stalk I snatched the hidden spring of 
stolen fire, which is to men a teacher of all arts, their chief resource. And now this 
penalty of that offense I pay, fast riveted in chains beneath the open firmament." xxii And 
again slightly later on in the play "And I, who in my pity thought of men more than 
myself, have not been worthy deemed to gain like favor, but all ruthlessly I thus am 
chained, foul shame this sight to Zeus."xxiii Prometheus learned nothing from the previous 
battles of the gods.xxiv It was his forethought that generated his arrogance and his 
undoing. He became a heroic, yet tragic figure, consumed, like Achillesxxv, in a desire for 
honor that repeatedly forced him to transgress all divine lawsxxvi, and the laws of 
community. And like Achilles, he was forced to stand- alone. Prometheus must make 
himself anew, such was the advice of the Titan Okeanos to him "I see, Prometheus, and I 
wish to give thee my best advice, all subtle though thou be. Know thou thyself, and fit thy 
soul to moods to thee full new."xxvii  
The power of Prometheus’ forethought was knowledge of the future conceived as 
progress this was its limit. It did not possess its opposite hindsight, the knowledge of the 
past. His actions were not conditioned by lessons learned, only futures seen. This was 
made all too obvious in Greek mythology. Prometheus has a twin Epimetheus, whose 
name means hindsight. The two stumbled through their existence for lack of ability to 
combine their respective powers.  
The theft of fire had an equally impressive impact on the community of man. 
Prometheus’ gift was the ability to recreate the world. The gift of titanian techne enabled 
humanity to evolve from beast to man, and to challenge nature and the gods.xxviii But there 
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was a hidden gift within the trilogy, one whose impact on the community of man was 
equally as great. The imperfection that Zeus perceived in man, was the replication of the 
Titan flaws of arrogance and conceit. These Promethean gifts lead to Hybris, a blindness 
of Moira. Verene reminds us that while forethought is related to the traditional concepts 
of Providentia, Prudentia, and Phronesis, what the ancient world saw as the basis of civil 
or practical wisdom, these virtues are precisely what the Titan Prometheus does not 
possess.xxix His power of techne lacks the sense of improvisation and intellectual agility 
learned from experience. It is the power of making, absent from the power of memory 
and wisdom.  
The sacrificial act of division and joining stood as a reenactment of origins, the 
moment of discontinuity between the divine and the human, the natural and the 
manmade. It was within the discontinuity of tectonic genesis, in the cunning and 
deception of Titanic techne, that the tekton was born. The gift of Forethought was both 
noble and vile, and must be controlled, bound by a force and strength other and greater 
than itself, a lesson that too often goes unlearned. And so we too must heed the advice of 
the Titan Okeanos, ‘know thou thyself’. Like Prometheus the tekton must seek restitution 
and re-create himself full new. How does the tekton achieve restitution: tectonic 
continuity? As the Promethean trilogy implied, the answer lies in re-creating the Titan’s 
techne through the recognition of Moira. He must re-learn techne in its Olympian form 





"Sing, dear- voiced Muse, of Hephaestos famed for 
inventions. With bright-eyed Athena he taught men 
glorious crafts throughout the world, -- men who 
before used to dwell in caves in the mountains like 
wild beasts. But now that they have learned crafts 
through Hephaestos the famed worker, easily they 




The Wisdom of Hephaestos: The Shield of Achilles 
 
The Promethean myths introduce a central thematic of tectonic culture; what I will 
refer to as the dialectic of techne and phronesis. To understand how Greek culture 
understood the necessary relationship between these two forms of knowledge we have to 
turn to the myths of the Hephaestos, the provider of Olympian techne.xxx It was in him 
that the two important symbolic images, Fire and the Double Axe, were united. The god 
of fire who brandishes the ceremonial Pelekys, he was the archetypal image of the tekton. 
By examining the myths surrounding him we can begin to excavate the foundations of 
tectonics and the framework of tectonic culture. 
In the Iliad, Homer describes one of Hephaestos' greatest works, the Shield of 
Achilles.xxxi Often considered the symbol of him as artificer, it marries practical necessity 
with an unsurpassed stylized beauty. On it the architect of Olympusxxxii, depicted the 
earth, the heavens with their constellations, and around the outer rim, the Ocean River; 
the barrier between life and death, the known and the unknown. 
Wrought in intricate detail across the face are several pastoral scenes. A fallow field 
of rich plowland, its farmers offered cups of honeyed mellow wine. An estate with 
laborers reaping the ripe grain, amongst the people who are setting out the harvest feast 
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stands their king. Innocent children plucking grapes in a thriving vineyard, to the sounds 
of a young boy playing his lyre. A meadow deep in a shaded glen with shepherds tending 
their flocks. A dancing circle, "broad as the circle Daedalus once laid out on Knossos' 
spacious fields", filled with boys and girls. Along side this is a scene of ramping lions 
seizing a bull from the herd of longhorn cattle, and tearing it to shreds before a shepherd 
can save it. 
Paired with these are the finely wrought images of two cities. In one a wedding feast 
takes place with song and dance. Two men quarrel in the street outside over a murdered 
kinsman. Their dispute is settled in a court of law by a judge. Circling the second city 
armies engaged in battle, the image detailed and bloody. A regiment in battle gear is 
about to lay siege to the citadel. Off in the fields two scouts slit the throats of innocent 
shepherds and steal their flocks.  
Bernard Knox interpreted the shield as an image of human life. "These two poles of 
the human condition, war and peace, with their corresponding aspects of human nature, 
the destructive and creative, are implicit in every situation and statement of the poem, and 
they are put before us, in something approaching abstract form, on the shield of which the 
god Hephaestos has made for Achilles. Its emblem is an image of human life as a 
whole."xxxiii Homer's epic poem is about the battle within the human soul between 
destructive and creative powers, about unbridled passions and their consequences. Homer 
uses Troy, and its hero Hector, as the physical embodiment of civil order, law and honor 
in the service of the social good. His is a world governed by justice, what the Greeks 
referred to as Dike. The Acheans on the other hand are depicted as men who lack a full 
control of their emotions, who often resort to violence as a means of solving their 
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disputes. Theirs is a world dominated by hybris. Achilles embodies this trait to a flaw. 
His arrogance leads to uncontrollable rage that ends in the death of Hector and his refusal 
to allow burial of the body. Allegorically, his actions represent the destructive forces 
ability to thwart all that man has accomplished and holds dear. In the end Achilles, like 
Prometheus, must remake himself in a new image, one closer to that of Hector, in order 
to die with true honor. 
The gift is ironic, the aesthetic device that gives material form to the theme of the 
poem- the necessity of man to control his passions for the greater good of humanity- is 
carried and at the same time used as protection by the very protagonist whose way of life 
is called into question. In the end Achilles must understand this irony. There can be no 
honor for men outside of community. The shield is an aesthetic commentary on the lot of 
mortal man. It was a fitting gift from Hephaestos, who knows first hand the creative and 
destructive possibilities of his own power. 
Man's knowledge of techne has given him the power of life over death. It was through 
the technical crafts that man learned to plow the fields, harvest the grain, to drink of the 
wine of the thriving vineyard, to raise flocks and herds of cattle. It was because of this 
that man could celebrate feasts and dance, rejoice and live a civilized life free from the 
fear of death at the hands of nature. But techne also brought man knowledge of war and 
destruction. The images the god gave us are those of man's barbarities, of slaughter and 
ruin. The knowledge of techne brought with it the power to reduce man to ‘a ramping 
lion’, to a beast.  
The imbalance of the images gives us, not only a framework within which to 
understand the rage of Achilles and the brutal death of Hector, but also a vision of the 
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whole, this was the true gift of the Olympian artificer, the revelation of man's lot in the 
world. The Shield, as an image, presented for the first time the human civil cosmos as a 
spectacle, a theoria. It gave birth to, or let appear, the order of human existence. It was 
what both Homer and Hesiod would define as a thauma idesthai, a wonder to behold. 
One that inspires those who gaze upon it to philosophize about what it means to be in the 
world.xxxiv Hephaestos' gift was not the physical armor, but the ability to wonder.xxxv It 
was a vision of civility, created when techne is bound by practical knowledge, it was the 
gift of phronesis. The myths of Hephaestos reveal the Homeric concern with the 
unrestricted application of techne. Such power was seen as having a direct impact on the 
nature of the civil world and on humanity as a whole. This concern proved to be a cen




"But between us and Goodness the gods have 
placed the sweat of our brows: long and steep is 
the path that leads to her, and it is rough at the first; 
but when a man has reached the top, then is she 




Hesiod’s Erga: The Twin Pillars of Justice and Work 
 
The gift of Hephaestos, presented as a poetic image on the Shield of Achilles, found 
its explanation in Hesiod’s Erga.xxxvi Stating his intention to sing of the divine justice of 
Zeus and the Olympians, Hesiod advocates a new morality, one based according to 
Versenyi, on 'the twin pillars of justice and work'.xxxvii 
The Erga began with a discourse on strife that was not one but two goddesses. One 
led men toward evil, war and battle, while the other encouraged him to work. "She stirs 
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up even the shiftless to toil; for a man grows eager to work when he considers his 
neighbor, a rich man who hastens to plough and plant and put his house in good order; 
and neighbor vies with neighbor as he hurries after wealth. This strife is wholesome for 
men."xxxviii Hesiod relates this discourse back to the original sacrifice and the third 
transgression of Prometheus. It is for the theft of fire that "the gods keep hidden from 
man the means of life", and its price "an evil thing in which they may all be glad of heart 
while they embrace their own destruction."xxxix  
Once again we are presented with two visions of man’s lot in the world,xl one that 
fosters Hybris and one that follows Dike. The rule of Hybris leads to a world blind to 
Moira, where men want more than their fair share. They sack each other’s cities, murder, 
and steal. This is a world were might makes right and corruption is the rule of 
government. This was the way of the Titans, of the Acheans of the Iliad and the battle 
sieged city on the Shield of Achilles.  
Opposed to this Hesiod gave us a vision of the world of Dike, in which the city was at 
peace. A world where "Neither famine nor disaster ever haunt men who do true justice; 
but lightheartedly they tend the fields which are all their care. The earth bears them 
victual in plenty . . . They flourish continually with good things, and do not travel on 
ships, for the grain -giving earth bears them fruit."xli This was the same image as the 
pastoral scenes on Achilles’ Shield that show men living a bounteous life off the land. In 
the world ordered by Dike disputes were settled by courts of law, where men "give 
straight judgments to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not aside from what is 
just, their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it." Disputes were settled, like the city 
of peace on Achilles' Shield, with justice.  
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Hesiod claimed that the allotment or portion given to man, his Moira, was justice. 
"For the son of Kronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged 
fowls should devour one another, for right [justice] is not in them; but to mankind he 
gave right [justice] which proves far the best."xlii Versenyi interpreted this as an 
opposition between the beastial and the divine natures of man. "Bia, violence, is the 
opposite of Dike, and man, having been given justice as his share, debases himself if he 
resorts to violence, the law of the beasts. What might be right for animals is brutish in 
man, for god gave man justice."xliii 
Hesiod's message was that of the Shield of Achilles. The application of techne may be 
used in the service of evil or good. Man's only means of overcoming the evil of his 
bestial nature, the retribution for the theft of fire, was through an act of restitution. That 
restitution was the conscious recognition of justice achieved through productive work. 
Paying honors to justice provides man’s restitution to Zeus. Hephaestos’ gift, presented in 
the form of the Shield of Achilles, was the gift of Olympian techne. Guided by practical 
knowledge, it allowed for restitution and escape from the Tartarian landscape of Titan 
techne with its reign of Hybris.  
 
The Birth of Athena: Construing Civil Constructions 
 
The myths of Prometheus, the shield of Hesphaestos, the shield of Achilles and the 
Erga of Hesiod teach that in the world of man Titanian techne must be transformed into 
Olympian techne through the guidance of a higher knowledge. But what is the nature of 
that relationship? How is techne related to a higher knowledge in such a way that the 
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transformation from Titan to Olympian techne can occur? For that we must look at yet 
another Hephaestian myth.  
In Greek mythology there was no stronger association than that between Hephaestos 
and Athena- in fact they shared many festivals, and rituals.xliv He ranked high among the 
male gods and she among the female. Both were fire gods and both were gods of craft 
credited with bringing civilization to the Athenians. Collectively they were the patron 
gods of the artisan class.xlv 
The best known myth involving them is that of the birth of Athena. It was Hephaestus 
with his pelekys who cleaved open the head of Zeus allowing Athena to emerge ‘fully 
armored’ into the world. The symbolic gesture of cleaving and emergence and its 
verisimilitude to the concept of tectonic genesis should not go unnoticed. It was the 
action of the artificer god wielding his pelekys that brought wisdom, in the form of 
Athena, into the world.xlvi Hephaestus did not carry the sublime power of the image of 
Athena, her esoteric wisdom took predominance in Greek culture over his practical 
knowledge; yet the myth implies that it was through him that she comes forth. The myth 
establishes a clear relationship between phronesis, the practical knowledge of Hephaestus 
and sophia, the theoretical wisdom of Athena. That relationship is further elaborated in 
yet another Hephaestian myth.  
Hephaestus was said to have fallen in love with Athena who resisted his advances. 
The goddess was said to be chaste, her esoteric wisdom like her personage must always 
remain pure. According to myth, Hephaestus attempted to mate with the goddess who ran 
from him, but not until after some of his seed landed upon her leg. She is said to have 
wiped it off with a wool cloth which she then threw upon the ground. From the spot 
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where it landed sprang Erichtonius (the Earth Born). Upon seeing the young infant 
Athena in compassion for the child takes him and raises him as her own. The Athenians 
claimed that Erichtonius became their first King.xlvii The significance of the myth lies in 
its message. The joining of practical wisdom, phronesis, with esoteric wisdom, sophia is 
an impossibility, but nevertheless it is out of such attempts that the civil world of man is 
born.  
The importance of this message to Greek culture was evidenced in the construction of 
the urban fabric of Athens itself. Overlooking the Agora, the physical manifestation of 
civility in the built world of the polis, stands the Hephaestion, the temple to 
Hephaestus.xlviii Behind it lies the district of the tektons, before it the agora, the center of 
Athenian culture. Above it, disjunct but ever in view, high atop the Acropolis sits the 
temple to Athena, the Parthenon, next to that sits the Erecthion, the temple to Erichtonius. 




What we find in the mythology is the cultural framework of tectonics. Man’s ability 
to transform the world and remake it in human form stems from the creative activities of 
the tekton. Such actions, the application of techne, can be either a blessing or a curse. It is 
in tectonic actions, themselves a form of praxis, that the character of our world takes 
shape as either a world of Hybris or a world of Dike. Tectonic culture finds its foundation 
in the ethical application of techne, framed in the philosophical concept of phronesis, the 
sphere of knowledge that governs praxis, and its relationship to sophia. 
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The Tectonic myths reveal the centrality of ethics within tectonic culture as it related 
to the creative act. The tekton recreates the world, but such re-genesis must be governed 
by Moira and Dike as manifestations of the universal logos. The ethical responsibility for 
resisting hybris and establishing a just society lies therefore, first with the creative action 
of the tekton who must apply knowledge of Moira and Dike to techne and praxis. The 
consistent theme of tectonic mythology was the application of a higher wisdom, to 




















                                                          
ENDNOTES 
iiiKarvouni. "Tectonics of the Human Body and Architectural Embodiments", printed in Constructions of 
Tectonics for the Postindustrial World,; Proceedings of the 1996 ACSA European Conference, p. 79. 
ii In the Pelasgian Creation Myth the world is created by the creatix, Eurynome, who suddenly arises 
naked in Chaos, and begins to divide the sea from the sky. She then creates Ophion the serpent and mates 
with him. It is from their union that she produces the Universal Egg out of which all the things of the 
world emerge. The Olympian Creation myth begins with this division as well when Gaia suddenly 
emerges out of Chaos. The best known of the Greek creation myths is Hesiod’s Theogony. In his version 
the world is created by the extraction from Chaos of the three primordial beings Gaia (the earth and 
primordial mother), Tartaros (the underworld), and Eros (the creative principle of Desire). See Hesiod. 
Theogony. lines 115-122. Symbolizing physical matter, darkness and death, and desire and longing 
respectively, it was through their union that the things of this world came into being.  
Towards the Classical period the conception of a single great god who purposefully creates the 
universe began to take precedent but the creation was still a matter of division and reconstitution. This was 
the case in Plato's Timeaus, where it was the demiourgos, who divided the whole into the unchangeable 
(intangible, invisible, eternal) and the changeable (tangible, visible, temporal). See Plato, Timeaus, 28a-
31a, see also 35b. 5-8. In Ovid's Metamorphoses it was the demiourgos suddenly appearing in Chaos that 
began to separate the heavens and earth. Ee Ovid, Metamorphosis, Creation lines 31-34.  
The Judeao -Christian tradition also incorporated this conception of division and reconstitution. Genesis 
begins with a series of divisions; of Heaven and Earth, from the god head; of Light and Dark; of the 
firmament and the waters, etc. This conception of division and reconstitution is present in the conception of 
the Trinity, in which the One or Unity is God, two is the division of the unity into God and Nature, and the 
Trinity is the reunification of the One and the Two in Unity. This more than likely has its roots in 
Pythagorean thought in which the same concepts were present. 
iiiTo the Ancient Greek mind, Chaos did not denote disorder or confusion. It was derived from the verb 
chasko meaning an opening, a yawn or a gape it signifies a void, darkness, or infinite unformed matter. For 
the ancients creation began with a cleaving of this unformed matter.  
iv Hersey’s purpose was to link the details of classical architecture to specific body parts and their ritual 
significance. But his outline of the ritual is important to this discussion. See George Hersey, The Lost 
Meaning of Classical Architecture, chap. 2, ‘Architecture and Sacrifice’, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
1988.  
v He claims: "In this the rite as a sign of the sacred is in particular the preparation, the beginning, on the one 
hand, and the subsequent restitution on the other: sacralization and desacralization about a central act of 
killing attended with weapons, blood, fire, and a shrill cry." See Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. Raffan, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1985, pg. 57. 
vi Berkert notes that an inscription on a tablet found at Knossos from the Greek Period indicates a direct 
correlation of the names of gods in Minoan and Greek. He uses the correlation of the names Eleuthia and 
Eileithyia as evidence of a continuity of religion, at least in part, from Late Minoan to Archaic Greek. See 
Berkhert, Greek Religion, chapter I 3.6, pg. 43. While it is clear that Greek religion finds its roots in the 
earlier Bronze Age cults, one must be careful not to assume a one to one correlation of religions here, Starr 
notes there is significant transformation of these cults to warrant a distinction. See Starr, Chester, The 
Origins of Greek Civilization 1100-650 B.C., pp. 171-183. 
viiIt is most often found in the cave sanctuaries but with the exception of the peak sanctuaries it is found 
almost everywhere. It is often set up between the horns of a sacrificial bull, or set vertical in a stone 
pedestal. On occasion it is set up above a libation table as well, attesting to its symbolic importance. Its use 
as a symbol is ancient. First found in stone form in the fourth millenium, at Arpachiya in Upper 
Mesopotamia. In the third millenium it finds its way to Elam and Sumer, as well as, Troy II. It finally 
arrives in Crete in Early Minoan times, earlier that the horn as a sacred image. 
viii It was perhaps the most prolific symbol in the Minoan -Mycaenean cults. Its iconographic use was great 
it has been found in painting, on seals, in vase painting, on jewelry, and sarcophagi. 
ixBerkert, Greek Religion, pg. 38. 
x See reference above to Muller, Handbuch der Archaologie der Kunst. 
xiBoth it and fire are constant reminders of the importance of the craft of the smith in Bronze Age culture 
Again it was the smith who was responsible for the creation of the iron weapons so essential to winning the 
Persian and Peleponesian wars. 
 36
                                                                                                                                                                             
xiiThe location at Sicyon is according to Homer, Hesiod in the Theogony refers to Mekone, whereas 
Aeschylus' famous play Promethius Bound has it set in Skythia. 
xiiiAccording Homer Prometheus succeeds in initially tricking Zeus, in Hesiod's version Zeus' choice is 
intentional, Prometheus has in fact not tricked the great god of all things.  
xiv Prometheus is of the order of Titans, the gods before the Olympians of the Zeus world. Hesiod attributes 
the characteristics of hybristes and atasthalie to them. According to Kerenyi, these terms designate 
‘unlimited insolence’ and ‘boundless pride’. See Kerenyi, Prometheus Archtypal Image of Human 
Existence, pp. 23- 30. When describing individual Titans Hesiod, in the Theogony, is likely to use terms 
such as wickedness (209), or arrogance, recklessness and excessive pride (514- 516). Their reign is 
dominated by these personality traits. The last of the oedipal conflicts that dominate this period . the 
Titanomachia, will leave Zeus and the Olympians rulers of the world. Those Titans who fought against 
them will be consigned to Tataros, the subterranean underworld.  
xvThe myths are confused on this issue some accounts claim it was Prometheus who made man, others 
Hephaestos. It is probable that as his assistant Prometheus assisted Hephaestos in the actual creation of 
man. This might be part of the claim that he made man.  
xviDonald Phillip Verene, Philosophy and the Return of Self-Knowledge, Yale University Press, New Haven 
& London. Verene's Introduction recounts the history of interpretation of this myth in depth. He interprets 
Prometheus as a metaphor for the Cartesian system of knowledge and modern science. 
xviiThe profacy that Prometheus knows is that one of Zeus' consorts will produce a son whose power is 
greater than the fathers. Scholars claim that this son is likely the Olympian god Hephaestos, whose cunning 
and power appear to out shine all others. Hephaestos is either the son of Zeus and Hera or a pananthenaic 
offspring of Hera alone, the myths are confused on this. They too are rather silent on the conflicts, which 
exist between the two. But Prometheus may or may not have the full prophecy correct, it may not be the 
son but the power of the son, which out does the father.  
xviiiHesiod, Theogony, 543-544. 
xix In the Archaic Greek myths of Homer and Hesiod the realms of human and divine are subject to a third 
force, greater in fact then both; that of Fate. Often identified by several names; moira, aisa, moros, 
pepromene, daimon or nemisis, they all share a common meaning that of allotment, portion or share. 
According to Versenyi Moira, as Fate is commonly referred to, "contains an idea of an as-yet-unarticulated, 
regulative principle governing all things. It stands for the way of things, the order inherent in all, the law, 
persistence, and necessity of the whole of that growth and flow which the later Greeks called physis." See 
Versenyi, Laszlo, Man's Measure, a Study of the Greek Image of Man from Homer to Sophocles, pg. 26. To 
go against moira is to go against nature. In mythic thought moira, is obeyed by the tributes and honors paid 
to those who deserve them. The gods are honored because it is their right as gods. The first transgression is 
one of moira. Zeus' prerogative is to approve all of the gods creations, this is his allotment, to do so is to 
honor moira. In his refusal to submit man for approval to Zeus, and in withholding the finest, Phainon, 
Prometheus' has refused to show honor to Zeus. It is a transgression not only against Zeus' prerogative but, 
and more seriously, one against moira. His first transgression reveals a fatal character flaw, one that will 
cost both him and man.  
xxHesiod, Theogony, par. 535. It is the moment of man's fall, when he is cast out of the company of the 
gods. Greek religion refers to the time prior to this moment as the golden age. It bears a strong relationship 
to the biblical story of the fall of Adam and Eve. 
xxiAeschylus, Prometheus Bound, trans in Nine Greek Dramas, edit. Charles W. Eliot, LL.D. New York, 
P.F. Collier & Son Corporation, 1961, pg. 167. Aeschylus wrote Prometheus Bound as part of a trilogy. Of 
the first part we have no knowledge most scholars believe it would have dealt with the early relationship 
between Zeus and Prometheus. The last Play Prometheus Unbound exists only in small fragments such that 
a full reconstruction is not possible. Many scholars believe that it dealt with the reconciliation of Zeus and 
Prometheus and his eventual release by Herackles. The loss of the latter play is unfortunate because in 
would have given insight as to how the Greek mind resolved the problem of human techne in the face of 
the divine.  
xxiiIbid., pg. 170. 
xxiiiIbid., pg. 175. 
xxiv The reference here is to the Titanomachia in which the Titans were overthrown by the Olympians, and 
imprisoned in Tartaros. According to Greek religion it was this battle that resulted in the reign of Dike or 
justice in the world.  
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xxvIn the Iliad Achilles chooses a short life full of honor over a long life with no honor. Because of this 
decision  he no longer fears death. This lack of fear endows him with a form of courage, which is heroic. In 
his quest for fame and honor on the battlefield Achilles transgresses all the laws of humanity. His 
unrestrained passion is bestial. What he losses is his sense of pity and concern for others. Eventually he is 
trapped and alone in his own world as he further isolates himself from the community of men. His image, 
of the courageous warrior, is balanced by that of Hector whose concern is always for the welfare of the city 
and its people. The moral lesson is that it is the fear of death, which unites individuals into a civilized 
society. This is achieved through an awareness of phronesis, or prudentia. 
xxviSeveral interpretations see the myth of Prometheus as a story of rebellion against power and the old 
social structure. It is clear that one of the story lines is certainly that of power relations between the two 
gods. To begin to relate the myth solely as a story of power though is to tie it too closely to political and 
social unrest of the Late Archaic or Early Classical age. The myth historically deals more with the Early 
Greek concern for overcoming the forces of nature, which they saw as life threatening. It is thus more about 
power relations between men and gods than political or social power struggles. Another common 
interpretation, and one that I shall refer to is to view the conflict as Oedipal. This interpretation is I feel a 
stronger one in that it sets up a framework for understanding the role of techne in Greek thought. 
xxviiAeschylus, Prometheus Bound, trans in Nine Greek Dramas, edit. Charles W. Eliot, LL.D. New York, 
P.F. Collier & Son Corporation, 1961, pg. 177. 
xxviiiOne should also remember that to the Greek mind wars were the result of conflicts between the gods 
and goddesses, who used men as pawns in their games. During the Persian and Peleponesian wars the 
technical ability of the Athenians in the production of instruments of war played a significant and decisive 
role.  
Techne, as the power of Hephaestos, allowed the Athenians to take charge of their own destiny. This theme 
is even played out mythically. When Hephaestos' Golden throne traps Hera, it is Ares, god of war who 
decries that he will save her by bring Hephaestos back to Olympus by force. He is rebuffed by Hephaestos' 
fire brands and Ares must return to Olympus in shame. Techne therefore, is a power strong enough to 
overcome the forces of war. 
xxix Donald Phillip Verene, Philosophy and the Return of Self-Knowledge, Yale University Press, New 
Haven & London, pg. 8. 
xxx Fire is the power of Hephaestos, the god of craft. Called the father of man, and the artisan of Olympus, 
he is the great Artificer. He is in fact, present in other cultures, as Vulcan in the Roman pantheon, and 
significantly as Pthah in Egyptian religion. Pthah is the creator or universal life in action. Jamblicus called 
him the demiourgos, or artisan of the world. See Alexander S. Murray, Who's Who in Mythology A Classic 
Guide to the Ancient World, pp. 79- 83 & pg. 343. He is associated with Athena, Prometheus, Aphrodite, 
and the Aglaia, the youngest of the Three Graces. Hephaestos is recognized as culture god, his aspect as 
god of craft secondary. He is credited with producing all the accouterments of the gods including their 
armor, jewelry, clothing, and thrones, as well as, the prized possessions of the Heroes of Mythology. Like 
the mythical inventor genius Daedalus, Hephaestos is said to have created automatons like the three legged 
tables in his workshop, that could think and move independentlyHe was, it would seem, the Olympian 
architect as well. His cult is believed to have been ancient perhaps originating in Eturia. Fire was 
significant in the Iron and Bronze Ages, at that time the craft of the smith shows close involvement with 
political and religious organizations, it is perhaps during this time that his cult first emerged. The Greeks, 
particularly in Athens, placed small statuettes of him in their homes, often on the hearth. Athens, was one 
of the three centers of his cult. We know that it was an extremely important one, from the oldest stratum of 
Attic religion. His cult saw a major revival of sorts following the Classical Age owing in part no doubt to 
the significance of armor and weaponry during the Pelleponesian and Persian Wars. The patron of all 
smiths, artisans, mechanics, forgers, weavers, goldsmiths, jewelers, blacksmiths, masons and carpenters he 
is the patron god of the tekton and the 'tectonic' crafts.  
xxxiHomer, Iliad, book 18, The Shield of Achilles. 
xxxii Interestingly Hephaestos also built the palaces on Mount Olympus. 
xxxiiiKnox, Introduction, Iliad, Penguin Edition, 1990, pg. 62. 
xxxivAristotle makes the claim that the origins of philosophy are in man's wonder about himself and the 
universe. Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 2, 982b 11-22, 983a 15. 
xxxvThis is emphasized in its Hesiodic double The Shield of Herakles. In the text of the same name Hesiod 
describes the Shield of Herackles, another gift crafted by Hephaestos, containing two images one of a 
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prosperous city at peace another of a city at war. In both instances the work is given to the mortal sons of 
gods, Thetis, and Zeus respectively, who must learn how to live 'godlike' in the human realm. Unlike their 
divine parents they must learn to prosper in the face of suffering. 
xxxviThe English translation of this classic is Works and Days. I refer to the original Greek title here because 
it reveals the true subject of Hesiod's text. Erga literally means productive work. It was erga, according to 
the Homeric Hymn, that Hephaestos taught man. 
xxxviiVersenyi, Man's Measure, chapter 2 The Erga, pp. 43- 69. 
xxxviiiHesiod, Erga (Works and Days), lines 20-24.  
xxxixIbid, lines 41-42 & 58-59. Most commentators rush to claim that it was Pandora, a woman, who was the 
evil thing. This reading is, besides being misoginistic more then likely incorrect. Pandora, whose name 
means all gifts, was not a gift to man but to Epimetheus, Prometheus' twin. It was not she that was the evil 
but those things the gods place in her jar. She was merely the vehicle through which strife and hardship 
entered the world. The version in the Theogony leads to a greater condemnation of women. He is quick to 
note that not all women are Pandora, only those who sit at home and do not work. It is lazyness that is the 
source of evil to men, for a man may have a good marriage where good and evil are balanced.  
xl  See lines 212- 247. 
xliIbid, lines 230-237. 
xliiIbid, lines 276-279. 
xliiiVersenyi, Man's Measure, pg. 49. 
xliv Graves points out that the name Hephaestos may be hemero-phaistos, which means 'he who shines by 
day'. This would identify him with the sun. Athena is the goddess of the moon, or 'she who shines by night'. 
He argues that in pre-Hellenic religion the sun always yields precedence to the moon owing to the fact that 
the moons light is constant and does to grow dimmer as the year recedes. Robert Graves. The Greek Myths, 
complete edition. pg. 87 
xlv In ancient Greece the collective artisan class was referred to as the Banausoi. This classification would 
have included all the artisans and craftsman including but not solely the tektons. Both Hephaestos and 
Athena therefore were the patron gods of the tektons but their patronage was extended to the non tectonic 
crafts as well.  
xlviIt should be noted that Athena is not just the goddess of Wisdom but also of War, once again the 
connection between techne and the Persian and Peleponesian wars is enforced. 
xlviiDepending on who tells the story he is either born solely by Hephaestos with no mother, or else Gaia, 
the earth goddess, is considered his mother. Again according to which source he is either the 1st king of 
Athens after Cycrops (the monster) or the grandfather of him. If he is considered the grandfather the name 
of the King is Erectheos. It is because of this myth that the Athenians consider themselves to be a direct 
descendant of Hephaestos. For this reason Athens was one of the centers of his worship. He was second 
only to Athena in festivals and importance. In the majority of the cities’ festivities the god and goddess 
were worshipped together. Even in the celebrations of Athena, Hephaestos was always present. 
xlviii In Athens all the crafts of which he was the patron were located together in a single precinct next to his 
temple, the Hephaestion, appropriately located off of the Agora. The location of the temple outside the 
Acropolis should not be seen as an indication of his lesser importance. In the history of Greek Architecture 
the temple is second in amount of detailing and number of refinements only to the Parthenon. Concerns 
over the destructive nature of fire prohibited the inclusion of the god's temples in sacred precincts. One 
might speculate that the link between the Greek fire festivals and the Peak sanctuaries of the Minoan- 
Mycenaean culture, also remotely located, may account for this as well. 
Chapter 3: Studies in Tectonic Etymology 
 
“Therefore, because of the discovery of fire, there 
arose at the beginning, concourse among men, 
deliberation and a life in common . . . ” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. II, chap. I.1 
 
The creation myths and the myths of Prometheus and Hephaestos center on the 
themes of creation, techne and ethics. These themes have established linguistic parallels 
in the etymological associations of tectonics and techne that indicate that the socio- 
cultural framework present in the mythology was not limited to Greek religion, but had 
broader ramifications within the Greek world. It is their verisimilitude that provides 
insight into the origins and definition of what we might term a “tectonic culture”.  
Previous attempts to examine the etymological roots of tectonics have to date traced it 
to the Hellenistic period. The word tekton at that time referred to someone who worked in 
wood, predominantly a roof-worker.i This has in turn lead modern scholars to associate 
tectonics with wood or frame construction. This interpretation finds its modern roots in 
Gottfried Semper’s The Four Elements of Architecture (1860-1863) where he used the 
term tectonics to refer to wood frame construction.ii This identification was again 
reinforced by Spiro Kostof in his book The Architect. In it he wrote: " . . .the Greek term 
architekton meant, at least initially, nothing more than master-carpenter; it was in this 
sense, rather than master-designer, that it was used to refer to shipwrights and temple 
builders alike."iii In his seminal work Studies in Tectonic Culture, Kenneth Frampton 
again reiterated this image; “Greek in origin, the term tectonic derives from the word 
tekton, signifying carpenter or builder. This in turn is related to Sanskrit taksan, referring 
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to the craft of carpentry and to the use of the axe. Remnants of a similar term can be 
found in Vedic poetry, where it again refers to carpentry.”iv  
But this trajectory proves problematic. The Hellenistic definition of tekton, as a roof 
carpenter, does not trace the word back far enough. The introduction of the compound 
word architekton predates the Hellenistic age. If we are searching for the origins of 
‘tectonic culture’ as a means of understanding how it might have shaped the 
conceptualization of architecture as discourse then we must trace the etymology at least 
as far back as that period in which such etymological distinctions first occurred.  
The exact literary origin of the word ‘architecture’ is unknown. What is known is that 
the prefix arche first appeared in the late 6th century B.C. writings of Anaximander, so it 
must be assumed that the compound word archi-tekton appeared later. The word architect 
was commonly used in historical and philosophical texts by the 5th century B.C. In the 
Symposium, the Greek philosopher Xenophon (460- 355BC.) referred to both carpenter 
and architect indicating that as early as the late 4th century B.C. they were viewed as 
distinct professions.v The etymological distinction between the tekton and archi-tekton 
therefore occurred sometime between 560 B.C. (when Anaximander was writing), and 
450 B.C. when the term architekton entered the common lexicon.vi The etymological 
origins of architecture, we must infer, lie in the dawn of the classical age of Greek 
culture. This time frame implies that the conceptualization of the term archi- tectonike 
(the formal discourse of architecture and practice) was subject to the same influences that 
gave birth to classical epistemology and culture.vii Likewise, its tectonic roots lay in the 
Homeric culture that preceded it. Any attempt to define the origins of tectonic culture 
must therefore address the role of the tekton in Homeric culture, while the attempt to 
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understand its role in the conceptualization of architecture must address the relationship 
between that culture and the episteme of classical thought. More specifically any attempt 
to address the distinction between tectonics and architecture as a formal discourse must 
address the addition of the prefix arche to what was the then tradition of tectonics in the 
Homeric age.  
As I intend to show, in its Homeric and Classic form it carried with it connotations 
that went far beyond the denotation of craft and construction associated with it today. If 
we trace the etymology to its Homeric usage we find that the tekton was not a carpenter 
but rather a classification of craftsmen united by the tools they used. It exposes linguistic 
associations with the concepts of poesis and techne that begin to direct the discourse 
toward a broader socio-cultural context. Such associations establish a linguistic 
foundation from which we can reconstruct the origins of ‘tectonic culture’ and the 
conceptualization of architecture as discourse.  
 
The Tectonics of the Tekton 
 
Tectonike, the act of building, or construction, finds its Indo- European root in two 
word- forms that predate it, Tek and Dem.viii It was the verb form of Tek, tectaino, that 
was the root of such words as tekton, architekton (architect), and architektonike 
(architecture). Tectaino referred to someone who, ax in hand, fashioned or transformed 
one thing into something new. In Ancient Greek the word for this tool, was pelekys.  
Tekton (the noun form of Tek) was rarely found in composite form, and when it did it 
often indicated the material worked in but not the final product. Thus we find the words, 
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siderotekton (iron-tekton), chrysotekton (gold- tekton), lithotekton (stone- tekton), 
xylontekton (wood-tekton) etc.ix Distinctions were made between workers in different 
materials, but they were all referred to as tektons. The actual definition includes all those 
workers who work in hard materials with the use of the Pelekys; the inclusion of metal 
workers implies the use of fire as well. Literary examples of the time would seem to 
support the inclusion of horn, and bronze also.x The Homeric tekton was not a single 
craftsman, but rather a collection of craftsman, who were united by the tools they used 
and the action taken with them. This is an important point because it begins to dispel the 
notion that the tekton was a carpenter and that tectonics should be framed within the 
rubric of wooden or frame construction techniques.xi As I intend to show, such 
conceptualizations limit our ability to understand the true origins of tectonics and its 
relationship to architecture. 
In its Homeric usage Tectaino referred to both the art of construction, and the art of 
devising. Thus the tekton was one who both devised in the mind and constructed in 
material form. Like the primordial Creator who devised the idea of the cosmos and then 
physically brought it into ‘Being’, the tekton was one who brought about being from non-
being. Both thinking and making were embodied in this one act which was at once both 
noetic and performative (i.e. cognitive and corporeal respectively). It is this duality that is 
the key to understanding how tectonics was conceptualized in the ancient world.  
How did Homeric Greece conceptualize the relationship between thinking and 
making? In Homer the concept of making was related to the emergence of the kosmoi, as 
orders or arrangements. The relationship was reciprocal in that it was the kosmoi that 
make for the ‘appearing’ of an object, and it was through the act of making that the 
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kosmoi, ‘appear’. This conception was not seen as limited to the physical manifestation of 
the cosmos or to material objects. In Homer and his successors the kosmoi were also a 
right ordering, linked to political and moral order. Thus, the civil world in its making and 
remaking was also an ‘appearing’ of kosmoi. The term used for this ‘appearing’ of 
kosmoi was techne, which in its Homeric usage did not refer to production processes, but 
to the manifestation of order and arrangement necessary in any creative act.xii  
While Homer used tectaino to refer to the devising of strategies, he used the term 
techne to refer to the cunning and wiles used in their application.xiii Hesiod too, used the 
term techne in this way, as did Sophocles.xiv The linguistic reciprocity of the term’s 
tectaino and techne should be of no surprise given that the etymological root of both 
words was tek. The pre- philosophic usage of the word techne as a form of cunning or 
trickery of strategy implies a sense of improvisation and intellectual agility that in the 
ancient Greek world was seen as a divine gift that protected against tuche or chance. In a 
world without techne man was at the mercy of the forces of nature, thus it became a form 
of insurance, a protection, in the control of life over death. M. Detienne and J.-P Vernant 
have pointed out that this cunning intelligence falls under the rubric of metis the talent for 
winning against the odds, so much praised by the Greeks. They saw this as evidence of 
forethought and experience gained over the years “[that could be] applied to situations 
which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations which do not lend 
themselves to precise measurement, exact calculation or rigorous logic.”xv Here techne 
has no performative presence; it is fully noetic, a form of adaptable cognition that is 
gained through experience. xvi 
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The term’s tectaino and techne establish a relationship between thinking and making 
in the Homeric age. Tectaino was a cognitive process, informed by prior experience that 
generated adaptable strategies, known as techne. Together they constituted the ingenuity 
necessary in the creation of order whether it is civic, moral or productive. Their usage 
implies a cognitive feedback loop in which experience and reason conspire to generate 
orders, kosmoi, from which physical realities become manifest. Such a cognitive 
definition provides a conceptualization of tectonics as a bridge between the noetic and 
performative aspects of the tektons activity. The physical by- product of the cognitive 
process is given very little emphasis except as an experiential tool from which to refine 
the process. The point here lies in the fact that thinking and making are not 
conceptualized as independent processes, but rather as a continuum. A more accurate 
understanding might be that the tekton thinks in the processes of making, which itself 
serves as both source and goal of such thinking.  
This carried with it a broader notion of the creative act, most specifically that of an 
artificer, who possesses a cunning intelligence that allows him to devise strategies for the 
creation of order in any given situation. It was this that eventually lead Aristophanes in 
the 5th century B.C. to associate the tekton with machination and the production of false 
things. By the early 6th century in the poetry of Sappho the tekton assumed the role of the 
poet, extending the use to the arts in general. For the Greeks, poesis meant to make, or to 
construct, in the sense of ‘to fabricate’, ‘creation’, or ‘production’. Poesis comes from the 
root word teucho meaning ‘to make’, or ‘to do’. In Plato's Charmides (163b) the term 
was used to denote ‘to make’ or ‘produce the first of something’, such as a material of 
manufacture or a work of art. In Memorabila (4.3.14), Xenophon used it to denote ‘to 
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bring about’, or ‘causes of things’, as did Isocrates in the Epistulae (7.54). In these 
examples teucho does not simply imply making or doing, but carries with it a 
reinforcement of the idea of genesis wherein the final product is something which has 
been brought into being for the first time. Teucho was also used in the sense of ‘to do 
something to another’ implying the sense of how one will act. This is how it was used by 
Herodotus' in Historicus (3.75) and latter by Isocrates in Espistulae (16.50) and 
Xenophon in Memorabilia (2.3.8). In addition Herodotus used the term to denote ‘to 
make account of’, and ‘to communicate’ (Homeri Opera, 7.156 & 6.4, 8.134). This 
explains Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics (1140a 2) where poesis was also used to 
indicate an action.  
In this way the idea of human interaction, the communication of causes and the 
teaching of Ethics, long thought of as the primary role of the poet, were brought into play 
with the activities of the tekton. The etymological relationship between tectaino and 
poesis serves to point to yet another key point to be noted, the reinforcement of an 
established relationship between creation, production and the communication of ethics. 
A study of the etymology of the term ‘tektonike’ indicates that the term as used in 
Homeric and Classical Greek carried with it connotations that went far beyond its 
denotation of craft and construction. The etymology reveals that the term tekton was used 
to refer to a group of craftsmen united by the tools they used, fire and the axe, and the 
basic action involved in their crafts, cutting and joining. It provides us with an image of 
the tekton as one that devises cunning strategies in the form of orders or arrangements, 
what the Greeks called kosmoi, that were then implemented as a right action, in the 
creation or fabrication of things.  
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In the end we are left with an image of the tekton and tectonics that focuses less on 
the actual craft or material and more on the cognitive ability and its ethical application in 
the creation of an ordered world or society that protected one from chance and nature. 
The study reveals a broader conceptualization of tectonics then previously held; one that 
was situated within a socio- cultural context that encompassed such concepts as creation, 
ontology, cognition and ethics.  
 
The Tectonics of the Archi-tekton 
 
It is often assumed that the 'arche' of architekton refers to a chief or leader.xvii This is 
not necessarily an incorrect assumption, the meaning of the root word arkh in the English 
‘architect’ means chief.xviii But this is limiting, perhaps even misleading, when 
attempting to understand the relationship of tectonics to architecture, particularly when
trying to understand this relationship in its classical formulation. Failing to take the 
etymology back far enough it gives the impression that the architect was a master 
carpenter or master mason. An impression that is increasing seen as problematic given
that the re-introduction of the term architect in the early Renaissance by writers like Leo
Battista Alberti and Philibert DeLorme specifically sought to establish a distinction 
between the profession of architecture and the task of the master mason and master 
carpenter. Further study reveals a broader and more comprehensive meaning, o
embodied ontological, epistemological and ethical aspects necessary in defining what








As noted above, Tectaino, the verb form of tekton, was rarely found in composite 
form. When it was, it often indicated the material worked in, but not the final product. 
This would mean that archi-tekton, referred to a tekton that worked in the material of the 
arche. But what is this material? In Pre-Socratic philosophy ‘arche’ was generally used 
to refer to the origin of the phenomenal world, conceived of as the very structure of the 
physical cosmos. As the source of creation/ genesis and the ordering of the world it had 
an ontological presence. The first use of the word was attributed to Anaximander of 
Miletus (611 -547 B.C.), by Simplicius in his Aristotle's Physica Commentaria.xix The 
text contains a fragment, known as B1, of Anaximander's description of the creation of 
the world.xx Simplicius' surrounding text tells us about the Ancient world’s understanding 
of Anaximander’s cosmology, more importantly it tells us the original meaning of arche. 
According to Anaximander the arche was the “boundless nature, from which all the 
heavens arise and the kosmoi within them”. xxi Reminiscent of Chaos in Hesiod's 
Theogony, the arche was the boundless other (to aperion physis), out of which order 
(kosmoi) emerged.xxii Indra Kagis McEwen has done an elaborate etymological study of 
this fragment.xxiii She states: "It is these 'orders', generated by a boundless source which, 
as is elsewhere attested, is all-encompassing and divine, that regulate and guide the ebb 
and flow of elements experienced as things coming to be and passing away. This other, 
boundless physis is the generation for the orders of onta."xxiv The arche served as the 
infinite source of genesis. It was from the orders (kosmoi) emerging from the arche that 
onta, things in themselves were generated. Generation and destruction, we are told, takes 
place, according to what needs be (kata to chreon).xxv This places the generation and 
destruction of things within the realm of both chronos (time), and physis (empirical 
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nature). There is an obvious implication that this 'realm' is one of historical time and 
human experience. The kosmoi, are the standards by which the judgment of orderliness or 
disorderliness, of things in and of themselves (onta), are measured. The arche was the 
source of such standards of judgement.  
In classical philosophy the arche took on the guise of episteme. For Heraclitus it was 
the origin of the intelligibility of all things. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle it 
denoted 'first principle' or 'element' in philosophical argumentation. We find it used in 
Plato's Republic as original argument, signifying to begin with or at first. This was also 
true of Aristotle who in the Metaphysics used the term to denote the first principles of 
knowledge. In this sense arche were first thoughts, the origin of reason. Plato also 
associated it with the principle of practical human conduct. In the Timeaus it denoted a 
source of action (praxis). In the Charmides, he claimed that philosophy had its origins, or 
arche, in human nature, while at the same time being an inquiry into those very origins.  
From an epistemological standpoint, the arche served as both the beginning and the 
end of wisdom, the substratum from which the order and harmony, of the physical world, 
of the world of human knowing, and of experience and praxis, emerged. Philosophically 
it was necessary to rationally understand and explain those origins so that the lessons 
learned might be successfully applied to lived experience.  
If the archi- tekton is one who works in the material of the arche, then we are left 
with a conceptualization of the architect, not so much as a master mason or carpenter, but 
as one who theorizes on the first principles of knowledge concerning creation and 
judgement. He/she was one engaged in a rational pursuit of the generation of the kosmoi 
and their applications.xxvi Architecture was conceptualized as a rational discourse whose 
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subject was the ontology of creativity. One must assume that any such ontological 
discourse would also take into consideration human nature, cognition and conduct.  
 
The Tectonics of the Archon 
 
The root arche was also applied to individuals. This is perhaps the source of the 
aforementioned connotation with chief or leader. In ancient Greek cities, the title Archon 
was given to an individual who held the highest office and had wide judicial and 
executive powers, but they were not heads of state or chiefs as we might think of these 
positions today. The title carried with it greater epistemological weight. The Archons 
were founders of the civic order. They were seen as the source and genesis of the kosmoi 
that brought the civilized world into being in the first place. It was from them that the 
civic world, the world of human social experience emerged and they also served to 
maintain its being. Hence we find the leader of the cults of the Acropolis attained the title 
Archon, as did the judge in the law court of Athens. In Plato's Euthyphro, it was to the 
Archon that Euthyphro and Socrates presented their cases. The Archon served as the 
source and maintenance of order in the civil world. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
remarked: “the magistracies in cities and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are 
called archai and so are the arts, and of these especially the architectonic arts.”xxvii The 
emergence of the title Archon at this time implies the possibility that the actions of the 
archi-tektons were seen as playing a part in the establishment of social and civic order as 




From the study of their respective etymologies we can begin to understand how 
tectonics and architecture were conceptualized, as well as what kind of framework may 
have existed for a “tectonic culture”. The etymology indicates that tectonic culture in 
Homeric times focused on the tekton and his relationship to concepts such as creation, 
poesis, techne and ethics. These relationships were not limited to the performative actions 
of the tekton, but stressed the noetic component of his actions equally. By the Classical 
age a greater interest in rational explanation lead to the increased focus on explaining the 
cognitive aspects of the tektons actions. Understanding the human mind and its ability to 
create became the paradigm for understanding the world. Increasingly the creation of 
order in the world of human making was identified as possessing a verisimilitude with the 
creation of order in the cosmos. It was no coincidence that the conceptualization of 
architecture emerged during the same period as that of philosophy. Both were attempts to 
rationally define discourses of knowledge and provide an ordered explanation of the 
world, in both its natural and man- made guises.  
The introduction of the prefix arche to tekton did not substantially alter the Homeric 
culture from which tectonics emerged but rather served only to reinforce the ontological, 
epistemological and ethical aspects already latent in its broader linguistic context that 
included the concepts of creation, techne, poesis and ethics. In its pre classical usage by 
Anaximander, arche as the origins of kosmoi reinforced the idea of creation inherent in 
both the noetic and performative aspects of techne. The prefix arche served only to 
strengthen the ontological component latent in tectaino, grounding it in cosmology and 
the idea of creation/genesis. Its later classical usage as first thoughts and the origin of 
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reason served to strengthen the epistemological aspects of tectaino and the tekton by 
calling for a rational explanation for the creation of order and arrangement. It was now 
necessary for the tekton to explore the intellectual process of creativity and making and to 
rationally explain the origins of such strategies.  
The addition of the prefix arche to tekton indicates the seriousness with which the 
ancient Greeks viewed the actions of the tektons and their ramifications on the social well 
being of society. The etymology reveals that tectonics was originally less focused on the 
performative process of making and more on the noetic aspects of the craftsman and the 



















                                                          
ENDNOTES 
i There is a notable exception to this tendency. Maria Karvouni has traced the term tectonike to its Homeric 
usage. Her work proves a more fruitful direction for further exploration and I have here endeavored to add 
to it. See Maria Karvouni. "Tectonics of the Human Body and Architectural Embodiments", printed in 
Constructions of Tectonics for the Postindustrial World, Proceedings of the 1996 ACSA European 
Conference. 
ii Semper identified four primary functions in architecture. They were; 1) the hearth: the location of the 
sacred fire, 2) the wall: or enclosure designed to protect 3) the hearth; the roof; seen as a means of 
protection as well, but from rain as opposed to keeping out animals as such, and 4) the platform or terrace; 
which served as a means of demarcation of a given precinct. He then began to look at the four elements and 
related them to four technological means of production: ceramic production (the hearth), textile production 
(the wall), tectonic production (the frame or structure of the hut itself), and stereotonomy, or masonry 
construction (the terrace). Semper envisioned the origins of architecture as the combination of four basic art 
forms and a combination of their respective technologies. Thus with Semper the term tectonic, as a means 
of production, becomes linked with carpentry or wood construction techniques. Semper never made the 
claim that architecture was carpentry but rather that it was based upon two primordial forms of dwelling; 
the earthwork and the framework. It was through his transformational morphology that these then 
developed into a collection of crafts and their different technological means of production. 
iiiKostof, Spiro. The Architect, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977, pp. 11-12. Interestingly only two 
sentences latter Kostof claims 'the central agent of the art of architecture was the stone-mason', he gives no 
explanation for this contradiction within his own text. 
iv Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., p. 3.  
v See Xenophon, Symposium 4.4, “What is there remarkable about that?’ asked Calais. ‘Do you not see 
plenty of carpenters, also and architects that build houses for many another person but cannot do it for 
themselves, but live in rented houses?” While both professions are associated with the construction of 
buildings it is clear that Xenophon does not view them as identical. The sentence would be redundant it that 
were the case.  
vi J.J. Coulton remarks that Plato, Herodotus and Aristotle all used the term architekton. See J.J. Coulton 
Ancient Greek Architects at Work Problems of Structure and Design, Cornell University Press, Ithica NY, 
1977. 
vii This would indicate that the origin of ‘architecture’ is commensurate with that of the discourse of 
philosophy, a point that I will elaborate on later. 
viii The verb form of Dem was demo, which served as the root of such words as domos (house), doma (room 
or terrace), dome (structure), oikodome (build a house or simply build), oikodomike (the art of building- 
architecture). Demo, was always formed in a composite structure inseparable from the final object made (as 
in words like oikodomos [house builder], teikhodomos [wall- builder], or naodomos [temple- builder]). For 
a more detailed explanation see Maria Karvouni. "Tectonics of the Human Body and Architectural 
Embodiments", printed in Constructions of Tectonics for the Postindustrial World, Proceedings of the 1996 
ACSA European Conference, p. 79. 
ix Interestingly, the first modern architectural use of the word tectonics occurs in 1830 in Karl Otfried 
Mullers Handbuch der Archaologie der Kunst (Handbook of the archeology of Art) where he defined 
tektonische as applying to a series of art forms including such objects as pottery, utensils and buildings. 
These he claimed form and develop “on the one hand due to their application and on the other due to their 
conformity to sentiments and notions of art.” Frampton points out that in the third edition Muller added 
remarks on ‘dry’ jointing making the claim: “I did not fail to notice that the ancient term tekton, in 
specialized usage, refers to people in construction or cabinet makers, not however, to clay and metal 
workers; therefore, at the same time, it takes into account the general meaning, which lies in the etymology 
of the word.” [my italics] It was the unfortunate miss- reading of tektones-xylon (tekton working in wood) 
for tekton that should be seen as the source of the image of the tekton as carpenter. See Muller, Ancient Art 
and its Remains, or a Manual of the Archeology of Art, trans. J. Leitch, London, 1847. See also Frampton 
Studies in Tectonic Culture, pg. 4. 
x Throughout the Homeric epics are several descriptions of structures fashioned by the tekton. They range 
from palaces on Mount Olympus, built by the God Hephaestos, to armor and tools. What is striking is the 
diversity of materials they are made from including wood, stone and bronze. In Book VI of the Iliad, 
Homer describes Priam's palace as "that magnificent structure built wide with porches and colonnades of 
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polished stone. And deep within its walls were fifty sleeping chambers masoned in smooth, lustrous ashlar, 
. . . The twelve sleeping chambers of Priam's daughters, masoned and roofed in lustrous ashlar, . . ." (289- 
296) In Book 22 we are told that the citadel of Troy has "rock- built ramparts" (232). In Book 18 we are 
given a description of the house of the god Hephaestos, which we are told is "indestructible, bright as stars, 
shining among the gods, built of bronze by the crippled Smith with his own hands." (432). In the Odyssey 
we find in Book 7 a description of Alcinous' bright palace, whose threshold is wrought in bronze. "That 
high-roofed palace was a realm of light, of brightness as of the sun or moon; the sides, in from the 
threshold to the halls, were lined by a resplendent frieze in azurite; within the robust house had doors of 
gold. . . .", in Book 10 "Within a forest glen, they found the home of Circe: it was built of polished stone 
and lay within a clearing." and again latter on "we found a sheltered house with smooth stone walls." Such 
descriptions of the work of the Tekton should serve to dismiss the idea that the tekton was a carpenter, held 
by both Frampton and Kostof.  
xi Both Frampton and Kostof have asserted that the tekton was someone that worked in wood frame 
construction.  
xii Heidegger made this point when he noted that to the ancient Greeks techne meant neither art nor 
handicraft but a ‘letting appear’. Heidegger, The Question of Technology, trans. Hosftadter, Harper & Row 
Publishers, New York, 1971, pg. 159- 60. See also Indra Kagis McEwen, Socrates’ Ancestor an Essay on 
Architectural Beginnings, The MIT Press, London, 1993, pg. 125. It was in the sense of a ‘letting appear of 
order’ that the Greeks were able to apply the term techne to politics.  
xiii"Once there, He wrapped those chains around the bed -legs; overhead, down from the roof, he hung that 
same strong mesh, as fine as spiders' webs - made with such craft and subtlety [techne] that it could not be 
seen, not even by the gods themselves." Homer, Odyssey, bk. VIII, 327, 332. 
xiv “Swiftly then the strength and noble limbs of the future lord grew; at the end of the year, tricked by the 
clever advice of Gaia, great crafty Kronos threw up his children, defeated by the craft and force [techne] of 
his own son.” Hesiod, Theogony, lines 491- 496. The term techne is often translated as craft because of its 
associations with the arts and crafts, but as it was used in the works attributed to Homer and Hesiod it is 
better understood as crafty. The heroic master of this ability was of course Odysseus, who uses his 
craftiness and wiles to out wit the gods. In Sophocles’ tragedy Ajax, techne is an ability of the god’s: “I 
know that a god’s contriving [techne] may do anything.” 
xv Dertaine & Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. J. Lloyd Sussex, 
Harvester Press, 1974, originally published as Les Ruses d’intelligence: la Metis des grecs, Paris, 1974. pp. 
3-4. 
xvi This is the opposite the modern conception of techne which often emphasizes the productive processes 
of making at the expense of addressing its cognitive aspects. 
xvii Kenneth Frampton in 'Rappel L'Order' referred to this, as did Coulton, Kostof, and Carpenter, among 
others. Coulton claimed that the early architects were individuals who oversaw the production of buildings 
and payments, acting more as business managers. Archi was here interpreted as chief or leader. See Coulton 
J.J., Ancient Greek Architects at Work, pg. 23. Kostof taking a different position than Coulton, claimed that 
the architect was a master- carpenter, archi here is interpreted as master of a craft. See Kostof, Spiro, The 
Architect, pg. 11-12. Carpenter translates architekton to mean literally builder- in -chief, thus he too defines 
arche as chief or leader, see Carpenter, The Architects of the Parthenon, 
xviii The first use of the word architect in English was in 1563, in a reference to John Shute, as painter and 
Architect. It next appeared in Milton's Paradise Lost (I. 732) "the work some praise, and some the 
architect." In English, it comes from two root forms, tekh, which means to weave or to build, and arkh, 
which means to begin, or to take the lead. The root arkh produced two sets of words. The first related to 
beginnings i.e., archaic, archetype, archeology. In 1541 Paracelus used the term archeus to name the vital 
force that produced all animal and vegetable growth and behavior. The second referred to a chief or leader. 
This it must be assumed was the source of the idea that arche meant chief or master. As I will show the 
term archon in ancient Greek also referred to a civic leader but it carried greater epistemological and 
ontological weight.  
xix Whilst Anaximander's work exists only in fragments, enough is there that scholars can attribute to him 
the first complete Greek cosmology. For this reason he is often considered the first philosopher. He also 
founded colonies and built fortresses. Perhaps most interesting, he also built a model of his conception of 
the universe, which included a celestial sphere, a map of the world and a gnomon (an hour indicator or sun-
dial the precursor to the clock). He has the distinction of being the first to construct such a device. 
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xxQuestions abound as to whether the fragment contains 17 or 56 original words. The Anaximander scholar 
Charles Kahn asserts the latter. Kahn, Charles H., Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology. 
xxiSimplicius’ entire quote is as follows "Anaximander . . . declared the boundless [to apeiron] to be the 
principle [arche] and element of existing things, having been the first to introduce this very term of 
'principle' [arche]. He says that 'it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some 
different, boundless nature, from which all the heavens arise and the kosmoi within them; out of those 
things whence is the generation of existing things, into these again does their destruction take place, 
according to what needs must be; for they make amends and give reparation to one another for their 
offense, according to the ordinance of time," speaking of them thus in rather poetical terms. It is clear that 
having observed the change of the four elements into one another he did not think it fit to make any one of 
these the material substratum, but something else besides these.” The opening line of the quote is in fact 
not attributed to Anaximander but rather to Simplicius. Anaximander's words begin with 'it is neither'. 
Simplicius' statement is an attempt to define the 'it' of Anaximander's words, what Simplicius refers to as 
'the material substratum' in the last line above. We must assume that the original text used the term arche, 
and Simplicius was here attempting to define the term. See Simplicius. Aristotle's Physica Commentaria. 
trans. Kahn Charles H. in Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmography. New York. 1960 p. 166. It 
is important to note that the term 'principle' used by Simplicus is a reflection of his Aristotelian 
background. In the Metaphysics (995b 8) Aristotle used arche to refer to first principles, specifically 
principles of knowledge. We must therefore, attribute this denotation to the classical period, with its 
Platonic /Aristotelian epistemology. Simplicius' opening statement also links arche to apeiron, the 
boundless. This too is an Aristotelian concept, which implies a hierarchical structure, replete with a 
teleological impulse. We must be careful not to attribute these latter philosophical concepts to this early 
text. While relevant to a later discussion of the architect and tectonics in the classical Greek and Roman 
world, they are not part of the early first usage of the term. 
xxii In Miletus c. 560 BC. (the time of Anaximander's life), the words physis (nature, or the lived world) and 
genesis (generation, emergence, being born) were interchangeable. The aperion physis was the infinite 
genesis from which the orders of onta (things in and of themselves) come forth. 
xxiiiMcEwen, Indra Kagis. Socrates Ancestor. pp. 9- 17. 
xxivIbid. p. 14. 
xxv Anaximander’s phrase here was Kata to chreon it was a polysemic phrase that denoted need, necessity, 
custom and usage. 
xxvi In fact Aristotle distinguished between the architect from the tekton precisely because he knew the 
causes of things see Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1 chap. 1 981a31-32. 
xxvii Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. V, chap. 1 1013a 11-14. Aristotle is here concerned with the definition of 
‘Beginning’ as a philosophical term. It is the search for origins of essence in the nature of things that is his 
primary interest and so he claims: ‘hypothesis are the beginnings of demonstrations’, ‘all causes are 
beginnings’ and ‘the nature of a thing is a beginning’. The statement quoted is in reference to those whose 
will or action brings about movement or change and who are therefore the source or beginning of such 
movement or change. The implication is that political leadership is the origin or source of a body politic 
and the architectonic arts are the source or beginning building.  
Chapter 4: Studies in Tectonic Philosophy 
 
“Socrates was the first to bring philosophy down 
from heaven; he took it to men’s cities, and 
introduced it to their homes; he forced it to inquire 
about life, and morals, about good and evil.” 
Cicero  
Tusc. 5, 4, 10 
 
Sophrosyne and the Ethos of the Good 
 
Okeanos’ advice to ‘Know thou thyself’, was a call to resist the titanic forces of 
hybris. Such resistance depended upon knowledge of moira, the eternal balance of 
nature, its fundamental law. The Greek term for such knowledge was sophrosyne.i It 
was the very thing that Titans like Prometheus, and Acheans like Achilles, notoriou
lacked. By examining this concept I intend to show how the dialectic of phronesis and 
techne formed not only the basis of tectonic culture in Homeric Greece, but classical 
philosophy and architecture, as well.  
sly 
Heraclitus was the first philosopher to address knowledge of moira as sophrosyne 
when he claimed sophrosyne to be the wisdom that acted in accordance with nature.ii 
What he did was to identify it as knowledge of the universal Logos in essence making it 
identical with theoria or theoretical wisdom. In its purest sense, theory was limited to the 
accounts of things that are necessary and eternal. By its very definition theory exists 
outside the particularities of space and time, encompassing only mathematical entities, 
heavenly bodies and the divine. In this sense it could have no practical import, making it 
both non- utilitarian and non- humanistic.  
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It was this that led Socrates to claim that sophrosyne was the highest form of wisdom. 
While theory was unpractical, it did have a place in life. A devotion to the contemplative 
life of theory was seen as beneficial, transforming the character of the soul to conform to 
the ethical structure of the ‘Good’.iii For Socrates, sophrosyne became synonymous with 
virtue whose end or function was an ‘Ethos of the Good.’ iv Once identified with the 
ethics of the good and the betterment of the soul, the practical application of sophrosyne 
to lived experience became a central concern.  
Following Socrates’ belief that virtue was the orderly arrangement of the soul, Plato 
increasingly associated sophrosyne with the harmony and order necessary for the 
manifestation of the ’Good’ and the unity of the whole.v According to him, sophrosyne 
allowed for good judgment and orderly rule, the two conditions necessary for a healthy 
state and the contemplative life. Sophrosyne became recognized as knowledge of right 
action associated with a moral or ethical outcome that formed a ‘standard’ of living, 
existing on a social, as opposed to personal, plane. As a guide for action (praxis) both 
individual and public, it was applicable in all areas of the civil world, from politics and 
medicine to carpentry and the arts.  
The contemplation of sophrosyne was believed to be necessary for a life of full 
human flourishing, or eudaimonia. In its perfection Aristotle called this the teleia 
eudaimonia. The concern for lived experience, with the world of human affairs and 
politics, Aristotle saw as a secondary form of eudaimonia, that he called deuteros 
eudaimonia. It was this that he defined in his ethical writings as the subject of phronesis. 
Properly understood phronesis is the practical application of sophrosyne to lived 
experience, it is sophrosyne in praxis. The central tenet of the tectonic myths: re-genesis 
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and the resistance of hybris through the dialectic of phronesis and techne, now became 
the foundation of Greek Ethics. 
 
“Proportion is a correspondence among the 
measures of the members off an entire work; and 
the whole to a certain part selected as standard. 
From this result the principles of symmetry. 
Without symmetry and proportion there can be no 
principles in the design of any temple.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. III, chap. 1.1 
 
Sophrosyne as Harmonic Ontology 
 
In the Gorgias, Plato used the term kosmoi (order) to define the virtue of sophrosyne 
in the soul, making it a concern for the establishment of measure and harmony. vi Once 
identified with the principle of order and a harmony of parts, sophrosyne took on an 
ontological guise. In the creation myths the emergence of kosmoi out of the division of 
chaos, was accompanied by their reconstitution in the forms of phusis, the physical 
world of nature. Such reconstitution occurred according to the principles of kosmoi 
(order), taxis (arrangement), symphonia (agreement), harmonia (harmony) and systasis 
(compromise).  
In the Timaeus, Plato concerned himself with two problems, the manner in which the 
cosmos was produced out of chaos and the relationship between the immortal (reason) 
and mortal (necessity) aspects of the soul. For Plato, kosmoi could be brought out of 
chaos only through a compromise between Reason and Necessity. It was the lack of 
proportion between them that led to evil and hybris in the world, hence the necessity of 
order and harmony. This allowed Plato to make the connection between the macrocosm 
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and the microcosm: just as phusis must be orderly and properly arranged so that 
harmonia presides, so too must the individual soul and the polis. vii The order of the 
universe and the virtuous order of the soul presupposed the notion that both were the 
creation of a pattern, an orderly arrangement of parts, constituting a right proportion or 
harmony. Both Beauty, the object of the soul’s desire in the Symposium, and the ‘Good’, 
the goal of Reason in the Republic, were now understood as harmonic proportion.  
Plato’s originality lay in the conclusion that the underlying rule or law that was found 
in both nature and man was the harmonious arrangement of the kosmoi, and that this too 
was the harmony sought in the realm of the divine, manifested as the notion of divine 
justice or Dike.viii Sophrosyne and justice became allied to the principle of order found in 
the cosmos, identifying them as necessary components of any creative act.ix Plato 
transformed sophrosyne from an ethical and epistemological standard to an ontological 
concept, one that increasingly took on aesthetic connotations. 
 
“ . . . we can have nothing but respect for those 
who, in constructing temples to the immortal gods, 
so ordered the parts that by means of proportion 
and symmetry the arrangement of both the 
separate parts and the whole should be 
harmonious.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. III, chap. II.9 
 
Beauty and the Sophron Eros 
 
The ontological concepts of kosmoi (order) taxis (arrangement), symphonia 
(agreement), harmonia (harmony) and systasis (compromise) collectively constituted a 
theory of right proportion or symmetria.x This implied a link between the demiourgos’ 
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and the tekton: both used orderly arrangement to achieve arete (excellence) in the 
production of things. The inherent implication was that the tekton in his excellence 
manifests the universal logos in the world of human making. Creation, the soul and the 
work of the tekton were now interconnected since excellence in each was defined as a 
harmony of parts. xi The result was that tectonics proved to be rational and aimed at the 
good of the whole. And likewise the search for the Good presupposed both tectonics and 
a tekton (technikos, demiourgos).  
Tectonics and Ethics were now linked in that both could be understood as practical 
applications of sophrosyne, one in making and the other in actions, meaning that both 
were discourses on phronesis. The subtlety of this is often lost in contemporary 
discussions of classical aesthetics. The idea that the work of the technitai imitated nature 
derives from the concept that it embodied and taught sophrosyne. This was a necessary 
first step in the establishment of a just and good society, which in turn must be present if 
Man is to live the full life of the deuteros eudaimonia. Tectonics was not a copy of 
nature, but the embodiment of sophrosyne in the creative activity of the tekton. This was 
the message of Plato’s Republic, if the tekton only copies nature then he has no place in 
society. The imitation of the physical aspects of nature was not the tekton’s role, the 
revelation of the higher truth of the universal logos was. Tectonics served to manifest 
sophrosyne and an ethos of the Good; this was what made the tekton a valuable member 
of society.xii Tectonics and its aspect of arete (excellence) now became a vital player in 





“Knowledge is the child of practice and theory. 
Practice is the continuous and regular exercise of 
employment where manual work is done with any 
necessary material according to the design of a 
drawing. Theory, on the other hand, is the ability to 
demonstrate and explain the productions of 
dexterity on the principles of proportion.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. I, chap. 1.1 
 
Does the craftsman who practices techne possess sophrosyne? 
 
Plato’s ontology had generated an aesthetic with an obvious correlation between 
creation and the actions of the tekton. In the Republic, he pointed out the real role of the 
tekton in society: the application of sophrosyne as a form of productive knowledge. In its 
excellence, the creative activity of the tekton should manifest moira in poesis. This raised 
a likely series of questions: ‘Is the tekton conscious of such a role?’ ‘Was the tekton truly 
virtuous in his actions?’ The Republic called for an answer to these questions as a 
justification for the tekton in society. In the Charmides, Plato posed the question outright 
when he asked: ‘does the craftsman who practices techne possess sophrosyne?’xiii In 
essence he begged the question; ‘Was the tekton sophronein?’  
But what does it mean to be truly sophronein? According to Socrates, sophrosyne had 
three facets: the sophron eros (creative desire), self- knowledge, and enkrateia/ antarkeia 
(self- control or self- sufficiency and independence) each a form of episteme.xiv To be 
truly sophronein the tekton would have to possess all three.  
The first: the sophron eros: was an awareness of the heavenly eros, the creative force 
that brought about order in the world. In the Symposium, Plato made a distinction 
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between heavenly and earthly Eros. When the Heavenly Eros, creative desire, prevails, 
the physical elements in the universe are brought into harmony, so that a sophron krasis 
(orderly mixture) results, with consequent fertility and health for mankind and animals. 
This was the form of eros that brought about the kosmoi found in the creation myths. It 
was the sophron eros that formed the basis of platonic ontology. The sophron eros was 
knowledge of moira, the universal logos applied to poesis, or making. To the contrary 
when Earthly Eros, destructive desire, prevailed the result was hybris. 
There is an obvious correlation here between the creative and destructive forms of 
techne, in its Hephaestean and Promethean guises. The sophron eros was the desire to 
manifest the ‘Good’ through the creative activity of Olympian techne. This is 
accomplished through an awareness and application of the concepts of harmony. The 
tekton’s establishment of a right order through the applications of proportion and 
symmetry is the demonstration of his awareness and application of the concepts of 
harmony. While the application of the theory of harmonic proportion by the tekton 
demonstrates an application of the sophron eros, it does not insure a full awareness of 
sophrosyne.  
This was Socrates’ argument in the Charmides. According to him, wisdom is twofold, 
true wisdom is knowledge of both the practical application and the theoretical 
justification for it. His claim was that the knowledge of the technites (the users of techne) 
did not possess knowledge of its limits or of how to properly apply it.xv If it could be 
demonstrated that the knowledge of the technites was both theoretical and practical then 
it could be said that they possessed true wisdom, in essence they could be said to be 
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sophronein. The sophron eros and the theory of harmonic proportion served to raise the 
question of virtue, but did not provide the assurance of a positive answer.  
The second facet, self- knowledge was the awareness of ones limitations in 
knowledge and experience. Socrates claimed it was not enough to know this in ourselves 
but that we must also be able to identify it in others. Self-knowledge was knowledge of 
moira, the universal logos applied to oneself. 
In the area of philosophy the fundamental problem was to move the more theoretical 
discourse on the universal Logos, toward the more practical. This was what Socrates was 
famous for; the insistence on a practical philosophy. But in the area of art and craft the 
problem was the reverse, to move the very practical activity of making toward the more 
theoretical. This required an epistemological framework that could locate the first 
principles (arche) and causes (aitiai) of techne so that it could be identified more 
properly as a theoria. This would not only provide knowledge of its limitations, but also 
provide a means by which to identify who possessed it.  
The third aspect was enkrateia/ antarkeia (self- control/ self- mastery and self- 
sufficiency/ independence). Antarkeia, the concept of self- sufficiency/ independence, 
embodies a sense of cunning in any situation it comes incredibly close to the Homeric 
concept of metis. It was wisdom never at a loss, able to adjust itself to any given reality. 
In this sense it is highly experiential, based on memory, but not limited by it. Perhaps 
most importantly, it was a truth that was not fixed and eternal, but rather fluid in its 
practicality, one that welcomes correction in order to bring itself closer to realization. 
Enkrateia, self- control and self- mastery, holds a close relationship to notions of 
moderation, compromise and the mean as they were understood in relation to politics in 
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the Greek world. In this sense, still highly experiential, it was based upon standards of 
social acceptability or ethics. Enkrateia/ antarkeia were knowledge of moira, the 
universal logos applied to praxis, or action. xvi  
The master of techne is determined by his or her ability to demonstrate a mastery of 
the material and technique in any situation. In this sense it is a form sophrosyne as 
antarkeia. But this only plays into Socrates argument that the knowledge of the technites 
did not possess knowledge of its limits or of how to properly apply it. To overcome this it 
would have to be proven that the tekton understood the limits of techne in practical 
situations and how to apply it within the boundaries of social acceptability. As knowledge 
applied to praxis, techne had to be made to conform to the aegis of phronesis.  
Plato’s dialogues generated the necessity of establishing a theorum on tectonics as a 
means to demonstrate self- knowledge, as well as a practicum as a means to demonstrate 
enkrateia/ antarkeia on the part of the tekton. This position was a logical outcome of the 
ontology. When Plato asserted that creation was a compromise between Reason and 
Necessity it correspondingly implied that art was neither wholly theoretical nor 
practical.xvii Art (techne) had to be understood as both reason and necessity, the 
implication was that art moves in two directions simultaneously, taking concrete material 
and moving it closer to the transcendental while making the transcendental more 
concrete.xviii The inherent discourse becomes one of universal and particular, freely 
moving between theorum and practicum. Mediating between the two, Art embodied their 
union. The dialogues restated the central point present in the etymology: that techne 
serves as a bridge between the noetic and performative actions of the tekton. But they did 
not provide the necessary answer as to how that was possible in order to do so techne had 
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to be assimilated as episteme to the form of both theoria and phronesis. xix That task fell 
to Aristotle.xx  
 
"We all know that Art is not Truth, Art is a lie that 
makes us realize Truth, at least the truth that is 
given us to understand." 
Pablo Picasso 
 
The Structure of Aristotle’s Epistemology 
 
How did Aristotle assimilate techne to both theoria and phronesis? The answer can 
be found in his epistemology. Aristotle conceptualized knowledge as a virtual triangle: 
with theoria at its apex and practical wisdom as its base, its left and right corners 
occupied by techne and phronesis. It is their relationship that reveals how he transformed 
the tectonic myths into philosophy and solved the riddle of the sophron- tekton.  
The apex of wisdom was theory and throughout his writings Aristotle sought to 
define it. In its purest sense, it served as a discourse on ‘Being’, encompassing only 
knowledge of what was permanent and fixed, and limited to the accounts of things that 
were necessary and eternal.xxi Theory was a logical ideal of demonstrability defined by 
its exactness. Aristotle referred to the structure of such knowledge as episteme, 
determined by whether one could give an accurate account of the thing by tracing it
to its originating principles, arche, or its originating causes, aitiai. True theoretical 
wisdom, was the ability to apprehend these and demonstrate how other knowledge led to 
 back 
them. xxii  
The notion that those objects constituting theory were permanent and fixed meant that 
it did not provide a knowledge content exploitable in the arena of human affairs. This was 
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because man lives kata to cheron, in a world of time and change, where nothing was self
sustaining. Our world was one of continual ‘Becoming’ containing so much fluctuation 
and variety that an accurate account could not be given- only a rough outline. Understood
as such, theory proved to be non- utilitarian and non- humanistic. Whilst not practical it 
had a place in life, its contemplation was seen as beneficial transforming the character o














life could not be 
sustained without practical wisdom that served as its precondition.  
rishing.  
The base of the epistemological triangle was Practical Wisdom.xxiv Its subject matte
was concerned with human life as lived, with the world of human affairs. For Aristotle 
this was a secondary form of eudaimonia or deuteros eudaimoina. Based as it was upon 
contingent and variable being, or things that could be otherwise, it dealt with those things 
that were within our power to change. xxv While it did not yield knowledge in the f
theory, it did yield knowledge that allowed for the possibility of making 
theuein). xxvi It served therefore, as an alternative form of episteme.  
The two were incommensurable, but for Aristotle such incommensurability did not 
imply disjunction. According to him, sophrosyne [theory] was the preserver of phro
[practical wisdom].xxvii Practical wisdom secured and sustained, if only briefly, the 
necessary conditions for eudaimonia, while it took its guidance in accordance with 
theoria as the governing principle of the cosmos.xxviii The two existed in conjunction, but 
the relationship was reciprocal. Sophrosyne was less theoretical in the abstract sense a
more practical in its relationship to episteme, and the contemplative 
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Aristotle asserted that practical wisdom must have its own form and set upon the task 
of defining its structure as episteme. To do so he made a distinction between the 
productive realm (i.e. poesis) and the realm of action (i.e. praxis). Sophrosyne had been 
formulated up to that time in terms of praxis and only tangentially associated with 
poesis.xxix He defined poesis as productive knowledge that has to do with making and 
fabrication designed to bring about something whose end or telos lay outside itself. This 
was different from praxis which had to do with the right conduct of ones life, a form of 
activity which for all intensive purposes left behind no real ‘product’ save a more just 
soul and polis. Its end or telos therefore lay within the action itself.  
According to Aristotle these two forms of knowledge were distinct because they were 
derived from two forms of activity “making and acting are different . . . so that the 
reasoned state of capacity to act [i.e. phronesis] is different from the reasoned state of 
capacity to make [i.e. techne].”xxx Or again “phronesis cannot be . . . techne . . . because 
action and making are different kinds of thing.”xxxi Techne was a specialized knowledge 
of production that incorporated an ability to understand the principles (i.e. the logoi, 
arche and aitiai) of production, whereas phronesis was the knowledge necessary to live 
well (eu zen) in the world.xxxii In the writings of Socrates and Plato phronesis and techne 
were both subsumed under the concept of sophrosyne, but to identify them as forms of 
episteme, Aristotle’s agenda, it was necessary to identify them as distinct discourses 
within the sphere of practical knowledge. What he did was to render the combined 
Socratic sophrosyne, as it related to its practical application, into two dialectical 
components. Phronesis became the ethical and experiential component of practical 
wisdom while techne became its theoretical component.  
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These concepts had to be defined and understood independently as forms of 
knowledge. But it would be a mistake to conceive of these two forms of knowledge as 
somehow distinct- Aristotle certainly did not. They were interrelated in that they are both 
forms of excellence (arete): one in actions and deeds, and the other in fabrications. The 
attainment of excellence was achieved in the practical realm through doing; merely 
theorizing about excellence would be absurd. Thus, according to Aristotle, “excellences 
we get first by exercising them, as also happens in the case of the technai as well. For the 
things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing, e.g. men become builders 
by building and lyre- players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just 
acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”xxxiii The distinction 
between techne and phronesis was one of knowledge, but not of excellence.  
The structure of Aristotle’s epistemology established a relationship between techne 
and theory by classifying it as the theoretical component of practical wisdom and 
established a relationship between it and phronesis by identifying both as forms of 
excellence.  
In and of itself this does not tell us how techne served as a bridge between the noetic 
and performative actions of the tekton, or how it served as both theorum and practicum, a 
necessary move if he was to prove the possibility of the sophron- tekton. It is how he 






“The arts are each composed of two things, the 
actual work and the theory of it. One of these, the 
doing of the work, is proper to men trained in the 
individual subject, while the other, the theory, is 
common to all scholars.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. I, chap. 1.15 
 
Techne as a Form of Episteme: Aristotle’s ‘theoretical’ Definition of Techne 
 
How does Aristotle establish techne as a form of theoria? His official definition of 
techne is as a hexis meta logou (alethous) poietike, xxxiv translated as “state of capacity to 
make involving a true [theoretical] course of reasoning” by Ross and “a rational (and 
true) quality concerned with making.” by Rackham. The epistemological emphasis was 
on the ability to render an objective account of the process for the purpose of instruction. 
Techne revealed an expertise, in understanding the universal premises that underlie the 
process of production, a point echoed elsewhere in his writings.xxxv What distinguished 
the knowledge of the technitai was their ability to move beyond mere experience and 
reach universal judgments regarding their craft. “We think that knowledge and 
understanding belong to techne . . . and we suppose technitai to be wiser than men of 
experience . . . because [they] know the why and the cause.”xxxvi His desire to create a 
systematic account of knowledge meant that he did not seek a clear distinction between 
techne and theoria. 
Aristotle’s ‘conception of techne here was constructed very much like that of Plato 
and placed a strong emphasis on telos and eidos which the technitai (the users of techne) 
must keep an eye on in order to make the object in question. “From techne proceed the 
things of which the form is in the soul.”xxxvii What identified the objects of techne from 
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those of nature was the efficient causality of the technitai, the objects find their arche not 
within themselves, but in their maker. 
Alongside this distinction: the efficient causality of the maker lay the fact that there 
were other factors at play in the generation of the thing. The material (hule) the maker 
used affected the durability, solidity and plasticity of the final object. The form (eidos) 
the final object took, given that it was different from the ‘natural’ form of the hule, 
provided the object with a unique characteristic. Finally the end (telos) of the object was 
realized in its eidos or its final use as it served its practical purpose. Techne was the 
ability to reasonably control all of the causal factors that come into play in the realization 
of, or generation of, an object. The mastery of techne required the ability to find the telos 
of the productive object that set the limits within which the individual who possessed 
techne would work. Since it was the end that would determine the form it was in the 
knowledge of the form, that techne resided. Thus, techne was never a useful thing in and 
of itself, but rather the arche that manipulated these aspects in such a way as to produce 
the arete (excellence) in question which was useful. Techne was the ability of the maker 
to successfully produce and reproduce this as an excellence.  
Aristotle was attempting to prove that the technitai possess knowledge. He did this by 
making the claim that the objects of techne proceeded from the forms of the soul, a 
necessary move given the idea that theoria is transcendental. The emphasis was to 
provide a rational account of the logos of the process and to trace it back to its causes 
(aitiai).xxxviii To do so was necessary if techne was to be related to theoria. The result was 
that techne now focused on the noetic, as opposed to the performative ontology in the 
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process of making. As a form of knowledge techne became coincident with rationality, 
and served as a source for purposive change in the world.xxxix  
Techne was a form of analysis that extrapolated universals from particulars. It dealt 
only with universalized theories of production, implying that once one descended to the 
particular in any techne, we were no longer securely within its proper governance. A 
point Aristotle himself asserted in the Rhetoric: “None of the technai theorizes about 
individual cases.”xl By establishing that techne was the locating of first principals (arche) 
and causes (aitiai) Aristotle was able to establish techne as a form of episteme. In so 
doing he could also make the claim that the technitai did in fact possess knowledge of 
first principals and causes, thus proving that they possessed sophrosyne in the form of 
self- knowledge.  
 
“In all matters, but particularly in architecture, there 
are these two points: the thing signified, and that 
which gives it its significance. That which is 
signified is the subject of which we may be 
speaking; and that which gives significance is a 
demonstration on scientific principles.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. I, chap. 1.3 
 
Can techne respond to the subtleties of making? 
 
While advancing the intellectual status of the technai, the ‘theoretical’ definition of 
techne was not without its problems. Understood as a contemplative discourse it provided 
a description of the movement from experience to knowledge, but it failed to provide the 
movement from knowledge to experience. From the point of view of theoretical 
explanation the concern was over the relationship between the original idea and the final 
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product. From the point of view of productive knowledge the concern is over the 
relationship between reason and necessity, between the idea and the material as opposing 
forces that must be brought into compromise, through experience. The former places far 
too much emphasis on the a priori intentionality of the technai before they begin to 
wrestle with the material and not enough on what happens during the process itself. It 
represents a virtual occlusion of the process of ‘Becoming’ in favor of ‘Being’.  
It also assumes techne as an analytic form of knowledge that takes as its subject 
matter production and is therefore not identical with it. Production becomes the mindless 
manipulation of matter. As Dunne pointed out “We do not get any sense of a making that 
is itself intelligent, endowed with a know-how which is learned and actualized in the very 
process of making. The intelligibility of making seems to be fully constituted by a 
thought process which is independent of the process of making.”xli All making is in truth 
guided by thinking, but one misses the point if one does not recognize that making also 
serves as a guide for further thought. While knowledge of the principles of making and 
excellence in making are two different things, they are not separable in any real sense, 
both are essential to the success of the technai. In this sense, techne does not imply an 
ability to be successful in achieving appropriate outcomes.  
This hinges on techne as an analysis of means to ends. According to Aristotle: “. . . 
Having set the end they [technai] consider how and by what means it is to be attained . . 
.”xlii But Aristotle’s distinction between ends and means is problematic because it focuses 
on a fixed end. The technai stand not at the end of ‘Becoming’, but at its beginning as the 
originary source. They are daily confronted with the development of a particular model 
that must address the concerns of a particular situation, possessing no fixed ends, because 
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their ends are fluid. As Dunne pointed out “Often we are not just trying to calculate the 
means to our end but are, rather, trying to work out what a worthwhile and feasible end in 
our situation is.”xliii To conceive of the problem as a simple calculation of efficiency of 
means to ends was to significantly miss the point and the nature of the task at hand.  
In the actual design process techne proves helpful but limiting. This begs the 
question: “Can techne respond to the subtleties of making?” As a theoretical form of 
knowledge, its concern is with the movement toward knowledge, its goal: to identify the 
fixed universals of production. But the actual processes of poesis are mired in the 
particularities of both situation and material by definition any theoretical discourse must 
shun them. 
But does Aristotle assume techne to be solely theoretical? The answer is no. His 
conception of techne contained an experiential aspect that too often slips through the 
cracks of his conceptual framework. When Aristotle asserted that techne was a hexis and 
an arete he suggested that it had a fixed orientation toward praxis in a determinate 
manner. “excellences [arete] we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case 
of the technai as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by 
doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre- players by playing the lyre.”xliv A 
few lines latter he goes on to state: “Again, it is from the same causes and by the same 
means that every excellence is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every techne; . 
. . men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were 
not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born 
good or bad [in their own techne].”xlv Aristotle’s notion of techne in these passages was 
not theoretical but experiential. From this we can assert that while techne has to do with a 
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teachable body of principles in a discourse, it does not suggest a corpus of knowledge 
disengaged from praxis. Rather it implies a teaching through engagement within a 
process.  
In a passage from the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle made a distinction between these 
‘theoretical’ and ‘experiential’ aspects of techne. “But the end of the productive sciences 
is different from science and knowledge . . . Now to know anything that is noble is itself 
noble; but regarding excellence, at least, not to know what it is but to know out of what it 
arises is most precious. For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor 
what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what 
being in health is.” Aristotle’s assertion that ‘knowing out of what it arises is most 
precious’ is an indication on his part that the more important knowledge for the technai 
was an understanding of the material. Thus the ‘theoretical’ definition begins to recede. It 
was for this reason that Aristotle scorned those who had an aversion to practice, taking 











“Architects who have aimed at acquiring manual 
skill without scholarship have never been able to 
reach a position of authority to correspond to their 
pains, while those who relied only upon theories 
and scholarship were obviously hunting the 
shadow, not the substance.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. I, chap. 1.2 
 
The Janus face of the Tekton 
 
How does Aristotle explain these two aspects of techne? In the Physics he claimed: 
“The technai, therefore, which govern the matter and have knowledge are two, namely, 
the techne which uses the product and the techne which directs the production of it. That 
is why using techne also is in a sense directive; but it differs in that it knows the form, 
whereas the techne which is directive as being concerned with production knows the 
matter. For the helmsman knows and prescribes what sort of form a helm should have, 
the other from what wood it should be made and by means of what operation.”xlvi Thus 
Aristotle gives us two aspects of techne: one directive of the form, keeping its eye on the 
eidos, and the other directive of the matter, keeping its eye on the nature of the material 
to be used. Both address the process, but from different perspectives: one is theoretical 
and analytic, the other practical and generative. His distinction can be thought of in terms 
of poesis and noesis, production and deliberation, or application and possession. They are 
in essence reciprocal phrases: poesis being the execution of production, in reverse order, 
of the steps already worked out intentionally by the technai in the deliberative process of 
noesis.xlvii By maintaining the Homeric distinction between the noetic and performative 
aspects of techne Aristotle was able to provide the necessary theoretical movement 
toward knowledge without sacrificing the more practical movement towards experience.  
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What distinguishes poesis as the generative form of techne? When talking about the 
technites Aristotle describes the communication of process in such a way as to insinuate 
the necessity of someone present in the making. Dunne claims that this indicates a use of 
logos in such a way as it is articulated primarily as an intelligibility that exists only within 
the actual process of poesis.xlviii His point is that in techne the logos are a discourse: 
potentially between teacher and student or craftsman and material. This he claims is what 
is meant by Aristotle when he claims matter is in the logos. “The logos of techne as an 
intellectual virtue lies not so much in general formulae as in specific accounts that are 
always measured to particular acts of production; and it is the ability, reliably, to produce 
such accounts that is the hexis meta logou of techne.”xlix Thus the logos of techne lies in 
the action itself. The logos is a discriminating resourcefulness informed by praxis. 
Herein lies the distinction: poesis is a form of praxis, it is experiential. While we 
might talk about an agent and a product in the analysis of production, during the actual 
process of poesis there really is no distinction. The technai is not acting on a ‘thing’ 
precisely because the ‘thing’ in question cannot be said to exist prior to its ‘Being’ or 
during its state of ‘Becoming’. The state of ‘Becoming’ is the activity of the agent as it is 
acted upon the material. Thus, there is prior material and agent, but during the action the 
agent is synonymous with the activity which in turn is synonymous with the material 
being acted upon.  
Waterlow implies that we should be thinking of this interaction as the formation of an 
organic unity.l He argues that such a unity is symbiotic, because it is materially 
constituted by both agent and product.li The actual experience transforms not only the 
material but the agent, as new knowledge is gained from the experience. This serves to 
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establish a firm connection between the technai and the material (hule). While the act of 
poesis is going on, the technai and the material are actually a concrete unit; in terms of 
knowledge subject matter, the technite brings knowledge of the universal while the 
material brings knowledge of the particular. The generative process is not undertaken in 
abstraction within the mind independent of the material. The technai thinks “in” his 
material, poesis emerges out of an engagement with the particulars of the material itself.lii 
It is this symbiotic transformation that is the real subject matter of poesis. 
In all productive acts of poesis there is both a product and the conscious action of an 
agent that exerted some level of inquiry, discovery and judgment. But what must be 
asserted further is that the product bears within itself that action, which brought it into 
being. Aristotle himself stated this several times. “The act of building is in the thing that 
is being built . . . the actuality is in the thing that is being made . . . in general the 
movement is in the thing that is being moved.”liii And again “When what is buildable . . . 
is in fulfillment, it is being built, and that is the building.”liv Or “The actuality of the 
buildable as buildable is the process of building.”lv The product therefore embodies the 
action taken in its production.  
There is an intimate link between the agent and the product due to the presence of that 
agent in the work: “This is what happens with technitai too; every man loves his own 
handiwork better than he would be loved by it if it came alive; . . . The cause of this is 
that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved and that we exist by virtue of 
activity (i.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is, in a sense, the producer in 
activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted 
in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in 
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activity.”lvi The product is not solely an object, but rather the potentiality of the maker in 
actuality. Thus, a building is both the action of building and the builder in action. It 
becomes a dual actuality that of the potentiality of techne as a possession of the builder 
and the potentiality of the builder in praxis. 
 
“. . . he should not be arrogant but rather urban, 
fair-minded, loyal, and what is most important, 
without avarice; for no work can be truly done 
without good faith and clean hands. Let him not be 
greedy nor have his mind busied with acquiring 
gifts; but let him with seriousness guard his dignity 
by keeping a good name.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. I, chap. I.7 
 
The Assimilation of the tekton to sophrosyne as enkrateia/ antarkeia 
 
How does Aristotle establish a practicum for techne that demonstrates sophrosyne in 
the form of enkrateia/ anrtarkeia of the tekton? Aristotle’s identification of poesis as a 
form of praxis provides an important link between techne and virtue. The excellences 
ascribed to the product exist because of the actions of the maker and as such they are 
subject to moral virtue. For Aristotle, they must issue from a just character. “The 
products of the technai have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they 
should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences 
have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or 
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first 
place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for 
their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable 
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character. These are not reckoned as conditions of the possession of the technai, except 
the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of excellences, knowledge has 
little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything.”lvii 
As an excellence (arete) in the inquiry, discovery and judgments made in its application, 
techne moves into the sphere of ethics. In excellence it is a form of virtuous action. 
According to Aristotle virtuous action did not aim at theoretical knowledge, “matters 
concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity . . . the 
account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any 
techne or set of precepts but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is 
appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the techne of medicine or of 
navigation.”lviii Any valid form of techne must address this. Techne is therefore never 
ethically neutral, nor purely theoretical. It was not enough to possess knowledge of 
principles, one must possess the ability to apply them in virtuous action. 
What Aristotle did by identifying techne as both a reasoned state and an excellence 
was to create a dialectical relationship between techne and phronesis within poesis, 
allowing for the assimilation of phronesis as an excellence in the taking of actions, to 
techne. The phronesis of any act of poesis was embodied within the product, becoming 
part of its techne as well. The means of elucidating the movement from knowledge 
toward experience, necessary to any definition of techne, came through the vehicle of 
phronesis as right action. Dunne calls this ‘phronetic techne’. It takes into account the 
experiential and in many ways returns to a pre- Aristotlean conception of techne that 
included the concept of metis. He states it is: “one whose responsiveness to the situation 
is not fully specifiable in advance and which is experiential, charged with perceptiveness, 
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and rooted in the sensory and emotional life. . . . Whereas the ‘official’ concept tends to 
assimilate these technai to a paradigm of fabrication, in the alternative concept 
fabrication itself is seen to be a process where involvement and fluidity are 
ineliminable.”lix The dialectic was essential. It allowed Aristotle to identify techne as an 
episteme akin to theory, while maintaining its necessary pairing with ethics from the 
‘tectonic myths’. More importantly the dialectic provided the means of demonstrating 
how the tekton could possess the last form of sophrosyne; enkrateia/ antarkeia.  
 
Summation 
The central tenet of tectonic culture; the recognition of the universal logos and its 
application to praxis was summed up in the traditional concept of sophrosyne. With the 
classical philosophers the concept was given epistemological weight by identifying it as 
theoretical wisdom and relating it to the two realms of practical wisdom: phronesis 
(Ethics) and techne (technical ability) and applied respectively to praxis and poesis. In 
the classical writings of Aristotle sophrosyne proved to be knowledge of how to apply 
theoria as a practicum, identifying it as the necessary union of theory and practice, and a 
compulsory component in all areas of training. The theme of Hesiod’s Erga, the 
manifestation of the ‘Good’ based on the twin pillars of work and justice, became the 
very epistemological foundation of Greek philosophy, learning and aesthetics.  
In Classical Greece the growing need to find rational explanations for previously held 
beliefs generated an intense discourse on the relationship between the craftsman and 
reason. Central to both the Platonic Dialogues and the writings of Aristotle was the 
identification of sophrosyne in the actions of the tekton. As Plato had noted in the 
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Charmides, the tekton had to be sophronien. What Aristotle’s approach did was to set up 
a dialectic between the more theoretical approach to techne and the more experiential 
approach to phronesis. Thus there are in essence two means of conceiving of the 
establishment of order in the world; that of theory and practice in their common 
contemporary meanings. One is abstract and concerns itself with universals and the other 
more concrete and concerned with particulars. There is an implication that ethics and 
making are not mutually exclusive and that some means of addressing making in the 
world are more adaptable, and broader in their ethical concerns. The mechanism of 
establishing the correct ethical means of making in the world comes through the 
mediation of the two through the union of theory and practice.  
Aristotle’s dialectic of techne and phronesis allowed him to provide the final closure 
necessary to answer Plato’s question ‘Does the tekton who possesses techne posses 
sophrosyne?’ Plato had shown through the sophron eros and his theory of right 
proportion that the tekton manifested an awareness of the universal logos in creation. 
Aristotle in his identification of techne as a theoretical episteme had shown how the 
tekton possessed knowledge of the archai and aitiai and therefore possessed sophrosyne 
as self- knowledge and applied the universal logos to one's self. And in his often 
overlooked dialectic of techne and phronesis he was able to show how the tekton 
possessed sophrosyne as enkrateia/ antarkeia, and manifested an awareness of 
knowledge of good and evil and applied the universal logos in praxis.  
The dialectic of techne and phronesis is subsumed under the concept of poesis in 
what Dunne had termed phronetic techne which now served as the loci of the juncture 
between the noetic and the performative aspects of poesis. This move made the concept 
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of sophrosyne synonymous with the right actions of the tekton who in his excellences 
manifests it in all three Socratic forms: 
 
 1) The sophron eros, through the use of orderly arrangement to achieve arête 
(excellences) in the production of things. This is achieved through the application of the 
ontological concepts of kosmoi (order) taxis (arrangement), symphonia (agreement), 
harmonia (harmony) and systasis (compromise) which collectively constituted a theory 
of right proportion or symmetria.lx  
2) As self- knowledge, by demonstrating the ability to reasonably control all of the 
causal factors that come into play in the realization of, or generation of, an object and by 
providing a rational account of the logos of the process of production and tracing it back 
to its first principles (arche) and causes (aitiai) such that the excellences produced can be 
repeated. 
3) As enkrateia/ antarkeia, through the demonstration of virtuous action (praxis) in 
both one’s person and in the judgments made during the act of poesis. This is achieved 
first through the manifestation of a just and ethical character on the part of the tekton and 
secondly on the judicious acts taken during the process of production that ensures the 
appropriate application of techne. It is an experiential form of situational knowledge 
guided by past experience and current conditions that result in the manifestation and 
maintenance of excellences. The latter is achieved through ‘phronetic- techne’ the 
determination of what is appropriate in any given situation.  
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The structure of Aristotle’s epistemology served to transform the tectonic foundations 
of Homeric culture into an epistemological framework providing the possibility for the 
























                                                          
ENDNOTES 
i Throughout the Ancient Greek civilization Sophrosyne was a central and important concept but during the 
4th and 5th centuries it grew in importance due to changes in the structure of society. For the Greeks, there 
existed a tension between the ‘heroic’ and ‘spirited’ personality and the ‘moderate’ and ‘gentle’ one. The 
rash impassioned actions of the hero, necessary to establish a society, suddenly became problematic in the 
city-state. The desire for wealth and power brought with it great wars and destruction. The growing 
conclusion was that excess leads to catastrophe. The polis by its very nature requires its inhabitants to 
exhibit restraint and prudence in their actions both civilly and with each other. Sophrosyne was the force 
that tamed the individual spirit of the hero, which if unchecked runs counter to the communal spirit 
necessary in the polis. The cultivation of sophrosyne became essential. In it’s early archaic usage in Homer 
and Hesiod it indicated a ‘prudence’ or ‘shrewdness in one’s own interests’ and was generally conceived of 
as reason unencumbered by emotions and passions. By the time of the tragic playwrights, it was 
increasingly understood as the self- knowledge necessary to resist unjust ambition and hybris. In the epic 
poetry of Homer sophrosyne was predominantly intellectual, a prudence in knowing oneself and avoiding 
unsuitable conduct. In the Iliad (21. 462- 64) we can get a sense of its Homeric usage when Apollo rejects a 
challenge by Poseidon because it is for the sake of mortals. Apollo is prudent because there is nothing for 
the God to gain in such a contest. But it also reveals the latter association of the term with the concept of 
self- knowledge. Apollo identifies the boundary between mortals and men. It is inappropriate for gods to 
fight over mortal causes but also the reverse is true: men should ‘think mortal thoughts'. In the writings of 
Hesiod the concept of sophrosyne is present in his notion of arete or measured restraint and self- control. 
Hesiod used the phrase Meden agan or ‘nothing in excess’. The Tragic playwrights brought the concept to 
the general consciousness while systematically expanding its realm. Sophrosyne was defined: by Aeschylus 
as a respect for the limitations imposed on man by the gods, by Sophocles as the power to recognize reality 
and act accordingly in self- knowledge and by Euripides as a control of the emotions and appetites, as a 
from of self- control. 
ii In Fragment 116 Heraclitus stated: “It is possible for all men to know themselves and sophronein.” In 
Fragment 112 he openly associated sophrosyne with wisdom (sophia) when he claimed: “Sophronein is the 
greatest arete, and wisdom consisting in speaking the truth and acting in accordance with nature, paying 
heed to it.” 
iii According to Dunne: “Through an engagement in theoretical pursuits, one opens oneself to the order and 
harmony of the cosmos, as well as to the transcendental serenity of the divine being. A mimesis is enacted 
whereby the character of the theorist comes to conform to the qualities of the theoretical objects. To 
become a theorist is to acquire a disposition which allows the right order of the cosmos and the simplicity 
of the deity to work their way into one’s soul and to become its prototype.” See Dunne, Back to the Rough 
Ground: Phronesis and Techne in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame, London, 1993, pp. 238- 239. 
iv Socrates often referred to sophrosyne as knowledge of Good and Evil. In book III of the Memorabilia, 
Xenophon claimed that for Socrates there was no distinction between sophrosyne and sophia or wisdom; 
both consisted in knowing what was good and fair. 
v While Plato’s association of sophrosyne with harmony first appears in the Republic but it is present in 
much of the later dialogues as well.  
vi In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates makes the comparison between the sophrosyne found in the soul and the 
kosmos(order) or taxis (arrangement) in the physical universe. The association of sophrosyne with order 
was also made by the Sophists and Xenophon, Plato’s originality lay in the ontological status he later gave 
it. 
vii In the Republic Plato claimed: “Than the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself 
become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.” (500D) Later on he claimed it to be the 
manifestation in humanity of the divine. “ . . . in the course of their work they [citizens] would glance 
frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things, and 
alternatively at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, . . . deriving their judgment from that 
likeness of humanity, which Homer too called, when appeared in men, the image and likeness of God.” 
(501B) 
viii It should be understood that Dike was the force that maintained the balance that was moira. 
ix This point was made by Helen North. See North, Sophrosyne, Self- Knowledge and Self- Restraint in 
Greek Literature, Cornell University Press, Ithica New York, 1966. pg. 163. 
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x To these should also be added the concept of oeconomia (economy or mean) itself another reference to the 
earlier usage of sophrosyne as political economy, balance and compromise. 
xi The astute reader will note the similarity of Plato’s definition of sophrosyne as the harmony of the parts 
and Alberti’s definition of beauty as that reasoned harmony of parts. It is my assertion that they are one and 
the same. The concept of sophrosyne found its way into architectural theory. Using the term Decorum, 
Cicero’s Latin translation of sophrosyne, both Vitruvius and Alberti applied it as the primary principle of 
architectural beauty.  
xii Aristotle also asserted this, noting the didactic value of art as a necessary component in the education of 
a just society. 
xiii In the Charmides Socrates related sophrosyne to wisdom through a comparison of the sophron to the 
craftsman. The dialogue raised the central concerns of the tectonic myths, the relationship between techne 
(and its application), and virtue, and the relationship between techne (and its application) and episteme. 
xiv Socrates use of the term sophrosyne are recorded in Plato’s early dialogues. See Plato, Charmides. For 
an explanation of these aspects see North, Sophrosyne Self- knowledge and Self- Restraint in Greek 
Literature, Cornell University Press, Ithica New York, 1966, pg. 153.  
xv See Plato’s Charmides.  
xvi Picking up on the third aspect of Socratic sophrosyne, knowledge of ones situation and the adjustment to 
reality, Xenophon in the Cyropaedia opposed sophrosyne to folly. 
xvii Theoretical knowledge or episteme was the term given to the contemplation of Sophia the knowledge of 
the permanent fixed and eternal truths of the universe. It therefore encompasses only mathematical entities, 
heavenly bodies and the divine. Only those methodologies that were exact were proper methodologies for 
it. It was a logical ideal of demonstrability. One’s knowledge could only be counted as episteme if it could 
be traced back to certain principles (arche) or causes (aitiai). In that sense it has no practical import and is 
in essence non- utilitarian, since its objects are above man it can therefore also be said to be non- 
humanistic as well. For a more in depth explanation of Sophia in Ancient Greek philosophy see Dunne, 
Back to the Rough Ground: Phronesis and Techne in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of 
Notre, Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pp. 236- 239. 
xviii This aspect of Plato’s aesthetic was eventually be brought forward by Hegel in his aesthetics. Hegel 
would refer to art as the concrete universal the union of universal and particular. It is an essential 
component of Romantic theories of art and as I hope to show of tectonic theories of architecture. 
xix Aristotle’s terminology here becomes problematic. While he is consistent in his use of theoria he uses 
the term phronesis in two distinct ways. Aristotle will use the term phronesis to refer in the broadest sense 
to practical knowledge as opposed to theoria. When discussing the shape of practical knowledge which 
may be divided into poesis and praxis he will use techne to refer to poesis and phronesis,in a narrower 
sense, to refer to praxis. Thus phronesis is opposed to theoria as distinct forms of knowledge that deal with 
distinct subject matter while simulaneously phronesis is opposed to techne in the realm of practical 
knowledge. This establishes a dialectic between techne and phronesis within practical knowledge.  
xx In the Republic Plato, argued that unless it could be shown that the craftsmen were of benefit to society 
they should be thrown out of the polis. Most scholars argue that Plato, himself a poet before turning to 
philosophy, was using irony to point to what he believed was the true role of art. While he asked for a 
justification or ‘apologia’, for the craftsmen in the Republic he himself did not provide it.  
xxi According to Dunne, theory identified by its “. . . epistemological preeminence had an ontological 
correlate: an object- domain which was limited to necessity and eternal being, and which therefore 
encompassed only mathematical entities, the heavenly bodies and the divine being or first power.” Thus 
only those methodologies which are exact sciences are proper methodologies for theory. Mathematics 
would be considered such an exact science. See Dunne, Back to the rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and 
‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 
1993 pg. 238 
xxii Dunne notes of episteme that “ One’s knowledge of something qualified as episteme only if one could 
give an account of the thing which traced it back or tied it down to certain principles (archai) or causes 
(aitai)” Ibid., pg. 237- 238. 
xxiii Dunne explains the usefulness of theory in the following manner. “Through an engagement in 
theoretical pursuits, one opens oneself to the order and harmony of the cosmos, as well as to the 
transcendental serenity of the divine being. A mimesis is enacted whereby the character of the theorist 
comes to conform to the qualities of theoretical objects. To become a theorist is to acquire a disposition, 
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which allows the right order of the cosmos and the simplicity of the deity to work their way into one’s soul 
and to become its prototype. In this classic Greek position, human being’s are not the measure of all things 
but find their own true measure through contemplation of an eternal order beyond themselves.” see Dunne 
Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993. pp. 239. 
xxiv Aristotle often used the term Phronesis when he was referring to practical wisdom. Thus in its broadest 
terms phronesis was identical with it but he also used it more specifically as the form of cognition that 
governed praxis. For the purpose of clarity I have here maintained the term practical wisdom. 
xxv What Aristotle called ta endechomeana allos echein. 
xxvi For a more detailed explanation on the relationship of theory to phronesis and their  incommensurability 
see Dunne Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993. pp. 238- 239 & pp. 243- 244. 
xxvii Terminology can become confused on this point. Sophrosyne was knowledge of the whole the law of 
moira. According to Socrates knowledge of good and evil. But such knowledge was for Socrates a form of 
Sophia, theoretical wisdom. Its application in the world of human experience becomes what we would call 
ethics. Aristotle referred to this, sophrosyne applied as practical knowledge, as phronesis. Technically it is 
phronesis that is the ethical standard, but this is a distinction not of kind but of application. For Aristotle 
Sophrosyne was the effortless, because habitual harmony of desire and reason. But the implied absolute of 
Plato’s sophrosyne that brings the three parts of the soul to acquiesce in judgement of phronesis is 
improved upon. He rejected the universal unvarying cosmic norm of Plato’s Philebus in favor of an 
adjusted standard on the basis that it was impossible to achieve absolute precision in morality. According to 
Helen North “Aristotle’s rejection of the Socratic equation of arete with episteme had given immense 
support to the common- sense assumption that something more than reason is needed to produce right 
conduct.” See North, Sophrosyne Self- knowledge and Self- Restraint in Greek Literature, Cornell 
University Press, Ithica New York, 1966, pg. 213. She notes that it was this aspect of Aristotle’s thought 
that was latter developed by Plotinus and St. Augustine. 
xxviii Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between phronesis and theory is evidenced in the 
following statements. From the Eudemian Ethics 8 “Since man is by nature composed of a ruling and s 
subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself- but this is 
ambiguous, for medical science governs in one sense, health in another, the former existing for the latter. 
And so it is with the theoretic faculty; for god is not an imperative ruler, but is the end with a view to which 
phronesis issues its commands. . . . What choice, then . . . will most produce the contemplation of god, that 
choice . . .  is the best; this is the noblest standard.” E.E. 1249b 9-19 And from the Nichomachean Ethics: 
“It [phronesis] is not supreme over sophia i.e. over the superior part of us, anymore than the art of medicine 
is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders , then for its sake, 
but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the techne of politics rules the 
gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of state.” E.N. 1145a 6-11. 
xxix In essence what Aristotle did was produce a critique of Plato removing ethics from the discourse of 
theory and moving into the realm of practice.  
xxx Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a 2-5 
xxxi Ibid, 1140a 2-5 & 1140b 1-4. 
xxxii This distinction may also be understood through a series of commonly used oppositions: making and 
acting, poesis and praxis, or possession and application the terms used by Gadamer. 
xxxiii Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 2.1.1103a 31- 1103b 2. 
xxxiv Ibid, 6.4. 1140a 5 
xxxv In the Nichomachean Ethics he wrote: ". . . it will perhaps be agreed that if a man does wish to become 
master of an art or science he must go to the universal, and come to know it as well as possible; for, as we 
have said, it is with this that the sciences are concerned."xxxv And in the Metaphysics: ". . .art [techne] arises 
when form many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is 
produced."xxxv 
xxxvi Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.1.981a 24-30. 
xxxvii Ibid, 7.7.1032a 34- 1032b 1. 
xxxviii Dunne describes the process in this way: "from this knowledge he [the technitai] can work out in his 
mind, through a process of deliberation, the steps which need to be taken in order to induce the form in the 
matter; and the actual process of making is the execution, usually in reverse order, of the steps outlined in 
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the deliberative process. His techne is, then, the source of the maker's mastery of his trade and of his ability 
therefore not only to accomplish a successful result but in doing so to give a rational account (logos) of this 
procedure- an account which is rational precisely insofar as it can trace the product back to the 'causes' 
(aitiai) to which it owes its being." Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in 
Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 250. 
xxxix In the Socratic dialogues Plato routinely made use of the image of the craftsman and techne as an ideal 
paradigm from which to extrapolate the true episteme of Sophia. The tendency of the Socratic 
philosopher’s to see techne as a comprehensive explanatory- ness, coincident with rationality itself meant 
that it increasingly became synonymous with reason as purposive change in the world. So much so was the 
association of techne with reason and theoria that the other source of purposive change in the world, the 
force of nature, could now only be understood via an analogy with it. This tendency reached its highpoint 
with Aristotle.  Dunne claims "Not only is techne in itself the rational source of the order that human 
agency brings into the world, it is also the primary model in terms of which we can understand the 
intelligibility that we find already existing in the natural order." , Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ 
and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
London, 1993, pg. 251. 
xl “None of the technai theorizes about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about 
what will help cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of 
patients: this alone is subject to techne- individual cases are so infinitely various that no knowledge of them 
is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems reputable to a given 
individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems so to men of a given type.” Aristotle Rhetoric, 
1.2.1356b 30-34.  
xli Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 285. 
xlii “We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. . . . Having set the end they [technai] 
consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they 
consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how 
it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which 
in the order of discovery is last . . . [but] first in the order of becoming.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
3.3.1112b 11-24. 
xliii Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 352. 
xliv Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.1.1103a 28- 34. 
xlv Ibid, 2.1.1103b 6-13. 
xlvi Aristotle, Physics, 2.2.194a 36-194b 7. 
xlvii This is where for Aristotle his definition of nature as immanent becomes problematic because if as he 
claims art imitates nature then noesis or deliberation, which requires a mind thinking independently, cannot 
be attributed to nature. Thus as Dunne points out the theoretical definition of techne begins to recede, 
leaving us with a relationship between poesis and noesis that cannot be linear in the strictest sense. He 
suggests that they are intimately interwoven in one process in which intelligence and production occur 
simultaneously in both technite and material. 
xlviii While in the Metaphysics Aristotle used logos in the sense of transcending the particulars of nature and 
therefore theoretical, he also uses it in the sense of an interlocutory context, which might give access to 
how logos might refer to something else. 
xlix Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 333. 
l “In the change as a concrete unitary event there are not different entities to be agent and patient. The 
active and passive of the verb, from this point of view, are used of the change itself only derivatively, on 
the basis of an actual distinction, existing only ante and post eventum. We cannot even call the two beings 
the ‘potential agent and patient’, since this implies that they could be actually so. But they could be actually 
so only in the actual change and in the actual change they are not distinct and therefore not agent and 
patient.” See Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 
pg.201 
li “we would not be able to distinguish one being as that in which the new state happens, and the other as 
that which contributes to this without itself suffering the new state. For this distinction presupposes that the 
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concrete event has already been conceptually split into the active and passive aspects. It seems then that 
considered prior to analysis, this event occurs in a single subject, which only upon analysis reveals different 
factors, an agent and a patient.” Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982, pg.201. 
lii Dunne explains how the conception of the division occurs as follows: “When we get involved in an 
activity of poesis, we usually have the opportunity of thinking about it in advance and of framing an 
intention. Then when we enter into the making we suppose ourselves to be enacting what has already been 
mapped out in our intention. But in our intention we could not help thinking of ourselves as distinct from 
that with which we were going to interact and so we suppose that in the making too- which we take to be 
simply a real production of the content which has already existed intentionally in our mind- the object to 
be- changed is distinct from ourselves.” Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in 
Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 342. 
liii Aristotle, Metaphysics. 9.8.1049b 29- 32.  
liv Aristotle, Physics, 3.1.201a 16-18. 
lv Ibid, 3.1.201b 8-10. 
lvi Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9.7.1167b 32- 1168a 9. 
lvii Ibid, 2.4.1105a 27- 1105b 5. 
lviii Ibid, 2.1.1104a 2-10. 
lix Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 355. 
lx To these should also be added the concept of oeconomia (economy or mean) itself another reference to 
the earlier usage of sophrosyne as political economy, balance and compromise. 
Chapter 5: Studies in Tectonic Architecture  
 
“Therefore, because of the discovery of fire, there 
arose at the beginning, concourse among men, 
deliberation and a life in common. . . . Hence after 
thus meeting together, they began, some to make 
shelters . . .” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. II, chap. I.1 
 
There are two possible areas of exploration to consider when determining if the 
culture of tectonics had a direct impact on the discourse of architecture: building and text. 
Clearly any exploration of the concept of sophrosyne in building is limited, as it is only 
possible through analysis to examine the first of the three Socratic definitions, that of the 
sophron eros.  
Therefore, if we are to search for evidence of the culture of tectonics in architecture 
we would have to look to texts which might discuss the methodology or principles of 
architecture. Here we are limited by the relative lack of substantial examples of 
architectural texts available. In the Ancient world writings on architecture, while existent, 
were usually limited to commentary on individual buildings, handbooks on the orders, 
rules of symmetry and on mechanics and machinery. Virtually none of these survive 
today. There were texts which discussed architecture as a discipline among others these 
included works by Cicero, Varro and Publius Septimius.i Only one discusses the 
methodology of architecture, its practice and its principles, De architectura libri decem 
by Marcus Vitruvius Pollio. ii   
Vitruvius’ De architectura libri decem is the only surviving treatise on Architecture 
from the ancient world and hence has proven to be an extremely important and influential 
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work in architectural history essentially shaping all of Western architectural theory from 
the Renaissance to the present.  
Vitruvius was writing c. 30-20 B.C. after several decades of political strife that ended 
with the defeat of Marc Antony and Cleopatra at Actium in 31 B.C. This period is 
marked by the rise to power of Augustus whose reign ushered in the Imperial period after 
the collapse of the Republic. It was an age of renewed building and cultural development 
that drew from a rich Hellenistic stock of science, technology, literature, art and 
architecture in the formation of a new social order. The books dedication to the Emperor 
is significant, Augustus once claimed “I found Rome a city of Brick, and left it one of 
marble”.  
Vitruvius’ stated intention is to expound a complete system of architecture.iii As 
several authors have noted, it appears as if he is attempting to construct a quasi- 
Aristotelian system of logic for architecture and giving it legitimacy through its 
establishment in primary causes (aitiai) as a form of demonstration.iv Vitruvius himself is 
explicit that this is his intention when he claims; “for no kinds of materials, nor bodies, 
nor things can arise or be subject to the intelligence without the coming together of 
elements, nor does nature allow them to have true explanations in the precepts of the 
physicists, unless the causes which are present in these things find proofs, how and why 
they are so, by accurate demonstrations.”v 
Book I begins with the education of the architect and then proceeds to a discussion of 
principles. The principles of Book I are intended to provide the arche of architecture. 
Vitruvius asserts this himself; “But in respect to the meaning of my craft and the 
principles which it involves, I hope and undertake to expound them with assured 
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authority, not only to persons engaged in building but also to the learned world.”vi And 
then again; “When I wrote this comprehensive treatise on architecture, I thought in the 
first book to set forth with what trainings and disciplines architecture was equipped, and 
to determine by definitions its species and to say from what things it sprang.”vii 
This is followed in Book II chapter I with a discussion of the origin of building, 
which we are told has its origins in language and society. “Therefore, because of the 
discovery of fire, there arose at the beginning, concourse among men, deliberation and a 
life in common. . . . Hence after thus meeting together, they began some to make shelters 
. . .”viii Vitruvius follows this in chapter 2 with a discussion of the primordial origins of 
the universe before moving in chapter 3 to the materials of construction.  
The discussion of origins of society, building and materials found in Book II 
constitute the causes of the discipline. Vitruvius states this emphatically himself when he 
says; “For this book [Book II] does not declare whence architecture arises, but whence 
the kinds of building have originated, and by what ways they have been fostered and, by 
degrees, advanced to their present finish. So therefore the arrangement of this book is in 
its order and place.”ix As such Books I & II serve to constitute a demonstration on the 
order of Aristotle’s ‘official’ concept of techne through their elucidation of the basic 
principles (arche) and causes (aitiai) of the discourse.  
One should not think of Vitruvius’ definition of techne solely as abstract theory in the 
epistemological sense. He begins his treatise with the statement that the knowledge of the 
architect is born of theory [rationcinatione] and practice [fabrica]. Practice he defines as 
“the continuous and familiar practice, which is carried out by the hands in such material 
as is necessary for the purpose of a design.” It is the act of making or performing a given 
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task, the bringing forward of the idea or design found as he says in a drawing. Theory he 
defines as “the ability to demonstrate and explain the productions of dexterity on the 
principles of proportion.” This ability as he claims is common to all scholars.  
Theory is not just the explanation, but the demonstration as well, and this implies an 
experiential component to his understanding of theory. The word used here is 
demonstrare in Latin it means to bring forth or to show a hidden truth; that is to reveal, 
and it is linked to the concept of inventio or invention. Vitruvius uses the term inventione 
to refer to “things which express the truth of the divinity, about the causes which lurk in 
the heavens.”  
An example of this is the Aeolus, a bronze ball with a small whole filled with water 
that when heated reveals the exchange of energy that transforms water into steam 
resulting is a burst of air. It is an invention that demonstrates how wind currents are 
produced when heat and moisture combine. x So too are the numerous ‘inventions’ 
Vitruvius describes in the preface to Book IX including Plato’s use of geometry to 
determine the necessary length of the side of a square double the area of an existent one 
or Pythagoras’ theorem of the hypotenuse of a triangle.  
In architecture the chief inventions are the columnar orders and their details that serve 
as the demonstrations of a theory of right proportion.xi Vitruvius sees them as theoretical 
demonstrations and presents their principles (arche) and origins (aitiai) in book IV.xii By 
relating their proportions to the human body in its various guises he is able to relate them 
to the discovery of symmetria in the human body and his discussion of ideal proportion in 
bk. III c.1.  
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The theoretical and demonstrative characteristics of techne are stated up front by 
Vitruvius when he states that; “both in general and especially in architecture are these 
two things found; that which signifies and that which is signified. That which is signified 
is the thing proposed about which we speak; that which signifies is the demonstration 
unfolded in systems of precepts.”xiii If we relate this directly to his idea of architectural 
invention, the columnar orders are the demonstrations that signify the signified harmonic 
ontology.  
Theory, as Vitruvius uses it, is inherently demonstrative: practical, didactic and 
experiential. It is achieved through the application of techne in the creation of inventions.  
He therefore follows Aristotle when he asserts that the techne of architecture consists of a 
teachable body of principles that is engaged in praxis. Moreover, its didactic character 
comes through an engagement within a process of invention.  
 De architectura libri decem is clearly a conscious attempt to demonstrate a theory 
(ratiocination) about architecture along the lines of self-knowledge. But is Vitruvius 
attempting to demonstrate that the architect is sophronen? If he is we would have to find 
not only a rational discourse on methods and first causes, but evidence of all three forms 
of sophrosyne including the sophron eros, self-knowledge and enkrateia/ antarkeia, 
including the application of Aristotle’s ‘unofficial’ concept of techne and phronetic- 
techne. I would assert that Vitruvius is doing just that through the interrelationship of 
what he will refer to as the six principles of architecture and the rhetorical structure of De 




Vitruvius’ Principles of Architecture 
 
In Book I Vitruvius gives us the principles of architecture and it is here that we 
should begin to search for evidence of a tectonic framework. Various scholars through 
the years have sought to develop a taxonomy of the six principles as a means to 
understand Vitruvius’ theoretical construct.xiv All of these help us to understand 
interrelationships between the six principles and flesh out the core of the theory, but they 
do not help to situate it within a broader cultural context, because they do not move 
beyond the discourse of architecture as defined by the text itself. As I intend to show, 
Vitruvius’ six principles are crouched in the broader cultural discourse of philosophy as it 
pertains to the tekton, the dialectic of techne and phronesis and Socrate’s three facets of 
sophrosyne. 
Vitruvius’ six priniples consist of ordinatio (order, taxis), dispositio (arrangement, 
diathesis), eurythmia (proportion), symmetria (symmetry), décor (propriety, decorum), 
and distributio (economy, oeceonomia). He defines them as follows:xv 
 
• Ordinatio is the balanced adjustment of the details of the work separately, and 
as to the whole, the arrangement of the proportion with a view to a 
symmetrical result. This is done through quantitas the selection of a unit of 
measure and the creation of a harmonious whole from the individual parts. 
Vitruvius tells us that this concept is called taxis in Greek and it is one of the 
terms that Plato used to describe the principles of kosmoi. 
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• Dispositio is the fit assemblage of details, arising from this assemblage, the 
elegant effect of the work and its dimensions, along with a certain quality or 
character. There are three kinds of dispositio (which in Greek is called ideae) 
ichnographia, orthographia, and scaenographia. The later three are 
traditionally translated as plan, elevation and perspective respectively.  
• Eurythmia implies a graceful semblance; the suitable display of details in their 
context. This is displayed when the details of the work are of a height suitable 
to their breadth, of a breadth suitable to their length; in a word, when 
everything has a symmetrical correspondence.  
• Symmetria xvi is the appropriate harmony arising out of the details of the work 
itself; the correspondence of each given detail among the separate details to 
the form of the design as a whole.  
• Décor demands the faultless ensemble of a work composed, in accordance 
with precedent, of approved details. It obeys convention, which in Greek is 
called thematismos, of custom or nature. 
• Distributio is the suitable disposal of supplies and the site, and the thrifty and 








 “They began to build, not huts, but houses, on 
foundations, and with brick walls, or built of stone; 
and with roofs of wood and tiles. Then by the 
observations made in their studies they were led on 
from wandering and uncertain judgments to the 
assured method of symmetry.” 
Vitruvius 
De architectura libri decem, bk. II, chap. I.7 
 
Architecture and the Sophron Eros 
 
It is in the principles of ordinatio, symmetria, and eurythmia that Vitruvius comes 
closest to Plato’s theory of right proportion and the harmonic ontology. These three are 
differing aspects of the same aesthetic phenomena, ordinario being the principle, 
symmetria the result, and eurythmia serves as a prerequisite for both. Vitruvius uses 
eurythmia (proportion) in three ways as a relationship of parts i.e. harmony, as a 
relationship of parts to whole via a common module i.e. symmetria, and as an analogy to 
the human body. This last is done in relationship to the idea of perfect numbers, but 
should also be understood as relating the macrocosm to the microcosm. Vitruvius claims 
we should use proper proportioning because it is what is found in both nature and 
geometry, it is the natural order of things, and in essence it is the universal logos.  
What has disturbed many commentators on Vitruvius is that he did not actually define 
eurythmia, nor did he provide an aesthetic concept in relationship to the idea. I would 
argue that there was no reason for him to do so. As Tatarkeiwicz has shown, in ancient 
times the general theory of beauty was conceptualized as proportions of parts and their 
arrangements.xvii This conception was initiated by the Pythagorians in a narrow form in 
reference to harmonious sounds, but quickly became analogous in the visual arts as well. 
Thus harmonia and symmetria became closely connected with the theory. The association 
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of beauty with number and proportion formed the basis of the conception of beauty 
throughout the ancient world. “The Pythagorians found the properties and relations of 
harmony in numbers . . . [and maintained that] order and proportion are beautiful and 
fitting, that thanks to numbers, everything looks beautiful.”xviii Or Plato “the maintenance 
of measure and proportion is always beautiful” and the absence of measure is ugly.”xix 
And Aristotle “Beauty consists in magnitude and ordered arrangement”xx the main forms 
of beauty are “order, proportion, and definiteness” For the stoics “The beauty of the body 
resides in the proportion of the limbs in relation to one another and to the whole.”xxiAnd 
Plotinus asserted that beauty consisted in proportion and arrangement of parts.xxii  
Thus Vitruvius had no need to assert a conceptual framework. He was not in anyway 
being original here. It was commonly understood that all tektons possessed this 
knowledge and the ability to manipulate it. The understanding of eurythmia, symmetria 
and the ability to establish ordinatio were the basic skills necessary in any art. Vitruvius 
was merely restating what was understood as the basis of Plato’s harmonic ontology and 
the central tenet of classical beauty. The world was conceived as a finely ordered 
proportional whole, whose underlying rule was that of harmony, the universal logos. 
Proportion carried with it an ontological, epistemological and ethical weight that came 
from the authority of Greek philosophy.xxiii The inclusion of the principles of symmetria, 
ordinatio, and eurythmia only serve to reaffirm his allegiance to the prevailing 
epistemological framework. 
What Vitruvius did achieve was to give Plato’s conception of sophrosyne as harmonic 
ontology its full aesthetic potential. He did this when he asserted that the architect, a 
master tekton, like the demiourgos, manifests arete in the construction of built works 
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through the application of harmonic proportion understood as the right ordering of 
members and space in an architectural construction. Such application served as a 
demonstration of sophrosyne in the form of the sophron eros on the part of the architect.  
But what of the second and third definitions of self-knowledge and enkrateia/ 
antarkeia? Can we find evidence that Vitruvius is attempting to demonstrate that the 
architect is virtuous in judgments made in the act of poesis and the determination of 
appropriateness in a given situation? The answer here can be found in Vitruvius’ 
understanding of architecture as a communicative art and in his principle of décor.  
 
The Principle/problem of Décor 
 
Architecture is conceptualized by Vitruvius as a system or means of communication 
like language or more specifically oratory, whose task it is not only to communicate but 
to simultaneously do so with style and eloquence.  
It is commonly recognized that Vitruvius took the principle of decor from Rhetoric. 
Decorum, or propriety, was present as an idea in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where it was seen 
as the defining feature of eloquence, the fitting manner in which the speaker unites his or 
her speech to the audience.  
In oratory, understanding what things signify and how they communicate is given 
emphasis through the concept of decorum or propriety. According to Quintillion; 
“Clearness results above all from propriety in the use of words. But propriety is capable 
of more than one interpretation. In its primary sense it means calling things by their right 
names, and is consequently sometimes to be avoided, for our language must not be 
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obscene, unseemly or mean.”xxiv Thus for Vitruvius the didactic or communicative aspect 
of architecture becomes a problem of decorum, propriety or to use the Greek term to 
prepon. Decorum operates as an ethical principle, rather than any formal prescription and 
is above all a manner of performance that is shaped by social expectation and order.  
Vitruvius modeled much of his text on the work of Cicero, particularly his texts de 
Oratore, de Officiis, Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione. Firth has gone so far as 
to argue that he appropriated the general themes and arguments as well, including the 
precept that knowledge is the child of theory and practice and the general education of 
the architect in the liberal arts, even his origins of civilization can be traced to him.xxv It 
is also from Cicero that Vitruvius takes the concept of décor most closely. It is therefor
necessary to understand Vitruvius’ use of the term décor to grasp his application of it.  
How then does Cicero define Decorum? How is it related to the discourse of sophrosyne?  
e 
 
"Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from 
the heavens and to place it in cities, and even to 
introduce it into homes and compel it to enquire 






Marcus Tullius Cicero was born in 106 B.C. and is widely held to be the greatest 
Roman orator, but he is also famous as both a politician and philosopher. He studied law 
in Rome, Rhodes and Athens, where he also studied Greek philosophy. In the last years 
of his life (46-43 B.C.) he turned to writing extensively, making Greek philosophy 
accessible to Roman readers. In this he made no pretense to originality, labeling himself 
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only a true follower of the Greeks. A true Roman he sought a practical philosophy (not 
unlike Socrates) seeking not primarily to know, but how to do. His central focus was 
therefore ethics. His most important work on the subject was De Officiis.  
It was with Cicero that sophrosyne entered the philosophical discourse of the 
Romans. In De Officiis, he referred to sophrosyne using the Latin term Decorum, 
claiming: “If we bring a certain amount of measure and order into affairs of daily life, we 
shall preserve honestas and decus,” (I.5.17) Cicero was here using the Platonic notion of 
sophrosyne as measure and order. North summarizes Cicero’s definition of decorum and 
its relationship to sophrosyne in the following manner: “Decorum generale belongs to 
every action that is morally good, that, in other words, arises for and is in harmony with 
one of the appetites of human nature, controlled by reason. Since, however, human nature 
possesses many appetites and impulses, differing with the individual concerned, it is 
necessary to adjust and harmonize them, so as to create order and beauty, what Plato 
called symphonia in the soul. When such harmony exists, decorum speciale is present; 
and since it is the function of sophrosyne to produce this order and equilibrium among 
the appetites, decorum speciale is inseparable from the fourth virtue.”xxvi Decorum was 
attained only when one obeyed the universal laws of nature, as well as those of our own, 
including those imposed by chance and choice. Thus Cicero continued Plato’s association 
of sophrosyne with order, arrangement and harmony but also adopted the more flexible 
position of Aristotle as the preserver of phronesis. Sophrosyne was a product of a 
particular situation, a practical knowledge of just action in the real world serving to 
maintain a balance in the world of human action that was necessary in order to harmonize 
it with the ‘Good’.  
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The aesthetic presence in Plato’s conception of sophrosyne was also continued by 
Cicero who believed in a basic human desire for order, measure, beauty and harmony in 
deeds and words, which he viewed as a moral perfection. Restraint was here again 
subordinated to an aesthetic function. This was evident in his comparison of a beautiful 
body whose parts were harmoniously arranged and the decorum present when order and 
moderation were present in word and deed. The aesthetic pleasure present was what won 
approval of decorum. Man’s possession of memory, foresight and reasoning allow him to 
develop wisdom but man also possesses the ability to see harmony and beauty in the 
visible world and this allows for the appreciation of beauty and harmony in thought and 
action. The Beauty of the Sophron Eros was therefore not limited as an aesthetic to Greek 
philosophy but became a central discourse in Rome during the reign of Octavian 




We must understand that the term décor as used by Vitruvius, while it is listed as one 
of the six principles, is a quality distinct from the others. His use of the term is limited in 
the book to two major locations; the listing of the principles of architecture, where it is 
given three sources: status, custom and nature, and the seventh book, where he is dealing 
with frescos and their appropriateness- there the issue is propriety.  
According to Horn-Oncken, Vitruvius only uses the term in connection to standards 
of “place, unity of style and ‘decoration’, as well as character and dignity of those 
persons, be it sacred or profane, to whom the buildings are dedicated.” She goes on to 
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state that; “Vitruvius’ emphasis is on those creative impulses that relate to choice, the 
arrangement and the place of formal elements, not on those that can be expressed in 
numerical ratios.”xxvii Only once does Vitruvius deviate from the above definition and 
apply the concept of décor to the idea of right proportion. This occurs in the second 
chapter of Book VI where he claims that the architect may seek to adjust the objectively 
correct proportions to achieve the proper subjective effect.xxviii Vitruvius’ actual account 
is as follows; “an adjustment of the proportions to the décor so that the appearance of 
eurythmy maybe convincing to the observer.”xxix This is the only time that he links décor 
to proportions and number and to the quantitative aspects of architecture.  
According to Horn-Oncken the term décor was extraneous to architecture, its 
philological background coming from poetry and rhetoric, its function serving as an 
ethical concept, its use in terms of the proper use of the columnar orders does not 
properly fit architecture.xxx  
While the general concept of beauty in the ancient world contained an ethical 
component, the predominant formulation is the application of number. It is the harmony 
of those numbers that manifests décor in the arts and crafts. Its inclusion as a separate 
principle therefore is not expected to be there. Vitruvius had to have a reason for bringing 
it into architecture as an isolated principle. One conclusion is that Vitruvius had the 
desire to elevate the role of the architect above that of the craftsman.xxxi Thus, while the 
other principles are intended to show that the architect possessed not only the technical 
knowledge but also the theoretical knowledge, Décor is used to show that the architect 
possesses the same level of intellectual engagements that are to be found in the higher 
discourses, notably philosophy, so he “employs all the arguments which other arts, 
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poetry, rhetoric, music advance in their own cause.”xxxii As Hermann has noted “Any ars 
wishing to climb up the social ladder had therefore to produce a theoretical superstructure 
and to demonstrate the use it made of other disciplines.”xxxiii  
Isolating décor as a separate principle signals Vitruvius intention to address the issue 
first raised by Socrates, that the possession of the sophron eros was not enough to prove 
the tekton sophronen. When Plato raised the question ‘is the tekton sophronen?’ he 
asserted that to answer the question in the affirmative one had to prove its other two 
forms as self-knowledge and enkrateia/ antarkeia, a task both he and Aristotle attempted. 
Keeping in mind the necessary structure of sophrosyne in its three facets, Vitruvius could 
not therefore achieve his goal (of equating the social role of the architect with that of the 
orator or philosopher) without proving the architect was a master of all three. Décor with 
its ethical component and literary background assists him in doing just that, hence it 
becomes a necessary topoi in the theory, even it if appears extraneous to it as he 
constructs it.xxxiv  
The topoi décor serves as a demonstration of excellences. It contains an aesthetic 
character, but it is essentially a quality of the individual. Vitruvius needs to demonstrate 
how that excellence in character is translated into the design process and into the built 
form if he is to prove self- knowledge and enkrateia/ antarkeia. He achieves this by 






The Triad of Excellences 
 
Vitruvian scholarship often makes note of the triad of Firmitatis, Utilitatis, and 
Venustatis. It is important to observe that these are not considered the principles of 
architecture, nor does Vitruvius state that the six principles are aspects of the last 
Venustatis, as some assert.xxxv Vitruvius makes reference to the triad, noting that the parts 
of architecture, building, dialing and mechanics; “should be so carried out that account is 
taken of strength [firmitatis], utility [utilitatis] and grace [venustatis].”xxxvi  
This kind of categorization can also be found in rhetoric in reference to the 
excellences (arête) of oratory, such that in Cicero we find the virtues of judgment, order 
and decorum and in Quintillion those of correctness, lucidity and elegance.xxxvii What 
Vitruvius is attempting in De architectura libri decem is to define the excellences of 
architecture using the structure of excellences and virtues found in rhetoric as a means of 
equating the architect with the social status of the orator.  
According to Frith, Vitruvius’ text teaches us to design a building in much the same 
way as Cicero teaches us to put together a speech through invention, arrangement, 
memory, delivery and style. “These are the five parts of rhetoric, and for an educated 
Roman, the same practices are put into action for the making of architecture. Important to 
both oratory and architecture is the character of the work, the decorum underlying the 
arrangements and ornaments, and the appropriateness of the work in the public 
domain.”xxxviii The very structure of De architectura libri decem draws on the common 
understanding of the educated Roman to recognize the connection.  
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According to Vitruvius; “Account will be taken of strength when the foundations are 
carried down to the solid ground, and when from each material there is a choice of 
supplies without parsimony; of utility, when the sites are arranged without mistake and 
impediment to their use, and a fit and convenient disposition from the aspect of each 
kind; of grace, when the appearance of the work shall be pleasing and elegant, and the 
scale of the constituent parts is justly calculated for symmetry,”xxxix Thus distributio is 
manifested in firmitatis, ordinatio, while  dispositio, is manifest in utilitatis and 
eurythmia, and symmetria in venustatis.  
The triad are localities for the judgment of the virtues of good design; where its 
excellences are manifest. But as the text implies they are simultaneously where the décor 
of the architect is demonstrated in the proper application of his techne, understood as his 
ability to master and control the remaining five principles. The manifestation of 
excellences of décor in firmitatis, utilitatis and venustatis define the character of both the 
architect and work.  
It is in the triad that Vitruvius asserts, as Aristotle had done, that the building is both 
the action of the building and the builder in action. Architecture is the dual actuality of 
the potentiality of techne as a possession of the architect and the potentiality of the 
architect in praxis. But is this dual actuality acknowledged anywhere else in De 






Phronetic- Techne and the Design Process 
 
According to Scranton this duality permeates Vitruvius’ six principles.xl Scranton 
notes that in Latin all words ending in tio or tionis take as their primary meaning the 
performing of a process. Thus in the three principles of ordinatio, dispositio, and 
distributio we are not looking at qualities of the work, but of the action taken by the 
architect.  
Thus ordinatio, which Vitruvius himself links to the Greek words taxis and diathesis, 
both action nouns, is not a quality of the work but the action of the architect in literally 
putting things together. It is the creation of order, the literal bringing about of order from 
chaos, symbolizing the very act of creation itself.  
Distributio is the control of the budget and the economy of the work and it is the 
action of the architect in controlling the production of the work.   
Dispositio should therefore be translated as the act or process of arrangement. It thus 
serves as the very core of the design process itself. Vitruvius gives us the means through 
which this is done in the form of a series of drawings, ichnographia, orthographia and 
sceanograhia. Again these are defined as actions taken and not as finished drawings and 
hence objects or works.  
Dispositio is the intellectual process of design, the actual working out of the idea, 
from conception through translation into built form. In Vitruvius, dispositio and 
inventione must come with qualitate and we must therefore assume a demonstration of an 
excellence as well.  
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If we assume Scranton’s analysis to be correct- and I do in terms of the three 
principles as action nouns- then we might formulate an taxonomy in which there are three 
categories the first consisting of ordinatio, distributio, and dispositio, a second consisting 
of eurythmia and symmetria and a third that of décor.xli The first is an expression of the 
design process, the second the application of the harmonic ontology and the third décor, a 
privileged other that modulates between the two.  
Eurythmia and symmetria are aspects of the harmonic ontology. They are directive of 
the form as they focus on the eidos of harmony. They are the manifestation in 
architecture of that which is permanent and fixed; as such their structure is theoretical. As 
principles they are deliberative and analytic and represent the architects’ possession of 
Aristotle’s ‘official’ techne. They are the architect’s noesis.  
Ordinatio, distributio, and dispositio serve as action nouns referring to the actual 
design process and hence indicate the use of the logos in such a way as to be primarily 
articulated as an intelligibility that exists only within the actual process of design 
representing the architect in praxis. They are directive of the matter, keeping an attentive 
eye on the nature of the material to be used. They are the manifestation in architecture of 
that which is contingent; as such their structure is generative. As principles they are 
performative and represent the architects’ application of Aristotle’s ‘unofficial’ techne. 
They are the architect’s poesis.  
Vitruvius is counter-balancing the more quantitative aspects of the design process, 
such as proportion, to the more qualitative aspects of invention. There is a direct 
correlation between what is directive and what is generative here. The proportional 
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system of creation and its analogue in architecture are directive, that is they come from 
our understanding and analysis of nature.  
Once again the generative process is not undertaken in abstraction within the mind 
independent of the material. The technai thinks “in” his material, poesis emerges out of 
an engagement with the particulars of the material itself. Here the logos is a 
discriminating resourcefulness informed by praxis. It is reliant on invention, which is a 
cognitive state of genesis. 
Vitruvius provides us with an example of how this works. “The architect’s greatest 
care must be that his buildings should have their design determined by the proportions of 
a fixed unit. When therefore account has been taken of the symmetries of the design and 
the dimensions have been worked out by calculation, it is then the business of his skill to 
have regard to the nature of the site, either for use or beauty, to produce a proper balance 
by adjustment, adding or subtracting from the symmetry of the design, so that it may 
seem to be rightly planned and the elevation may lack nothing.”xlii The principles of 
eurythmia and symmetria serve as a necessary embodiment of the theoretical precept of 
harmonia. But the direct translation of theory into the practical realm of materiality is 
often problematic. For Vitruvius this is especially true with buildings who appearance to 
the eye is often distorted by its site conditions and viewing angles. The result is a false 
image in the eye which distorts our judgment of eurythmia and symmetria and the 
recognition of harmonia.  
According to Vitruvius the architect must compensate for the reality of the building 
and its appearance in perspective, thus the drawings and models are used to create a 
feedback loop from which the architect might learn from, examine and alter the design 
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process in the making of the thing. What Vitruvius seeks is not the literal translation of 
the theory of right proportion in the building, but the revelation of it in the inventions of 
the architect. “When the magnitude of this is once determined, there will follow upon it 
the adjustment of the proportions to the décor so that the appearance of eurythmy may be 
convincing to the observer.”xliii This correction of ideal proportions had a long standing 
precedent going back to classical Greek architecture where optical refinements to the 
design were common.  
Hence the design process according to Vitruvius is not wholly directive, but 
generative as well. It is here that Vitruvius is able to locate how the architect as tekton 
moves in the opposite direction from the noetic, eurythmia and symmetria, to the 
performative, dispositio, ordinatio, and distribution, from directive to generative. The 
relationship between the principles and their movement is evidenced in the localities of 
the triad.  
Excellences are maintained within the process of ‘Becoming’ via the guidance of 
décor, derived from memory in accordance with precedent found in status, custom or 
nature. The principle of décor is an experiential form of situational knowledge guided by 
past experience and current conditions that together result in the manifestation and 
maintenance of excellences. Aristotle’s dialectic becomes embodied in Vitruvius’ 
principles with décor serving as the ethical component of phronesis in praxis necessary 
to demonstrate the concept of phronetic-techne. Décor becomes a key link in the 
demonstration of the third definition of sophrosyne enkrateia/ antarkeia necessary to 




Vitruvius’ De architectura libri decem did not significantly alter the existing culture 
of tectonics, rather it maintained its’ ontological, epistemological and ethical aspects, 
including the concepts of creation, techne, poesis and phronesis. What it did achieve was 
to demonstrate that the knowledge of the archi-tekton was both theoretical and practical. 
That meant that they were in possession of true wisdom and could be called sophronein. 
Vitruvius accomplished this by showing how the architect was in possession of all three 
forms of Socratic sophrosyne; the sophron eros, self-knowledge and enkrateia/ antarkeia. 
More importantly he formulated tectonic culture into a coherent demonstration of the 
intellectual process of creativity and making as the dialectic of techne and phronesis as a 
practical theory of design. 
Vitruvius’ inclusion of eurythmia and symmetria in the principles of architecture 
establish his acceptance of the classical theory of beauty as the harmonic proportion of 
parts and their arrangement, historically seen as a possession of the object. His 
anthropomorphic application of them to the columnar orders that relate to ideal numbers 
signals that they are analogically taken as representations of the larger ontological 
concept of harmonia. Architecture is conceptualized as a language whose primary means 
of exchange is metaphor, as didactic inventions the columnar orders serve to signify an 
idea extraneous to them. Vitruvius’ importance comes in his assertion that Plato’s 
harmonic ontology was the eidos of architecture, the very source of the reason underlying 
it as a discourse.   
For Plato the manifestation of that eidos in the natural world comes in the creation of 
kosmoi, or orders, itself a compromise between reason and necessity. Creation, in all its 
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forms including art, is therefore never wholly theoretical or practical. Vitruvius reiterates 
this concept first in his assertion that knowledge is the child of theory and practice, but 
more significantly in the conceptual structure of architectural invention found in the 
principle of dispositio, and the principle of distributio. The theoretical eidos of harmonia, 
evidenced in the principles of eurythmia and symmetria, are never accepted as a pure 
mathematical manifestation in architecture, but always subject to the practicalities of 
material, economics, and vision.  
Excellences are maintained via memory of status, custom and nature, identified as the 
principle of décor, itself a necessity if one is to prevent the lack of proportion and 
harmony that would lead to hybris in the world. Vitruvius reasserts the ethical 
responsibility of the tekton in resisting hybris and establishing the just society. Décor 
becomes the rhetorical device that demonstrates the architect’s understanding of 
appropriateness in all aspects. It becomes a demonstration of phronesis taken into praxis, 
Architecture serves once again as a signifier of that appropriateness that is both construed 
in the design and constructed in the building.  
The cognitive structure of the design process is revealed in the interaction of the 
principles as the action of the architect in the process of production is guided by decor in 
the maintenance of excellences. The architect’s techne maintains its pre-philosophic 
usage as both the devising of strategies that allow for the appearance of kosmoi, and the 
sense of improvisation and intellectual agility. It is an adaptable cognition gained through 
experience and memory. This implies a cognitive feedback loop in which experience and 
reason conspire to generate orders, kosmoi, from which the physical reality of 
architecture becomes manifest.  
 110
The dialectic of techne and phronesis becomes embedded in the principles of 
architecture as an explanation of the design process itself defined as the loci of the 
juncture between the noetic and performative. What Vitruvius is able to achieve is to 
establish an episteme of architecture akin to theory, while still maintaining its necessary 
pairing with ethics, via the principle of décor.  
Architecture in its excellence serves as a didactic tool, a thauma idesthai, which 
reveals both the harmony of the created universe and the harmony of the social order. The 
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Chapter 6: The Epistemological Parameters of Classical Tectonics 
 
The Epistemological Parameters of Classical Tectonics 
 
Aristotle and Vitruvius sought to prove the technai possessed Socrates’ three facets of 
sophrosyne, to do so they had to first demonstrate how they possessed theoretical 
knowledge. But they also understood that the knowledge of the tekton could not solely 
rest upon the epistemological structure of techne. The reason for this was that while its 
subject matter was production it was not identical with it. The theoretical definition of 
techne placed an emphasis on the possession of knowledge rather than its application. 
This posed several problems in regard to the process of making.  
 
• First, its focus on universals; as theoretical knowledge techne is only 
concerned with general premises regarding the processes of production. But 
the application of such universals on the particularities of making would 
literally deny the contingency of matter, something that can only be done 
through the avoidance of reality. It is to mistake the realm of theory with the 
realm of practical knowledge and represents a breakdown of the 
understanding of the very structure of knowledge itself.  
• Second its instrumentalization; techne focuses on the telos or fixed end of the 
process of production and therefore seeks the best means to accomplish that 
end. This has the tendency to conceive of the problem of production in terms 
of a simple calculation of efficiency.i But as we have seen tectonic culture in 
the classical age was concerned first and foremost with the ethical application 
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of techne in the creation of order in the human world, not its efficiency. This 
leads to the other inherent problem.   
• Third its limitation in the area of ethics; theoretical techne allows for no value 
judgments outside itself. Its subject matter is the technique used and it 
therefore becomes a neutral form of technology.  
 
The critique of techne inherent in classical tectonics reveals the limits of rationalism 
applied to the design process. Design concerns itself with the generation of the thing, not 
its explanation. The actual process of design does not in fact conform to the deliberative 
and analytic process and therefore its application as the only truly valid definition of 
techne is fatally flawed.ii In the actual design process techne was helpful but limiting. 
The aim, or end, of architectural knowledge is building as a form of praxis. Like 
politics architectural design moves out of experience, but in the end must also return to it. 
Both Aristotle and Vitruvius asserted that the knowledge of the tekton was in fact 
necessarily more practical. The tekton needed the assistance of metis in order to deal with 
the contingencies of matter (Hule). In practice the technai required the type of knowledge 
known as phronesis which ameliorates the inherent limitations of techne and serves to 







“. . . because the end aimed at is not knowledge 
[gnosis] but action [praxis].” 
Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1.3.1095a 
 
Phronesis as Experiential Knowledge 
 
At the core of Classical tectonics and architecture is the necessity for the participation 
in existence and the primacy of the particular in the generation of meaning and 
application in design. This is the first parameter of classical tectonics, the emphasis on 
experience and perceptiveness rather than formulated knowledge as the starting point of 
design. 
It was through his analysis of politics that Aristotle was able to identify phronesis as 
an alternative form of knowledge, distinct from theory. According to him, in the study of 
politics theoretical knowledge was a vain one “because the end aimed at is not knowledge 
[gnosis] but action [praxis].”iii Its end was directed toward praxis, its knowledge 
therefore, had to come from it as well. In the case of justice there could be no real 
application of universal laws, because their application in all situations would lead to 
injustice.iv The rule of justice was defective, not because the law might be incorrect nor 
the legislator, but precisely because of its universality. In the field of politics, reason 
itself was unable to carry the day in regards to men’s actions- if it could there would be 
no need for politics.  
This meant that phronesis did not categorically serve the universal so necessary to the 
definition of theoretical knowledge. It was experience that was more valuable, serving as 
a necessary companion for pure theory, if not its replacement. Aristotle’s analysis of 
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politics revealed the limits of theoretical reason. Phronesis appeared to be both natural 
and yet not specifically teachable in the sense of theoria.v  
In the sphere of action, experience and judgment come into play with reason and 
necessity. Judgment (i.e. phronesis) becomes essential in action (i.e. praxis) and such 
ability to judge and act wisely in any situation is molded through experience.  
Phronesis is formed from the stabilization of particularities in memory, which 
provide a universalization, while still able to maintain a reference to such particularity. vi 
This produces a more fruitful universalization that functions to deepen experience, 
allowing one to draw from it what was relevant to the new particularity; and apply 
experience only where it is appropriate. 
Phronesis was a virtue that must suffuse knowledge and guide it toward the greater 
good. To believe that this kind of cognition could be submitted to demonstrable rules, 
was to succumb to what Gadamer called “[the] illusion of experience perfected and 
replaced by knowledge.”vii It was he who pointed out that: “The truth of experience 
always contains an orientation towards new experience.”viii Thus, for Aristotle we find 
that experience always remains in the background as the foundational substructure of 
practical knowledge.  
Gadamer notes that the guiding principles of phronesis “have only the validity of 
schemata. They always have to be made concrete in the situation of the person acting.”ix 
In this sense it served as a more concrete form of cognition geared toward praxis, 
deriving concreteness from its participation in the particularity of existence. Phronesis 
called for the concrete mediation between knowledge already known (the Universal) and 
the opportunities and limitations of the present situation (the Particular).  
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What we grasp from this analysis of phronesis is that knowledge may be grasped in 
experience in a manner that is independent of ratiocination.x It was Gadamer who pointed 
out that “experience [Erfahrung] itself can never be science [Wissenscaft]. It is in 
absolute antithesis to knowledge [Wissen] and that kind of instruction that follows from 
general theoretical or technical knowledge. The truth of experience always contains an 
orientation towards new experience . . .  The dialectic of experience has its own 
fulfillment not in definitive knowledge, but in that openness to experience that is 
encouraged by experience itself.”xi 
The ‘theoretical’ definition of techne severs knowledge from experience leaving it a 
form of analysis of production and not a form of productive knowledge that informs the 
agent in the act of making. Phronesis on the other hand is a cognitive process grounded 
in experience and a concreteness derived from its participation in the particularity of 
being. Thus the concreteness of experience is formed from the stabilization of 
particularities in memory, which provide a universalization that is able to maintain a 
reference to such particularity.xii Phronesis is a type of experience that is inwardly 
impelled toward a more fruitful universalization, it therefore functions to deepen 
experience. This mental faculty is one that is continuously renewed through new 
experiences, and they’re grounding in perceptions and applications in inventions.  
The generative process is not undertaken in abstraction within the mind independent 
of material, but rather emerges out of the actual engagement of the material itself. 
Together ‘theoretical’ techne and phronesis form a symbiotic relationship encompassing 
the range of being from particular to universal. In the act of making the tekton establishes 
a firm connection between his or her techne and the material (Hule) such that they are a 
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concrete unit, in terms of knowledge subject matter. The technai bring knowledge of the 
universal, while the material brings knowledge of the particular, manifested in the technai 
as phronesis. Form is not imposed upon material in a totalitarian manner but must be 
negotiated with it. 
It is this symbiosis during the actual process of making that the tekton is able to 
engage the particularities and contingencies of reality and overcome the limitations of 
theory and abstract reasoning that so define techne.xiii 
This is central to all proponents of tectonic theory if not explicitly then implicitly in 
their remarks regarding the expressive nature of materials. Such a claim, that materials 
inherently express or rather elicit certain characteristics or qualities implies the material 
bring something to the table that has an effect on the expressivity of the architectural 
detail. This is precisely what Louis Kahn meant when he made the claim that he ‘asked 
the brick what it wanted to be’. It is this immanence that is manipulated by the architect 
in the application of his or her techne.  
In a linguistic interpretation of architecture here we would have to make the claim 
that the architect who masters the techne of building is like the poet who elicits from the 
given vocabulary of words their inner expressive potentiality. We would not claim that 
the poet imposes meaning on words, but rather brings forth meanings overlooked, 










“good action is an end and desire aims at this.” 
Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a. 36- 1139b. 4 
 
 Phronesis and the Means and Ends Equation 
 
The second parameter of classical tectonics is the resistance to instrumentalization. 
As stated above, techne can be split between possession and application, a condition 
which allows it to focus solely on either means or ends and to potentially become 
instrumentalist as a form of excellence.  
Aristotle’s analysis of phronesis was conducted in terms of means and ends and this 
has often lead to a concentration on means. But one must be careful how one interprets it 
from such a stand point.xiv Because phronesis is revealed through a network of social 
interactions and communal responsibilities, its purpose is not the maximization of what 
one has (that would be greed), but the maximization of what one must become. This 
implies a concern with ends (telos) as concerns the agent. Aristotle himself pointed to this 
when he claimed that “good action is an end and desire aims at this.”xv  
Aristotle was at pains to prove that phronesis was a natural intuitiveness and not an 
independently achieved knowledge, that is to say, it is not an abstract knowledge in the 
sense that mathematics or geometry are abstract because they are independently 
demonstrable. This means that phronesis does not categorically serve the universal and 
therefore he must repudiate any attribution to phronesis of mere calculative efficiency in 
respect to means. To do so would be to make the claim that it has the ability to serve 
indifferently to ends. Thus goodness would be only incidental to action. In the end we are 
left with the idea that phronesis is a virtue that must suffuse knowledge such that it 
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guides it toward the end (telos) of man: the greater good i.e. a better life in the ethical as 
opposed to the materialist sense. For this reason the conceptual framework of 
instrumentality can only provide a negative formulation.xvi In praxis the end is 
determined within the means because of this neither the ends nor the means can be 
securely fixed a priori.xvii  
Phronesis therefore does not contain a true distinction between means and ends nor 
the distinction between possession and application present in ‘theoretical’ techne. It is not 
as self- contained. The a priori indeterminacy of the means/ends equation within 
phronesis is its defining condition. Any interpretation of it solely as a concern for means 
would literally be un- phronetic. The insinuation is that phronesis is always caught up in 
the temporal dispersion of life making it contingent in the process, and this prevents it 
from being instrumentalized.xviii It must be understood within the dialectic of means and 
ends. Phronesis is the third term of the dialectic, taking into consideration the broader 
social context as a particularity.  
This point is a significant one. The tendency to view ‘theoretical’ techne as a 
deliberative activity of the mind hinges on it as an analysis of means to ends. But in the 
design process we are not trying to calculate the best means, but rather to calculate what 
is an appropriate end what is feasible and appropriate in the given situation. This is very 
relevant to architecture because when confronted with a project we do not begin with an 
end in any real sense of the term. We may be asked to design a house or library but there 
is no set model of such a program in the purest sense of the term model. Outside of 
speculative housing we do not replicate ala mass production an a priori model. It must be 
remembered that this is precisely what contemporary tectonic theorist’s object to the 
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most. Instead we are confronted with the development of a particular that addresses the 
concerns in that situation. There is no fixed end from which the architect need only to 
determine the best means available to achieve it. The end is still fluid. All design studios 
prove this point; given identical sites and programs a multitude of final projects emerge 
that solve the problem, but bear no resemblance to one another, they posses the same 
utility but by different means and to different ends. To conceive of the problem as a 
simple calculation of efficiency of means to ends is to significantly miss the point and the 
nature of the task at hand.  
 
 “We are always already in the situation of having to 
act.” 
Gadamer 
Truth and Method, pg. 283  
 
Phronesis and Right Judgment 
 
The third parameter of classical tectonics is it’s assertion of the primacy of ethics as a 
quality of the maker and the made. Theoretical techne is concerned with the excellence of 
possession, the efficiency of the process of production in achieving a priori ends. But 
such efficiency takes on a utilitarian framework- one that is focused on the quantitative 
aspects of poesis independent of its qualitative aspects- one that potentially leads to 
‘instrumentalization’. In addition the excellences of possession lie in its evaluation of the 
process independent of an evaluation of its ends or telos. It does not contain the necessary 
questioning of either means or ends proposed in a given situation that would be necessary 
for it to possess an ethical structure. In the case of architecture, as Vitruvius asserted, this 
could lead to impropriety.  
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What distinguishes phronesis is the presence of the agent, according to Aristotle “a 
man has phronesis not by knowing only but by acting.”xix The agent is by definition more 
invested in his or her own action then the producer is in the product. As Dunne notes the 
agent: “is constituted through the actions which disclose him both to others and to 
himself as the person that he is . . . he becomes and discovers who he is through these 
actions . . . the medium for this becoming through action is . . . a network of other people 
who are also agents and with whom he is bound up in relationships of 
interdependency.”xx Phronesis is bound up in this desire and striving for ‘Becoming’ in a 
political sense- as a member of a community determining what constitutes justice.xxi It 
concerns itself with the intentionality of the agent in actions, as well as their eventual 
effect. It emerges from the desire to be civil.  
The finality of phronesis as a form of episteme is coterminous with praxis. This sets 
up the real contrast between it and techne. While both are described by Aristotle as 
belonging to hexis meta logou “a reasoned state’, techne can be forgotten and it can be 
applied in any direction towards the greater good or as an evil. The reason for this is that 
techne can be split between being and use, or to use Gadamer’s terms ‘possession’ and 
‘application’, this allows it to focus solely on either means or ends and to potentially 
become an instrumentalist form of excellence. xxii Phronesis, on the other hand, cannot be 
forgotten neither can it be misapplied. xxiii We cannot speak of an excellence in phronesis 
because it is excellence; a fault in action is a lack of excellence. Ones actions are either 
just or unjust.xxiv Dunne points out that this is so because praxis as action and phronesis 
as excellence are so intimately related. “Phronesis comes into its own only in the 
situations that draw the self into action. . . .  all genuine phronesis is absorbed into 
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action.”xxv Or to use Gadamer’s understanding of it: “We are always already in the 
situation of having to act.”xxvi  
In phronesis knowledge and virtue become moments in a more comprehensive 
process of experience. Dunne explains that: “knowledge and virtue taken on their own as 
concepts are abstractions that must be negated or successively ‘sublated’ in order to 
express the concrete and unitary experience of the virtuous person in action.”xxvii 
Virtuous action and the knowledge of it are concrete in the sense that both simultaneously 
occur as real entities and not independently. In the end we are left with the idea of 
phronesis not as knowledge of ethics in any abstract sense, but a resourcefulness of mind 
that can respond to a particular situation in which these ideas are to be applied. It was a 
natural proclivity to learn through experience the proper means of action in society.  The
point here being that what is endemic to phronesis and its relationship to knowledge is its
dependency on experience as part of the lea
 
 
rning process.  
Phronesis is that resourcefulness of mind that allows for contemplation of 
particularity which turns experience into right judgment and action. It is the ability to 
recollect the past and transform it, in order to provide insight into its future application. 
Its purpose is to exploit the collective meaning of experience in an attempt to 
continuously self- correct itself as knowledge. Moreover, it is an ‘openness’ to experience 
that allows for a continuation of the learning process.  
This is why in De architectura libri decem Vitruvius did not provide a prescriptive 
definition of décor. Instead we are told what it demands, its results and we are treated to 
examples of it in particularity. It suffuses the design process, but is not its precept. Its 
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origins in status, custom and nature indicate its dependency on experience while its’ 
application in the particularities of a given situation espouse its return to it.  
At issue here is that in all productive acts of poesis, including architecture, there is 
both a product and an action taken. We can discuss the product, but its coming into being, 
its production, was still the conscious action of an agent that exerted some level of 
inquiry, discovery and judgment. But what must be asserted further is that the product 
bears within itself the action, which brought it into being in the first place and hence is a 
manifestation of that judgment. A failure of judgment lies in the nature of the discoveries 
regarding the relationship between the principles of techne and the particulars of the 
situation. In the case of architecture incorrect judgments and wrong orderings are 
embodied within the built environment serving to reinforce such judgments. 
It is this point that lies at the historical assertion of the relationship between 
architecture and ethics. In other words, ones’ actions as an architect are subordinate to 
ones actions as a human being. We are talking of the ethics involved in the manifestation 
of excellences (arête) in the process of making. While techne refers to an excellence in 
production, phronesis refers the application of that excellence in action. To truly possess 
excellence the architect must possess both forms of excellence.  
The idea that the architect must be just or virtuous or that the architect is accountable 
for the effects of his or her actions in production has had a long standing. Its conception 
is present in Vitruvius’ notion of décor, but decorum has since pervaded architectural 
literature. It is present in Albeti’s de Re Aedificatoria, and in the writings of John Ruskin 
and William Morris, both of whom were concerned with the ethics of production for 
society, and it also served as the foundational concern of the Deutscher Werkbund.  
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The heart of the distinction between techne and phronesis is one of distinction 
between the subjects of their excellence. Theoretical techne’s pairing with phronesis 
therefore serves to ensure not only an excellence in possession found in techne, but an 
excellence in application found in phronesis as well.  
 
Phronesis and Design Cognition  
 
Aristotle called phronesis an intuitive reason concerned with the ultimate particular 
whose object was not knowledge but perception, the ability to perceive similarities or 
verisimilitudes. xxviii He contrasted this with nous, another form of intuitive reason. xxix 
Nous, the reason of the archai, was the end point of all deductive reasoning, the first 
principle or ultimate premise, which cannot be further proven. xxx It also served therefore 
as the origin of knowledge. Together nous, the ability to find the archai, and phronesis, 
the ability to perceive verisimilitudes in particularity, form the beginning and end limits 
of argumentation. They share a correspondence, becoming the same intuitive reasoning 
ability at opposite ends of topical thinking; one moving towards universals the other 
towards particulars.  
As a form of cognition, this is what Dunne has referred to as phronesis- nous; it 
served as a cognitive theory of making whose subject matter moves from particular to 
universal, finding its loci and significance in the uniqueness of the situation and 
condition. This includes the nature of the materials and the particularity of place.  
When we are looking for phronesis- nous we should look to: “a mode of knowledge, 
which is immediate and ‘intuitive’ rather than to a range of objects which are analytically 
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simple.”xxxi The perceptive ability of phronesis- nous is one that does not look to 
description in its apprehension of relationships, but rather to explanation in its 
apprehension. Within it and its explanatory knowledge there is a sense of ‘because’ in its 
formulation. This sense is not one of general propositions, but inscribed within a given 
particular. Such insight comes not from analyzing general principles, but from the study 
of particularity.  
According to Dunne, this allows for the revelation of significance.xxxii Phronesis 
provides us with the ability to see what is really significant in the particularity of 
existence, allowing for the manifestation of meaning, anchoring it in the genus loci of its 
own condition. It fits itself into the domain of contingent and variable being, what 
Aristotle called ta endechomena allos echein, things that could be otherwise and are 
within our power to change. Phronesis is the cognitive ability to deal with the necessities 
of lived experience, and to learn from them. This form of cognition is at odds with 
theoria, reason in its abstract sense, which by definition is fixed and permanent.  
Phronesis occupies itself with seeking the best solution in a given particular situation 
such that it bears a close affinity to the discourse of topics. That is to say that it is topical 
in it structure. It therefore searches for a variable arche of a given condition. By doing so 
it anchors itself into the loci of the situation, as well as its temporal condition. It develops 
its knowledge base from the particular to the universal as opposed to applying a universal 
to the particular situation, in order to search for the best solution to a given particular. 
It should be no surprise therefore that Vitruvius borrowed the structure of De 
architectura libri decem and his architectural theory from Cicero’s rhetoric. Rhetoric is 




The origins of tectonic culture can be found in the Homeric belief that the actions of 
the tektons shape the character of human existence. Increasingly, understanding their 
actions and ability to create became the paradigm for understanding the world.  
During the classical age the increased focus on rationally explaining those actions 
resulted in the formulation of the dialectic of techne (to make) and phronesis (to act). The 
dialectic placed a premium on the cognitive aspects of making, as it asserted that there 
are in essence two means of conceiving the establishment of order in the world: that of 
theory and practice.  
Aristotle’s division of techne into two forms: one practical and generative and the 
other theoretical and analytic, allowed him to establish two epistemological frameworks 
for dealing with production. Theoretical techne conformed to the epistemology of theory 
while generative techne conformed to the epistemology of phronesis. The division is 
clearly one between theory and practice and Aristotle implies that this division carries 
with it two forms of knowledge associated with them; the first focuses on reason and the 
other deals in necessities. The true knowledge of the technite was neither one of these, 
but their union in the final act of poesis. The creation of real meaning and signification 
must come from both forms of knowledge,xxxiii and the ability to freely move between 
them.  
For his part the Roman architect Vitruvius was able to transform the basic tenets of 
tectonic culture into a working theory for architecture. Architectural knowledge, its 
techne, following Plato, was the union of theory and practice. The possession of only the 
 128
first results in the chasing of shadows, while possession of only the latter could bring no 
prestige.xxxiv Modeled on Aristotle’s epistemological structure and the dialectic of techne 
and phronesis, De architectura libri decem demonstrated how the archi-tekton possessed 
sophryosyne in all three facets, as the dialectic became embedded in his six principles of 
architecture. Central to his theory was the principle of décor, itself a demonstration of 
phronesis taken into praxis that served as the third term of the dialectic. 
The conceptualization of tectonics in the classical world was crouched in the dialectic 
and its cognitive implications. This in turn set operable epistemological parameters for 
both tectonics and architecture.  
Inherent in classical tectonics was a critique of techne and the limits of rationalism 
applied to the design process. Its union with phronesis in the dialectic served to 
ameliorate these limitations as the epistemological structure of phronesis set operable 
parameters for tectonics. Central to it was an emphasis on experience and perceptiveness 
rather that formulated knowledge as the starting point of design, a resistance to 
instrumentalization, and an assertion of the primacy of ethics in the taking of judgments 
in design. As a cognitive theory of making, phronesis proves to be topical in nature, 
moving from particular to universal, as it finds its loci and signification in the 













                                                          
ENDNOTES 
i According to Aristotle; “Having set the end they [technai] consider how and by what means it is to be 
attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best 
produced . . .” Nicomachean Ethics, 3.3.1112b 11-24.  
ii The critique of techne was certainly not limited to the classical age. Herder pointed this out in his writings 
and framed his critique of the Enlightenment on what he saw as an inappropriate understanding of reason. 
It was also the same critique leveled by Heidegger at what he termed ‘standing reserve’, by Jacques Ellul at 
what he termed ‘technique’ or ‘technical phenomena’ and by Louis Mumford at what he termed ‘technics’. 
iii Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.3.1095a 4-5. See also 10.9.  
iv Ibid, 5.10.1137b 13-24. 
v What Aristotle had done was to reject Socrates’ understanding of Ethics as theoria, in doing so he 
provided for the possibility of understanding sophrosyne as a practical episteme. It is true that Socrates’ had 
insisted that wisdom had to be practical and was in fact credited with bring philosophy down form the 
heavens. But it was Aristotle in his definition of phronesis that provided the epistemological framework for 
understanding it as episteme. One must understand Aristotle here as continuing Socrates’ intentions.  
vi Dunne refers to this as ‘Phronetic Experience’ and claims that it is distinguished from the universalism of 
theory and ‘ordinary experience’ in that: “. . . while it retains familiarity with particulars, it still contains a 
greater pressure toward universalization . . . it may lag behind theory in the degree of formal universality 
possessed by its major premises, but it has the advantage over theory in that it can redeem all the minor 
premises implicitly contained in each of its major premises and thus maximize its contribution to action.” 
Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pp. 294- 5. 
vii Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. edit. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 1975, 
p. 324. 
viii “experience [Erfahrung] itself can never be science [Wissenscaft]. It is in absolute antithesis to 
knowledge [Wissen] and that kind of instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical 
knowledge. The truth of experience always contains an orientation towards new experience. That is why a 
person who is called ‘experienced’ has not only become such through experiences but is also open to new 
experiences. . . . [the experienced person] is particularly well- equipped to have new experiences and to 
learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its own fulfillment not in definitive knowledge, but in that 
openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. edit. 
by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 1975, p. 319. 
ix See Gadamer Truth and Method, trans. edit. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 
1975, pg. 286.  
x In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristolte argued this very point. “The Socratic saying that nothing is stronger 
than phronesis is right. But when Socrates said this of knowledge he was wrong. For phronesis is an 
excellence and not a species of knowledge, but another kind of cognition.” Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 
1246b 8-11. Theoria, is the highest form of wisdom, but in the realm of practical knowledge nothing is 
higher than phronesis. It rules over all forms of practical knowledge, it does so because it is precisely not 
knowledge, but another means of cognition or thinking. It is the knowledge of good and evil, of right 
action, applied in the particularity of existence. 
xi Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. edit. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 1975, 
p. 319. 
xii Aristotle alludes to the limits of techne as theoretical and the concreteness of phronesis when he states: 
“This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than 
others who know [possess techne]; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did 
not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken 
is wholesome is more likely to produce health. Now phronesis is concerned with action; therefore one 
needs both kinds of knowledge, but particularly the latter [phronesis].” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1141b 16- 22. 
xiii Hegel would later refer to this organic union of the universal and the particular as the concrete universal 
and it served as the basis of his aesthetic theory something I shall return to later.  
xiv There is ample justification for this given that the common usage in Ancient and Classical times was as 
what was in one’s own best interest. In fact Arsitotle gives us this list of common usage that imply a 
concern with means that leads to an instrumentalist interpretation. But it is important to note that Aristotle 
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rejected them. This point is noted by Alastair MacIntyre in After Virtue were he states: “. . . although 
Aristotle treats the acquisition and exercise of the virtues as means to an end, the relationship of means to 
end is internal and not external. I call a means internal to a given end when the end cannot be adequately 
characterized independently of a characterization of the means.” See MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in 
Moral Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1984, pg. 184. 
xv His complete remark was that phronesis: “rules the productive intellect as well, since every one who 
makes, makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in an unqualified sense but only relative to 
something i.e. of something)- only that which is done is that; for good action is an end and desire aims at 
this.” Thus his understanding of phronesis in relation to ends was framed within an understanding of the 
means ends dialectic as relates to production. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a 36- 1139b 4.  
xvi Dunne argues: “I have been trying to show that the whole conceptual framework of instrumentality, 
which is so well fitted to the analysis of techne, can provide only negative formulations in relation to 
phronesis and praxis and that we must continually stretch our thinking beyond it if we are to catch the 
movement of the self as agent.” Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern 
Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 269. 
xvii Because phronesis is rooted in the ethos of the good it cannot be determined prior to the actual situations 
in which it is realized. This leads Dunne to assert that as a form of episteme it is ‘characterized at least as 
much by a perceptivness with regard to concrete particulars as by knowledge of universal principles.’ See 
Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 273. 
xviii On this point Dunne states: “Whatever issues from it, by way of action, already has the full weight of 
ourselves behind it and so can be instrumentalized not by ourselves but, if at all, only by someone else who 
may try to use what we have done for his own ends. The point here, however, is that such a person will not 
be able to manipulate himself in the same way.” See Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and 
‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 
1993, pg. 268. The same point was made by Alastair MacIntyre in After Virtue when he notes in chapter 8 
that the social sciences cannot in fact hold to generalized statements of action because there can be no 
predictive certainty in human action. See Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue a Study in Moral Virtue, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1984, chapter 8 pp. 88- 108. 
xix Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7.10.1152a 8-9. 
xx Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, see pages 263. 
xxi Aristotle notes that man is a political animal whose nature it is to live with others and in fact needs 
others. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.7.1177a 30-34 & 9.9.1169b 16-19. 
xxii Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. edit. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 
1975, pg. 284. 
xxiii “While there is such a thing as excellence in techne, there is no such thing as excellence in phronesis; 
and in techne he who errs willingly is preferable, but in phronesis, as in the [ethical] excellences he is the 
reverse.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.5.1140b 28-30. 
xxiv “While one cannot indeed from knowledge be ignorant, but only make mistakes and do the same things 
as one does form ignorance, in the case of justice a man cannot even act from it in the way that he will act 
from injustice.” Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1246b 2-4. 
xxv Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 268. 
xxvi Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. edit. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed and Ward, 
1975, pg. 283. 
xxvii Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, pg. 280. 
xxviii “It [phronesis] is opposed, then to nous; for nous is of the definitions, for which no reason can be 
given, while phronesis is concerned with the ultimate particular [eschaton], which is the object not of 
knowledge but of perception- not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to 
that by which we perceive that the eschaton is a triangle for in the direction too there will be a limit.” 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.8. 1142a 25- 29. 
xxix “Nous is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the primary definitions and their 
ultimates are objects of nous and not of argument, and in demonstrations nous grasps the unchangeable and 
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primary definitions, while in practical reasoning it grasps the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second 
proposition. For these are the staring points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are reached 
from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception and this is nous.” Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, 6.11. 1143a 35- 1143b5. 
xxx Ernesto Grassi notes that “We claim to know something [theoretical knowledge] when we are able to 
prove it. to prove means to show something to be something, on the basis of something. To have something 
through which something is shown and explained definitively is the foundation of our knowledge.” This 
may be referred to as apodictic speech, which shows to demonstrate through the tracing back to first 
principles or archai. This is the basis of theoretical knowledge according to Aristotle and the subject of 
nous. The archai by definition cannot be demonstrated to be true. They cannot be the object of apodictic or 
logical speech, for if they could they would cease to be the archai, by definition. We can then state that we 
arrive at the archai via deductive and inductive reasoning but we must confront the fact that the archai is 
not itself the product of reasoning. In the end as Grassi rightly notes it proves to be a belief that cannot be 
proven but that serves as the basis of knowledge and cognition. It is the indicative nature of the archai, 
which provides the framework within which knowledge and meaning can come into being. Thus it is the 
source or beginning of knowledge understood theoretically. See Grassi Rhetoric as Philosophy, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park & London, 1980, pg. 19.  
xxxi Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, see pp. 302. 
xxxii “Phronesis is a habit of attentiveness that makes the resources of one’s past experience flexibly 
available to one and, at the same time, allows the present situation to ‘unconceal’ its particular significance- 
which it may do comfortably within the terms of one’s experience or else only by evincing as insight 
which, while it could not occur without one’s past experience, still transcends, and so enriches, it.”Dunne, 
Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techne’ in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993, see pp. 305- 6. 
xxxiii “Both in general and especially in architecture are these two things found; that which signifies and that 
which is signified. That which is signified is the thing proposed about which we speak; that which signifies 
is the demonstration unfolded in systems of precepts. Wherefore a man who is to follow the architectural 
profession manifestly needs to have experience of both kinds.” Vitruvius, On Architecture in Ten Books, 
trans. Granger, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, bk. 1 chap. 1 par 3. 
xxxiv “So architects who without culture aim at manual skill cannot gain a prestige corresponding to their 
labours, while those who trust to theory and literature obviously follow a shadow and not reality. But those 
who have mastered both, like men equipped in full armour, soon acquire influence and attain their 
purpose.” Vitruvius, On Architecture in Ten Books, trans. Granger, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard 
University Press, bk. 1 chap. 1 par 2.  
Part III 
 
 Architecture and the Epistemology of Science:  
















































Chapter 7: Science and the Image of the World 
 
“. . . of all those who have already searched for 
truth in the sciences, only the mathematicians were 
able to find demonstrations, that is, certain and 
evident reasons.” 
Rene Descartes 
Discourse on Method 
 
The Medieval Imago Mundi: Geometry and the World 
 
One of the fundamental possessions of an age is the ultimate picture of the world that 
it conjures up for itself. This image is in the end the final controlling factor in all thinking 
and knowledge formation. That the image of the world formed after the Renaissance was 
fundamentally different from that prior to it is undeniable. The Renaissance set in motion 
the construction of a new image of the world and of man’s place in it. It was a period of 
transformation, the junction between one image and another. Since our first task is to 
examine this new image, we must begin our construing at the juncture where this new 
image was constructed. We need to determine how the Renaissance transformed the 
image of the medieval world. 
What was the medieval imago mundi? In medieval cosmology man occupied a more 
significant and determinative place in relation to physical nature. The world not only 
existed for man, but was also fully present and fully intelligible. It possessed an 
essentially human character, seen as explainable in terms of its relationship to humanity 
and human purposes. These explanations were valued above those of efficient causality.i  
Aristotelian metaphysics was one of difference that sought the distinct essence of the 
thing, through an examination of its qualitative characteristics. Its epistemology was 
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structured upon the doctrine of the Four Causes; four forms of questions designed to 
determine the nature of a thing. 1) Efficient Cause- what is the source of its beginning? 
(St. Thomas Aquinas had argued that God must be the efficient cause of all things), 2) 
Final Cause- what is its purpose or use? 3) Formal Cause- what is it? 4) Material Cause- 
what is its constitutive material? These questions were answered by analyzing both 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics as perceived by the senses. “The world of 
nature existed that it might be known and enjoyed by man. Man in turn existed that he 
might ‘know God and enjoy him forever.”ii 
To relate this in architectural terms, we might claim that the material cause of a house 
is; either stone or wood. The formal cause is; shelter from the elements. Its final cause 
would be; to bring about a more civil and pious world. The efficient cause would be; God 
will’s it.  
In the medieval image of the world, God existed at the summit of a hierarchically 
arranged universe, in the middle was Man, and below was Nature. This hierarchical 
system was one of intrinsic value, in which God, the being par excellence, is the most 
real thing of all. It implies a hierarchy of reality, with degrees of being, wherein that 
which is at the bottom, the ‘realm of nature’, possesses the least reality- a reality 
explained in essentially qualitative terms 
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Fig. 1 Image of medieval Hierarchy 
 
The fundamental task of philosophy and the pursuit of knowledge were to trace the 
architectonics of ‘being’. Because of its structure, knowledge of nature had to pass 
through man, in order to reach the ultimate reality, God. “All knowledge, no matter what 
its content, is ‘natural’ so long as it springs from human reason alone and does not rely on 
other foundations of certainty. ‘Nature’ therefore does not so much signify a given group 
of objects as a certain ‘horizon’ of knowledge, of the comprehension of reality.”iii 
Comprehension of this horizon required human reason, and was grasped through a 
combination of sense perception, logical inference and judgment. The task of Scholastic 
philosophy was to reconcile the ‘realm of nature’ with the ‘realm of grace’ in order to 
find the harmony of God’s world.iv Stress was placed on final causality, given in terms of 
purpose or use that was tied to man’s relationship to God.  
For medieval philosophy, the questioning of events in the ‘realm of nature’ was 
always a question of ‘why’ explained in terms of use and purpose for man and eventually 
via the quest for union with God. In this way medieval metaphysics was both a 
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theological and a practical philosophy. Why was this explanation of the world that gave 
accounts of reality in terms of use and the ‘Good’, abandoned? What replaced it? 
 
“We do not learn to demonstrate from the manuals 
of logic, but from the books which are full of 
demonstrations, which are the mathematical and 
not the logical.” 
Galileo 
Opera, I, 42 
 
The Transformation of the World 
 
The rise of Neo-Platonism in the Renaissance brought with it a redefinition of Nature 
that had a profound impact on Western metaphysics. Renaissance philosophy, due to the 
influence of men like Nicholas of Cusa, abolished the dualism between God and the 
created world. The true essence of nature was now seen to be the creative process (natura 
naturans) rather than the created world (natura naturata). Because this process is 
ongoing, divine essence participates in nature, moving within it as a formative principle. 
In this new system there was no need for the soul to act as a mediator. 
Ernst Cassirer has noted that this shift literally elevated Nature to the sphere of the 
Divine, while at the same time giving priority to the individual entities of nature 
themselves, each of which possessed the Divine within their own nature. The underlying 
harmonies sought in Nature as a reflection of the Divine could now be found within a 
given entity.v It is important to note here that this implies that the part asserts itself as 
equal to the whole, within the discourse of knowledge. 
The ‘realm of nature’ and the ‘realm of grace’ were still viewed as distinct but their 
interconnectedness was now one of direct participation. While we often think of 
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Renaissance Humanism as placing Man in a central position, its definition of nature 
actually removed Man from that location. The search for fixed immutable essences was 
now to be found within the structure of each of the individual parts of nature itself.  
In Medieval philosophy the’ realm of nature’ had been described in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms, but its essence was seen in fundamentally qualitative terms, that 
were best described through logic. Mathematics was a quantitative means of description. 
Since quantity was only one of ten predicaments and not considered the most important, 
logic was higher than mathematics as a means of ascertaining certain truth.  
The reinterpretation of nature not only removed the centuries old homocentric focus 
of philosophy and challenged the relationship between part and whole, but it also had a 
profound impact on the course of epistemology. It essentially removed the Aristotelian 
conception of logic- defined as deductive inference - from its central position in the 
epistemology of natural physics. It was replaced with a mathematical methodology, 
defined first as geometrical, then algebraic and finally calculus. This substitution of 
quantitative over qualitative, mathematical method over logical inference, has been 
debated in metaphysics ever since. It also played a significant role in the history of 
architectural theory. Why and how did this substitution take place? 
Since the time of the ancients, the world had always been seen as reducible to 
geometrical representations and geometry was the mathematical science par excellence. 
According to Pythagorean doctrine, the world was made up of numbers understood as 
geometrical units. Plato took this up in the Timaeus, when he discussed the structure of 
the universe in mathematical terms. In the Meno he resorted to mathematics to explain his 
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doctrine of ‘Recollection’, and in the Parmenides Plato had suggested that the plurality of 
the universe unfolded from unity to multiplicity via a mathematical process.  
By the late Middle Ages there was a tendency to explain the world through spatial 
images or geometrical figures. Evidence of this form of conceptualization might be found 
in the 13th century lodge-book of Villard de Honnecourt. In the section on draftsmanship 
entitled ‘Portraiture’, Villard introduces us to the geometrical system used during that 
time to describe the natural world. Forms are broken down, their parts abstracted or 
reduced to pure geometrical figures and then reconstructed. Unlike the proportional 
systems of Antiquity that were based on modular measurements of organic forms, the 
medieval draftsman interprets the world as a compilation of autonomous geometrical 
figures added together. Villard’s sketches give us an insight into a system through which 




Fig. 2 Image from Villard de Honnecourt’s Lodge- book 
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After the 13th century there was a strong revival in mathematical studies. Men like 
Roger Bacon began to express the desire to find a fuller mathematical interpretation of 
nature. 
With the ‘discovery’ in c. 1410 of linear, or scientific, perspective by Brunelleschi 
and others, the world had a model for the conceptualization of geometric space. Reality 
could now be defined, reduced and represented through mathematical formulation. It 
provided a means by which reality could now be understood not only in geometrical 
figures, but also as geometrical space. With its codification by Alberti, in his 1435 Della 
Pittura, the model became readily available and a vital part of the Renaissance image of 
the world.  
 
 




Fig. 4 Image Geometric construction of Space 
 
Renaissance thinkers such as, Nicolas of Cusavi, Leonardo Da Vinci and Giordano 
Bruno perceived the infinite harmony of the world as based on mathematical proportions. 
The ‘realm of nature’ was one of number and measurement and the stage was set for the 
belief that all certain knowledge was mathematical. It is no accident that Leonardo takes 
for granted that the only way to communicate the conclusions to his experiments in 
mechanics, hydraulics and optics is mathematically. Nor is it by accident that architects 
of the Renaissance became ever more concerned with Ideal form and proportion. The 
studies of ideal geometrical compositions found in the work of Leonardo and Bramante, 
the proportional systems of Alberti and Palladio, as well as ideal city plans such as 
Palmanova are ample proof of this desire to conceive space in geometrical terms. 
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Fig. 5 Images of ideal forms and city plans 
 
Neo-Platonism and Humanism eventually weakened the strong hold of Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Plato’s philosophy, like Aristotle’s, included a hierarchical cosmology in 
which the ‘realm of nature’ was subordinate to the ‘realm of Ideas’, leaving in place a 
concern with the transcendental, so important to Aristotelian metaphysics. For this reason 
the majority of Renaissance Neo-Platonists continued to study the world from the 
perspective of human purpose and use. While the focus of humanistic studies had shifted 
from ‘the realm of grace’ to the ‘realm of nature’ and the ‘realm of human action’, the 
boundaries of that knowledge were still conceived within the relationship between human 
reason and divine knowledge. The arts and humanities, including architecture, developed 
in line with this traditional Neo-Platonism.  
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But that also carried with it a Pythagorean element in which the world was viewed as 
a mathematical structure and harmony. The universe was fundamentally geometrical and 
could therefore, as in Plato’s Timeaus, be reduced to limited geometrical figures or 
portions of space. A universal mathematics of nature was conceivable, even though how 
it was to be applied was unresolved. But the overall focus of Neo-Platonism was not on 
that form of mathematical reduction. The interest in mathematical harmonies and 
proportions in architecture were central but they were balanced with other qualitative 
concerns such as Beauty and Ethics. Alberti for example, had defined the task of 
architecture and the architect in terms of social commitment, ethics and service to 
humanity as a whole. That balance would remain undisturbed until the middle of the 
1600’s. 
 
“I often considered if perchance a more rational 
system of circles might be discovered, on which all 
the apparent diversity might depend, in such a 
manner that each of the planet would be uniformly 





The Copernican Revolution and the New Image of the World 
 
With the world comprehended as geometrical space, it was only logical to extend this 
to cosmology. It is with this extension, the Copernican Revolution and the development 
of Galilean science, that the epistemological foundations of science were formulated. 
While still maintaining geometry as a form of mathmesis, a scientia universalis relating 
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the microcosm to the macrocosm, it opened the door for the later ‘instrumentalization’ of 
mathematics devoid of transcendental dimensions.vii 
In Ptolemaic cosmology the earth was given as a fixed condition, but when 
astronomers looked to the heavens they observed a series of regularly changing 
phenomena that produced a series of anomalies. These had to be accounted for by a 
complex set of equations that provided a certain dilemma. Since antiquity, nature and 
God’s order had been perceived as governed by the principle of simplicity. As evidenced 
by the common proverbs ‘Natura semper agit per vias brevissimas’; ‘Natura nihil facit 
frustr’; and ‘natura neque redundat in superfluis, neque deficit in necessariis.’ This 
carried over into mathematics in the form of an aesthetic prerogative- the simpler 
mathematical solution is always the best solution. If the equations could be simplified it 
would be an improvement. This is precisely what Renaissance astronomers sought to 
find- a means for generating a simpler set of mathematical equations.  
The complexity of the Ptolemaic system inspired Copernicus to question its basic 
assumption: that the earth was the only legitimate reference for the study of the universe. 
In seeking a simpler mathematical solution he came upon his now famous conclusion; if 
the sun was used as the reference point instead of the earth the geometrical equations and 
solution were far simpler. What attracted many to Copernicus’ new cosmology was the 
elegant simplicity of its mathematical explanation, not whether it was true or false that 
the earth revolved around the sun.viii 
Copernicus’ solution carried with it ramifications that his contemporaries were quick 
to realize. It raised an important question concerning the legitimacy of taking any point of 
reference other than the earth. Not only does this produce a non-geocentric worldview 
 143
and support the emerging non-homocentric philosophy of science, but it also forced, as 
we shall see, a reevaluation of the principle of final causality: what is the use and purpose 
of the thing? Copernicus’ solution, if accepted, meant subordinating the universe as a 
whole to a mathematical structure. Once convinced of the mathematical structure it was 
only natural that the principle of mathematical relativity must pertain to the earth and the 
‘realm of nature’. The acceptance of his solution meant a radical transformation in 
epistemology and the reduction of all certain truth to mathematical methodology.  
If the fundamental epistemological distinction of the emerging new science had to do 
with the significance of mathematics, it was Kepler who gave it its preeminence. He 
believed that the universe was composed of mathematical harmonies, and that the diverse 
facts of the ‘realm of nature’, were connected by them. The object of scientific study 
became the search for connecting harmonies that united the diverse phenomena of the 
world. He accomplished this by applying Copernicus’ ideas to a broader range of 
knowledge.  
To prove that the universe was simple, ordered and harmonious he had to overcome 
the Aristotelian philosophy of distinction by reducing empirical facts to mathematical 
relationships. Following men like Vives, Sanchez, Montaigne and Campanella he revived 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities found in the ancient atomist and 
skeptic schools of thought. Kepler believed that: “Knowledge as it is immediately offered 
the mind through the senses is obscure, confused, contradictory, and hence 
untrustworthy; only those features of the world in terms of which we get certain and 
consistent knowledge open before us what is indubitably and permanently real. Other 
qualities are not real qualities of things, but only signs of them.”ix  
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This skeptical position became an important part of the emerging image of the world. 
All real qualities were those that related to the mathematical harmonies of the world and 
the world could be known with certainty only through its quantitative characteristics. All 
difference became difference of number alone. From this point forward quantity became 
the primary feature of things and the only objects of study as far as the world of 
knowledge was concerned. The qualitative and changeable surface qualities did not fit 
into the harmony of the rationally ordered mathematical schema of reality, and were no 
longer viewed as possessing substantial reality.  
With Kepler the task of knowledge was no longer to define what a thing ‘is’, what 
makes it distinct, its ‘essence’, but how it was mathematically related to everything else. 
The world of objects was reduced to mathematical homogeneity, a uniform system of 
exchange, related to each other through a common set of principles. A true hypothesis 
was one that addressed underlying mathematical harmonies and mathematical 
demonstration became the only means of proof. 
The beginnings of the impact of this definition of knowledge on architecture can be 
found in the treatises of the late 1500’s. It was during that time that theorists such as 
Serlio and Vignola began to emphasize the prescriptive character of the orders. In 1537 
with the publication of Book IV the Regola, Serlio began the rigid codification of the 
proportional system of the orders unknown in Antiquity and the early Renaissance. 
Vignola’s 1562 publication of the Regola della cinque ordini, the most widely used 
‘textbook’ on architecture up to the 19th century, was an attempt to provide a simplified 




Fig. 6 Image of Plate #3 The system of the Orders from the Regola  
 
Vignola sought a unified mathematical principle for determining the dimensions of 
the orders. But his formalism and a complete reluctance to derive the canon of the orders 
from their symbolic meanings, is also evident. Neither of these architects intended to 
introduce a dogmatic approach to the orders, or to reduce architecture to mathematical 
prescription. Yet their theoretical writings on the orders formed the basis for a 
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concentration on proportion and the orders that would define architectural discourse for 
the next century, a discourse that would transform the very nature of architectural theory 
by the early 1700’s. 
It was this new image of the world, mathematically structured and determined, that 
was the basis of the new science and the emerging metaphysics of the modern age. But 
this image was still endowed with a transcendental character. Mathematics was still a 
symbolic system designed to relate the macrocosm to the microcosm, in a universe 
charged with divinity and composed of difference. This would soon change as the 
development of Galileo’s new science and Cartesian metaphysics threatened that 
symbolic understanding.  
 
“My Purpose is to set forth a very new science 
dealing with a very ancient subject.” 
Galileo 
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences  
 
The New Metaphysics of Science 
 
The new science restructured the epistemological foundation that had existed since 
antiquity, essentially turning it on its ear. It was based upon the assumption of the 
mathematical nature of the universe- an assumption that was essentially impossible to 
prove without resorting to the use of mathematical demonstration. This form of logic 
appears circular, but it was based upon a firm conviction of the mathematical structure of 
both nature and the mind of God, a conviction that, at the time, was uncontestable. It was 
impossible for men like Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and those that followed them, to step 
outside of the very episteme they were constructing. That construction saw a redefinition 
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not only of epistemology but also, of the definition of reality, the human mind, and 
causality. The scientific quest for certain knowledge of the world would eventually result 
in the complete capitulation of those who believed that it would be possible to understand 
the world in its complexity. By the 1730’s the result was a concept of the world 
profoundly different from the world of Aristotelian categories. A world in which man 
saw himself increasingly alienated as all transcendent qualities disappeared. The writings 
of three key figures, Galileo, Descartes and Newton, played important parts in that 
transformation. 
 
“This book [the universe] is written in the 
mathematical language, and the symbols are 
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, 
without whose help it is impossible to comprehend 
a single word of it; without which one wanders in 
vain through a dark labyrinth.” 
Galileo 
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences  
 
Galileo and the Foundations of a New Epistemology 
 
A contemporary and friend of Kepler, Galileo adhered to many of the same basic 
beliefs as the former. But he would take these beliefs one step further, and with even 
more profound implications. Logic had formerly always been seen as the primary means 
of accessing truth but in Galileo it assumed a secondary role. “We do not learn to 
demonstrate from the manuals of logic, but from the books which are full of 
demonstrations, which are the mathematical and not the logical.”x No longer the means 
of demonstration, it became a means to analyze the consistency of a conclusion derive
from mathematical demonstration. “Logic teaches us to know, whether the conclusions 
d 
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and demonstrations which are already discovered and at hand are consistent, but it cannot 
be said that it teaches us how to find consistent conclusions and demonstrations.”xi 
Mathematics was now placed higher than logic as a vehicle of truth. 
For Galileo, Divine Wisdom was mathematical and since the human mind also 
possessed mathematical reason, the difference between the two was simply one of degree. 
Divine Wisdom was more complete and thorough. In his Dialogues Concerning Two 
Great Systems of the World (1632) he wrote: “As to the truth, of which mathematical 
demonstrations give us the knowledge, it is the same which the divine Wisdom knoweth; 
but . . . the whereof we understand some few, is highly more excellent than ours, which 
proceedeth by ratiocination, and passeth from conclusion to conclusion, whereas his is 
done at the single thought or intuition.”xii The book of the universe and knowledge of it 
could not be understood “. . . if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols, 
in which it is written. This book [the universe] is written in the mathematical language, 
and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it 
is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain 
through a dark labyrinth.”xiii The key to nature was its underlying mathematical 
principles, now conceived of as the only valid method of study and proof in the natural 
sciences.  
Galileo was to a certain degree an empiricist. But, as Copernicus’ astronomical 
observations had proven, the senses could not always be trusted. They were an inaccurate 
cipher, one that often led to inaccurate judgments. For Galileo, the empirical method was 
unreliable and opened a Pandora’s box when it came to the verification of truth. 
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The goal of the new science was to establish the rational mathematical order of the 
universe, but when empirical observation could not confirm this, it had to be superseded. 
Thus the empirical method became subservient to the mathematical demonstration. The 
former was used only to demonstrate a previously proven mathematical postulate.xiv In 
this Galileo reveals one of the key problems of science; the a priori belief that the world 
was mathematical could not be confirmed by sensory experience, therefore the validity of 
sensory experience had to be challenged. Sense perception had to conform to 
mathematical principles. 
Like Kepler, he had adopted a doctrine of primary and secondary causes.xv But 
Galileo would develop a form of Atomism that would explain and justify the doctrine. He 
postulated that all bodies were made up of infinitely small indivisible atoms that 
possessed only the quantitative characteristics of number, figure, magnitude, position and 
motion, only these characteristics could be ascribed to atoms. These could not be 
divorced from a given body, and therefore, they remained the fixed and permanent 
aspects of the ‘Thing- in- itself’. It was the quantitative, and not the qualitative, 
characteristics that defined the formal cause, and so only they were aspects of reality.  
This meant that the secondary qualities observed by the senses, such as hot, cold, soft, 
hard, loud etc, were derived from another source and were not truly real. Galileo 
attributed them to the human sense organs themselves. This allowed him to ascribe the 
secondary qualitative characteristics perceived by the senses to opinion and sensorial 
illusion and dismiss them from the discourse of knowledge. 
Galileo’s primary interest was in terrestrial dynamics- the movement of earthly, as 
opposed to heavenly bodies. He was not interested in ‘Why?’ but specifically “How?’ 
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bodies moved. Given his brand of atomism, it should be no surprise that in his brand of 
dynamics all bodily movements would have to be reduced to exact mathematical 
measurement.  
Since the ‘thing- in- itself was an atomic figure of numerical extension, and physical 
space was assumed identical with geometry, motion became a mathematical concept. 
Within Galileo’s science, space, distance and time now became fundamental 
categories.xvi The redefinition of reality in terms of distance, measured in units of time 
turned the finite world of Aristotle into an infinite extension. Center, place and location 
became relative concepts, a point in space dependent upon its relationship to another 
body moving in space and time. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Image of Galilean conception of God nature and man 
 
Causality became a question of the ‘how’ of atomic motions themselves. Under such 
conditions final causality- use and purpose- have no bearing whatsoever. The separation 
of man from nature and God, latent in Kelper, now became overt. God, in Aristotelian 
terms, was no longer possible. To maintain the notion of Divinity, Galileo had to set God 
as the first efficient cause, or creator, of the atoms. No longer the Supreme Good that 
 151
directs, controls or “is” the universe, God was now something quite separate from nature, 
the inventor of a vast mechanical machine, and man an unimportant spectator.  
Within his system of dynamics, Time became nothing more than a mathematical 
measurement, a point in an ever-flowing continuum. The temporal moment became 
nothing more than the slipping boundary between the past and the future. All is in a state 
of permanent becoming, with no possible conception of actuality, in Aristotelian terms. 
The lived experience became inconsequential, as utopian dreams of the future became the 
only potential reality.  
 
“I was a substance the whole essence or nature of 
which was merely to think, and which, in order to 
exist, needed no place and depended on no 
material thing. Thus this ‘I’ that is, the soul through 
which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the 
body, and is even easier to know than the body, 
and even if there were no body, the soul would not 
cease to be all that it is.” 
Rene Descartes 
Discourse on Method 
 
Descartes and the Foundation of Modern Metaphysics 
 
Galileo’s new science dramatically altered the epistemology of science, as it was 
understood in Aristotelian metaphysics. But it also indirectly affected architectural theory 
and the built environment, when it was transformed into a metaphysical structure. That 
task would fall to another mathematician and scientist, René Descartes. He invented 
analytic geometry, a means of reducing the description of phenomena to a set of 
mathematical numbers, referred to as the Cartesian Coordinates. Considered the first 
philosopher of the modern age, his writings had a profound impact on the nature of 
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thought and education in the late 1600’s and early 1700’s. That impact would 
fundamentally change the nature of philosophy and ultimately it would change 
architectural discourse in the modern era. 
Descartes was the first to offer a metaphysics that responded to the new science. 
Where Galileo and Kelper had sought a unified principle for all the discourses of science, 
Descartes sought to take that principle and apply it directly to philosophy and in so doing 
make it the key to all human knowledge. If scientists debated the supremacy of rational 
induction over empirical observation, Descartes came down decisively on the side of 
rationalism.xvii His refutation of Empiricism was an essential part of his epistemology.  
He would align reason with the mathematical method so that it would gain the same 
clarity and certainty for philosophy that it had in geometry. According to him, the 
mathematical method consists of two mental operations: intuition, or self- evident 
principles, and deduction, the orderly logical inference from those propositions. The key 
to method was the determination of a ‘true’, self- evident proposition, presented to the 
mind as a clear and certain idea. Such ideas are so self-evidently true that reason cannot 
help but accept them. Descartes referred to this as charité. All searches for knowledge 
must begin with the search for the clear and simple ideas that are subject to the principles 
of mathematics and logic.  
The quest for certainty led him to introduce systematic doubt into the philosophic 
system. If I am deceived in all my beliefs, I must exist in order to be deceived. Every 
time I doubt I must exist to doubt. Since I must exist in order to doubt, the one 
proposition that cannot be doubted is “I think therefore I am”, his infamous Cogito Ergo 
Sum. It is the ultimate form of rationalism. The only thing that cannot be called into doubt 
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is that a human being is a thinking being. In Discourse on Method he wrote: “I was a 
substance the whole essence or nature of which was merely to think, and which, in order 
to exist, needed no place and depended on no material thing. Thus this ‘I’ that is, the soul 
through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and is even easier to 
know than the body, and even if there were no body, the soul would not cease to be all 
that it is.”xviii The essence of man is as thinking consciousness only, hence the comment 
that both the body and the place, or location in space, are also unnecessary in 
understanding what it is to be human. Descartes Cogito led to a dualism that established a 
separation between an intelligent nature and physical nature. 
For Descartes the world is divided between two forms of substance: the res extensa, 
and the res cogitans, or mind, each with a specific discipline that studies it. Res extensa is 
studied and analyzed by the science of physics, res cogitans by philosophy and theology. 
Each of the two substances has properties that are unique to it and that define it. The res 
extensa is spatially extended, measurable by geometry, infinitely divisible, its mechanical 
motion is determined by the impact of other bodies, and it is without free will or any 
moral qualities. It exists without the capacity for reasoning. The res cogitans occupies no 
space, is not in motion and has the capacity for reasoning, remembering, denying, free 
will, and is morally responsible for its actions. Its principle property is the attribute of 
consciousness. It can never be shown to be derived from, or a form of, or a function of, or 
reducible to, matter. These two forms of substance present two distinct realities whose 
division cannot be bridged. The dualism produces a mind that occupies no space and a 
body that cannot think. 
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In order to account for the primary and secondary causes in Galileo, Descartes had to 
relegate the senses to the mind, outside of physical reality. He then denigrated them, 
along with memory and the imagination, as confused elements of the thinking substance, 
in order to preface rationality as the basis of knowledge. According to him, the 
imagination and memory are distinct from the rational intellect. In the ‘Sixth Meditation’ 
from Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes tells us that the imagination requires a 
particular effort, one that is distinct from the understanding. The same can be said of the 
senses. Both are distinct modes of thinking. He states that “ . . . the mind, when it 
understands, in a sense turns toward itself and looks at one of the ideas that are in it; 
whereas when it imagines, it turns toward the body, and intuits in the body something 
that conforms to an idea either understood by the mind or perceived by sense. . . . I can 
clearly and distinctly understand myself in my entirety without these faculties, but not 
vice versa: I cannot understand them clearly and distinctly without me, that is without a 
substance endowed with understanding in which they inhere, for they include an act of 
understanding in their formal concept. Thus I perceive them to be distinguished from me 
as modes of a thing.”xix  
This distinction is of central importance. Both sensing and imagining represent a co-
mingling of mind and body and are therefore confused modes of thinking. Since the 
imagination comes from the body and from sensory perception, it directs the intellect 
away from the innate ideas that are held to be true. Accordingly, these faculties of the 
mind cannot be trusted nor can they lead to truth. With Descartes the traditional 
relationship between art (and architecture) and truth became problematized.  
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His work had an enormous impact on all of Europe during the course of the 
seventeenth century. But it did have its critics, even within the scientific community. In 
England, the Cartesian system’s extreme rationalism was countered with a more 
empirical approach viewed as essential in the development of a hypothesis that was 
credible. But reason was to be the ultimate judge of those observations. Scientists like 
Gilbert and Boyle attempted to postulate a new philosophy built upon the two 
foundations of Rationalism and Empiricism. But the basic metaphysical suppositions of 
Cartesian philosophy were maintained. xx  
Hobbes saw the Cartesian Dualism as a form of scholastic occultism. For him, all 
activity and change was motion, since thinking was an activity, it too must be motion, if 
so then the mind must be corporeal. The mind for Hobbes became a corporeal body, and 
the idea too, must be corporeal. The nominalistic aspect of his philosophy had been 
present in England since the middle ages and so there is no surprise that in England, at 
least, Descartes metaphysics would be challenged along these lines.  
But this implies that there can be no essence without existence. The only things that 
can exist for Hobbes are particular objects in motion which must be thought of as 
corporeal images present to the mind. The activity of thinking becomes nothing more 
than the stringing together of images. The problem of the Cartesian Dualism was in fact 
not solved, but worsened in the following way.  
This new theory of mind postulated not a res cogitans, distinct from the res extensa, 
but one dependent wholly upon it. Since the res extensa consisted of only bodies in 
motion and the res cogitans consisted of organic bodies in motion the res cogitans 
becomes a small dependent aspect confined to a section of the human brain.  
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Hobbes interpretation of the Cartesian Dualism became the standard interpretation of 
the problem. Mind was still confined and shut off from the res extensa, but now it was no 
longer distinct. It became just a ghost image of it, a collection of gradually decaying 
images of sense perception, external motions communicated via the sense organs as 
motions in the mind. In this way, Hobbes continued the Galilean conception of the res 
extensa as a geometrical configuration into a description of the human mind. What 
applied to the res extensa in terms of its accurate description via mathematical 
demonstration was now applicable to the mind. 
The problem of Descartes dualism found its final resolution in Boyle. Both Descartes 
and Galileo had been eager to banish man from the mathematical cosmos and place mind 
in a meager location, the pineal gland, with the only access to the res extensa via the 
secondary qualities of an unreal interface. The result was the reduction of the secondary 
causes to sensory illusion. Boyle asserted that they were in fact just as real as the primary 
causes in extension. But they were not real, in the sense of being a part of the res extensa; 
they were real as images of the mind. The mind’s perception of reality was now 
introduced as a key component. While perception may be real, it is real only in the sense 









“Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is 
to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, 
whether metaphysical or physical, whether occult 
qualities or mechanical, have no place in 
experimental philosophy.” 
Isaac Newton 
Principles, II, 314 
 
Newton and the Metaphysics of Science 
 
If Descartes effectively translated the epistemology of science into philosophy, its rationalism failed to 
mediate the empirical and mathematical strains of science. The final coming together of both strains with 
philosophy, to form a cogent metaphysics would fall to Sir Isaac Newton. He did not significantly differ 
from the physiology or the metaphysics of Descartes when it came to the mind. While he speaks of man as 
being in immediate contact with the world, the point of contact is a small window through which the soul 
gains access via the senses. Like Descartes’ pineal gland, Newton postulated the sensorium, a tiny seat in 
the brain where the soul resides. It is through that tiny region that all contact with the res extensa takes 
place. The secondary qualities have no real existence outside the human mind, but are manufactured within 
the sensorium, in response to the mechanical manipulation of particulate matter by the res extensa.  
Where he differed was that unlike Galileo, Kepler and Descartes, Newton did not 
believe in the a priori notion of mathematical certainty. For him there were mathematical 
truths, and there were physical truths. Mathematical formulations had to be continually 
modeled on experience. He rejected outright any hypothesis, or speculative philosophy 
that might attempt to explain a truth, beyond empirically observed facts. Without the 
verification of experience, the mathematical demonstration was only an abstraction. In 
this way, Newton managed to fuse the two dominant strains of seventeenth century 
science; the empirical and mathematical. In the end, we have to acknowledge that it was 
the empirical that took a slight dominance.  
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The inability of mathematics to solve all problems with certainty led him to consider 
the ancient position that what is certain is geometrical and what is less so is mechanical. 
In the Principia Newton developed an empirical and practical method where geometry 
was a part of universal mechanics. It, along with other branches of mechanics, makes up 
the science of bodily motions, a science that is always in the service of practical needs. 
Science became a twofold process, the deduction of forces from certain motion, and the 
demonstration of other motions from the forces thus identified. 
For Newton, it was an analysis of force existent in the ‘thing- in- itself’, evidenced by 
motions, that was the starting point of both science and philosophy. This single 
Newtonian achievement was necessary for the development of modern mechanics, the 
new definition of physical bodies as mass. It meant that in addition to their geometrical 
characteristics of extension they also posses vis inertia, the acceleration imparted to them 
by a given external force.  
The concept of Mass helped to transform Descartes mechanical vision of the universe 
into a strict geometrical machine, as Newton’s theory of gravity replaced the questionable 
Cartesian theory of Vortices. The transformation was aided by new definitions of Space, 
Time, Place and Motion, found in the Principles that proved to have significant impact on 
metaphysics. 
It is clear that in Newton the concept of place, a part of space occupied by a body, is 
reduced to a mathematical understanding of relative relationship between masses. It is 
stripped of any potential qualities outside the discourse of mathematical demonstration. 
The result is that any conception of the genus loci, understood from either the position of 
Ancient Greek philosophy or Modern Phenomenology, becomes unthinkable. 
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Space was divided into absolute and relative. Absolute space exists without regard to 
anything external and remains singular and immovable. It is a total abstraction existing 
without reference to anything real. Relative space refers to movable dimension, or the 
measure of absolute space between bodies in absolute space. It therefore requires a fixed 
reference point from which to measure the bodies in question.  
How Newton related these concepts to time became an enduring metaphysical 
problem. Again in the Principles, Newton gave his definition of time, but it is under the 
section on motion that he developed an understanding of time that was completely 
mathematical and divorced from human experience. Absolute motion is the translation of 
a mass from one place in absolute space to another, and relative motion the translation of 
a mass from one relative place to another. 
The relationship between time and the length of the day, or the seasons, Newton saw 
as vulgar, the exact length of a day varies and so this experiential understanding is false. 
Real or absolute time is liable to no change and therefore, immutable. Absolute, True, 
and mathematical time flows equably without regard to anything external. Referred to as 
duration, it was a means of quantifying motion. Space and time now became quotients in 
a mathematical equation, attaching the concept of absolute time to the concept of motion. 
Space and time become either entirely relative or entirely abstract concepts.xxi The result 










“I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena 
of nature by the same kind of reasoning from 




Science and the Image of the World 
 
Science created a new image of the world through the redefinition of three 
metaphysical categories, reality, causality and mind. But this image brought with it 
several fundamental problems that would manifest themselves in the form of crisis in 
both science and modern metaphysics. They would also surface within the discourse of 
architecture, and are fundamental to understanding the critique posed by tectonic theory. 
Reality was no longer a world of substances possessing ultimate qualities 
discoverable through the logic of human reason. It was now a world of atomic particles 
possessing only quantitative characteristics, composed of the primary causes of 
extension, mass and vis inertia, explainable through mathematical axioms. But the 
phenomenal world was surely a more complex construct than that.  
The dismissal of the qualitative characteristics, as sensory illusion, created an 
interesting enigma. If reality is only that which is fixed, permanent, and known through 
quantitative analysis, how do we account for the apparent fact that the majority of human 
experiences are of flux and change? And how is it that our knowledge of the world is 
predominantly through qualitative sensory perception? It must consist of the secondary 
causes as well. 
It is perhaps the conception of time as quantitative, divorced from any qualitative 
conception of ‘being’ that has had the most profound impact. Myth, that attempts to 
 161
overcome the temporal spectrum by making a past moment ever present, became a major 
problem for modern metaphysics. Memory and the platonic notion of ‘Recollection’ also 
became irrelevant. The result was the permanent exclusion of lived experience from the 
world of reality. 
Modern science redefined causality, when it replaced the Aristotelian question ‘Why 
is this thing not another?’ with the question ‘how is this thing related to another?’. 
Answers were expected in terms of mathematical equations that explained the underlying 
geometrical laws of physics. The purpose of a thing in the world of human knowing, it’s 
final causality, became irrelevant to the discourse of knowledge.  
The fundamental assumption of the new science was that all cause and effect is 
reducible to the motions of elementary ‘mass- units’, stated in the form of mathematical 
equations. All explanations were now given in terms of the simplest elements, related to 
causes mechanically treatable. The world became a vast mechanical machine, operating 
according to fixed geometrical laws. All transcendental value was effectively removed 
from reality when God, the efficient cause, ceased to be the embodiment of a geometrical 
universe, and became the originator of an efficient cosmological mechanism. God ceased 
to be present in reality and man lost his place as the connection between God and nature.  
With the explanation of things in terms of efficient and final causes eliminated, the 
discourse of knowledge was reduced to a concern for formal and material causality 
(‘what is it?’ and ‘what is its constitutive material?’). Purpose, understood as utility, and 
material understood as mass, became the only categories through which man could relate 
to the world.  
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But man inherently needs to ask the ‘Whys?’ of efficient and final causes. This is the 
very essence of religion and of human nature in general. The refusal of modern science 
and philosophy to ask the questions we most desperately need to ask, even if those 
answers are unsatisfactory, resulted in a sense of alienation in the modern world.  
With the adoption of the doctrine of primary and secondary causes came a new 
conception of mind. No longer defined by its faculties, the mind became a collection of 
‘images’, sensations caused by external mechanical motions. Locked away in a small 
corner of the brain, it was only a passive spectator in a world of infinite extension. The 
resulting dualism produced a rift between the world of nature and a world of subjective 
perception. The subjective consciousness of the individual mind was now severed from 
the physical world of nature, as well as the social world of human interaction. Access to 
these realms of experience now became problematic. The only way to prove their 
existence was through the abstract rationality of a subjective mind, one divorced from the 
body and from physical reality. 
There are fundamental epistemological concerns with this theory of mind. The soul is 
conceived of as that part of the mind that possesses intellection, the capacity for 
understanding. It resides within a small part of the brain with the only means of accessing 
the external res extensa being via atomic motions acting through the senses. But those 
senses can deceive and therefore, need correction by the rational substance of the soul 
itself. How then can we be certain, given that reason sometimes fails us, that we have any 
knowledge of the res extensa that is true with any degree of certainty? The theory of 
mind, and the ensuing epistemology it determined, led inevitably to a skeptical position 
toward truth.  
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The result was Positivism. The discovery of knowledge was far too meager and 
limited to ever postulate a comprehensive system of knowing that would provide a theory 
of the whole. In the end, science fails to provide a greater understanding of the world of 
knowledge, both human and divine. Science, and the discourse of knowledge, was now 
limited to merely acquiring incomplete fragmentary bits of information, based upon 
observation and experiment, all in the hopes of one day having acquired enough, to begin 
to understand some small part. The establishment of principles and axioms were things 
now viewed with unease, as unscientific.  
The theory of mind embodied in the Cartesian dualism has consistently been refuted. 
The very existence of art, religion and civilization, it has been argued,xxii imply a mind 
widely different from that proposed by science. As the philosopher of science E.A. Burtt 
has pointed out, unless science can develop a more accurate account of mind, it cannot 
produce a cosmology that is adequate to man’s existence.xxiii Hence the problem with 
modern science, it cannot work within human experience, and is fundamentally, always 
at odds with it. 
The basic assumption that caused this epistemological shift, the supremacy of 
mathematical demonstration in the attainment of absolute certainty, was never, from the 
time of Kelper to the present, questioned by science. But it was precisely this notion, that 
mathematical truths are discovered in the facts of the objective world that was later 
contested outside of science. The Neapolitan philosopher Vico would be the first to raise 
the question; ‘was the truth discovered, the harmony of the universe, or the truth of 
mathematics itself as a closed hermetic system?’xxiv Scientists and their philosophical 
supporters in the 16th and 17th, insisted it was the former. The critics of this new 
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epistemology would insist on the later. While philosophy has challenged the supremacy 
of quantitative over qualitative characteristics, the dominant episteme of modernity, 
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mathematical proportions. Number was the first model of things in the mind of the creator and all 
knowledge was measurement. 
vii The term ‘instrumentalization’ is taken from Alberto Perez- Gomez’ Architecture and the Crisis of 
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Chapter 8: Rationalism and the Duality of Beauty 
 
Classical architecture, through the sixteenth century, existed within an 
epistemological framework governed by transcendental values, and a metaphysics that 
understood the lived world as a microcosm of the macrocosm. The image of the world 
formed by that framework provided the foundation for both theory and practice. But that 
image was giving way, as the foundations on which it was based were increasingly 
undermined.  
The seventeenth century began as a world of divided epistemology that applied an 
instrumental mathematics to the physical world of nature, while holding to transcendental 
values and Divine intervention. Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum, of 1620, proposed a 
new form of knowledge, one derived from natural phenomena and independent of 
transcendental values. Knowledge was no longer perceived as the closed hermetic system 
it once was, proceeding from necessary particulars, to universal truths enshrouded in 
divine revelation.  
By the middle of the century a new image of the world began to take hold, as 
Cartesian metaphysics became the pedagogical foundation of the newly formed 
academies, being established around Europe. Architectural theory, in the wake of these 
changes, found itself stripped of its metaphysical foundation, leaving the precepts, upon 
which the discipline had been founded, open to challenge and alteration. A response was 
inevitable, particularly in France, where there was a concerted effort to impose the 




“. . . the only things that fully convince me are those 
that I clearly and distinctly perceive.”  
René Descartes  
Meditations on First Philosophy 
 
“. . . the things we conceive very clearly and very 
distinctly are all true . . .” 
René Descartes  
Discourse on Method 
 
The Cartesian Influence on the National Academies  
 
In the 17th century, the regime of Louis XIV began establishing state run academies. 
The establishment of the academies was not limited to France, but it was there that it 
began and was most comprehensive. They established a system of formal education in 
various areas of Science, and the Arts and Letters, all under the direct guidance of the 
monarchy, or its agents. The first of these, the Academie Francaise, was founded in 1635 
by Richelieu to oversee the French Language. It was followed by the Academie de 
Peinture et de Sculpture (1648), the Academie de Danse (1661), the Academie des 
Inscriptions et Belles- Lettres (1663), the Academie des Sciences (1666), the Academie de 
France a Rome (1666), and the Academie de Musique (1669). The final academy to be 
established was the Academie Royale d’Architecture in 1671.  
With the founding of the Academie des Sciences, the pedagogy of the academies 
became ever more influenced by the new epistemology of science and in particular, the 
philosophy of charité Descartes. His work, published between 1637 and 1644, had an 
influence on French thought that should not be underestimated. By mid- century 
Cartesian philosophy consistently shows up as the prominent philosophical underpinning 
in most disciplines.  
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The influential painter Charles Le Brun (1619- 90) had based his interpretations of 
the human emotions and their representation in painting on Descartes Treatise of the 
Passions of 1649. The writer Charles Perrault was a Cartesian, as were his four brothers, 
including his elder brother Claude, and Nicolas, a physicist who furthered Descartes 
mechanical conception of the universe. The philosopher Gerauld de Cordemoy, author of 
Discours Physique de la Parole, published in 1668, was a Cartesian. His son was the 
architectural theorist Jean Louis de Cordemoy (1626-1684). 
In architecture, France saw several influential theorists emerge whose early training 
was in areas now widely considered to be sciences. They brought with them an 
understanding and respect for the new epistemology of science and the philosophy of 
Descartes. The theorist and professor of the Academie Royal D’Architecture, Roland 
Freart de Chambray (1606- 76) had been trained in mathematics, geometry and 
perspective. Claude Perrault (1613- 88), translator of Vitruvius and author of the 
Ordonnance des cinq especes de colonnes selon la methode des Anciens, was trained as a 
doctor and published several texts on diverse subjects such as Histoire des animaux, and 
Traite de Mecanique. Francois Blondel (1617- 1686), the first director of the Royal 
Academie d’ Architecture, was an engineer and mathematician.  
The new epistemology of science caused a rethinking of the traditional structure of 
the arts and sciences, as they had been passed down through history. Accepting its 
premises meant the rejection of ancient authority, not only in the natural sciences and 
astronomy. It also began to be rejected in the area of Arts and Letters as well. Scientists 
and intellectuals throughout Europe began to debate not only the authority of ancient 
texts and art, but also their role as canonical works to be imitated.  
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The debate was most vocal in France, where it took on political dimensions, when the 
monarchy sought to establish modern France as one of histories great civilizations. All 
that was needed was to show how modern achievements in the arts and sciences were 
equal or superior to those of the golden ages of Rome and Athens. What ensued was the 
now famous Querelle des Anciens et Modernes.  
One of the central figures initiating the Querrelle was Charles Perrault. He was a 
well-known writer of fairy tales and was close to Jean- Baptiste Colbert who founded the 
Academies. He, like his brothers Claude and Nicolas, was heavily influenced by 
Cartesianism. Charles had credited Descartes with overturning Aristotelian metaphysics 
and both Nicolas and Claude had used Cartesian models and methods in their research in 
physics. While advancing the tenets of Descartes, they were also guarded, criticizing 
those that believed that his ideas would lead to final causes.  
Charles was perhaps more an ardent anti- Aristotelian, than an ardent Cartesian. 
While accepting most of Descartes’ ideas, he rejected the idea put forward in Descartes’ 
Principia Philosophiae of 1644 regarding the origin of innate ideas. Descartes postulated 
that the mind was endowed with clear and distinct ideas, placed there by God that could 
be supported by mathematical demonstration and since God does not deceive, these ideas 
must be true. Charles Perrault and his brothers rejected Descartes’ assumption, not on the 
basis of their charité to reason, or on the basis of their mathematical structure, this they 
accepted. What they did not accept as scientific truth was that such clear and distinct 
ideas were placed in the mind by God. For the Perrault’s this was a theological issue. 
Descartes was still attempting to reconcile philosophy with theology. For him the 
universe was mechanistic, but it still retained a connection to the divine, if only 
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tangentially. The Perrault brothers, like other Cartesians at the time, attempted to avoid 
the obvious paradoxes in Descartes’ thinking by separating reason and faith. There might 
be innate ideas possessing charité of reason, but their divine origin could not be proven. 
They were in one sense in the vanguard on this issue. Later 18th century philosophers 
would dismiss several of Descartes’ hypothetical theories as flights of fantasy. While 
adhering to Descartes’ methodology, they were more in tune with Galileo’s maxim that 
all hypotheses’ should be rejected. Following a strict interpretation of the epistemology 
of science they rejected any argument that claimed access to efficient, or final causes. 
Investigations that revealed the underlying laws of formal and material causality, in terms 
of necessary and mathematically determined relations, were of greater value and in 
possession of greater certainty.  
This represents a proto- positivistic stance, a growing trend in the years between 1680 
and 1730, when Newton’s natural philosophy was first receiving general acceptance. We 
can see evidence of this in Claude Perrault’s Essais de Physique published in 1680, 
where he states: “It is impossible to arrive at a perfect knowledge of things” and again “. . 
. we do not seek anything in this science other than what we can reasonably hope for, and 








“I could not do better than to try once and for all to 
get all the beliefs I had accepted from birth out of 
my mind, so that once I have reconciled them with 
reason I might again set up either other, better 
ones or even the same ones. And I firmly believed 
that by this means I would succeed in conducting 
my life much better than were I to build only on old 
foundations or to lean only on the principles of 
which I permitted myself to be persuaded in my 
youth without ever having examined whether or not 
they were true.” 
René Descartes 
Discourse on Method 
 
The Querelle between the Ancients and the Moderns 
 
The Querelle began on January 27, 1687 when Charles Perrault read a poem, entitled 
“Le Siecle de Louis Le Grand” (“The Century of Louis the Great”), to an assembly of 
members from the Academie Francais and the Academie de Sciences. In the poem 
Perrault compared the reign of Louis XIV with the age of Augustus. While admiring the 
greatness of the Roman age, its authors and artists, he claimed the moderns did not have 
to bow before them. Perrault went on to state that the progress in the sciences and the arts 
under Louis XIV was superior. In reaction to this D.N. Boileau, the famous literary critic 
and poet, is said to have stormed out, later calling Perrault ignorant of taste. While the 
actual Querrelle between Perrault and Boileau ended around 1703 with Perrault’s death, 
it took the form of a broader cultural upheaval that lasted well into the 1700’s.  
For his part, Charles Perrault documented the debates in his Parallel des ancienes et 
des modernes, a four volume collection of five dialogues, published between 1687 and 
1697. It spelled out and developed the form of the debates that would eventually shape 
French culture and the Enlightenment. The first dialogue stated the principles, the second 
covered the three visual arts of painting, sculpture and architecture, the third was devoted 
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to eloquence, the fourth to poetry, and the fifth to the sciences. Only eloquence and 
poetry were found to be superior in the work of the ancients.  
The Parallele was important in the development of modern thought for several key 
reasons. First it established an awareness of the value of modern work, including the need 
for a modern canon of works. In doing so it challenged the conception of the past as a 
glorified golden age of perfection, to be copied but never quite achieved. It replaced it 
with a teleological view of history, in which man’s perfectibility lay not in the past, but in 
the future.  
In many ways the Parallele did for the arts and letters what Francis Bacon’s Novum 
Organun had done for science. Bacon too, challenged the authority of the ancients and 
attacked the hermetic system of knowledge. He called for a new system independent of 
transcendental conceptions. Science was seen as progressive, based upon learned 
experience, accumulated over time, and added to by each successive generation. It 
became a collective task of humanity, moving toward greater perfectibility with time. 
The Parallele also established a clear separation between the arts and sciences, by 
treating them as distinct systems in separate books. Only music was still considered a 
science, owing to the fixed and permanent mathematical proportions of the harmonic 
cords. He also rejected the Renaissance idea that art had any ‘scientific’ function. As the 
art historian Kristeller has pointed out, this is perhaps the first time in history that we find 
this kind of complete separation.ii It proved to be an important step in the development of 
a modern definition of art, one being formed by the painter Charles Le Brun (1619- 90).  
Le Brun’s lectures on art theory were the basis of the academies’ teaching, in them he 
rejected the Renaissance notion that artists should emulate nature. This, he believed, 
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could only lead to confusion. He no longer saw art as a vehicle to uncover the underlying 
truths of nature. Instead, he proposed it as a product of an acquired culture. It became the 
basis of academism in the arts. The young artist, according to him, should study the 
canon of great masters. This was what was to be emulated. The Parallele supported this 
shift. The arts and sciences are separate because their subject of study is different. 
In his dialogue on science, Perrault rejected astrology and alchemy as fantasy, lacking 
any true principles in the scientific sense. He also began to make the distinction between 
scientific thought, defined as truth, and the hermetic tradition, seen as shrouded in the 
occult and myth, and projected as pure illusion. He wrote in the Parallele: “Man has no 
proportion and no relation with the heavenly bodies . . . infinitely distant from us.”iii The 
central tenet of the Aristotelian cosmology, man as the link between Nature and the 
divine was completely dismissed.  
In the end, the Querelle and the subsequent publication of the Parallele represent an 
important step in the attempt to supplant one epistemological system by another. It began 
the removal of faith in transcendental values and replaced it with pure rationalism and 
science defined as mathematical demonstration. As Perez- Gomez has claimed: “It was 
an affirmation of faith in progress and militant reason . . .”iv  
While the arguments in the Parallele were historically significant they were not the 
last word. The Quarelle in fact, lasted well into the 18th century. One of its chief 
battlegrounds was the Academie Royal d’Architecture. This had been founded in 1671 by 
Jean Baptiste Colbertv, as the central architectural institution in France, and remained so 
until 1798. Its task was to establish binding architectural doctrine and develop a 
systematic method of teaching architecture historically, it was the first institution to do 
 175
so. The Academie was founded upon a belief in the absolute authority of antiquity and the 
notion that the only means of achieving perfection in architecture was through the 
imitation of ancient works. It met weekly to discuss themes central to architecture, which 
usually consisted of reading the texts of earlier theorists.  
It also held public lectures twice a week for the education of young architects. Unlike 
the classic liberal arts education, structured according to two main fields of study, the 
triuvium, consisting of grammar, logic and rhetoric, and the quadruvium, consisting of 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, the public lectures of the Academie Royal 
d’Architecture show a heavier influence on the quadruvium. The subjects taught were 
geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, hydraulics, military architecture and perspective. There 
was in fact, a strong Cartesian influence from the beginning. As Kruft points out: “. . . in 
the case of Freart de Chambray, the principles on which the Academie’s discussions were 
based were derived from philosophy and the natural sciences, and were not specific to 
architecture: in the spirit of Descartes’ rationalist philosophy, the basic principle of all 
discussion is raison. Only mathematics can guarantee certitude, while geometry is the 
basis of all beauty. Bons sens (good Sense) saves the architect from mistakes. Experience 
serves as a control for raison.”vi  
It was in many ways this duality within the Academie itself, between the respect for 
the authority of the ancients and the influence of the new epistemology, that lead to its 
becoming a flash point for the Querelle. The debate lasted for nearly 80 years and 
eventually spread throughout Europe, dominating the discourse in all the newly formed 




“. . . the mind is wholly diverse from the body” 
René Descartes  
Meditations on First Philosophy 
 
Baroque Science and the Duality of Beauty 
 
Into this cantankerous world of shifting epistemologies, came three prominent 
Baroque architects. All were significant builders, having an enormous effect on the 
profession in their respective countries, and all were trained in the sciences. They were 
the Frenchman Claude Perrault (1613- 88), the Italian Guerin (1624- 83), and the 
Englishman Christopher Wren (1632- 1723). Each wrote treatises that were structured 
according to the epistemology of science, which examined the principles of architecture 
and challenged the foundations upon which they stood. All three provided a rationalized 
theory of architecture by recourse to a duality of beauty, that left architecture 
characterized as either an airs fabricant, or an airs subjective.  
While all three were in Paris during the years of 1665 and 1666, there is no concrete 
evidence supporting the idea that they meet and conversed on the subject of architecture. 
But given their respective prominence, and Wren’s comment that he sought to meet all 
the prominent scientists and architects in Paris during his stay, it is conceivable that they 
may have exchanged ideas. It is not likely that they were familiar with their respective 
publications. Each was formulating and writing during the same time period, and the 
publication of their texts, in their respective countries, appeared later. Peril’s Les Dix 
Livers d’Architecture de Vitruve was published in 1673 and the Ordonnance des cinq 
especes des colonnes selon la methode des anciens in 1683. Guarini’s treatise 
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Architettura civile was written between 1678 and 1683 but not published until 1737. For 
his part Wren formulated and most likely wrote his Tracts during the 1670’s, they 
remained unpublished until 1750. Only Perrault’s writings were translated into another 
language, English.  
The similarities of their critiques of architecture and their similar proposal of a duality 
of beauty should be seen not as the result of direct, or indirect contact, but as a result of 
the influence of their early training in science. It is an indication of the pervasiveness of 
scientific thought, and the strong will to make every discipline conform to its 
methodology. This proved to be a tendency that was not limited to any single country, but 
was a general condition throughout Europe at the time.  
 
“. . . how ill-founded is the opinion of people who 
believe that the proportions supposed to be 
preserved in architecture are as certain and 
invariable as the proportions that give musical 
harmony its beauty and appeal, proportions that do 
not depend on us but that nature has established 
with absolutely immutable precision and that cannot 
be changed without immediately offending even the 
least sensitive ear.”  
Claude Perrault 
Ordonnance for the five Kinds of Columns 
after the Method of the Ancients 
 
Claude Perrault and the Rationalization of Architectural Proportion 
 
In France, the Querelle took center stage in the Academie, largely due to the 1683 
publication, of the Ordonnance. It brought the debate straight to the heart of architectural 
theory. Claude Perrault, the brother of Charles Perrault, had been trained in medicine, but 
he showed a keen interest in various aspects of scientific research, much of which he 
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published in Essais de Physique (1680). The first volume of this contained his research 
on the workings of the body, the second and third on sound and perception.vii He is today 
best known for his translation of and commentary on, Vitruvius, that served as the 
definitive translation in French until the mid- 1850’s. His most controversial text, the one 
that would undermine the authoritas of the canons of classical architecture, and the one 
that concerns us most here, was the Ordonnance des cinq especes de colonnes selon la 
methode des Anciens.  
The Ordonnance can be divided into two parts: the more theoretical ‘Preface’, and the 
remaining text, which deals with Perrault’s method for calculating the proportions of the 
orders and his refutation of optical refinements. It has been argued that the Ordonnance 
had little direct impact on architecture.viii This is to an extent correct. The system of 
proportion found within the Ordonnance did not substantially alter the method, and or 
means, of developing the classical orders in either France or England, the only other 
country in which it was published.  
But Perrault’s theory, found in the ‘Preface’, is another matter. Following his brother 
Charles’ refutation of the superiority of the ancients, Claude launched an attack on 
Medieval Scholasticism and the hermeneutical approach toward knowledge and learning 
that had dominated the discourse since the Italian Renaissance. ix If, in the epistemology 
of science, knowledge had yet to attain its highest power then surely this was also the 
case for architecture. Perrault began to conceive of architecture as a progressive discourse 
moving ever forward in increasing rationalization. Rejecting the Renaissance definition 
of architecture as a reflection of cosmology, Perrault sought to align architectural theory 
with the epistemology of science by making it adhere to Cartesian reason.  
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The ‘Preface’ contained several key theoretical arguments, the first was the rejection 
of the musical analogy in architecture, the second was the rejection of the immutability of 
the theory of proportions and the third was Perrault’s assertion of ‘Positive’ and 
‘Arbitrary’ beauty. While He was neither the first, nor the only one to assert this form of 
duality in beauty, the Ordonnance contains the first application of it to architectural 
theory. The Dual definition of beauty would take center stage in theoretical discussions 
for the next 75 years. It marked a radical shift in architectural theory one based on the 
epistemology of science and Descartes new theory of mind.  
Even before its publication, Francois Blondel (1617- 86), Perrault’s contemporary 
and a professor at the Academie Royale d’ Architecture, dedicated three chapters of his 
Cours D’Architecture published between 1675 and 1683,x to its refutation. Blondel 
understood that Perrault was applying an instrumentalized understanding of number in 
his theory. While Blondel too asserted the geometrical nature of architecture, for him, it 
still possessed the transcendental qualities of mathmesis. Perrault’s theory, he believed, 
could lead to the establishment of fixed rules for the orders, even if Perrault, himself, 
would have rejected them.  
In the ‘Preface’ to the Ordonnance, Perrault begins by stating that the five classical 
orders represent the only existent rule in architecture, but that the proportions of the 
orders were treated in one of two ways. The first is the imitation of an established model. 
The second is the use of an established set of proportions, such as those of Palladio, 
Vignola or Scamozzi. He does not seek a resolution of the first and second methods his 
intention is to propose a third. 
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Perrault blatantly rejects the first method, the imitation of a perceived model, or 
canon, outright in much the same way as a slavish adherence to ancient authority is 
rejected by science. He was keenly aware of the inherent occultism in the imitation 
theory. Architects, such as Villalpando, had argued that works like the Temple of 
Solomon embodied divine numbers, communicated to man directly by God. Like his 
brother Charles’ rejection of Descartes’ assertion that innate ideas were God- given, 
Claude rejected any notion that the proportions of the orders used by the ancients were 
either divinely inspired, or an absolute truth. It was this rejection of the transcendental 
origins of the orders or of their proportions that lead him to refute the musical analogy.  
The rules for the orders, Perrault informs his reader, are well established as to their 
general character and proportions, but vary immensely in details and dimensions from 
architect to architect. He claims: “This shows just how ill- founded is the opinion of 
people who believe that the proportions, supposed to be preserved in architecture, are as 
certain and invariable as the proportions that give musical harmony its beauty and appeal, 
proportions that do not depend on us, but that nature has established with absolutely 
immutable precision and cannot be changed without immediately offending even the least 
sensitive ear.”xi The statement is telling.  
Why does Perrault attack the notions, first that the proportions are immutable, and 
second that they are related to musical harmonies? There are several key points to keep in 
mind here. First, Renaissance theory advanced the notion that architecture was related to 
the cosmos via proportions. Derived from the geometric symbolism of Pythagoras’ 
Iambicus and Plato’s Timeaus, Renaissance theorists from Francesco di Giorgio Martini, 
and Alberti, on to Daniele Barbaro and Palladio, all advanced the conception that 
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architecture embodied the harmony of the universe through the use of such symbolic 
numbers.xii In this way architecture was a microcosm of the macrocosm that embodied 
the absolute truth of the cosmos, making it a reflection of divine creation.  
Second, it was Alberti who, in De Re Aedificatoria, claimed that the mathematical 
harmony of the universe could be found in certain proportional relationships identified in 
music as harmonic cords. It should be noted that the structure of that universe was 
Ptolemaic. Ptolemy’s universe was a series of fixed concentric spheres each rotating at a 
unique rate. The rate of rotation from one sphere to the other was thought to be in a ratio 
equivalent to the ratio of a harmonic cord in music, hence the phrase: ‘the harmony of the 
spheres’. Music therefore, was the manifestation of the beauty and harmony of divine 
creation in sound. Alberti argued that architects should use such ratios and proportions. In 
this way they could embody ‘The Good” in the built environment. He claimed: “The very 
same numbers that cause sound to have that concinnitas, pleasing to the ears, can also fill 
the eyes and mind with wondrous delight. From musicians therefore who have already 
examined such numbers thoroughly, or from those objects in which nature has displayed 
some evident and noble quality, the whole method of outlining is derived.”xiii  
The musical analogy was key to understanding architecture in relationship to divine 
creation. God was conceived as in possession of a mathematical mind in the creation of 
the universe, but man and nature all partake in that mathematical construction. 
Architecture was a microcosm of the macrocosm because of its adherence to specific 
proportional ratios that embodied the underlying harmony of the universe. Number in the 
form of mathmesis possessed transcendental value as an absolute geometrical 
construction. In this way, the orders, and architecture in general, were endowed with 
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transcendental value. The insistence on right proportion, as a basis for a true architecture, 
was based upon this earlier symbolic understanding of number as mathmesis and its 
relationship to the Ptolemaic cosmology in particular the idea of the sophron eros. 
The understanding of geometry, as a form of mathmesis, was still present in both 
Galileo and Kelper, but by the early 1600’s Descartes was attempting to relegate God out 
of the mathematical operations of the universe. God became only the original creator, 
who only infrequently adjusted the system, which operates mechanically according to 
fixed geometrical laws. Number became reduced to those fixed immutable laws that are 
more and more independent from the Divine. By the time of Newton, number and 
mathematics had been striped of their transcendental value, as God was also factored out 
of the understanding of the universe. By 1700 number had become instrumentalized, a 
tool of science devoid of symbolic and transcendent meaning. 
Perrault, the scientist, rejected the musical analogy because of its cosmological 
symbolism. Following his brother Charles, in the Parallele, Claude claimed music was a 
science, not because it embodied the harmony of the spheres, but because musical 
harmony could be quantifiably measured as the linear distance of the string plucked. 
Charles had demystified music and his brother Claude was doing the same for 
architecture. According to Perez- Gomez; “Architectural proportion lost in Perrault’s 
system its quality of absolute truth. Numbers no longer had their traditional magic power, 
their connotations as an essential form of divine revelation. Perrault was thus able to 
reduce the problem to the immanent discourse of reason, and at the same time question 
proportions immemorial role as the ultimate justification of praxis.”xiv With the symbolic, 
or mythical, basis for the proportional system of the orders debunked, Perrault was free to 
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advance his cause: the rationalization of architectural theory. He did this by applying the 
scientific method to the study of architecture.  
Perrault rejected the second method, which relied on given canonical systems of 
proportion, because of the variety and complexity of the systems put forward. He saw 
Palladio, Vignola and Scamozzi attempt to establish a canon, or rule of proportion, for 
the orders, but notes that they were not granted the authority to do so, nor were they able 
to establish rules that were self- evident in themselves. That is to say, they did not possess 
either the strength of personality, or the reasoned authority of scientific probability, that 
would have produced a fixed, constant and established basis for the orders.  
While most architects had used a clear whole number ratio of column diameter to 
height, they often resorted to complicated fractional ratios in the determination of their 
lesser details. Those ratios changed from order to order further complicating the method 
of designing the columns.  
In point of fact, many of the variations had originated as optical refinements. Perrault 
rejected the need for these because, as he claimed, the eye cannot be deceived by visual 
imperfection. In so claiming, he is following the Cartesian belief that vision is the least 
deceptive of the senses, because the rationality of the mind quickly corrects such optical 
illusions. Descartes metaphysics was occularcentric, and Perrault’s insistence that there 
was no need for optical refinements is one example of how this was carried over into 
architecture. But it also carries with it epistemological weight, the possibility that there 
could be no discrepancy between reality and the ideal. The optical refinements only 
served to complicate the measurements and thereby the proportions of the orders. 
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Like Copernicus before him, Perrault sought a simpler mathematical equation. This 
reveals his adherence to the aesthetic prerogative; the simpler mathematical formulation 
is the more beautiful solution, present in science from Copernicus onward. One must 
remember that the acceptance of the heliocentric theory of the universe by scientists had 
less to do with whether it was true, and more to do with the simplicity of the equations, as 
compared to the complexity of the Ptolemaic solution.  
Perrault’s ‘third’ method was an attempt to make the proportions conform to reason. 
He proposed a mathematical mean derived from the previously established canons that 
used only whole numbers. He claimed of his system: “Now it is easy to see that the third 
method is at least simpler and more convenient than the others . . . As a result, even if one 
may not be able to claim that this proportion is the true one . . . it should at least be 
considered a likely proportion, since it is founded on the regular division of a whole into 
three equal parts.”xv He justified this system by stating that it was a return to the origins 
of architecture, Vitruvius’ proportional system had been based upon whole numbers.xvi  
The moderns, he believed, deviated from this system because they found 
inconsistencies in the ancient works studied, leading them to believe that there was no 
rational fixed basis for the proportions of the orders. Perrault blamed the inconsistencies 
on poor construction techniques. “The carelessness of those who built the ancient 
buildings we see is the only reason for the failure of these proportions to follow exactly 
their true ones, which one may reasonably believe were established by the first 
originators of architecture.”xvii The ancients had of course intended to build consistently 
according to whole number proportions. His method therefore, built upon the previous 
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collected knowledge, and sought to perfect it through the rationalization of the 
mathematical formulations of its parts.  
While Perrault’s method failed to have much impact on architecture, it provides much 
insight in understanding his thinking. At the root of his discourse on the orders is a 
concern with the discrepancies between the dimensions of the real works and the 
theoretical calculations. Previous architects had never been concerned with this. In 
Aristotelian metaphysics there is an acknowledged gap between the ideal and the real, 
due to the lower level of nature in the hierarchy of reality. The irregularities are not 
questioned, but rather accepted, as the effects of attempting to transfer the ideal into the 
material world, a world that is in essence, always flawed. The earlier approach 
established a relationship between theory and practice that was continuous. Both theory 
and practice played reciprocal roles in the comprehension of architecture, as the ideal was 
translated into reality. Theory served as the metaphysical justification of praxis. In this 
way architectural value was tied to the proportional system of the orders, perceived as the 
link between the divine and reality.  
The discrepancies can only become a problem once that hierarchy is eliminated. 
Science first defined nature as infused with the divine, this eliminated the gap. It then 
defined nature as mechanical and devoid of the divine. In the mechanical world- view 
proposed by Descartes and Newton, the dimensions of an object should be exact 
corollaries to any reasonable mathematical formulation. In the case of the proportional 
theory of the orders this would mean that praxis must become identical with theory. For 
the scientist Perrault, this can only be achieved by simplifying the method of calculation, 
making it more reasonable, and therefore easier to understand and implement 
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mechanically. But it resulted in the abandonment of the sophron eros and the dialectic of 
theory and praxis central to classical tectonics as the basis of the ethical component of 
architecture.  
 
“In order to judge rightly in this case, one must 
suppose two kinds of beauty in architecture and 
know which beauties are based on convincing 
reasons and which depend only on prejudice.” 
Claude Perrault 
Ordonnance for the five Kinds of Columns 
after the Method of the Ancients 
 
Claude Perrault and the Duality of Beauty 
 
The orders had been considered the source of beauty, but observation had shown that 
those proportions were not fixed and permanent, they changed over time. From this 
Perrault concluded; the beauty of a building was less a product of unvarying proportions 
and the relative size of details, as the grace of its form. But this only proved that the 
orders varied and could not be considered a permanent, fixed truth. The fact remained 
that they were viewed by most as important to the overall beauty of a building, and 
Perrault himself viewed them as the only true rules of architecture. If they did not 
represent a fixed truth, what did they represent?  
Perrault’s answer was that they represented the shifts in culture and fashion. He 
explained this through his famous recourse to the duality of beauty. “In order to judge 
rightly in this case, one must suppose two kinds of beauty in architecture and know which 
beauties are based on convincing reasons and which depend only on prejudice.”xviii 
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Perrault called the first kind of beauty, those based upon convincing reasons, ‘Positive’. 
Those beauties Perrault saw as based upon prejudice he called ‘Arbitrary’. 
Before explaining Perrault’s use of these terms it is important to note the Cartesian 
reference in the above quote. In the Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes claimed 
the greatest utility of his systematic doubt ‘lies in freeing us of all prejudices’xix, these are 
of course the false opinions that prevent us from seeing the clear and distinct ideas, the 
charité and truth found in true reason. Perrault’s ‘Preface’ of the Ordonnance is 
Descartes method of systematic doubt, applied to architecture.  
We are told the ‘Positive’ beauties please everyone because “common sense is all that 
is needed to apprehend most kinds of positive beauty.”xx They are, in essence, clear, 
distinct and self- evident to reason, and bear close resemblance to Descartes innate ideas. 
Included among them are: the richness of the materials, the size and magnificence of the 
building, the precision and cleanness of the execution and symmetry. Perrault defines 
symmetry in two ways. The first is clearly the Vitruvian definition of symmetry, wherein 
a modular dimension is related proportionally to the parts, and to the whole establishing a 
continual series of proportional relationships between part and whole. The second is the 
more modern definition, and relates to the balanced disposition of size, number and order 
of spaces in plan- a simplistic understanding of this is bilateral symmetry.  
In contrast, the ‘Arbitrary’ beauties were based on properties that were culturally 
determined, such as proportions. Perrault appears to make the claim that they are only 
beautiful by their association with the canonical works. It is the hidden, ‘positive’ 
beauties, detected by the mind’s eye, which please us in such masterpieces. We associate 
the proportions of the orders with beauty because they are more obvious. This principle 
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of association is: “the natural basis for belief, which is nothing but the result of a 
predisposition not to doubt the truth of something we do not know if it is accompanied by 
our knowledge and good opinion of the person who assures us of it.”xxi  
The orders, their proportions and their details, are not the product of utility or 
necessity, such as might be the case in military architecture, the construction of machines, 
the disposition of the building plan, or the durability of its structure, what Perrault called 
positive and necessary reasons. It is neither emulation of nature, nor the rules of reason, 
or even good sense that constitute the ‘Arbitrary’ beauties. They are the product of 
custom and tradition, and therefore, caught up in history. But Cartesian metaphysics is 
ahistorical, there can be no truth, either human or divine, revealed in it. Because of this 
the ‘Arbitrary’ beauties can have no certain truth in themselves. They are ‘likely 
probabilities’ at best, only hypotheses. As Perrault saw it, this is the reason that they 
have, and can, be altered.  
But Perrault does not discount their validity. They are part of the accumulated 
knowledge of the discourse of architecture, a knowledge that is ever growing and moving 
toward perfectibility, in the Baconian sense. Perrault tells us his “purpose is simply to 
extend change a little further than before, to see if I might cause the rules for the orders of 
architecture to be given the precision, perfection, and ease of retention they lack by 
attempting to persuade those who have more knowledge and ability than I to work toward 
making the outcome of this project as successful as the project is itself useful and 
reasonable.”xxii His proto- positivistic stance toward science led him to proclaim that 
science was the search for probabilities of knowledge, and that is what he is searching for 
in the ‘Arbitrary’ beauties.  
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Where did Perrault get the idea of ‘Positive’ and ‘Arbitrary’ beauty? The concept is in 
fact, quite old and can be traced to Plato, who made a distinction between ‘Absolute’ and 
‘Relative’ beauty.xxiii Given the Neo-platonic bent of the 17th century scientific 
community, and their familiarity with the recently restored dialogues, it could have been 
possible for Perrault to reinterpret those concepts into the contemporary scientific 
discourse.  
Perrault was a Cartesian, and the central tenet of Cartesianism is the reduction of 
knowledge to abstract rational principles. Perrault’s ‘Positive’ beauties are those that are 
answerable to rational criteria. Judgments regarding material, size, formal distribution of 
spaces and quality of construction, can all be quantified, and measured. As such, their 
truth is of a fixed and permanent nature. They are answerable to questions of material and 
formal causes and therefore, pose no problem to the scientific mind.  
What was a problem for Perrault were the proportions of the orders. He had rejected 
the mystical or divine origin of the proportions, but was still left with a body of particular 
proportional systems each without authority of knowledge, yet collectively considered 
the body of rules for architecture. Given his empirical training as a scientist, it is not 
surprising Perrault valued the ‘Arbitrary’ Beauty of the orders, they were particulars 
derived from human observation and experience. While the Cartesians were less 
empirically minded than their English counterparts, observation of empirical phenomena 
still played an important role. 
Francis Bacon’s conception of scientific knowledge, as a continuous collective effort 
toward perfectibility, operates under the base assumption that our collective experience of 
particulars allows us a glimpse of a universal truth. By resorting to the dualism Perrault 
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found the means to account for the seeming inconsistency of the proportional systems 
and the historically observed facts, while still being able to hold to a geometrical 
structure of truth. The only thing necessary was to rationalize the particulars and 
extrapolate the universal truth they contained. By doing so the ‘Arbitrary’ beauty of the 
orders would become subject to Rationalism. 
When looked at in this way, Perrault’s dualism was an attempt to maintain the 
tradition of the orders, according to him the only true rule of architecture, in the face of 
scientific doubt. The epistemology of science demand that truth be reducible to 
mathematical law, but the observation of ancient and modern masterworks revealed a 
lack of strict adherence to mathematical law in the orders. Architecture was threatened 
with the loss of its status as the philosophy of built form. To prevent this, Perrault 
resorted to the duality, as a means of justifying the orders. He was able to remove the 
obstacle of inaccurate proportions in the orders, which prevented architecture from 
conforming to the rules of science. By doing so he effectively rationalized architectural 
theory. 
But Perrault’s process of rationalization produced two paradoxical results. The orders 
became either the location of licentious subjectivity, or a means of establishing absolute 
rules for artistic production. In the hundred years following the publication of the 
Odonnance, Perrault would be credited with having done both. 
Because it is the clarity of the rational system that reveals truth, for Perrault 
architecture cannot be a signifier of anything beyond the rationality of its own theory. 
Theory becomes an ‘ars fabricandi’, a method of fabrication, as opposed to a means of 
metaphysically justifying praxis. The theoretical system becomes self-referential and has 
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no need of continuing reinterpretation. His attempt to rationalize architectural theory 
along the lines of Cartesian science implied an epistemological framework wherein the 
evolution of the rationalization process replaced traditional metaphysics as that which 
architecture communicates. The proportional system can, therefore, become fixed, altered 
only for the purpose of increasing its own rationality. Practice becomes instrumentalized, 
a mechanical tool to reflect the pure rationality of the mind. It was for this reason that 
most architects rejected his method of calculating the proportions. 
Conversely, in his attempt to demystify the orders, he shifted the location of 
architectural value from the orders, now classified as ‘Arbitrary’ beauties, to the 
‘Positive’ beauties of material, craftsmanship, construction and symmetry. The tendency 
of Enlightenment thinkers to search for absolute truths in Nature, caused them to reject 
Perrault’s interpretation of ‘Arbitrary’ as a probable hypothesis. The orders, now freed 
from their adherence to an absolute value system, were interpreted by latter generations 
as the location of architectural license, the reflection of the subjective taste of the 
architect. In the late 1700’s, Perrault’s theory was interpreted in just this way. His 
justification of ‘Arbitrary’ beauty was seen as the cause of the extremes of the Rococo. 
As unjustified as those accusations were, what resulted was an attempt to shift the 
definition of architecture away from the ‘Arbitrary’ beauties and toward the ‘Positive’ 
beauties that opened the door to a further rationalization of theory in the form of 
functionalism. 
In the end, Perrault’s Ordonnance posed a challenge to traditional architecture. As 
Edward Robert de Zurko points out, it set the stage for the latter development of 
functionalist doctrines in two ways.xxiv First, by challenging the idea that beauty was 
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derived from mathmesis, the symbolic understanding of geometry and number present in 
the traditional theory of proportion. In classical tectonics this was the sophron eros. 
Perrault was attempting to remove the symbolic use of mathematics and geometry, and 
opting for a rational, or instrumentalized, application of number to architectural theory, in 
its place. And second by introducing the notion that beauty could be created by a variety 
of other factors such as culture, custom, material, and precise construction. This was the 
basis of his postulation of ‘Positive’ and ‘Arbitrary’: the Duality of Beauty. This too, 
would go a long way in disrupting traditional theory. It introduced the discourse of taste, 
and the subjective theory of mind, directly into architectural theory, raising new questions 
that required new answers. 
 
“There are two Causes of Beauty, natural and 
customary. . . . Here lies the great Occasion of 
Errors; here is tried the Architect’s judgment: but 
always the true Test is natural or geometrical 
Beauty.” 
Christopher Wren 
Tract I  
Christopher Wren and the Rationalization of Architectural Perception 
 
Sir Christopher Wren began his professional career, like Claude Perrault, as a 
scientist. A contemporary of Newton, and trained in Cartesian philosophy, he conducted 
significant research in mathematics, astronomy, optics, mechanics and experimental 
philosophy. Along with some colleagues from Oxford and London he founded the Royal 
Society, in 1660. Chartered by the King, it served as the first English scientific 
institution, much like the Academie des Sciences in France. It had been founded on the 
notion that one should reject all forms of received knowledge, in favor of the Baconian 
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approach. It set as its task, collecting a history of nature and the mechanical arts that 
could become the basis for establishing new scientific hypotheses.  
Included within the scope of the mechanical arts was architecture. The Royal Society 
had, in fact, established an early program designed to study and reassess the existing 
principles of architecture, and develop new ones. Fellows of the Royal Society began to 
pursue studies in building types, strength of materials, instruments and techniques of the 
building trade, as well as the practical application of mathematics to architectural 
structures. The Royal Society did not limit its studies to contemporary architecture, rather 
its fellows studied not only the architecture of earlier ages in Europe, but around the 
world as well. Wren would prove an important contributor in these areas.xxv  
Shortly after establishing the Royal Society, without having received any formal 
training, Wren turned to his second profession, as amateur architect. He received his first 
commission in 1661, the repair of Old St. Paul’s Cathedral, London, and around 1669, he 
was appointed Surveyor General. He spent much of his life studying all forms of 
architecture using both material and literary sources, always applying the critical method 
of science. While having turned his attentions toward architecture, Wren never ceased 
work on his scientific experiments, or his active involvement with the Royal Society. It 
was Wren’s dual professional life, as both architect and scientist, which shaped his 
outlook. He viewed architecture through the epistemological lens of the natural sciences.  
In addition to his scientific research, Wren is remembered for his many buildings, and 
while it is true that he never published his writings on architecture, they were known. 
Wren’s work as Surveyor General and his work and writings for the Royal Society 
concerning architecture made him a central figure in the architectural community. As 
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early as 1663, Wren was busy drawing reconstructions of historic buildings and 
investigating problems of structures. Lydia M. Soo, in Wren’s ‘Tracts’ on Architecture 
and Other Writings, comments on the many requests made by individuals to see these 
drawings, which he used to illustrate theoretical points.xxvi We can infer from this that, 
while Wren did not publish, he did discuss his writings and thoughts with others. They in 
turn would have discussed them with others. Wren was therefore, influential on his own 
generation of architects and their thinking. 
Eight of the eleven texts that he eventually wrote on architecture have survived due to 
the 1750 publication of the Parentalia.xxvii Wren’s theoretical writings on architecture are 
preserved in his 5 Tracts, begun early in his career. He began writing the Tracts in the 
1670’s and more than likely had formulated much of his theoretical ideas regarding 
architecture by the 1690’s.  
While Wren concerned himself with traditional theoretical issues found in many 
treatises of the time he approached the subject matter from the standpoint of a natural 
philosopher. By applying the methods of 17th century science to his investigations of the 
history of architecture, Wren compiled a unique collection of information that compelled 
him to question the precepts of classical theory. In all, the five Tracts made four 
significant contributions to architectural theory. Wren 1) proposed a new hypothesis for 
the origins of classical architecture, 2) he produced the first history of architecture, 3) he 
provided one of the first dualistic definitions of beauty, Perrault’s having been published 
in 1683, and 4) he also provided one of the earliest statical investigations of 
structures.xxviii  
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Where Perrault had rejected the musical analogy in the proportions of the orders, 
Wren rejected the Vitruvian analogy of the orders to the human body. Like the music 
analogy the theory of human proportions was designed to establish architecture as a 
microcosm of the macrocosm an embodiment of the sophron eros and Alutheia. Wren on 
the other hand saw no observable relationship between a column and the human form. He 
proposed that the earliest temples were no more than simple cellas around which the 
faithful gathered, and speculated, groves of trees would have been planted to shade the 
faithful. Eventually, wooden colonnades were constructed, and over time, stone columns 
replaced them. Wren referred to this proto-tree/column as the Tyrian order. Wren also 
believed that it was this order that was the one used by Tyrian and Phoenician artisans in 
the construction of the Temple of Solomon. It was from this natural/ divine order that the 
Doric, Ionic and Corinthian had evolved. With this hypothesis Wren not only dismissed 
the theory of human proportions, but also Vitruvius’ assertion that the Doric order was a 
spontaneous creation of the Greeks. He proposed that the orders evolved over time, 
originating in nature and altered by subsequent cultures.  
The persistence of the classical orders proved their universal appeal, and their 
adherence to both natural and divine law. It was for this reason that they had the right to 
be called the rules of architecture. Conversely, those orders of columns that had not 
persisted, or were used only by an individual nation, proved to be derived more from the 
fancy of the nation, or individual, than from natural and divine law. These Wren saw as 
egregious errors of judgment. But even the five orders were subject to alteration. Each 
subsequent culture had modified the proportions of the orders, as well as their small 
details, according to its own unique national taste. Wren came to the same conclusion as 
 196
Perrault; the proportions were a product of culture and not natural or divine law, but the 
orders although originating as cultural variations, adhered to natural and divine law and 
therefore, were the established rules of architecture 
When it came to the study of architecture, Wren’s hope was to uncover the 
underlying reasons for all architecture, in order to develop true theoretical principles. At 
the heart of his search was the desire to discover whether the true nature of architecture 
was based on universal, absolute laws of nature, or on the laws of man and society.  
Wren approached the subject in much the same way a natural scientist would. The 
Scientific method required the investigator to search for, and gather all available data 
comprehensively, systematically and critically. Only after having done so could one 
determine its true principles. This was the basic agenda of the Royal Society in its 
investigations as well. The result was that Wren looked beyond the models and 
precedents used by the Renaissance theorists and included in his studies the architecture 
of the Near East, China, and Islam. Prehistoric monuments such as Stonehenge and 
contemporary primitive structures from around the globe were also included.  
Soo has argued that Wren’s description of architecture possesses an historical 
consciousness and thereby represents the first true history of architecture.xxix What he 
gives us in Tracts IV and V is a chronological account of the development of architecture 
from the earliest descriptions of Old Testament structures, through the various ancient 
works, including Egyptian, Babylonian, Greek, Etruscan and Roman. Wren views these 
as evolutionary with each culture developing its own unique forms based upon the 
knowledge and progress of the previous culture. Thus each ‘style’ is a product of its own 
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time and place but architecture taken as a whole is one that moves, changes, progresses 
and potentially declines, in response to culture.  
Wren concludes that architecture is a product of culture, but the persistence of the 
classical orders with their roots in natural and divine law indicate that certain cultural 
‘inventions’ in architecture possess legitimacy as reflections of universal truth. They do 
so because they adhere to natural law and the collected experience of the ages. It was this 
ability for architecture to express natural law that lead Wren to propose that beauty in 
architecture must be understood in dualistic terms. He used the terms ‘Customary’ and 
‘Natural’ and his nomenclature clearly records his own bias. In Tract I “of Architecture” 
he states; “Beauty is a Harmony of Objects, begetting Pleasure by the eye. There are two 
causes of beauty, natural and customary. Natural is from geometry, consisting in 
uniformity (that is Equality) and proportion. Customary beauty is begotten by the use of 
our senses to those objects which are usually pleasing to us from other causes, as 
familiarity or particular inclination breeds a love to things not in themselves lovely. Here 
lies the great occasion of errors; here is tried the architect’s judgment: but always the true 
test is natural or geometrical beauty.”xxx  
Wren’s seemingly harmless statement belies a radical approach toward beauty. 
‘Natural’ beauty is defined as the product of geometry, uniformity and proportion. It is 
linked here with number and mathematical demonstrations. But ‘customary’ beauty is 
understood through the faculty of the senses and linked with aesthetic judgment. In this 
statement, Wren has introduced rationalism and the modern conception of a subjective 
mind.  
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Wren is in part taking his clues from Renaissance theory, particularly Alberti, who 
saw nature as governed by the underlying laws of geometry. In De Re Aedificatoria 
Alberti defined beauty as that Concinnitas, or the reasoned harmony of parts where 
nothing may be added or taken away without detriment to the whole. For Alberti, beauty 
in architecture was a product of the design of the lineaments and disposition in plan of 
geometrical figures that both reflected the absolute values of the cosmos and were self- 
evident to the mind. Number possessed absolute transcendental value, a value that was 
continuous from the mind of God, through the human mind, and into nature. In Alberti it 
is this continuity that allows the mind to grasp the divine beauty of nature and 
architecture. There is no judgment implied in Alberti’s thinking. Divine beauty is self- 
evident to the mind. But this kind of continuity does not exist in seventeenth century 
science. 
‘Natural’ beauty and number are not necessarily architectural qualities as Wren 
applies them. He is here applying the systematic thinking of the scientist, who does not 
view number as transcendental, but rather as instrumental. Geometry and number are 
tools to define and quantify objects of the phenomenal realm. In his 1657 inaugural 
speech to Gresham College he stated: “Mathematical Demonstrations being built upon 
the impregnable Foundations of the Geometry and Arithmetick, are the only Truths, that 
can sink into the Mind of Man, void of all Uncertainty; and all other Discourses 
participate more or less of Truth, according as the Subjects are more or less capable of 
Mathematical Demonstrations."xxxi But Wren’s use of the term mathematical 
demonstrations is unique and should be qualified.  
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The French Cartesians saw mathematics as a reflection of absolute rationality and 
truth, Descartes had believed that all truth was mathematical in nature and that it was the 
pure rationality of mathematical truths that underlay all of nature, God, and the mind. For 
this reason he believed the mind automatically corrected optical illusion and perspective 
distortion. Because of this, Perrault too, rejected optical refinements in the orders.  
Wren was an English scientist, and in England the Empirical wing of science was 
more dominant. Empiricists placed more emphasis on the visual observation of facts that 
were then demonstrated using mathematical explanations. Wren was in many ways an 
extremist in this way. While most still saw mathematical proofs as truths in themselves, 
Wren saw them only as appearances of truth. In the body of his writings, mathematical 
demonstrations and number fail to possess the quality of absolute truth evident in 
Descartes and most of the Rationalists. 
This may have been due to his extensive research into optics and the physiology of 
the human eye. Unlike Perrault who believed the mind able to correct the deficiencies of 
sight, Wren believed the opposite. While the geometric proportions of an object might be 
part of the phenomenal realm, the visual perception of those proportions, and hence the 
aesthetic experience of them, were not. According to Lydia Soo: “The phenomenon of 
architectural beauty was dependent upon the unique physical conditions under which an 
individual person would view the building, making it impossible to formulate absolute 
laws concerning the geometrical appearance, despite the fact that these appearances also 
depend upon a phenomenon of nature- the physiology of the human eye.”xxxii For this 
reason Wren often stressed the need for architects to be skilled in perspective and to think 
of perspective and viewing angles when designing. The purpose was not, as in classical 
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theory, to provide optical corrections, but to design in such a way as to minimize the 
distortion of the geometrical appearance.xxxiii  
Wren introduced the notion of subjective perception into the definition of beauty. 
What is perceived is only appearance. The concept of subjective perception and its 
relationship to truth raised by the Cartesian duality was now brought directly into the 
discourse of architectural theory. The classical conception of beauty and its relationship 
to truth was now called into question.  
Wren proposes a theory of architectural beauty in line with both Descartes and 
Newton’s theory of mind. Consciousness locked away in the sensorium or pineal gland, 
gains access to the ‘Natural’ beauty of the object, in the res extensa, via the filter of the 
senses, in this case vision. The object may possess ‘Natural’ beauty, but this can only be 
perceived via the senses. The mind no longer has direct access to it, in the way it did say 
for Alberti. Because it must rely on the body, all aesthetic appreciation becomes a matter 
of judgment. Wren’s text raises the question; is the beauty perceived the absolute beauty 
of the ‘thing- in- itself’ or the subjective beauty of the individual mind?  
If what is perceived cannot be guaranteed to be the object of phenomenal existence, 
then what governs that perception? For Wren it was governed by culture and custom, 
over and against nature, now defined as the res extensa of atomic particles in extension. 
This is key to understanding Wren, who in effect produced an even greater division of 
beauty than Perrault. 
In ‘the Sixth Meditation’ of Meditations of First Philosophy Descartes claimed: “. . . 
not all bodies exist exactly as I grasp them by sense, since this sensory grasp is in many 
cases very obscure and confused.” xxxiv Descartes had argued that when the mind had to 
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rely on the body it produced a confused form of thinking, which opened the door to miss- 
judgments and prejudice. “. . . confused modes of thinking arise from the union and, as it 
were, the commingling of the mind with the body.” Descartes defined the imagination, 
‘without exception feeble and limited’, as this commingling of mind and body. This 
confusion opens the door to judgment, which Descartes saw as governed not by the 
intellect but by the will, which is easily lead astray.xxxv  
Wren does not differ significantly, when he claims that in judgment the mind opens 
itself to outside influences that disturb the mind’s understanding of ‘Natural’ beauty. 
Except that for Wren, speaking specifically of architecture, the will is replaced with a 
familiarity produced by ‘Customary’ beauty. ‘Customary beauty is begotten by the use of 
our senses to those objects which are usually pleasing to us for other causes, as 
familiarity’ that lead to the ‘great occasion of errors.’ Unlike ‘Natural’ beauty, 
‘Customary’ beauty was a human invention, the product of the imagination, and a 
reflection of a given culture. It was here that the great occasion of errors could take place. 
‘Customary’ beauty might lead to thinking that certain characteristics of an object were 
beautiful that were not truly so.  
Because of this ‘customary’ beauty takes on in Wren a negative connotation, it is a 
“Fancy that blinds the judgment”xxxvi. As J. A. Bennett recognized Wren’s ‘Customary’ 
beauties are similar to Bacon’s ‘Idols’, false appearances that fool the mind and override 
the understanding.xxxvii But Wren does not specifically wish to eliminate ‘Customary’ 
Beauty altogether. It is also the source of great inventions that can and sometimes do 
reveal the truth of ‘Natural’ beauty, the prime example being for him the five classical 
orders. In one sense, they are also the source of progress in architecture. Like Descartes’ 
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insistence that the rational intellect must keep watch over the judgment of the will, Wren 
insists that the architect must keep watch over the forces of custom, the imagination and 
personal style. Both Descartes and Wren used recourse to reason as a solution.  
For Wren, the architect could maintain a standard of good taste by using functional 
utility, structural stability and geometry, to guide his design. In other words, Wren 
proposed subordinating ‘Customary’ beauty to ‘Natural’ beauty, or more specifically 
nature and the rules of physics. The primary quality of good design was structural 
equipoise. And it is with him that we see a decisive move toward a rational structuralism. 
In this way an architectural invention could be the product of eternal rational rules, while 
still being a product of a given culture.  
In the end, Wren rationalized architectural theory by co-opting Vitruvius’ triad. The 
true principles of architecture were Beauty, Firmness, and Convenience. But he qualified 
them by stating: “the two first depend upon the geometrical reasons of Opticks and 
Statiks; the third only makes variety.”xxxviii Beauty and firmness became subject to the 
laws of science, while Convenience was where cultural differences were expressed.  
This was the motivation behind Wren’s studies in statics. He advocated the use of 
scientific analysis of materials and their strengths in determining proportions and size of 
members promoting it as a practical application of mathematics to architecture. This 
would eventually be realized by Jean Rondelet and his work with Jean Jacques Soufflot 
on Ste. Genevieve in Paris beginning in 1754 (shortly after the publication of Wren’s 
writings). Wren’s promotion, of the application of number, as an instrumental tool, for 
the architect was central to his work and his theory, but it paled in comparison to the 
pervasiveness of number found in Guarino Guarini.  
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 “Although architecture is based on mathematics, it 
is nonetheless an art that delights” 
Guarino Guarini 
Architectura Civili 
Trattato I Capo III intro 
Guarino Guarini and the Rationalization of Invenzione 
 
The Italian Guarino Guarini (1624- 83) entered the Teatine Order in 1639, and was 
ordained a priest in 1647. His architectural career was international, including works in 
Turin, Paris, Nice, Munich, Prague and Lisbon. But he is best known for his later work 
done in the Italian City of Turin.  
His interests and studies were broad and in many ways comprehensive, revealing an 
intellectual curiosity that spanned almost every field of knowledge. Guarini studied 
theology, philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy, as well as military, civic and 
ecclesiastical architecture. His professional career is equally varied and accomplished he 
was not only an architect, but also a writer, playwright, priest, mathematician, scientist, 
and teacher. He taught both Philosophy and Mathematics in Modena and Messina, and 
Theology in Paris between 1662 and 1666. It was in Paris that he became familiar with 
the work of the French mathematicians Derand and Desargues, who pioneered the 
science of projective geometry, known as stereotomy, which proved highly influential in 
Guarini’s career as an architect.  
The diversity of Guarini’s literary career, which began in 1660 with the moral 
tragicomedy La Pieta Trifonfante, is virtually unmatched. He continued writing 
throughout his life, producing works that might be termed summas because of the 
comprehensiveness of their subject matter. Those writings included the Placita 
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philosophica of 1665, in which he defended the geocentric theory of the universe, the 
L’Euclides adauctis, a treatise on mathematics, of 1671, the Del modo di misurare le 
fabbriche of 1674, Trattato di fortificare of 1675, the Leges temporum et planetarum of 
1678, and the Caelestis mathematicae of 1683. Perhaps his most significant work, and the 
one that concerns us here, is the architectural treatise Architettura Civile published 
posthumously by Bernardo Vittone in 1737.  
Like Perrault and Wren, Guarini was thoroughly modern. He too, rejected the 
authority of the ancients, preferring instead to absorb the body of historical knowledge, as 
if it were empirical evidence for the study of architecture, evidence that was to be 
critically analyzed according to rational categories of judgment. Like Wren he studied a 
large body of historical writings and built work, choosing not to limit himself to the 
received canonic works. He included in his literary survey not only Vitruvius and the 
Italian theorists, but also the French theorists Philibert Delorme and Roland Freart de 
Chambray and the Spaniard Juan Caramuel.  
His historical survey of built works was equally broad in scope. His celebrated 
chapter on Gothic architecture is comprehensive and impressive for the amount of 
information and the unbiased review of its history. Guarini claimed that the Gothic 
master masons were ingenious builders whose work was, in his mind, possessing of great 
art. The masons had created buildings that: “astonish the intellect and render the 
spectators terrified” through their use of visually weak orders that miraculously stood as 
if by the hand of God.xxxix  
His studies of military architecture, in Trattato di fortificare, had revealed that over 
time fortifications had changed as a direct result of technological advances in weaponry. 
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The realization that military architecture evolved overtime in response to external forces 
led him to conclude that civil architecture must be equally susceptible to outside 
influence. Those outside influences in civil architecture were convenience and utility 
which become fundamental categories in Guarini’s theory. “Architecture is concerned 
above all else with convenience.”xl These reflect the particularities of use and function 
that are the result of an individual culture. 
In the end, he had to conclude that as society and man’s needs change, it becomes 
necessary to correct the rules of architecture in order to accommodate those changes. 
Additional evidence of this conclusion could be found in the fact that the ancients did not 
adhere strictly to Vitruvius, and that the moderns hadn’t either. Therefore the rules and 
proportions of architecture could not be the fixed ‘absolute truth’, proposed by classical 
theory, in the sense, that they were universal and self- evident to all. The result was that: 
“architecture can correct the rules of Antiquity, and invent new ones.”xli And further “the 
symmetries of architecture can be varied without causing disharmony between parts.”xlii  
But Guarini does not advocate a relativistic approach toward architecture. He 
perceived architecture as a science, and by that he meant mathematics and geometry. 
Making a distinction between design (designo) and execution (esecuzione), following 
Alberti, Guarini saw the task of the architect primarily as that of design. This was made 
evident in his Modo di misurare le fabbriche, where in the first three chapters he 
discusses the architect’s need to use drawing to communicate his ideas and then embarks 
on a description of the materials and implements which he uses.  
Architecture according to him was “based on measure” and “depends on 
geometry.”xliii And in this way Guarini adhered to a belief in ‘true proportion’ and a ‘true 
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symmetry’xliv that prevented architecture from descending into relativism. For this reason 
geometry and its’ practical application to architectural design, was central to the 
Architettura Civile. As a result whole chapters are dedicated to demonstrating the 
geometrical basis of the plan, the elevation, the orders and vaulting. The stereotomic 
method, learned from the French mathematicians Derand and Desargues, was also 
included in the Architettura Civile. In the introduction of Trattato IV, entitled ‘Dell 
ortografia gettata’, Guarini claimed that the method of projective geometry was 
“absolutely necessary to the architect, even though little understood in Italian 
architecture, but splendidly utilized by the French on many occasions.”xlv As Rudolf 
Wittkower has pointed out, it was the new French geometry and Guarini’s own additions 
to those theorems that provided the scientific basis of his architectural theory.xlvi  
What remained relativistic was the perception of beauty and the pleasure it imparted, 
because custom and judgment affected it. “It is very difficult to know how this pleasure 
arises- just as difficult as to understand the pleasure we get from a pretty dress. Nay, 
more- not only are men constantly changing their minds, and hating that as deformed, 
which they used to admire as beautiful, but what one whole nation likes another will 
dislike. In our own subject, for instance, the architecture of the Romans was despised by 
the Goths, just as Gothic architecture is despised by us.”xlvii  
For Guarini, the perception of geometry takes precedence over numerical abstraction 
in aesthetic judgment. This is evident in his many statements to that effect: “although 
architecture is based on mathematics, it is nonetheless an art that delights”xlviii And again 
“. . .  if the eye should be offended by the adherence to mathematical rules- change them, 
abandon them, and even contradict them.”xlix Like Wren, Guarini, in studying projective 
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geometry, had observed the important role visual perception plays in understanding the 
geometrical figure. It was for this reason that, while Guarini saw architecture as 
mathematical, he still believed that: “Architecture has for its aim the pleasing of the 
senses.”l The senses in question here are limited to the sense of vision. Projective 
geometry is a means of visual representation and is therefore by definition occularcentric; 
nowhere does Guarini advocate an appeal to the other senses of sound, touch or smell. 
It is evident that Guarini has adopted the Cartesian dualism of mind. Nature possesses 
truth but the mind does not directly participate in that truth. Its access is through the filter 
of the senses, which are often deceptive. Like Wren, he comes to the conclusion that the 
phenomenal realm and mental perception are two distinct realities, realities that must be 
acknowledged within the discourse of beauty. The result is that he, like Wren, proposes 
empirical laws to compensate for the problems of perception that lead to a dualistic 
definition of beauty. 
The first problem of perception was the personal and cultural prejudice that often 
blinds one to true beauty. Guarini, like Wren and Perrault, advocated its rejection, 
arguing instead for an adherence to true proportion and symmetry. The fundamental 
categories of architecture, as he defined them: Sodezza (strength), Eurythmia (which he 
defined as ornament), Simmetria (understood as proportion) and Distribuzione (in the 
French sense of the arrangement of rooms in plan), were to determine proportion. Note 
that his criteria for architecture depart from Vitruvius’ six criteria, and place an emphasis 
on those aspects of design that reflect convenience and utility, and are in many ways 
subject to rational analysis and quantification. Only Eurythmia prevents architecture from 
becoming completely rationalized as a formal science. 
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The second problem of perception has to do with the mechanism of vision itself. 
Certain viewing angles produce a perspectival view that distorts the object. Descartes had 
claimed that the rational intellect automatically compensated for this visual distortion, a 
position that Perrault also took. Wren, on the other hand, had insisted on the application 
of the laws of optics to generate optical refinements. Guarini in one sense took a middle 
stance. He believed that the imagination would automatically correct the distortion, but 
still advocated optical corrections to minimize the effect. The architect often had to 
“depart from the rules and the true proportions” to produce the perception of true 
proportions and symmetry. li It was here that the architect’s imagination, invention and 
knowledge of projective geometry come into play. In order to compensate for the 
distortions generated by the viewers’ position relative to the work, the architect had to 
have a mastery of geometry, proportion and mathematics. Imagination and invention are 
guided by a rational understanding of these sciences. In his writings Guarini advocated 
the use of the imagination, guided by rational applications of the rules of geometry to 
invent means, by which the architect could reveal the truth of architecture and proportion. 
Such truths he believed responded to convenience and utility, and where therefore shaped 








“It is as if logic and aesthetics, as if pure knowledge 
and artistic intuition, had to be tested in terms of 
one another before either of them could find its own 
inner standard and understand itself in the light of 
its own relational complex.” 
Ernst Cassirer 
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
 
Aesthetics and the Duality of Beauty 
 
Descartes methodology of systematic doubt called for a distinction between innate 
ideas, those principles of transparent reason and charité- what he called truth, and what 
he termed prejudices- beliefs derived from tradition and culture. It was the application of 
this method and the inherent desire on the part of the epistemology of science to find 
permanent and fixed principles that lead to the wholesale reexamination of architectural 
theory by Perrault, Wren and Guarini. What they did was to launch an attack on the 
scholastic and hermeneutical approach toward architectural knowledge that dominated 
theory since the Renaissance. Following Bacon’s assertion that scientific knowledge was 
teleological, increasing and moving toward greater perfection through the course of time, 
they each instituted a reassessment of theory conceptualizing architecture, like science, as 
a progressive discourse ever increasing in its rationality. The result was a wholesale 
redefinition of beauty along the lines of scientific rationalism bringing it in line with the 
new epistemology.  
It was the classical orders, identified by Vitruvius as a notable ‘device’ demonstrating 
the analogy with cosmology, which became the focus of the originating attack. Were they 
in fact a ‘law’-an innate idea- or merely a tradition?lii Challenging both the musical and 
the anthropomorphic analogies of the orders, they effectively removed the transcendental 
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underpinning of architectural theory and classical tectonics. The loss of their traditional 
association with cosmology and the lack of any evidence of either a fixed proportional 
canon or consistency of application meant the orders could only be deemed a tradition 
and hence in Cartesian terms a prejudice making them a hindrance to truth. Yet their 
traditional association with beauty and their persistence throughout western history meant 
that their rejection, at least during the Baroque era, was not a realistic option. Instead the 
tradition of the orders needed to be justified along rationalist lines to bring it in line with 
the new definitions of reality, causality and mind.  
To achieve this each resorted to the duality of beauty as a means of providing a 
rational account of their persistence. The duality allowed Perrault, Wren and Guarini to 
assert that, while the orders were culturally determined and could not possess certain 
truth, their persistence identified them as accumulated knowledge reflecting the 
particularities of culture and use. Following Bacons assumption that our collective 
experience of particulars allows us a glimpse of a universal truth, the orders were 
maintained as a form of natural law. The duality of beauty had the purpose of saving the 
idea of an absolute value to art in the face of the loss of transcendental values and the 
growing realization of the relativity of national and personal taste.  
The duality redirected aesthetic judgment by splitting it into two distinct categories 
that served to bring the new theory in line with the new epistemology of science; 
mirroring the duality present in the theory of mind, as well as the duality of method. The 
first made up of quantitative characteristics, mathematical demonstration, and the 
deductive method of rationalism; the second made up of qualitative characteristics, 
empirical observation, and the inductive method.  
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This allowed the first category to conform to the basic tenets of the new metaphysics. 
The nature of Architecture could be assessed via the Formal and Material causes: ‘What 
is it?’ (i.e. its function?) and ‘What is its constitutive material?’ The questions could be 
posed in rational terms conforming to the new definition of reality: quantitative 
characteristics using the primary causes of extension, mass and vis inertia all explainable 
through mathematical axioms. The answers given in terms of fixed universal laws. 
Beauty could now be analyzed and quantified. In this way architecture could be 
maintained as a discourse on truth, only now in the form of science as opposed to 
philosophy.   
Empirical observation of the whole discourse of architecture revealed cultural 
traditions, themselves inventions that could be a source of licentiousness. As such they 
needed to be held in check by the precepts of the first aesthetic category making them 
examples of the collective experiential knowledge in response to convenience and use. In 
this way it provided a rational filter for the second category. It also provided the 
mechanism through which architectural knowledge could be understood as teleological in 
the same way as scientific knowledge. Over time architectural inventions through 
experience would become perfected and as use and custom advanced they would change. 
The second category also shifted the focus from the physical nature of the thing-in-
itself (in this case the individual work of architecture) to the perception of it within the 
subject/object relationship. The history of optical corrections and the diversity of 
proportions revealed the limitations of the senses, in this case the sense of vision, in the 
apprehension of the thing. The image of beauty in the mind proved to be a subjective 
response to the stimulus of the senses. Beauty is comprehended as both a possession of 
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the thing (that is the first category), as well as a collection of images themselves the result 
of a passive subjective perception. In this way the duality also reflected the complexity of 
Descartes duality with, to use Perrault’s terminology, ‘positive’ beauty reflecting the 
structure of the res extensa and ‘arbitrary’ beauty reflecting the structure of the res 
cogitans.  
The duality of beauty proved to have an enormous impact over the succeeding 
generations, as countless writers took up the discourse under various names and guises.liii 
What each had to come to terms with was the futility of a conception of beauty derived 
from custom. As Wolfgang Herrmann has pointed out, all dualistic theories of beauty had 
the same purpose: “to save the conception of beauty, as an absolute value, from the threat 
of being undermined by the constantly growing awareness of the relativity of taste.”liv 
The inherent subjectivity of national or personal taste opened the discourse to the very 
same problems intrinsic to the Cartesian theory of mind. The problem of ‘how can the 
mind have certainty regarding anything in the res extensa?’ became ‘how can beauty 
possess any meaningful truth?’ The duality of beauty raised fundamental questions 
regarding not only the very nature of architecture and its truth, but also its 
comprehension, as regards the subject/ object relationship. These questions were not 
limited to the discourse of architecture, and spilled over into the general discourse of 
aesthetics as well. Beauty now conformed to the epistemology of science, but it was not 
an operative theory of art. As a result both philosophy and theory turned their attention to 
penetrating the nature of the aesthetic experience.  
Following developments in both science and philosophy, 18th century thought sought 
clear and rational principles as explanations of phenomena. Both art and architecture 
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posed a serious threat to that system of thinking. Aesthetic criticism, and in particular 
architectural theory, now sought increasingly to interpret taste and aesthetic sensation 
through the light of rationality, as the strength of rationalism was tested by the very 
precepts of art. Ernst Cassirer described this curious relationship in the following way: “It 
is as if logic and aesthetics, as if pure knowledge and artistic intuition, had to be tested in 
terms of one another before either of them could find its own inner standard and 
understand itself in the light of its own relational complex.”lv The result of this ‘testing’ 
was a furor of thought in art, as new aesthetic problems emerged and the general 
direction and goals of the art world remained transient.  
Two trends in aesthetics emerged between 1675 and 1750. They should be seen as 
direct outgrowths of or corollaries to, the duality of beauty, elevated to general aesthetic 
theories. That is to say, that what underlies ‘Positive’ and ‘Arbitrary’, their respective 
foundation principles, likewise underlies these two theoretical positions.lvi The first, 
following along the lines of ‘Arbitrary’ beauty, was the emergence of a ‘Subjective’ 
aesthetics. It sought to empirically define the phenomena of artistic behavior and the 
subject/ object relationship along the lines of Newtonian empiricism. The second trend, 
following along the lines of ‘Positive’ beauty, was an ‘Objective’ aesthetic, which sought 
the rationalization of beauty along fundamentally Cartesian lines. These two operative 
theories not only framed the aesthetic discourse, but also the philosophical and 
architectural discourses, as well. It is important to note that both are the direct outgrowth 
of the epistemology of science, specifically the theory of mind it engenders. Since natural 
science seeks to identify the principles and laws of nature in a clear and distinct manner, 
aesthetic theory sought to represent those principles clearly and distinctly in art. The 
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methodology of how those laws were found- deductive or inductive reasoning, 
rationalism or empiricism- was what separated the two.  
 
“Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists 
merely in the mind that contemplates them, and 
each mind perceives a different beauty.” 
David Hume 
Of the Standard of Taste 
 
Taste and the Aesthetics of Subjectivity 
 
The discourse of “Arbitrary’ beauty had revealed that aesthetic judgment was outside 
the spectrum of mathematical, or scientific determination. This introduced fundamental 
problems. It essentially resisted the epistemology of Cartesian rationalism, in the face of 
which beauty became futile, revealing rationalism’s greatest flaw: it could not encompass 
art, one of, if not the most significant, aspects of human experience.  
In response to this problem, aesthetic theory attempted to find a new means of 
explaining aesthetic experience in light of the epistemology of science. To do this, 
‘Subjective’ aesthetics shifted gears, turning to Newtonian empiricism as its guide. It 
rejected the discursive form of reasoning, holding to the claim that aesthetic appreciation 
does not lie in clarity and distinctness of the object, but rather in the wealth of 
associations brought forth in the mind of the subject by the object. It relied instead on the 
principles of artistic behavior for its validity, deriving its truth from an imitation of the 
‘nature’ of man and the human mind. It is the perception of the object by the subject that 
became its’ central concern.  
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But this is not to say that this approach gives up entirely on the concept of 
universality, in favor of isolated subjective responses. It was less the individually 
subjective character as the prominence of a thematic in the collective unconscious that 
provides authority, becoming an exemplar of the objective will- indicators of the 
principles or laws inherent in the human mind. The emphasis is on intellection and the 
process whereby the object itself is brought forward in the mind. Taste, defined as a 
shared common sensibility, becomes a general principle, uniform in human nature and 
discernable through empirical observation. The concept of ‘taste’ defined the nature of 
the aesthetic experience in terms of shared empirical observation.lvii  
Bouhours, in his 1687 text The Art of Thinking in Works of the Intellect, rejected the 
concept of ‘correctness’ in aesthetics, as defined by Boileau in his L’art Poetic of 
1674lviii, and replaced it with the concept of ‘delicatesse’. Cassirer defines this term as a 
new ‘organ’ whose aim is: “not as with mathematical thinking, consolidation, 
stabilization, and fixation of concepts; on the contrary, it is expressed in lightness and 
flexibility of thought, in the ability to grasp the finest shades and the quickest transitions 
of meaning.”lix For Bouhours, aesthetic ‘reasoning’ is not a product of a clear and distinct 
process, but rather its opposite, inexactness, the emphasis is shifted from objective 
thought and content, to the processes of intellection itself. Expression and representation 
are not a reflection of the objective truth of an object, but of the process by which the 
object is brought forward. The focus of aesthetic theory places greater emphasis on 
expression and representation than that found in objective beauty that sought a 
representation of nature that was ‘correct’. In ‘Subjective’ aesthetics, the representation 
of nature is less a representation of the nature of the object, in the subject/ object 
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relationship, but a representation of the relationship itself. ‘Taste’ becomes a matter of 
perception. Nowhere is this more evident than in Hume’s statement: “Beauty is no quality 
in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind that contemplates them, and each mind 
perceives a different beauty.”lx  
Hume’s proclamation appears as an assertion of aesthetic relativity, but this would be 
a mistaken interpretation. His approach is still beholden to the epistemology of science, 
only here the emphasis is on empiricism, as opposed to rationalism. The vast diversity of 
cultural and individual taste does not prevent the understanding from discerning an 
underlying rule, or commonality of perception. Those works that appear as consistently 
pleasing through history reveal this commonality of taste. Thus ‘taste’ for Hume becomes 
‘a general principle’, that is ‘uniform in human nature’ and discernable through empirical 
observation of artworks that prove aesthetically pleasing to the connoisseur. The 
epistemological focus here is not on individual aesthetic perception but on the collective 
consensus of ‘taste’ that serves as the underlying universal ‘law’ of aesthetic judgment. 
The epistemological focus here is not on individual aesthetic perception but on the 
collective consensus of taste that serves as the underlying universal rule of aesthetic 
judgment. For Diderot, this was both, subjective and objective. It is subjective because it 
was individual perception, objective because it could be found in hundreds of individuals. 
“What then is taste? It is the faculty acquired by reiterated experiences for grasping the 
true or the good along with the circumstances which render it beautiful, and for being 
readily and vitally moved by this perception.”lxi It is this concept of ‘Subjective’ 
aesthetics that lies at the base of the theory of Associationalism so central to both the 
Picturesque and the Neo- gothic styles.  
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“Truth and beauty, reason and nature, are now 
but different expressions for the same thing, for 
one and the same inviolable order of being, 
different aspects of which are revealed in 
natural science and in art.” 
Ernst Cassirer 
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
 
Reason and the Aesthetics of Objectivity 
 
 ‘Objective’ aesthetics sought to define beauty along the lines of Cartesian 
rationalism. Cartesian philosophy with its conception of ‘universal knowledge’ set a new 
standard and ideal not only for the sciences, but for art as well.lxii The absolute unity 
under which all knowledge was thought to exist within Descartes’ system meant the 
rejection of, or at least the overcoming of, all arbitrary and conventional thinking. Art, 
like science, was now subjected to the rigorous demand of reason. Like the other areas of 
knowledge the arts were increasingly examined in an attempt to locate essential, 
permanent and fixed principles. The variability of aesthetic pleasure, witnessed in the 
fluctuation of national and cultural styles, became a fundamental problem that had to be 
overcome.  
If aesthetic theory was to be anything more than just the observation of diverse 
cultural trends, it would have to reject the very diversity of such phenomena, and attempt 
to grasp the nature of the artistic process, and of aesthetic judgment, as a generalized 
principle. This is the very basis of the search for an ‘Objective’ aesthetics that emerged in 
the late 17th century. Just as nature herself, in all of her diverse manifestations, can be 
reduced to a series of generalized principles or laws, so must art. The truth of nature, its’ 
eternal laws, become the foundation of the beautiful. But nature here is not understood in 
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the physical sense, but rather as a functional significance. The generalized laws of nature, 
as posited by both Descartes and Newton, were mechanistic.lxiii   
‘Objective’ aesthetics derived its’ truth from a representation of the mechanistic 
structure of nature. Art takes it inspiration from the simplicity and efficiency of ‘la belle 
nature’. As Cassirer puts it: “Truth and beauty, reason and nature, are now but different 
expressions for the same thing, for one and the same inviolable order of being, different 
aspects of which are revealed in natural science and in art.”lxiv  
It is here that the ‘Objective’ aesthetics adheres most closely to Cartesian thought. In 
Descartes’ writing the imagination is not viewed as a means toward truth, but rather as a 
confused means of thinking and judging that must be controlled and subjected to reason. 
Art becomes a representation of the forces, or laws, of nature, which are objective truths. 
These laws are not invented per se, but discovered in the nature of things. Subjective 
forces and the imagination essentially play little part in this, while essential in instigating 
the artistic process they must be purged from the process in the end by reason. Likewise 
according to Descartes, sensory qualities and properties are relegated out of the realm of 
truth as sensory illusion. In ‘Objective’ aesthetics the object is not the object of 
perception, but the object of pure relations expressed in terms of exact rules. These are 
the very characteristics of ‘Positive’ and ‘Natural’ beauty as defined by Perrault, Wren 
and Guarini.  
‘Objective’ aesthetics adhered to Cartesian thought in other ways as well. Descartes’ 
chief contribution to mathematics was the invention of analytic geometry, which 
succeeded in reducing all intuitive relations between objects to exact mathematical 
relationships. This transformed ‘matter’ into ‘extension’, within an abstract geometric 
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field of space. In Cartesian epistemology, space is a condition of pure reason, guided by 
the conditions of logic and arithmetic. In Descartes’ world, space is not subject to sensory 
experience, or the play of the imagination. Similarly, such issues and concerns can play 
no part in the determination of either beauty or aesthetic judgment in architecture.  
It was not just the concept of space that was affected. According to analytical 
geometry, the nature of a given form is not presented in its diverse manifestations, but 
rather in its’ formative law. For example, an ellipse may be defined as “a closed plane 
curve generated by a point moving in such a way that the sums of its distances from two 
fixed points is a constant.”lxv That some ellipses are more circular than others are and 
some are rather narrow is inconsequential to understanding the ‘nature’ of the ellipse. The 
diversity of reality is not denied, but rather reduced to general law.  
This law of mathematical unity has its corollary in aesthetic theory as well. The 
diversity of the art object now achieves unity through the introduction of the concept of 
genre or type. Once again Cassirer explains it in the following way. “The genres and 
types of art correspond to the genera and species of natural objects; the former like the 
latter have their immutable and constant forms, their specific shape and function, to 
which nothing can be added and nothing taken away. The aesthetician is not the lawgiver 
of art any more than the mathematician, or physicist, is the lawgiver of nature.”lxvi  
In response, we find in the beginning of the 18th century the application of the 
concept of type applied to the history of architectural form. Unlike the traditional 
reverence for the ancients as authority, the recourse to the past, as type, was based upon 
this new desire to achieve unity in the diversity of historical form. What resulted was the 
reduction of antiquity to ideal type forms, now believed to hold the true principles of 
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architecture. It was the simplicity of form and the inherent clarity of relationship of part 
to whole that was of value. Such principles, clear, simple and hence rational, represent an 
attempt to maintain the absolute value of architecture, in the sense of possessing an 
‘objective truth’.  
The central metaphysical issue that surrounds the epistemology of science, the 
relationship between the particular and the universal, is here carried over into aesthetics 
and architecture.lxvii The relationship between the general and the particular, the rule and 
the exception, now becomes a key concern in the nature of ‘Objective’ aesthetics, as the 
particular recedes into abstraction. The rule and order inherent in the type take 
precedence, and act now as guideposts for the artist and protect him/her from capricious 
judgment. Artistic freedom and creativity are here constrained by the selection of type 
that essentially constitutes both content and form. The result is that artistic creativity must 
now be found elsewhere, in the development of new means of expression and 
representation of the type. Such creativity is always in the service of a technical mastery 
of the type and is faithful to it in the sense that the expression, or representation, should 
be that which clearly and distinctly reveals its’ truth. Simplicity, brevity and clarity 
become the aesthetic ideals in the search for ‘objectivity’ in art.  
The objective view of nature allowed for the creation of a conception of beauty, 
wherein beauty of form was seen as the adaptation to necessities of environment. One of 
the earliest formulations of such a definition of beauty can be found in Francis 
Hutcheson’s An inquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue of 1725. In it 
he claimed: “This beauty arising from correspondence to intention, would open to curious 
observers a new sense of beauty in the works of nature, by considering how the 
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mechanism of the various parts known to us, seems adapted to the perfection of that part 
and yet in subordination to the good of some system or whole.”lxviii  
By defining beauty as the adaptation to necessity Hutcheson begins to equate Nature, 
and its beauty, with mechanized devices and their beauty. He also compared the beauty of 
architecture, to the beauty of machines, or automatons. For him the same artistic 
principles applied to both, as well as art in general. The mechanistic view of the universe 
embodied in the metaphysics of Newton was now translated into the discourse of beauty, 
allowing it to be transferred to the man- made realm directly.  
The clear and self- evident operation of means to ends became understood as 
evidence of beauty because this was also the way in which the physical sciences 
presented the world of nature, as clear self- evident means to ends. Just as nature was 
efficient and used an economy of forces to achieve many ends, the world of human 
creation was subjected to the same principle of beauty, mechanical efficiency. Thus 
Hutcheson becomes one of the first to define beauty as the clear expression of economy 
of means. He elevated the concept of utilitas to that of venustas, via the analogy of 









“The novelty in painting does not consist principally 
in a new subject, but in good and new dispositions 
and expression, and thus the subject from being 
common and old becomes singular and new.”  
Nicolas Poussin 
Lettres de Poussin 
 
Science and the Image of Beauty 
 
The new emerging epistemology of science resulted in the gradual dissolution of the 
classical notion of mimesis which served as the basis of the Vitruvian tradition. In its 
place was what has been called the theory of imitation, known as ‘la belle nature’.lxx 
While both can be said to be theories of imitation they serve different epistemological 
ends and the content of their forms are different.  
The classical doctrine of mimesis, operated on two fundamental premises.lxxi  First the 
belief in a hierarchical set of transcendental values present as the underlying ordering 
system of all things both divine and in the world of nature. Second the theory of 
mathmesis; the belief that the fundamental structure of that ordering system was 
essentially geometrical in nature such that there was a clear relationship between the 
macrocosm and the microcosm owing to their fundamentally identical structure. The use 
of geometry and mathematical structures, the application of the sophron eros, provided 
an absolute value for art, grounding it in metaphysical foundations.  
In classical mimesis art emulates nature in its forms, its orders and its underlying 
organization. It conceptualized the role of the artist, craftsman and tekton as working to 
analogically emulate the central guiding principle of creation, aesthetically defined as 
harmony. At its core was the philosophical concept of sophrosyne, a theory of right 
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proportion and balance that ensured and maintained the ethics of the Good. In 
architectural theory this was most often manifested in theories of right proportion and 
anthropomorphism. The process by which this was attained in the design process was via 
the dialectic of techne and phronesis.  
The imitation theory of ‘la belle nature’ is not a mimesis of nature, the re-presencing 
of creation, wherein the work of art or architecture serves as a microcosm of the 
macrocosm and aesthetic theory a metaphysical justification of praxis. Derived from the 
epistemology of science it sought the same goals and aims. Science demands all 
knowledge be reducible to clear and precise principles and eventually that all principles 
be reduced to a single axiom, this held true for art as 17th and 18th century aesthetics came 
increasingly under the influence of the epistemology of science. As Cassirer notes of art’s 
emulation of nature, “. . . all these partial laws must fix into and be subordinate to a 
simple principle, an axiom of imitation in general.”lxxii Evidence of the strong desire to 
do for art what science was doing for nature can be found in the work of Boileau (163
1711), often called ‘The Law giver of Parnassus’.
6-
lxxiii and in the title of Abbe Charles 
Batteux’s (1713-80) most important work The Fine Arts reduced to a single Principlelxxiv 
According to Descartes all being must first be reduced to laws of spatial intuition in 
order to be clearly conceived and understood as pure concepts; this was considered the 
fundamental method for all knowledge. This idea of figurative expression was found in 
his Rules for the Direction of the Understanding. There is an intuitive character that 
belongs to geometrical figures. This led to analytical geometry; the discovery of a method 
where all intuitive relations among figures could be reduced to an exact numerical 
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relationships. According to Descartes it was the pure rationality of mathematical 
demonstration and truths that underlay all of nature.  
The new aesthetic theory of imitation saw art as indicative of the physical set of rules 
of operation in ‘la belle nature’, a mechanistic image of nature derived from the new 
epistemology. Here the work of art indicated the mechanical organization of nature in its 
physical components. Nature here is analyzed via its quantitative characteristics in 
accordance with the methodology of scientific study determined by the epistemology of 
science. This method does not examine the qualitative characteristics of being and hence 
asks divergent questions. The central concerns of harmony; sophrosyne and ethics, of 
classical mimesis and the Vitruvian tradition are absent.  
The imitation of ‘la belle nature’ seeks to represent the rationality found in nature as 
an idealized model: the model being the purity of reason exemplified in nature, not nature 
herself as an organism or system of relationships. It defined nature in a more restricted 
sense, as ideational concept derived from pure reason. It is the reduction of nature to 
fixed principles and laws which make it synonymous with reason. The work of art here is 
indicative of the purity of reason as abstract universal ideal. Accordingly, art is a 
representation of the ideal of what nature could or should be. It is not nature as object 
being represented, but the rational principle perceived as underlying it. It is not a field of 
objects, but the exercise of intellectual forces; it is in this sense that nature becomes 
synonymous with reason. Nature is understood as a functional significance.  
In the first half of the eighteenth century, this new rationalized theory of imitation 
applied regardless of whether ‘nature’ referred to the nature of the res extensa or the 
nature of the res cogitans. It was therefore true of both, to ‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ 
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aesthetics. One looked to the natural sciences and the other to the past, in the form of an 
aesthetic canon, for its rational ideal.   
Those that looked to nature found themselves searching for rational principles of 
design and composition that could be derived from an analysis of nature, or ‘la Belle 
Nature’. While nature itself might not be perfect, the immanent principles underlying its 
construction were. Men like Batteux advocated a selective imitation, in which the 
relationships between phenomena and their principles, not the natural forms, were 
represented in artistic terms. lxxv  In this case imitation was not of a given a priori model, 
but rather the processes, or principles of nature that could be observed a posteriori, and 
then applied to the design process. lxxvi Such concepts were not limited to architecture but 
proved to be a determining factor in the development of architectural theory.  
Those that looked to the past found themselves searching for rational principles of 
design and composition that could be derived from an analysis of canonical works. Such 
principles, clear simple and hence rational, constituted what eighteenth century theories 
referred to as taste, and represented an attempt to maintain the absolute value of 
architecture, in the sense of possessing a ‘truth’. This tendency can be found in the 
church studies and project of men like J.H. Mansart, Claude Perrault, Abbe de Cordemoy, 
Michel de Fremin, Germain Boffrand and Contant d’Ivry. It is also present in the 
idealization of Greek art and architecture found in the writings of Winckelmann and 
LeRoy.  
Unlike the traditional reverence for the ancients as authority, this recourse to the past 
as model was based upon a new desire to overcome the relativity of custom, through a 
return to origins. Architects and theorists sought to find their true principles of 
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architecture in forms and types believed to be more pure, because less affected by 
cultural alterations. In other words, in sources closer in formulation to the principles of 
nature than of culture. What resulted was the reduction of antiquity to ideal type forms. It 
was the simplicity of form and the inherent clarity of relationship of part to whole that 
was of value.  
Art like science was now subjected to the rigorous demand of reason, and like other 
areas of knowledge increasingly examined in an attempt to locate essential permanent 
and fixed principles. What resulted was a whole new foundation for aesthetic theory 
derived from the epistemology of science’s emphasis on reason and clarity. Aesthetic 
theory became an ars fabricandi a method of fabrication as opposed to a means of 
metaphysically justifying praxis. It implied an epistemological framework wherein the 
evolution of the rationalization process replaced traditional metaphysics as that which art 
communicated.  
It is the distinction between these too forms of imitation; the classical mimetic and ‘la 
belle nature’, too often overlooked or not fully understood, that leads to a failure to fully 
understand the extent of this epistemological revolution and its effect on aesthetics and 
architecture. It is also the very source of the instrumentalization of architectural theory 
and the production of what Perez Gomez referred to as the ‘functionalization’ of theory 
that, as he claimed transformed it “into a set of operational rules into a tool of an 
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Chapter 9: Function and the Instrumentalization of Architecture  
 
“Architecture is an Art of Building having regard to 
the thing itself, the person for whom it is built, and 
the site.” 
Michel Fremin 
Memoires critiques d’architecture  
 
With the dawn of the eighteenth century, after the Copernican Revolution and the 
new ‘mechanized’ cosmology of Descartes and Newton, came the steady progressive 
influence of the epistemology of science on architectural thought. The wholesale 
restructuring of aesthetics along either ‘Objective’ or ‘Subjective’ lines was widely 
accepted as the writings of Perrault, Guarini and Wren were more broadly distributed.  
In France the objective aesthetics of ‘la belle nature’ had become the academic 
standard for the definition of beauty. Based on a functional prerogative, it manifested 
itself in two interrelated cognitive mechanisms of efficiency, what I have termed: 1) The 
Mechanism of Structure- the functional relationships of the structural elements, and 2) 
The Mechanism of Disposition- the functional relationships of spatial elements defined 
by the concept utilitas. The first evolved into what has been called the ‘Greco-gothic 
Ideal’ and the second a general discourse on typology which played a significant role in 
the development of a theory of type. Both manifestations appeared within the discourse 
of architecture in the 18th century and as I intend to demonstrate both played significant 




“. . . insofar as it relates to the whole, each part 
should be proportionate, and have a form 
appropriate to its use.” 
Germain Boffrand 
L’aventure d’un architecte independant 
 
Architectural Theory and ‘Objective’ Aesthetics 
 
One of the first to directly advocate the representation of ‘la belle nature’ in 
architecture was Amedee- Francois Frezier (1682- 1773), who called for a return to the 
simplicity of primitive times. He advocated an architecture naturelle, based upon fixed 
rules that made close reference to nature, going so far as to expound the beauty of simple 
Caribbean huts which he had seen on his trip to South America.i According to him, it was 
in the representation of nature that true beauty lay.ii Frezier was not alone, as a slew of 
writers began to see nature as the source of clear and rational principles.  
Philippe de la Hire (1640-1718), Blondel’s successor as Director of the Academie d’ 
Architecture subordinated taste to use and function. In 1734 the Academie approved 
definitions of four fundamental principles of architecture: bon gout, ordonnance, 
proportion and convenance. The guiding principle was bon gout, which consisted of the 
harmony between the whole and its parts, and was dependent upon the remaining three. 
Ordonnance or the distribution of parts, was dependent on the size of the building and its 
intended use. Proportion was the appropriate measure, or dimension, of the parts 
determined by use and location, and based on nature. Convenance was the adherence to 
established use. It is important to note here that taste was not based on any system of 
rationality, even Perrault in his theoretical analysis of beauty had to a certain degree 
acknowledged this in his definition of ‘Arbitrary’ Beauty. But that does not prevent it 
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from taking on a significant role. As Kruft points out, Bon gout takes on the theoretical 
status of Alberti’s Concinnitas. “Ordonnace, proportion and convenance are all defined 
in terms of use (usage), i.e. of the function of architecture. This latter concept, on the 
other hand, is no longer subject to definition. Usage is evidently whatever is required of 
architecture in any given case: practicality, comfort, fashionableness, etc. Basic aesthetic 
concepts become dependent on the utility value of architecture.”iii What becomes 
significant is the apparent move to align taste, i.e. bon gout, with categories that 
eventually could and would become subject to a system of rationality, notably function in 
the form of disposition, as I intend to show. 
Germain Boffrand (1667- 1754) had argued, in his Livre d’architecture (1745), that 
while the principles of architecture were subject to development and were therefore not 
constants, they had their origins in Nature. According to him, the closer the adherence to 
the principles of ‘noble simplicity’ found in Nature, the closer to true architecture. It was 
through reflection and experience that those principles could be brought nearer to 
perfection. Boffrand would introduce the term caractere as a reflection of the function, or 
purpose, of the building. Thus establishing a rhetorical fitness of purpose between form 
and function, akin to that found in nature. He would write “insofar as it relates to the 
whole, each part should be proportionate, and have a form appropriate to its use.”iv  
Charles- Ettienne Briseax (1660- 1754) had also claimed that the laws of beauty were 
to be derived from the study of nature. In his Traite du Beau Essential dans les arts 
(1752), he claimed such laws were found in nature’s proportions, evident in both music 
and architecture. Briseax was a rationalist, applying the epistemology of science in his 
aesthetics. Placing intellectual comprehension over receptivity to the senses, he rejected 
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the conception of taste, in favor of the establishment of firm principles. While he 
emphasizes the use of harmonious proportions, they are not derived from the same 
metaphysical precepts found in earlier classical theory. Rather for Briseax they are 
derived from science’s analysis of nature. It is from this scientific understanding of the 
underlying principles of nature that aesthetic certainty is to be derived.  
Deriving his theories from John Locke and J.J. Rousseu, Charles Batteux (1713-1780) 
held that art consists of the faithful imitation of the beautiful in nature. In his Les Beaux- 
Arts Reduits a un meme Principe (1746) he advocated a selective imitation, in which the 
relationships between phenomena and their principles, not the natural forms, were 
represented in artistic terms. In this case architecture does not represent a given a priori 
model, but rather the processes, or principles of nature that could be observed a 
posteriori, and then applied to the design process.  
It is important to note that underlying all of these writers was their adherence to 
‘Objective’ aesthetics and the insistence on a return to ‘la belle nature’; the view that 
nature operated according to clear, rational principles and that the expression of form was 
a response to the necessities of function. Aligning itself more fully with the methodology 
of science, architectural beauty was increasingly tied explicitly to this functional 
significance through the theoretical categories of usage, commodite and convenience to 
become a representation of the ‘fitness for purpose’ of the thing. It was in this way that 
architectural theory became ‘functionalized’, as metaphysical concerns became 
increasingly replaced by the attempt to develop a science of architecture. This inherent 
view of nature would become the basis of a functionalist approach to beauty that took 
hold in the 18th century and became a dominant feature of both the engineer’s aesthetic of 
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the 19th century and the doctrine of functionalism in Modern architecture in the 20th 
century. 
 
“Ordonnance is that which gives to all parts of a 
building the appropriate dignity that is proper to 
their use.” 
J. L. De Cordemoy 
Dissertation sur la maniere dont les eglise  
doivent entre batires 
 
The Abbe De Cordemoy and The Dawn of the Greco- gothic Ideal 
 
In the early 18th century a new form of architectural conceptualization began to take 
hold, in response to the rationalism of ‘Objective’ aesthetics, termed the Greco- gothic 
Idealv by the Abbe Jean-Louis de Cordemoy (1660- 1713),vi. The fifth son of the 
Cartesian philosopher Gerauld de Cordemoy, he first coined the term in his Nouveau 
traite de toute l’architecture of 1706. The Greco-gothic Ideal advocated simplicity of 
form and composition, as well as a clear articulation of parts and their functional 
relationship to each other. This tendency can be found in the church studies and projects 
of men like J. H. Mansart, Claude Perrault, Abbe de Cordemoy, Michel de Fremin, 
Germain Boffrand and Contant d’Ivry. It is also present in the latter idealization of Greek 
art and architecture, found in the writings of Winckelmann and LeRoy, and Neo-
classicism.  
As Robin Middleton has shown the Greco-gothic Ideal was instigated by two trends 
in architectural thinking in the early eighteenth century.vii The first was the interest in the 
more pure rectilinear forms of classical architecture. This trend was more a reaction 
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against what was seen as the excesses of the Rococo than any true academic appreciation 
of Greek architecture. Middleton notes that it was not until the middle to late eighteenth 
century that any true study of Greek art and architecture became influential on French 
architecture, most notably with the publications of Pere Pancrazi’s Antichita Siciliane 
(1752) and Julian David LeRoy’s Les ruines des plus beaux monuments de la Grece 
(1758). It wasn’t until 1778 with C.N. Ledoux’s incorporation of the Paestum Doric 
column at the theater at Besancon that a true appreciation of Greek architecture took 
hold.viii Thus the Greco aspect of the Ideal must be understood as a return to the 
classicism of earlier French works most notably that of Perrault and Mansart.  
Likewise, the Gothic aspect of the Ideal did not emerge out of an appreciation of the 
Gothic style. To the contrary, the Gothic was not appreciated as a complete aesthetic until 
the late eighteenth century. Instead the growing interest in a rational exploration of 
architecture, its structure and structural economy brought many architects to an 
appreciation of the construction practices of the Gothic masons. Their work was praised 
for its clarity and economy, as well as its resulting lightness. It was these aspects of the 
Gothic that French architects now began to call for in architecture, again in part as a 
reaction to the Rococo.  
Thus the Greco-gothic Ideal was born not out of an aesthetic appreciation of historical 
form or the desire to find a new third hybrid style, but a growing rationalist trend to 
introduce simplicity of form, clarity of structural expression and economy of means into 
the theoretical discourse. This was in essence the ‘Ideal” sought; justified via a specific 
reading of historical precedent. It reveals the depth of the influence of the epistemology 
of science on architecture and the art world. The Ideal was promulgated by three 
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influential writers; Michel de Fremin, A.F. Frezier and Abbe de Cordemoy, whose 
collective work placed a decidedly rational bent on architectural theory.ix Middleton 
asserts that it is their continued influence on the succeeding generations that lent a 
rationalist undertone to French theory right up to the writings of Violet-le-Duc in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  
Not much is known of Michel Fremin other than that he was the President du Bureau 
des Finances in Paris. In 1702 he published his Memoires critiques d’architecture 
contenans l’idee de la vraye & de la fausse Architecture where he insisted on a reasoned 
approach to design, stressing the supremacy of functional concerns over aesthetic ones. 
The only valid aesthetic concern for him was the orderly distribution of spaces in plan 
and all ornament had to be subordinate to functional concerns. Restrictions of site, cost, 
materials and client needs took precedence in his writings. Michel Fremin was not the 
first to approach architecture from a rationalist perspective, but it was his rational 
analysis of Notre Dame de Paris that opened the door to the exploration of the values of 
Gothic construction, if not the Gothic style. While he disliked the details of Gothic 
architecture he nonetheless saw good architecture in the mason’s rational and prudent 
approach to construction, believing that architects needed to be better informed about 
construction. 
A.F. Frezier viewed Gothic as a precisely calculated, rational structural system. He in 
fact, advocated adopting the rational principles of Gothic, if not its forms. In his magnum 
opus La Theorie et la pratique de la coupe des pierres et des bois pour la construction 
des voutes, ou Traite de stereotomie a l”usage de l’architecture of 1737, Frezier provides 
an analysis of Gothic architecture as a precise and calculated system of vaulting. He was 
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perhaps the first to recognize that the webs of the gothic vaults were irregular spheroids 
and not simple curves. These were in turn supported on the ribs of the vault which were 
then supported by the columns, the entire structure balanced and braced by the buttresses. 
The work of the Gothic mason was practical and economic in its lightness. This was 
accomplished by redirecting the forces almost vertically into the piers, reducing the 
structure’s overall dimensions. Frezier’s analysis of Gothic architecture was as a 
perfected system of engineering, where the construction is viewed primarily as a solution 
to the problem of statical equilibrium.  
His analysis was in no way wholly original; there had been a long standing precedent 
for considering the structural efficiency of Gothic going as far back as Philibert de 
l’Orme (1505-1570). In his Nouvelles Invenions pur bien bastir the latter postulated that 
the ribs of the Gothic vault were an independent structural support system.x His idea was 
picked up by Francois Derand (1591-1644) who, like de l’Orme, studied the construction 
of the Gothic vaults and their materials. Derand noted the importance of the buttresses in 
the structural system of the Gothic cathedral and was more explicit than De l’Orme in his 
assertion that the Gothic rib was a functional structural member.xi  
The dominant interest in Gothic architecture and construction in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries lay in its lightness and structural finesse and the image of it as a 
rational system of construction, an interpretation that persisted through the nineteenth 
century, where it was an important aspect of the theories of Violet-le-Duc (1814-1879). 
In fact Middleton asserts that “in France, the rational interpretation of Gothic was clearly 
familiar long before Violet-le Duc emerged during the nineteenth century to elaborate 
and codify it.”xii  
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The most vociferous proponent of the Greco-gothic Ideal was the man who coined the 
term, Abbe de Cordemoy. Inspired by Michel Fremin’s book Memoires critiques 
d’architecture he proved more forceful in developing an appreciation of Gothic 
architecture based upon the conception of honest and economical construction than either 
Fremin or Frezier. It was the writings of Claude Perrault, in particular his anoted edition 
of Vitruvius, that served as the basis for his theory of architecture. Nowhere in his 
Nouveau traite de toute l’architecture of 1706 does the Abbe de Cordemoy provide a 
definition for either ‘beauty’ or ‘taste’, nor does he specifically state that beauty depends 
on fitness of use, but all three of his principles of architecture are linked though the 
concept of it. He listed the principles of architecture as 1) Ordonnance, 2) Distribution or 
disposition, 3) and Bienseance, or propriety and fitness. Ordonnance was the order, 
arrangement or regulation, of all the parts of a building that give them their proper size, in 
relationship to their use. Disposition was the convenient arrangement of the parts, or 
spaces, within a building. In France, the concept of Distribution had a long- standing 
tradition, men like Salomon de Brosse and Jules Hardouin Mansart had insisted that 
spaces be laid out according to convenience for use, initiating a functional disposition of 
rooms in plan that replaced the formal symmetrical compositional strategies of earlier 
styles.xiii De Cordemoy defined Bienseance as “that which ensures that this Disposition is 
such that nothing will be found that is contrary to Nature, to custom, or to the use of 
things.”xiv De Cordemoy saw bienseance as dependent on custom, as it related to 
function, and thereby placed the aesthetic category on par with usage and commodite as a 
determinant of beauty in architecture. While de Cordemoy did not embrace the dominant 
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rule of function, he did propose that the principles of architecture were united under the 
heading of utilitas. 
Perrault had questioned the significance of the orders as the essence of architecture 
and its beauty. The Abbe also challenged the significance of the orders, but on different 
grounds. They were not significant because of an inherent beauty of a priori proportions 
but because of their structural expression. This proved to be a key interpretation in the 
development of later Neo- classical aesthetics in architecture. In his studies of 
architectural history, de Cordemoy came to the conclusion that Gothic structures were 
more rational due to the fact that the structural supports, in fact the entire structural 
system, were clearly expressed and evident. It was the rational expression of the structure 
that constituted the Gothic edifice according to de Cordemoy.xv The same, he believed, 
was true of Greek architecture, whose simplicity of form and basic trabeated system of 
construction was equally rational. This led him to demand that the freestanding column 
be seen as the primary architectural and structural element, it was the rhythmic 
progression of these elements that gave both styles their effect. But for him it was the 
underlying belief that they were successful in expressing their function that made their 
use paramount.  
On this point Frezier was critical of de Cordemoy. He disagreed with his advocacy of 
the free-standing column and lintels in churches, pointing out that France did not possess 
stone with the strength to build trabeated systems advocating the archuated system of 
construction which he believed served French construction better. xvi   
De Cordemoy’s conclusions about both Gothic and Greek architecture led him to 
advocate what he termed a Greco- gothic Ideal, based on simple geometric forms that 
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would possess a unity of structure. But at the same time he called for the articulation of 
independent structural members that would clearly express their rational function. He 
referred to this last characteristic as degagement and it is the central and most important 
characteristic in his theory of architecture. It is also a direct translation of the aesthetic of 
‘la belle nature’ into a precept of architectural theory. The term would be taken up by 
other French architects and played an important role in the aesthetic judgment of 
architecture.  
De Cordemoy had proposed, as an example of his Greco-gothic style, a church model 
that contained freestanding columns, between the nave and side aisles that would support 
horizontal entablatures and not arches. The nave he proposed should be covered with a 
barrel vault. The west front was to be preceded by a portico with balustrade above. This 
model, it has been suggested, came from an unrealized, 1680 design for the Paris church 
of St. Genevieve, proposed by Claude and Charles Perrault.xvii In fact a version of the 
model was actually under construction in 1698; the Royal chapel at Versailles follows 
this same typology. While attributed to Jules Hardouin Mansart with Robert de Cotte, 
there is evidence that Claude Perrault was involved with that early design.xviii  
The first consistent attempt to translate de Cordemoy’s Greco-gothic Ideal into 
architecture was in the work of Contant d’Ivry (1698-1777). He was fascinated with 
testing structural techniques and it was his desire for economy and precision that lead him 
to an appreciation of de Cordemoy and to attempt to apply his theories. This was done 
first in his Church of St Vaanon at the Conde-sur- Escaut in 1751. It was here that he 
attempted to illustrate de Cordemoy’s theoretical concept of ‘degagement’. This was then 
followed by his St. Vaast at Arras begun in 1754. While neither of these attempts was 
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heralded as important or influential works they nonetheless served as a basis for 
exploration of the ideas. It was in his unrealized plans for La Madeleine in Paris (1761) 
that the application of freestanding columns and a clear expression of structure were best 
expressed. D’Ivry died while the foundations were being laid and the project was 
redesigned and built by P.A. Vignon in 1807.  
 
 
Fig. 8 Interior of Contant d’Ivry’s Madeleine from Engraving by de Machy. 
 
More significant was de Cordemoy’s influence on Germain Boffrand whose manner 
of composition and use of free standing columns can be attributed to him. In 1703 he was 
commissioned to build the Chateau de Luneville outside Nancy. Not finished until 1740 it 
was the first chapel in France to reflect de Cordemoy’s theories in their entirety. The 
chapel was a hall style plan with an apse at its far end. Surrounding the nave were aisles 
and galleries composed of superimposed freestanding columns bearing an unbroken 
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horizontal entablature. Its significance lies in the way in which the mass is reduced to a 
minimum and its windows made as large as possible. Boffrand’s chapel at Luneville 
bears a certain resemblance to his master Jules Hardouin Mansart’s chapel at Versailles, 
but there the second floor galleries are supported by arcaded walls. Only the galleries 
appear light and airy. It was therefore Boffrand that achieved the lightness and 
delicatesse of the Gothic with the clarity and simplicity of the Classical as de Cordemoy 
had advocated. Interestingly it was the upper gallery in Mansart’s chapel at Versailles 
that de Cordemoy had in mind when he conceived of the Ideal church form.  
 
 
Fig. 9 Interior of Boffrand’s Luneville Chapel 
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What De Cordemoy successfully managed to do was to give form to an architectural 
principle derived from the precepts of ‘Objective’ aesthetics. The Greco-gothic Ideal 
embodies all of the aesthetic categories of judgment found in ‘Objective’ beauty; its’ 
representation of a mechanistic understanding of beauty defined as ‘fitness of purpose’, 
and its’ desire for simplicity of form and composition as ideal type. The Greco-gothic 
Ideal understands architectural form as the rational exposition of structure, elevating the 
architectural principle of firmitas to the status of formative law. It translated the 
functional signification of nature into the functional relationships of the Structural 
Mechanism. It is the exercise of forces understood intellectually, there is no 
understanding of architectural form, or space, in terms of sensation, or perception. It is an 
object of pure relations expressed in terms of the rationally understood principles of 
statics. Artistic expression and representation is relegated to the clarity of such principles.  
 
“Before art had molded our manners and taught our 
passions to speak an affected language, our 
customs were rustic and natural, and differences of 
conduct announced at first glance those of 
character.” 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
First and Second Discourses  
 
Philosophy and the Reconciliation of Nature and Culture 
 
While ‘Objective’ aesthetics saved the objective ‘truth’ of architectural beauty along 
rationalistic lines, it failed to address the issue of cultural diversity revealed by 
‘Arbitrary’ beauty. In the spirit of Bacon’s Novum Organum there had to be some 
rational means to extrapolate the universal truths inherent in the particularities of 
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architectural history. The role of culture and its relationship to both ‘taste’ and the 
‘nature’ of man, now became a concern. Could they be reconciled with Reason and 
Nature?  
The issue of Taste proved to be a serious matter in the course of architectural history, 
but it also had broader implications that carried with them metaphysical weight. The 
duality of beauty implied a fundamental, categorical distinction between nature and 
culture. By the middle of the 18th century, that dichotomy had become the primary focus, 
not only of architecture, but of philosophy as well, becoming the very ground of 
Enlightenment thought as a whole.  
It was as a reaction against the Rococo and its excessively ‘subjective’ ornamentation 
that concerns over convention and custom were raised in architecture. This combined 
with the anti- theoretical stance of the Rococo resulted in a desire to find rationally 
justifiable rules, or parameters, from which to design. Perrault’s ‘Arbitrary’ beauty was 
increasingly viewed as the source of architectural licentiousness.xix Its cultural corollary 
was seen in the pomp and circumstance of the Rococo courtiers, now viewed as a sign of 
moral degeneracy. 
This attitude can be found in the writings of the French ‘Cafe Philosophes’, most 
notably in the First and Second Discourses of Jean- Jacques Rousseau.xx “Richness of 
attire may announce a wealthy man, and elegance a man of taste; the healthy, robust man 
is known by other signs. It is in the rustic clothes of a farmer and not beneath the gilt of a 
courtier that strength and vigor of the body will be found. . . . The good man is an athlete 
who likes to compete in the nude. He disdains all those vile ornaments which would 
hamper the use of his strength, most of which were invented only to hide some 
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deformity.”xxi For Rousseau the advancement of the arts and sciences represented a move 
away from the natural form of society, where customs were based upon necessity and 
utility. In its place was a world of urbanity and convention, where the art of pleasing 
takes precedence, producing a base and deceptive uniformity.xxii It becomes clear that 
‘taste’ and ‘culture’, categories now associated with a lack of virtue, are opposed to those 
of nature. “Before art had molded our manners and taught our passions to speak an 
affected language, our customs were rustic and natural, and differences of conduct 
announced at first glance those of character. Human nature, basically, was no better, but 
men found their security in the ease of seeing through each other, and that advantage, 
which we no longer appreciate, spared them many vices.”xxiii Rousseau advocated a 
return to the condition of the ‘noble savage’, a time, at the dawn of culture, when man 
was most free, and most virtuous. Rousseau’s position not only elaborated the distinction 
between nature and culture, natural and arbitrary, but also came down squarely on one 
side. A return to man’s origins in nature, was a return to a more virtuous, moral and true 
state, of being. Condillac too, believed that human understanding had been lead astray. 
He thought it would have taken a different course had it stayed true to nature. What 








“What is art, if not that mode of expression 
(maniere) which is based on clear principles and it 
carried out with the help of unchanging 
precepts?”xxiv 
Abbe Laugier 
Essai sur L’architecture 
 
Laugier and the Reconciliation of Taste and Reason 
 
Where philosophy sought the reconciliation of ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature’, architecture 
sought the reconciliation of ‘Taste’ and ‘Reason.’ xxv That reconciliation would come in 
the writings of the Jesuit priest Marc- Antoine Laugier (1713-1769), who, in many ways 
took his cue from Rousseau’s argument.xxvi Laugier was not an architect, nor had he 
formally studied the profession, yet in 1752, at the age of 36, he produced one of the most 
widely influential texts in the history of architecture. In it he claimed that previous 
writers had failed to provide firm principles upon which to base architecture. Laugier’s 
Essai sur l’Architecture proposed to do just that. In point of fact, Laugier would rely 
heavily on the writings of men like Michel Fremin, J.F. Felibien and most significantly 
the Abbe de Cordemoy, taking his criteria and developing them further into a more 
cohesive theoretical stance. In the Essai the Greco-gothic Ideal found its most refined 
definition. The book had an almost immediate impact, only one year after its publication, 
J-F. Blondel had recommended it to his students at the Academie d’Architecture. It was 
translated into English by 1755, and into German in 1756. In 1765 Laugier followed it 
with the publication of Observations, a book on the orders and proportion.  
The traditional basis of architectural beauty in classical aesthetics had relied on the 
proportions of the orders, which was for him a futile task. Adopting a positivistic stance 
he claimed: “about all this we really have no rule which is well established. . . . Only 
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natural taste together with great experience can safely guide the architect on this obscure 
path. . . It would be desirable if critical research were undertaken in this field which in 
time could arrest uncertainty . . .” and again “Perhaps one day through study and 
reflection, I shall succeed in basing the science of proportions on more rational and 
firmer principles.”xxvii Laugier attempted instead to step behind the issue of the 
proportions and find the rational explanation, or principle, as to why we associate them 
with beauty in the first place. Adopting the very methodology of science, architectural 
theory for Laugier became the deductive search for the ‘first principles’, or arche of 
architecture. But before he could establish it for architecture, he would have to establish it 
for the concept of ‘Taste’. 
For the Jesuit priest, the most fatal of all prejudices was the belief that a rational test 
was unnecessary in matters of aesthetic beauty and taste.xxviii For Laugier, as for many of 
his day, ‘Taste’ was seen as an inborn talent that could be refined through reflection and 
training. It was this refinement, brought about by a rational, or theoretical, foundation 
that prevented the licentiousness and caprice that marked the Rococo. Taking a rationalist 
position, Laugier believed that taste should be overseen by reason, whose task it was to 
prevent the miss-judgments of taste brought on by prejudice and custom. He claimed: “If 
only arbitrary rules were wanted for the arts one can insist on custom, but if the processes 
of art must go back to fixed principles it is necessary to appeal to reason against custom 
and to sacrifice to the light of one the force and sway of the other.”xxix  This position had 
been stated earlier by Wren. Taste, defined as universal approval sanctioned by reason, 
was to be accepted whereas universal approval that relied on custom he abhorred. For 
Laugier ‘Taste’ was a combination of both ‘Subjective’ and ‘Objective’ aesthetics.  
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Following the likes of Frezier, de Cordemoy, Boffrand, and Briseax, Laugier also 
advocated a return to ‘la belle nature’ as the source of taste, beauty and the true principles 
of architecture. This is evident throughout the Essai. “Let us keep to the simple and the 
natural, it is the only road to beauty.” And slightly later on: “One must always come back 
to nature to forestall flights of fancy . . .” xxx His concern for the ‘Noble Simplicity’ of 
nature was also motivated by a desire to remove the trappings of culture. This in turn was 
derived from Rousseau and Condillac, thus Laugier relied on ‘la belle nature’ for the 
guiding principles of taste used to resist the poor judgments that lead to licentiousness 
and caprice. 
His fascination was with the air of elegance conveyed by nature’s simple efficiency. 
One can perceive Hutcheson’s ‘new sense of beauty’, in Laugier’s text. “. . . nature’s 
process clearly indicates its rules.” And again: “. . . by imitating the natural process, art is 
born.”xxxi Art takes its inspiration from the simplicity and efficiency of ‘la belle nature’, 
in this sense Laugier reveals an adherence to an ‘Objective’ aesthetic.  
Wanting to penetrate the cause of aesthetic effects, he applied the empirical 
methodology of Newtonxxxii in his search for a shared common sensibility. Using direct 
observation of architectural works, he recorded his reaction to them and, by comparing it 
to the reaction of others, felt that he could determine a general principle of aesthetic 
judgment, a universal truth, from which to begin. He thought he’d found it in his 
observations, and the observations of others, praising simplicity and nobility of form and 
composition.  
The aesthetic effect that Laugier sought proved to be the ability to perceive a clear 
and simple efficiency of form and composition that made both nature and architecture 
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beautiful in his eyes, and he believed in the eyes of others. It was the object of universal 
approval, which was necessary for a true ‘Taste’, based on reason. Unable to determine 
why these effects were pleasing and beautiful, he settled for proving to himself “the 
inevitability of these effects without knowing the cause.”xxxiii  
His early fascination with Greek architecture was motivated by this and not with a 
concern for its rationally defined geometric forms. The idea that Greek architecture 
embodied a simple elegance, a ‘Noble Simplicity’, had become increasing popular in the 
early 18th century as architects and theorists began to see the Greeks as having been the 
first to develop a true form of architectural beauty and proportion.xxxiv The Greeks were 
also praised for their nearness to nature.xxxv  
This then became the ground of Laugier’s ‘first principle’, or arche of ‘Taste’. The 
charm of nature lay in her gracefulness and ease, her dexterity of form. Nothing is 
excessive or superfluous. These were the very qualities he admired in those modern 
works he considered of good taste and in Greek architecture in general. He translated this 
into the terms Degagement (lightness) and Legerete (fineness), which he associated under 
his idea of Delicatesse (refinement).xxxvi It was the ability of the architect to 
communicate, and the subject to perceive Delicatesse in the details of a building that was 
evidence of taste. It served as the universal truth underlying the diversity of the 
particulars of taste and ‘arbitrary’ beauty. Bouhours had defined Delicatesse as the 
lightness and flexibility of thought represented in art.xxxvii Laugier applied it to both the 
creative process and to its perception. In both his empirical method and his application of 
the term Delicatesse Laugier reveals an adherence to a ‘Subjective’ aesthetic, but his 
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anchoring it in ‘la belle nature’ grounds it in ‘Objective’ aesthetics. Affecting, for him at 
least, a universal ‘Taste’ based on reason.xxxviii  
If Laugier believed he had identified the aesthetic effects of taste and translated them 
into architecture, they were not enough of a base for a theory of architecture. Its 
principles had to be derived from reflection on those effects. It was essential for the 
architect to learn to think and to consciously understand what he does and why. As he 
explained it: “An artist should be able to explain to himself everything he does, and for 
this he needs firm principles to determine his judgments and justify his choice so that he 
can tell whether a thing is good or bad, not simply by instinct but by reasoning and as a 
man experienced in the way of beauty.”xxxix For him, art, and architecture, had to 
conform to ‘fixed and unchanging laws’ “What is art, if not that mode of expression 
(maniere) which is based on clear principles and it carried out with the help of 
unchanging precepts?”xl Once again turning to the methodology of science, Laugier no
sought a ‘first principle’, or arche for archi
w 
tecture.  
From his observations, Laugier drew the following conclusions about architecture. 
“1) That absolute beauty (beauties essentielles) is inherent in architecture, independent of 
mental habit and human prejudice; 2) that the composition of a piece of architecture is, 
like all creative work, susceptible to dullness and liveliness, to propriety and disorder; 3) 
that there is necessary for this as for any other art talent which cannot be acquired, a 
measure of inborn genius, and that this talent, this genius, must nevertheless be subjected 
to and governed by laws.”xli We could assume that the third conclusion is an assertion 
that individual genius is subject to scrutiny by the universal principle derived from the 
collective consensus of ‘Taste’. In this sense ‘Taste’ becomes subject to ‘Reason’. 
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Laugier’s search for an arche of architecture was framed by several factors derived 
from his observations of architecture and his understanding of taste. First he believed in a 
beau essential, an absolute beauty in architecture. Second, the first principle of taste was 
the imitation of nature’s efficiency, or Delicatesse. Third his belief in the need to return 
to the origins of architecture, in order to remove the trappings of what had come to be 
seen as a degenerate culture. This issue had been derived from the writings of the 
philosophes, in particular Rousseau and Condillac. And fourth, owing to his Rationalism, 
his conclusion had to reflect fixed and unchanging law, it had to be derived from a clear 
and distinct principle.  
Laugier’s solution was ingenious. He started with Rouseau’s ‘noble savage’ and the 
condition of man in nature. This was the ur condition of man, culture and architecture, 
and it was here that, he believed, the beau essential would be found. He then turned to 
Vitruvius, Filarate, Frezier and others, and the historical discourse of the ‘primitive hut’. 
He stated: “All the splendors of architecture ever conceived have been modeled on the 
little rustic hut . . . It is by approaching the simplicity of this first model that fundamental 
mistakes are avoided and true perfection is achieved.”xlii Laugier posited the ‘primitive 
hut’ not as an evolutionary beginning, or as a counterfoil to the accomplishments of the 






Fig. 10 Image of the ‘Primitive hut’ from Essai 
 
The hut, as the basic principle of architecture, derived from nature at the dawn of 
civilization allowed him to use it as the loci between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. This meant he 
could avoid any question of custom and the corruption of judgment, but maintain the idea 
that architecture was a fine art due to its origins as an emulation of nature. Laugier 
successfully fused Rousseau and Condillac’s critique of culture to the mechanistic 
definition of beauty as fitness of purpose, under the guise of ‘la belle nature’. 
Once established as the principle of judgment in architecture, the image of the hut 
became used as a basis for immutable fixed laws. It was transformed into a normative 
ideal type form, all those elements that adhere to the ‘principle’ of the hut are essential 
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truths and the cause of beauty, those admitted by necessity are licenses and those 
admitted by caprice are of fault.xliv Under the auspices of science’s insistence on 
deduction from first principles any deviation from the ‘principle’ of the hut is called into 
doubt. Laugier’s hut, like Descartes cogito ergo sum, became the basis of systematic 
doubt, wherein all parts of the building are questioned and in fact eliminated.  
This is in fact just what Laugier did, all elements which are not the essential parts of 
the ‘primitive hut’ are eliminated as necessary parts of architecture or sources of beauty. 
“Let us never lose sight of our little rustic hut. I can only see columns, a ceiling or 
entablature and a pointed roof forming at both ends what is called a pediment. . . . I 
therefore come to this conclusion: in an architectural Order only the column, the 
entablature and the pediment may form an essential part of its composition.”xlv Laugier’s 
reduction of the building to ‘almost nothing’, meant the reduction of architectural 
signification and representation to the structural support system. According to Kruft: “ He 
continually reduces all those concepts which have acquired a separate identity in earlier 
theory to their role in the totality of a building, structural justification being the deciding 
factor in each case.”xlvi  
By the first half of the 18th century, the orders had taken on a greater mechanical 
significance, representing, as in the Greco-gothic ideal, the rational exposition of 
structure. Laugier pushed this new mechanical understanding of the orders to their logical 
conclusion. Following the conception of fitness of use found in nature the orders, or 
columns, are here related to their fitness for structural use. According to him, The parts of 
the architectural orders were the parts of the building itself, and therefore demanded that 
they be understood and applied in such a way that ensured the actual solidity of the 
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building.xlvii Laugier replaced the metaphorical understanding of the orders as 
representations of a larger cosmological truth and replaced it with a technical, or 
functional, understanding of them derived from precepts found in nature.xlviii The orders 
are no longer viewed as mimetic of transcendental concerns, but as representations of 
their own solidity, or structure, understood from the point of view of statics. If de 
Cordemoy had integrated the functional signification of nature into architecture in the 
form of the functional relationships of the Mechanism of Structure Laugier reduced the 
entire discourse of architectural theory to that mechanism. While Laugier may not have 
subscribed to a completely mechanistic definition of beauty, or the concept of 
architecture as a self- referential language, his Essai sur l’Architecture opened the door to 
just such ideas.  
Laugier’s Essai sur l’Architecture managed to successfully provide a theoretical 
framework for De Cordemoy’s Greco-gothic Ideal, which had failed to comprehensively 
address the issues of culture and taste and their relationship to nature. In anchoring taste 
and culture to nature Laugier believed he could make the claim that his ‘first principle’ 
was a permanent, fixed, objective and universal truth.  
The ‘Primitive Hut’ embodied all the requirements of Rationalism and ‘Objective’ 
aesthetics. 1) It subjected architecture to the rigorous demands of reason by producing a 
rule designed to reject and overcome all arbitrary and conventional thinking. 2) Truth and 
Beauty, Reason and Nature are coexistent terms in Laugier’s theory which derives its’ 
‘truth’ from a representation of nature in its simplicity and efficiency. 3) The ‘Primitive 
Hut’ reduced architecture to a series of pure relations of parts that can be analyzed in 
terms of an exact rule. And lastly 4) it reduced architecture to a general law. The diversity 
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of building form first raised by the discourse of ‘Arbitrary’ beauty was summed up in one 
immutable and constant form reducing all of architecture to a single genre or type: the 
‘Primitive Hut’.xlix The particularities of built form receded into an abstraction. The clear, 
simple and rational form of the hut, with its inherent clarity of relationship between part 
and whole, became the guidepost for architectural judgment.  
 
“May at last a bold and fearless genius arise, who 
will free our buildings of all these superfluous 
masses, and who will teach the workman, 
superstitious slaves of bad practice, that there was 
nothing done in the past that could not be done 
again.” 
Abbe Laugier 
Essai sur L’architecture 
 
Rationalism and the Greco-Gothic Tradition: Soufflot’s Pantheon 
 
The result of Laugier’s theoretical work was the formulation of the Greco-gothic 
Ideal and the idea of type as first principle into a comprehensive theory of architecture. 
That theory was immediately and perhaps best exemplified in Jean Jacques Soufflot’s 
(1713-1780) St. Genevieve. Laugier himself would claim; “Sainte Genevieve was to be 
the premier model of perfect architecture, the masterpiece of French architecture.”l 
Soufflot had become a member of the academy in Lyons where he gave several papers, or 
Memoire, on architecture among them one entitled De l’architecture Gothique delivered 
on April 12, 1741. In it he discussed the arrangement, planning, construction and 
proportions of Gothic structures remarking that their effect was more moving than that of 
modern structures. Soufflot sought to find a means of introducing the effects of Gothic 
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into contemporary building, drawing much of his ideas from Fremin and de Cordemoy. 
The paper remained unpublished and in many ways was not influential, at least in the 
Lyon circle to which it was first presented. But the research that went into it would serve 
to frame his approach toward architecture and building for the rest of his life.  
While receiving many commissions in Lyon, it would not be until 1754 that he would 
be given the commission that would provide the opportunity to explore the thesis put 
forward in the Memoire. Saint Genevieve in Paris would not only make Soufflot one of 
France’s most influential architects, but it would come to be seen as one of the most 
significant structures of the eighteenth century. It was revolutionary on two fronts. First it 
was the example par excellence of both de Cordemoy and Laugier’s theories; 
successfully creating a new spatial unity through the combination of vaulting and 
trabeated construction. In this sense it fulfilled the rationalist mission of the Greco-gothic 
Ideal. Secondly, it pushed the limits of reinforced masonry construction. It did so aided 
by the application of new rational means of analysis of stone strength derived from the 
development of infinitesimal calculus. It also extended the application of iron rods to 
reinforce the tensile strength of masonry construction, a technique used by Perrault on the 
East faced of the Louvre. Ste. Genevieve would undergo a series of design modifications 
over the course of its construction, but from the beginning it was clear that Soufflot had 
in mind a very different conception of the church form, one that pushed the ideas of de 
Cordemoy and Laugier to their ultimate manifestation.  
Proceeded by the massive front portico of Corinthian columns designed to recall the 
splendor of Ancient Roman architecture, Ste. Genevieve was an attempt to develop to its 
fullest the cross shaped plan with dome on drum typology. Following the dictates of de 
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Cordemoy and Laugier the freestanding column was given undisputable significance. On 
the interior the nave is separated from the side aisles by Corinthian columns that support 
a continuous entablature. In its original design even the lantern was designed to appear as 
if supported by the freestanding columns. Inspired in part by the work of Piranesi,li the 
side aisles are raised above the floor of the nave. The spatial effect is that of a Greek 




Fig. 11 Image of interior nave of Ste. Genevieve 
 
The structure was composed of a series of cluster vaults and flat domes set on 
transverse ribs and intersecting arches that create a supporting scaffold of piers that 
sprang from a continuous entablature supported by the nave columns. The visual result is 
the clear articulation of the statical forces of the vaulting in linear succession from vault 
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to floor. But unlike the linear effect of Gothic architecture in which the rib springs from 
the floor and continues unimpeded to the center boss of the quadripartite vault, at Ste. 
Genevieve the line of force moves continuously through a series of visual devices- the 
domes, transverse arches, piers, entablature and column- that not only distinguish the 
lines of force but also the various spatial zones and structural vocabulary. What is so 
revolutionary about the effect is that at each transition of force there exists a shift in 
architectural vocabulary which clearly articulates each member of the structural system. 
Thus the roof supported by the dome expressed on the interior as vault is transitioned to 
the transverse arch which carries the force diagonally down the arch to a vertical point 
expressed in the way in which the transverse arches come together to form piers above 
the entablature. All loads from the vaulting are transferred into pure vertical force along 
the continuous line of entablature marking the transition from roof structure to vertical 
support in the form of the columns supporting the entablature. This provides the clear 
demarcation of components contained in Laugier’s little rustic hut; the vertical supports 
and the roof. According to his pupil Brebion; “The principle object of Mr. Soufflot in 
building the church was the union of the most beautiful forms, the legerete of the 






Fig.12 Image of the interior vaulting of Ste. Genevieve 
 
If Ste. Genevieve served as a model for the Greco-gothic Ideal as design strategy it 
also served as testing ground for a new means of approaching building construction, 
revolutionizing the building industry by introducing rational methods of material 
analysis. In the early 1760’s after the foundation stones were laid it was discovered that 
the site was an old clay pit, causing concern that the stability of the soil would not 
support the audacious structure Soufflot proposed. What resulted was a mobilization of 
Soufflot’s inner circle to demonstrate not only the structural logic of the work, but also 
the presentation of Gothic precedents for it. As Middleton rightly noted; “it embodied in 
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an extraordinary way another aspect of contemporary French thought- that belief in 
economy and structural refinement which had made the study of Gothic techniques so 
vital and engaging a part of the early eighteenth century architectural thought. Ste. 
Genevieve became the catalyst of all activity and discussion on building construction and 
inevitably, on Gothic building construction in late eighteenth century France.”liii  
While Ste. Genevieve was purported to be based upon Gothic structural principles it 
was evident that the major supporting device for the roof was in fact the entablature 
above the interior columns. Gothic structures relied on the equilibrium and 
counterbalancing of the statical forces carried via the ribs and arches to the columns. At 
Ste. Genevieve that counterbalancing is not contiguous to the floor. While some within 
Soufflot’s inner circle would certainly have noticed this inconsistency, those outside it 
were not always as forgiving in particular Pierre Patte (1723-1814).liv  
Relying on empirical observation of the structure of St. Paul’s in London, Patte 
argued that the structural system proposed by Soufflot was insufficient. His argument had 
weight because of where it was presented; in the last two volumes of Blondel’s Cours 
d’architecture mainly written and published by Patte in 1777 and 1778. They established 
him as the leading authority on construction and an expert on the Gothic. Like most of his 
age, he saw Gothic architecture as a tasteless affair to be appreciated predominantly on 
the legerete and delicatesse of its structure. In line with de l’Orme, Derand and Frezier he 
conceived of Gothic as a structural scaffold whose statical forces were made visible via 
the linear patterns of ribs. It was Patte who would note that every element in the Gothic 
system served a vital role in the total equilibrium of the structure, including the pinnacles 
which until this time have been thought of as decorative. He realized they were cleaver 
 262
counterweights designed to redirect the lateral forces coming from the flying buttresses 
down into the outer buttress. Gothic had become an economical solution to the problem 
of equilibrium, a technical ‘tour de force’, and every element and feature had to be 
looked at through that filter.  
What ensued was yet again another flurry of debates over the construction of Ste. 
Genevieve. The result this time was the demonstration of sound rational principles of 
analysis of building materials and structural systems, based upon the scientific method. 
This was achieved with the support of the engineers from the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussees; Charles- Augustin de Coulomb (1736-1806), who invented the modern 
statical theory and Emiland- Marie Gauthey (1732-1806). Founded in 1715 the Corps 
was not an exclusively engineering body. Boffrand, for example, served as ‘ingenieur en 
chef’. By 1747 the Academie des Ponts et Chaussees was founded, providing specialized 
training in engineering laying the foundation for economy and precision in building 
construction and a more rational architectural doctrine. What Soufflot and his circle did 
was to develop and build machines to measure the compressive strengths of the stones 
used. Using mathematical calculation and experiment they were able to coordinate and 
interpret their results developing formula and equations that formed the basis of modern 
structural analysis. This was facilitated by Gauthey who invented the first machines to 
analyze and test the compressive strength of the stones used. Jean-Baptiste Rondelet a 
pupil of Soufflot’s who served as mason on the project would later refine the device. 
Work on Ste. Genevieve resumed in 1774 with the construction of the dome, but only 
two years later in 1776 the supporting piers were found to contain cracks. The resulting 
inquiry found the fault to be poor workmanship. The piers were constructed with an inner 
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core and an outer facing. The stones used on the outer facing were harder, denser and 
stronger than those of the core resulting in unequal transfers of stress. Additionally the 
joints of the outer face were finer than those of the inner core aggravating the problem. 
Vindicated, Soufflot returned to construction this time with a more audacious dome 
design.  
Soufflot did not live to see the completion of Ste. Genevieve he died in 1780. The 
completion of the church was left his students M. Brebion, Soufflot-le-Romain and J.B. 
Rondelet. It was Rondelet who took over completing the main portico, the vaults of the 
nave and the transepts and the supervision of the dome construction.  
In 1791 with the building almost complete yet another design change took place this 
time instigated by Quatremere de Quincy (1755- 1849). Asserting the purity of the Neo-
classical style he had the towers and sacristies on the east end of the church, added 
reluctantly by Soufflot to satisfy the clergy, removed. He also had the pediment 
sculptures replaced. It was Quatremere de Quincy who was also responsible for perhaps 
the most controversial alteration; filling in the large windows that lined the aisles. The 
result was a more sever Neo-Classical structure; the radically innovative sense of light 
and space engendered by the freestanding columns and transparency of the outer walls 
was compromised. In 1806 Rondelet was appointed to restructure the main piers that 
supported the dome which once again had shown structural problems. Under his guidance 






Fig. 13 Image of Rondelet’s cutaway elevation from his Traite Theorique et practique de l’art de batir 
 
The extent of Soufflot’s structural innovation on Ste. Genevieve, as well as the 
technical limits of pursuing the trabeated aesthetic of the Greco-gothic Ideal in large scale 
construction can be found in the 1770 iron clamping of the pronaos documented in the 
construction drawings published in Rondelet’s Traite Theorique et practique de l’art de 
batir dated between 1802 and 1817. While iron clamping in masonry construction dates 
as far back as ancient Greek construction and was certainly used by Perrault in the east 
façade of the Louvre, at Ste. Genevieve the iron rods are more elaborate and complex 
serving more as reinforcing in the modern sense of its use in ferro-concrete then as 
clamps. As Frampton has noted it is to the extent as to literally anticipate Francois 




Fig. 14 Image of Hennebique’s Ferro-concrete Frame construction System 
 
Additionally it should be noted that the crossing contains some relieving arches such 
that not all of the forces have visual expression on the interior. While a technological 
achievement it is clear that the structural integrity of the construction of Ste. Genevieve 
was in these matters suppressed in favor of the aesthetic preference for simplicity and 
clarity of form. The pivotal role that Ste. Genevieve played in the history of architecture 
should not be underestimated. As Middleton has noted; “Soufflot’s rational Gothic 
aesthetic so dominated architecture in the late eighteenth century France that no architect 
however retiring, however reactionary, can have been unaware of the problems with 




Utilitas and the Mechanism of Disposition 
 
The Greco-gothic Ideal was the result of ‘Objective’ aesthetics and ‘la belle nature’; 
based upon the idea of nature as the mechanistic expression of function. All forms of 
nature clearly express their purpose and function and it was this principle that was to be 
emulated in art, an idea that is clearly evident in the writings of theorists like Hutcheson.  
The expression of the functional relationships of the Mechanism of Structure in the 
Greco-gothic Ideal was in line with the mechanistic theory of the universe as it was 
developed by the epistemology of science. The scientific method approaches the objects 
of the natural world by first dissecting the ‘thing-in-itself’; breaking it down into its 
component parts and analyzing them; identifying their properties, assigning functions and 
then reassembling those component parts, mapping their functional relationships in the 
process. The cognitive processes behind the aesthetic of the Greco-gothic Ideal operate in 
much the same way. Architecture is dissected into its constituent structural elements, 
whose functions are determined clarified, expressed and then reassembled in such a way 
as to make the functional mapping readable and intelligible. While it emphasized the 
importance of the clear readability of the Mechanism of Structure, it still did so within a 
symbolic structure that validated that rationality in terms of an extrinsic value structure, 
nature’s efficient beauty.  
The Greco-gothic Ideal was also concerned with the idea of form and type. Laugier’s 
‘Primitive Hut’ was an attempt to reconcile Reason and Nature through recourse to 
origins. But the history of architectural form revealed a diversity that could not be totally 
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subsumed within the type proposed. There had to be some other rational means to 
extrapolate universal truths inherent in the particularities of history.  
In analytic geometry the nature of form is not presented in its diverse manifestations 
but in its formative law and developments in the natural sciences sought to classify and 
categorize the ‘thing-in –itself’ in terms of the functional relationship of use to organic 
form. Increasingly in architecture there was a desire to see the functional relationships 
expressed in the physiognomy of built form. To do that the architectural concept of 
utilitas would have to be elevated to the status of formative law. The rational analysis of 
type would concentrate on the functional relationships of the Mechanism of Disposition. 
This would first appear as the concept of ‘charactere’ and then manifest itself in the 
general discourse on typology; an analogical expression of function and use in the 
development of form, as it emerged in the latter half of the eighteenth century. According 
to Anthony Vidler the idea of type informed the development of architectural theory in 
two distinct ways. lvii As he claims “First by rooting architecture in a notion of first 
principles, either in nature or industrial production, it has provided an ontology, so to 
speak, for the legitimacy of design . . .  Second, when assimilated to the emerging 
theories of typology in the natural sciences it has provided a ready basis for the 
generation of entirely new species of building demanded insistently by the rising 
consumption and production society. Thus, the elements of architecture, their rules of 
combination, and the characteristic form of the resulting building type were, in some 
way, seen as similar to the generation of type in nature.”lviii How did utilitas become 
elevated to formative law? How did the notion of type enter architectural theory? And 
how was it developed in relation to the aesthetic theory of the time?  
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“. . . all the different kinds of production which 
belong to architecture should carry the imprint of 
the particular intention of each building, each 
should possess a character which determines the 
general form and which declares the building for 
what it is.” 
Jacques Francois Blondel 
Cours d’architecture 
 
Character and Composition: the Taxonomy of Function 
 
Utilitas had long played a major role in French theory, beginning as early as 1520 
with the organization of a suite of rooms into apartments or ‘donjon’ at Chambord. It was 
in the work of Salomon de Brosse and Francois Mansart that utility and use in the 
organization of the plan had begun to take center stage as a design issue. In their work it 
was the internal organization of spaces according to necessary use and adjacencies and 
the subsequent expression of that organization in the massing of the building that served 
as their key contributions to architectural history.lix  
The application of utilitarian concerns to plan organization would be transformed into 
a concern with form and type by the introduction in French theory of the concept of 
‘character’. This first occurred with Germaine Boffrand (1667- 1754) who introduced the 
term caractere into architectural theory, arguing in 1745 that “each part of a building 
should have a form appropriate to its use.”lx It was in so doing that one could resist the 
temptation of fashion in order to produce architecture of ‘noble simplicity’.lxi Others had 
of course been concerned with the character or expressiveness of a building, but Boffrand 
was the first to do so systematically. According to Boffrand “Different buildings should 
by their arrangement (disposition) their construction, and by the way that they are 
decorated, proclaim their destination to the observer.”lxii This notion that architecture 
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must speak of its function, through its construction, form, composition, and detailing is 
what would come to be known as ‘architecture parlante’. 
This idea could also be seen in the writings of Etienne Briseux (1660- 1754) who 
argued for a rationalist aesthetic, claiming that over and above the understanding of 
architecture through the senses an intellectual comprehension of the underlying principles 
was necessary. According to him the objects with which one seeks to decorate a facade 
must not only be appropriate to its character but must appear useful and necessary and 
merit their place there. Following in the spirit of the episteme of the Enlightenment and 
of scientific reasoning what was useful and necessary could be defined as having a 
‘mechanistic’ functionalism. Just as nature was being defined mechanistically in terms of 
its functions, architectural function was now being increasingly defined mechanistically: 
how it operated, its ordering systems, structural organization etc. The expression of such 
function was now seen as important.  
Boffrand’s concerns were then picked up by Jacques- Francois Blondel (1705- 1774) 
who argued that caractere is the expressive function of the building and that ornament is 
not an arbitrary matter; it must be determined by an expression of function. The key to 
Blondel’s theory was his insistence on the massing of the building as the carrier of 
meaning with the orders reduced to a supplementary and even superfluous feature.  
This tendency to render form as an expression of the function of a building had its 
parallel in the natural sciences. In 1735 Carolus Linnaeus (1701-1778) was able to 
develop a system of classification into class, order and genre for the natural sciences, 
published in his Systema naturae. lxiii J-F. Blondel sought to develop a similar taxonomy 
for architecture based upon use. It was the use that should impart a specific character 
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readily discernable in the built form. According to J-F. Blondel; “all the different kinds of 
production which belong to architecture should carry the imprint of the particular 
intention of each building, each should possess a character which determines the general 
form and which declares the building for what it is.”lxiv Blondel used the term genre or 
species here to refer to building functions such as theaters, colleges, hotels, libraries, 
factories, etc.  
The idea is a system of taxonomy, or classification, taken from the natural sciences in 
the classification of both plants and animals and based, as it was in Linnaeus’ Systema 
naturae, on the outward signs of the physiognomies. The idea of an architectural 
taxonomy transformed the mechanistic theory of le belle nature into a system of 
architectural classification in which the adherence to type was related to the clarity of 
expression of use.  
One can argue that architecture was always expressive of something, the heraldic 
insignia of the builder, religious iconography, mythology, etc.lxv these are all extraneous 
to architecture in that they refer to the external world, religion, politics, cosmology or 
history. But it is important to understand the distinction. The French theorists are linking 
this form of expression to utility- that is the function defined or conceptualized in 
mechanistic terms, serving, as Vidler has noted, to provide ontological legitimacy.lxvi In 
this sense French theory of the 1700’s became increasingly self- referential or 





Character and Visionary Architecture 
 
In the work of the French Visionary architects Etienne- Louis Boullee and Claude 
Nicholas Ledoux the idea of character was largely informed by this approach to design. 
At the time, Character was understood in two complimentary ways: 1) The exterior 
aspect of an edifice was supposed to inform the viewer about its destination; that is its 
function. 2) The appropriateness of visual expression once the destination was known.  
Boullee transformed Blondel’s emphasis on merely identifying a building’s purpose 
when considering character to evoking an appropriate feeling,lxvii believing that simple 
prismatic volumes could occasion an aesthetic experience. He went beyond the 
expressive role of character to add still another dimension what could be called 
metaphorical or allegorical character, designing each of his civic buildings according to 
an appropriate metaphor or allegory.lxviii To These two categories of character the 
expressive and the metaphorical Boullee then added a third, the symbolic.  
In all of his buildings Boullee joined together expressive, metaphorical and symbolic 
character. For him it was the symbolic character that provided the raison d’etre of the 
other two. It is the symbolic expression of the form reflective of the function that serves 
as the chief communicatory vehicle. This can be seen in his various projects. The Royal 
Library project contained a temple like space consecrated to the idea of the institution it 
housed. Metaphorically it was a rendition of Raphael’s School of Athens; symbolically 
the interior is transformed into a giant amphitheater of books where the shades of the 




Fig. 15 Image of the Royal Library 
 
Likewise in his famous Cenotaph for Sir Isaac Newtonlxix the sarcophagus is placed at 
the center of a spherical cavity, symbolic of the globe on the exterior and of the universe 
on the interior. Newton’s tomb achieves expressive character on the outside through the 
combination of horizontal and spherical forms with vertical massing and on the inside by 
using the vast spherical cavity to convey the sensation of the immensity of Nature. It 
exhibits metaphorical character by depicting the earth to the exterior and the universe 
inside. And it achieves symbolic character through the temple like space of its interior, 







Fig. 16 Image of Cenotaph of Newton 
 
Claude Nicholas Ledoux took the notion of metaphorical character to such an extreme 
that it was dubbed l’Architecture Parlante: speaking architecture. If we consider the salt 
works at Chaux we find two stages in the development of his application of character and 
type. The first corresponds to the actual constructions; the second belongs to the ideal 
city that Ledoux envisaged to complete his scheme.  
In the salt works as built, Ledoux created an imaginative variation on the Renaissance 
theme of rusticated architecture as indicative of the world of Nature. After all the salt 
works were not only in the country, their manufacturing process involved evaporating 
salt from water coming from the earth. From the entrance building with its dramatic 
grotto porch to the director’s house with its massive rustication extending even to its front 
portico to the manufacturing buildings belching smoke through their upper widows, the 
imagery of nature has been rendered as a type of nether world. The conceit is not only 
appropriate to the building type but more specifically to the saltwater issuing from the 
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underground caves of Salins and to the grotto source of the river Loue that irrigates the 
site. 
This narrative theme of the nether world is subsumed into a larger schema in the ideal 
project that is dominated by the idea of humankind as the guardian of the earth. It is here 
that Ledoux designs his workers combined houses and workshops characterized 
according to profession through a typology of simple shapes based on the square, circle, 
and pyramid.  
Thus the agricultural guards are housed in a spherical building, symbolic of the earth. 
The charcoal burners are housed in a pyramid building that echoes the wood piles burned 
to make charcoal. The coopers are given a dwelling whose facades display concentric 




Fig. 17 Image of the Agricultural guards house from Ideal City of Chaux 
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The guards of the River Loue are given a house whose central form is a cylinder a 
double abstraction of conduits for water and of the overturned urns, the typical 
accompaniment of the river god in garden architecture and more specifically the primary 
source of decorative imagery in the salt works.  
 
Fig. 18 Image of the Guards of the River house from Ideal City of Chaux 
 
In the ideal city of the late French Enlightenment each building would tell its purpose 
through its expressive and possibly metaphorical character; each would move the viewer 
with an appropriate feeling prompted by its aspect. Whether one considers the ensemble 
of Boullee’s unexecuted projects for civic buildings the collection of the Grands Prix and 
other competition designs by the students of the Academie Royal d’Architecture or the 
totality of buildings both real and ideal that Claude Nicholas Ledoux assembled for the 
salt works of Chaux, one finds the built world imbued with such a space of clarity.  
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As Vidler has noted it was in the work of Boullee and Ledoux that an inherent 
conflict between the idea of type- as model to be imitated- and the idea of character took 
place. At the heart of this conflict is the inherent individuality that eventually emerges 
when the idea of character is pushed to its conclusion as it was done by Ledoux in the 
houses of the Ideal City of Chaux. There the individual character of each housing form 
literally obliterates the type ‘house’ in favor of a multiplicity of particular forms, one for 
each worker. This is so owing to the fact that the individualization of housing type 
according to specific workers loses sight of the universal principle, or formative law, for 
the type ‘house’, a necessary step if the system is to conform to ‘Objective’ aesthetics and 
the epistemology of science.  
Colin Rowe has pointed out that the inherent individualization in their work shows 
the influence of the emerging theories of the picturesque.lxx It must be remembered that 
Piranesi was the major influence on them, Boullee in particular. But we must also 
acknowledge that such theories are derived from ‘Subjective’ aesthetics and thus the use 
of character found in Boullee and Ledoux still bears the stamp of the epistemology of 
science even if, as Boullee attempted to assert, architecture was a poetic art.  
But a central metaphysical issue that surrounds the epistemology of science was the 
relationship between the particular and the universal. The methodology of science seeks 
to find the universal truths underlying the diversity of particularities in nature. As Bacon 
had noted it was our collective experience of the particulars that allow us to glimpse a 
universal truth. Character as it was developed by Boullee and Ledoux served only to 
increase the diversity and relativity of the built form akin to that of Perrault’s ‘Arbitrary’ 
beauty of the orders and their proportions. According to Vidler “Boullee and Ledoux in 
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elevating character to a primary formative role and in postulating the endless play of 
abstract geometrical permutation as its instrument were undermining a truly rational 
system of types.”lxxi As Vidler asserts their work is less rational, in the Cartesian sense 
then Laugier’s type of the ‘Primitive hut’. Like Perrault’s ‘Arbitrary’ beauties a new 
mechanism was needed to rationalize the diversity of built form.  
 
“We must return to the source, to the principles, 
and to the type.” 
Ribard de Chamoust 
L’ordre Francois Trouve dans la Nature 
 
The Search for a Universal Grammar of Construction: Typology 
 
It was to the sense of individuality found in the work Boullee and Ledoux that 
Antoine- Chrysostome Quatremere de Quincy (1755- 1848) would in 1832 decry abuse. 
According to him “No longer do they see in a pediment the representation of a roof, but 
because of the fortuitous relation of the form of necessity with a geometrical figure, the 
roof is to their eyes only a mysterious triangle, emblem of the divinity.”lxxii On the 
development of character in architecture he would claim “. . . this art, I say, is perhaps, of 
all secrets of architecture, the finest and most difficult to develop and to understand; this 
happy talent of feeling and making felt the physiognomy proper to each monument . . 
.”lxxiii  
For Quatremere de Quincy character might take on several levels or genres but they 
were tied to more fixed principles; an essential character- expressive of moral and 
physical greatness common to all civilizations and eras, a general character- based on 
national character a product of climate, mores and levels of civilization, and an imitative 
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character- the expression of use. It is important to note that general character is 
essentially defined in the same manner as Hume’s ‘taste’ and thus identical and derived 
from the same general concern with the establishment of a universal principle or 
formative law, likewise the imitative character, based as it is on use, is derived from 
function understood again mechanistically and therefore fully in line with the goals of 
‘Objective’ aesthetics.  
Vidler notes that Quatremere de Quincy would provide the means of characterization 
in architecture for another century: The gradation of richness and size derived from the 
function of the building and its rank in social importance in society; and indication of 
moral qualities; the use of elemental forms that express the nature of use; the type of 
construction; and the type of decoration.lxxiv Such means represented a turn away from 
the symbolic and metaphoric approaches to character of Boullee and Ledoux in favor of 
more coherent system of categorization. In many ways this was done through a 
reorientation back to the Enlightenment’s concerns with origins. 
It was Quatremere de Quincy who formally introduced the idea of ‘Type’ into 
architectural theory.  According to Silvia Lavin; “his aim in doing so was to transform 
theoretical speculations about systems inherent in architecture into operative means for 
making architecture in the modern world.”lxxv His explorations of primitive structures had 
convinced him that there was an originating principle in architecture, one that was 
essential and universal and could serve as an architectural metaphysic; a system of 
architecture.  
In his studies of Greek and Egyptian architecture Quatremere de Quincy became 
increasingly convinced of both the universality of primitive architecture and the 
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fallaciousness of the idea of a single first structure as proposed in Laugier’s mythology of 
the ‘little rustic hut’. If Laugier’s origin theory was correct then one only needed to 
establish an historical genealogy. But the lack of evidence of the single source for 
architecture challenged that assertion. Additionally he was increasingly convinced that 
different architectural styles produced by different cultures –in the case of his studies; 
Greece and Egypt- did not share common lineages. This led him to conceptualize the 
possibility of multiple origins for architecture and the necessity to find an alternative 
framework for understanding the historical development of architecture.  
That alternative came in the form of recent linguistic theory and the concept of 
universal grammar. What Quatremere de Quincy sought to develop was a type grammar 
for architecture akin to the recent attempts to develop a universal grammar for language 
by men like De Pauw and Rousseau.lxxvi According to him both language and architecture 
contained unique operating systems. “. . . columns, cross beams, capitols, and other 
things that are the natural elements of the art of building are, consequently, and to all 
architectures throughout the world, the same as the elements of universal grammar are to 
diverse languages.”  It was the consistency of the universal grammar of construction 
elements that lead to the false assumption of an historical continuity between cultures. 
The true key therefore was to move beyond the grammar and identify the mother 
languages and their dialects, each of which acts as a system and that each architectural 
language has its own originating principle. He would claim that “The Theory of the 
originating principle from which this art is born . . . this idea of system is applicable to 
more than one kind of architecture and that each architecture can have its own.”lxxvii As 
Quatremere de Quincy himself noted; “as with all languages there are many ways [in 
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architecture] to speak against the rules of grammar.”lxxviii  The trick was to find an 
appropriate methodology to determine the universal principles underlying the grammar 
that would establish a set of appropriate categories for architectural types.  
At the time the fascination with all things Egyptian lead linguists to interpret the 
hieroglyph as a form of proto writing. For many it was seen as an image which conveyed 
a platonic ideal without conceptualization. By this was meant that the hieroglyph acted as 
an image of the idea, a thought/image. In this way the hieroglyph was seen as 
communicating its message directly without the necessity of either abstract 
intellectualization or conventionalized language.lxxix In doing so it conveyed philosophic 
truths directly, as an instrument of learning, by circumventing the deficiencies of nature, 
i.e. rational human intellect and sensory perception. The hieroglyph was seen as a form of 
figurative expression which emerged right at the moment when language and art came 
into being.  
If hieroglyphs conveyed thoughts those thoughts were carried on buildings, giving 
them a social communicative function. “With all their surfaces destined to receive 
inscriptions in symbolic characters, they must be regarded as enormous books always 
open for the education of the public . . . All monuments were legends . . .  these 
monuments were utterly unmetaphorically- the depositories of rites, dogmas, exploits, 
glory, in the end of the philosophical or political history of the nation.”lxxx Previous 
theological interpretations of hieroglyphs had centered on the notion of them as ‘the book 
of nature’ that revealed divine law to those who could decipher them. Quatremere de 
Quincy instead followed contemporary theorists of the day, in particular Warburton, in 
seeing the hieroglyph not as revealing divine thought but rather human thought, not 
 281
through symbolism but through the figure.lxxxi As such they were not just a form of 
natural language but a human invention. Hence the hieroglyph was a social artifact. This 
meant that they communicated not the book of nature but the book of humanity they were 
not divine but manifestations of social structure. In this way Quatremere de Quincy could 
make the claim that architecture was synonymous with the creation of social structures.  
Contemporary writers like Home, DePauw, Rousseau and Vico had divided social 
structure and development into three distinct states fishing, shepherding and farming. It 
was this concept of distinct social structures that found its way into Quatremere de 
Quincy’s theory. He would state; “During their first stages, societies were necessarily 
divided between three ways of life. Nature, depending on the diversity of the countries in 
which these societies were located, presented each with one of these three states that 
today still distinguish different regions of the globe. Men were, depending on their 
various locations, either hunters, gatherers, or farmers. . . . Hunters or fisherman would 
have had no need to build any habitation for a long period of time. They would have 
found it simpler to dig dwellings out of the earth or to take advantage of excavations 
already prepared by nature. . . . Gatherers, who move constantly . . . needed mobile 
dwellings that could follow them: from this fact came, in all times, the use of tents. . . .  
Agriculture must have suggested to men that they build more solid and fixed shelters. . . . 
The wooden hut, with its roof, must have arisen quite soon.”lxxxii This lead to his 
assertion that there were three principle types in architecture “the tent, underground 
[caverns] and the hut or carpentry.”lxxxiii According to Quatremere de Quincy every form 
of architecture could be traced to one of these three models, the ‘pre-existent germ’ or
origin, which served as the first principles of architecture underlying the universal 
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grammar. “This Elementary Principle is like a sort of nucleus around which are 
assembled, and with which are consequently coordinated, all the developments and the 
variations of form to which the object was susceptible. . . . This is what ought to be called
type in architecture as in every other area of hum
 
an invention.”lxxxiv 
The significance of Quatremere de Quincy must not be lost. The establishment of a 
primary connection between society and type meant that architecture establishes its 
authority not in nature as it had with Laugier but in man- it was a human artifact. The 
rationality of building form was no longer validated in terms of the extrinsic value system 
of nature’s efficient beauty. The theory of type proffered by Quatremere de Quincy 
moved architecture one more step towards being an autonomous discipline. That meant 
that type was no longer a static universal principle of nature but an operative principle of 
creation. This allowed for two important transformations; first the idea of type was now 
secularized and second as a product of human invention (as opposed to an imitation of a 
fixed law of nature) it was possible to link type to systems of production.  
The adherence to type, which was an essential aspect of architecture and one that 
prevented abuse, was not a slavish imitation of the essential model of hut, cave or tent. 
Between the individuality of Boullee and Ledoux and the mindless imitation of the rustic 
hut he would propose the notion of an ideal type. For him there was a difference between 
the imaginative model and the material idea of a positive model. In the Dictionnaire 
Quatremere de Quincy defined type in the following manner; “The word type presents 
less the image of a thing to copy or imitate completely, than the idea of an element which 
must itself serve as a rule for the model. . . . The model, understood in the sense of 
practical execution, is an object that should be repeated as it is, contrariwise, the type is 
 283
an object after which each artist can conceive works that bear no resemblance to each 
other. All is precise and given when it comes to the model, while all is more or less vague 
when it comes to the type.”lxxxv Type was transformed from a model to be imitated into a 
formative law in much the same way as Descartes analytic geometry sought a formative 
law for the geometrical type.  
Quatremere de Quincy’s assertion that the origin of architectural types was a product 
of human invention meant that the new theory of type was an operative theory. 
According to Silvia Lavin “Quatremere’s theory of type claimed an operative dimension 
because it determined not just the genesis of the world’s first buildings but the genesis of 
every building: types became architecture in the same way that gestures became 
words.”lxxxvi It was the type that regulated the transformation of the hut to the temple, and 
the type also regulates the transformation into any new contemporary work of 
architecture. Furthermore it moved the idea of type outside the limitations of the hut and 
the temple of classical architecture and made it applicable to all architecture as a 
universal principle both abstract and atemporal.  
Quatremere de Quincy’s theory of type allowed for the transformation of type forms 
through time in the same way as language develops dialects or absorbs words from 
another language. This meant that there is no need for a slavish imitation of the type as 
implied in Laugier’s use of the ‘little rustic hut’ but that did not mean that architectural 
invention was not subject to rules nor did it mean that he rejected the theory of imitation.  
As Quatremere de Quincy would claim “One could generally say that there are few 
buildings that cannot by their very purpose direct the architect toward the more or less 
simple or more or less complicated path of ideas that the plan requires. The uniformity of 
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customs will therefore produce a certain uniformity of distribution in a school or in a 
hospice, for example, and this effect must be correlated with the elevation, whose 
simplicity of line will become the obligatory character. One could generally say, as the 
plan goes, so does the elevation. A great diversity of uses, functions, residents of varied 
social standing, all necessitating numerous varieties in plan, as in the large public 
establishment, will therefore allow the architect to reflect this state of affairs in the 
exterior combinations of forms and lines that will influence the aspects of the 
elevation.”lxxxvii  
Architecture as he defined it adheres to its generative principles in its expression of 
basic construction typologies found in the primitive hut, tent and cave. But it is 
transformed via use into a myriad of building types. “The word type is also used in 
architecture to designate certain general forms which are characteristic of the building 
that receives them.”lxxxviii And again “. . . there is enough material to suggest to the 
intelligent architect a characteristic motif of plan or elevation that distinguishes and 
reveals the monument for what it is.”lxxxix It is the uniformity of custom that maintains 
the type categories based as they are in the functional expression of use and allows for 
their classification and categorization.  
What Quatremere de Quincy did was transform the concern over the expression of 
function in built form from one based on physiognomy to one based on the Mechanism of 
Disposition, as an operative principle, bringing it in line with the epistemology of science 
as found in the natural sciences and analytic geometry. It is this understanding of type 
that allowed for both its assimilation to systems of production and the permutations of 
programmatic development.  
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Scientific influences in the work of Cuvier would eventually overturn the basis of 
imitative expression in the theory of type and complete the transformation into the second 
form of type Vidler identifies. These changes would bring the theory of type in line with 
the simultaneous development of engineering allowing for its transformation into a more 
instrumentalized definition of production and technique. This transformation would occur 
in the work of Jean- Baptiste Rondelet and at the new Ecole Polytechnique with the 
theory and pedagogy of J.N.L. Durand. 
 
“The essential objective [of architecture] was, 
above all, the construction of solid buildings, using 





Jean- Baptiste Rondelet and the Practique of Building  
 
Jean- Baptiste Rondelet (1734- 1829) first became known while working with 
Soufflot on Ste. Genevieve. As previously noted he had been responsible for calculating 
the stresses of the stones used and had in fact, refined the devices Gauthey designed to do 
so. When stress cracks emerged under the dome it was Rondelet who shored up the piers 
by adding stone and iron around them and it was he who actually finished the structure 
after Soufflot’s death. He was also one of the first to undertake a systematic analysis of 
iron and its static potential, an interest he developed while working with Soufflot. In 1799 
he took a position teaching at the Ecole des Beaux- Arts, where in 1806 he assumed the 
Chair of Stereotonomy and Building Construction.  
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Given his experience on Ste. Genevieve it is not surprising to find that for Rondelet 
architecture was not an imaginative art, but rather a science controlled by need and 
necessity. His Trait theorique et pratique de l’art de batir (1802- 17, published in 5 vol.) 
concerned itself predominantly with building materials and their strengths and properties, 
advocating the teaching of mathematical calculation in the determining of stresses in 
building members and calculating their size. The Book was the first effective textbook on 
building science, proving very successful and going into many editions.  
Conceiving of building from the perspective of Firmitas- the solidity, stability and 
durability of the building- Rondelet understood architectural history as a history of 
rational building techniques. He was of the opinion that “the essential objective [of 
architecture] was, above all, the construction of solid buildings, using a just amount of 
selected material with art and economy.”xc In his Discours pour l’ouverture du cours de 
construction a l’Ecole speciale d’ architecture (1816) he claimed the character of the 
design should show a greater influence of the methods of construction. For Rondelet it 
was in the art of construction that the beauty of a building lay. Construction becomes an 
art once theoretical knowledge is joined with that of practice to regulate equally all its 
operations.xci For Rondelet, theory was the result of experience and reasoning, it was 
founded on the principles of physics, mathematics and statics, and the physical 
application of different artistic operations. The proper result was perfect solidity and 
economy.xcii The Traite subjected the building craft itself to a form of rationalism.  
Quatremere de Quincy had transformed the theory of type into an operative theory 
allowing for the creation of new types derived from the ever changing Mechanism of 
Disposition. Rondelet’s Traite did the same for the Mechanism of Structure; creating an 
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operative theory for the design and detailing of structural members based upon the 
rational determination of material properties. It was the mechanics and the strength of 
materials that allowed the builder to arrive at the determination of correct forms and 
dimensions of any given part of a building in a given structural situation. 
There is an abstraction about Rondelet’s practique, one that renders his art of building 
more a technology than a techne; a rational application of science derived from the 
operations of practice and less an issue of craft, or practical know how, in terms of 
working the material. According to Rondelet the best means of expression was the 
expression of an economy of means. He was the forerunner of a kind of instrumental 
determinism in architecture. As Perez- Gomez has pointed out Rondelet’s Traite: “put 
forward a theory conceived as a powerful and universal instrument for the thorough 
domination of the building craft. Within a positivistic framework, myth and nonscientific 
speculation were unacceptable. For the first time in a book on building the transcendental 
justification of architecture no longer mattered.”xciii In this sense, he should be seen as a 
key proponent of the emerging rational tectonic in architecture. 
 
Architecture and the Origins of Engineering 
 
Rondelet’s approach to architecture was reflective of the larger developing trend in 
the eighteenth century. The increased influence of the epistemology of science in 
formulating the Mechanism of Structure had opened the door to a rational science of 
construction. Simultaneously, several components of what had been the traditional 
purview of architecture and architectural practice were being systematically fabricated 
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into a whole new discipline; engineering, the creative application of scientific principles 
to design.   
During the 16th century fortification had developed as a distinct discipline within 
architecture. By the late 17th century under the direction of the Marquis de Vauban, the 
design of military architecture in France was taken over by a special corps of military 
engineers, who were part of the French army. In 1715, the first official corps of civil 
engineers was formed known as the Departement des Ponts-et-Chaussees.  
Owing to the fact that the work assigned to this department was previously done by 
architects, interaction between architecture and civil engineering at this early date was 
evident from the start. It was therefore not unusual that the first directors of the 
Departement des Ponts-et-Chaussees, Jacques Gabriel and Germain Boffrand, were 
famous architects associated with the Academie Royal d’Architecture. Additionally, it 
should be no surprise to learn that, as early as 1750, its students were expected to study 
architecture there under J.- F. Blondel. In 1747, under the direction of Jean- Rodolphe 
Perronet (1708-1794), the department was formally turned into an academy and in 1775 
was given the official title of the Ecole des Ponts-et-Chaussees, and whose aim was to 
provide rational, analytical and technical training.  
During the French Revolution the new government began to promote the 
development of engineering, and by 1789 Rondelet proposed a formal academy of 
engineering. That vision would be realized in 1794, with the founding of the Ecole 
Centrale des Travaux Publics, which was renamed the Ecole Polytechnique in 1795. It 
was the first official school of engineering, training surveyors and engineers, from civil to 
structural. While close connections between the Ecole Polytechnique and the tradition of 
 289
architectural training existed for some time, the emphasis in design at the Ecole 
Polytechnique was geared toward the needs of its engineering students, and reflected the 
attitudes of Rondelet. As Egbert points out, the Ecole Polytechnique placed increasing 
emphasis on the efficiency of structure as an end in itself, as opposed to a means to end: 
formal beauty.xciv This tendency found its ultimate manifestation in the writings and 
teaching of J.N.L. Durand, by far the most important and influential man associated with 
the Ecole Polytechnique and the man most responsible for the final development of a 
rational tectonic and the instrumentalization of architectural theory.  
 
“The source of beauty in Architecture is Economy 
joined to Convenience” 
Attributed to J.N.L. Durand 
H. Rohault, Projet d’hopital pour 1,500 malades 
 
J.N.L. Durand and the Autonomy of Architecture 
 
Jean Nicolas Durand (1760-1834), a close friend of Rondelet, was professor of 
architecture at the Ecole Polytechnique from 1795 to 1830 and essentially shaped its form 
and direction. Trained at the Academie Royal d’Architecture he first came to recognition 
when, in the atelier of Etienne- Louis Boullee (1728- 99), he placed second in the Grand 
Prix of 1779 and 1780.xcv Durand’s work and theory was by any standard revolutionary, 
and in that sense one could claim he followed in his master’s footsteps. But Durand’s 
work, while showing a certain allegiance to Boullee, in many ways moved in a 
fundamentally different direction.xcvi  
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Durand saw architecture as both a science and an art, but it is clear that by art he 
meant talent and by science he meant its reduction to scientific methodology. He brought 
this attitude to his teaching, establishing a pedagogical structure at the Ecole 
Polytechnique derived from the elements d’ideologie that Destutt de Tracy (1754- 1836) 
had elaborated several years earlier.xcvii Durand would claim: “inasmuch as reason 
indicates to us, following the method used in scientific schools . . . where students are 
taught the progression from the simple to the complex, from the known to the unknown, 
so that one idea paves the way for another and recalls its predecessor, we shall 
increasingly support this plan of study.”xcviii Thus his teaching method and pedagogy was 
taken straight from that of science and this also carried over into the way in which he 
defined architecture and conceived of design. It is true that Durand taught architecture to 
surveyors and engineers at the Ecole Polytechnique, but his teachings proved to be 
inspiring to a whole generation of progressive students at the Ecole Ecole des Beaux- 
Arts as well. In this way he exerted a greater direct impact on the development of 
architecture than might first be expected.xcix  
Durand’s writings also proved particularly influential, carrying his ideas farther than 
just the two French schools. Three in all, they sum up his theory and teaching pedagogy, 
as well as his design methodology, taught at the Ecole Polytechnique. His first text was 
the Recueil et parallele des edifices de tout genre, anciens et modernes first published in 
1799 in France, translated into Italian in 1833, republished in Belgium in 1839, and 
issued in an American edition in 1915. His Precis des lecons d’architecture first appeared 
in 1802 and then again in 1805 in a revised edition, it was translated into German in 
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1831, and republished in Belgium in 1840- 41. His last book the Partie graphic des cours 
d’architecture was published in 1821. 
It was in the Recueil et parallele that Durand would transform the operative theory of 
type developed by Quatremere de Quincy into a fully instrumentalized Mechanism of 
Disposition. Durand must have known Charles Perrault’s Parrallele (1687-97)c and one 
might assume that the similar title was intended by Durand to indicate his intentions and 
desire to bring the study of architectural typology into the sphere of the epistemology of 
science in much the same way as Charles Perrault sought to bring the arts and letters in 
line with Bacon’s Novum Organum.  
Perrault’s Parallele called for the development of a cannon of modern work. But its 
significance was in its teleological view of history, one in which perfectability was not 
found in a past golden age but was achieved through progression to the future. Perrault 
was following Bacon’s Novum Organum in which science was seen as progressive, based 
on learned experience, accumulated over time and added to by each successive 
generation, a collective task of humanity moving toward greater perfectibility with time.  
Durand’s Parallele produced a cannon of work presenting the history of architecture 
in a comparative manner. ci According to Vidler “The comparative method allowed 
Durand to arrange his specimens on the page as if in natural progression from the most 
primitive type to the refined versions of the present. The plans ‘perfected’ themselves, as 
it were, graphically on each page, crystallizing in ever higher forms.”cii This teleological 
view of history was not unlike Durand’s stated understanding of scientific progress taken 
from Destutt de Tracy and applied to his pedagogical theory. In that manner it presented 
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the collective experience of architecture as a demonstration of the progress and 
prefectablity of the type forms through time.  
In many of the cases the designs presented were well known reconstructions of major 
works that, more often then not, were then simplified by Durand in terms of their 
composition and details. He shows little concern with historical accuracy in either an 
archaeological or academic sense. They become abstractions; idealized versions of 
historical types. The systematic simplification of the plans and types while seemingly un-
scientific in terms of empirical observation was also not surprising. Charles’ brother 
Claude Perrault’s system of proportions from the Ordonnance was a simplification of the 
empirically observed ratios of the orders; itself a reflection of the aesthetic prerogative 
present in science from Copernicus forward that the simpler the mathematical equation 
the more beautiful the solution. The orders, the primary ‘Arbitrary’ beauty, were for 
Perrault evidence of the accumulated knowledge of the discourse of architecture one that 
was in his mind ever growing and moving toward perfectability. According to Bacon our 
collective experience of particulars allows us to glimpse a universal truth. For Claude 
Perrault the only thing to do was to rationalize the particulars and extrapolate that 
universal truth. Claude Perrault rationalized architectural theory along Cartesian lines by 
implying an epistemological framework wherein the evolution of the rationalization 
process replaced traditional metaphysics. In his case the proportional system could 
become fixed and then altered only for the case of its own increased rationalization. It set 
in motion the potential for the instrumentalization of architecture. It was not fully 
successful in that project owing to the fact that most architects failed to use his system of 
proportion. 
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The study of building typology revealed an equal diversity of disposition and form as 
that found in the orders. Type, like the orders, runs the risk of radical individuality and 
absolute licentiousness, qualities of which Quatremere de Quincy had accused Ledoux 
and Boullee, Durand’s teacher. But as Claude Perrault’s work implied it could also be a 
means of establishing the rule of production.  
Durand arranged the comparisons according to functional typologies drawn to the 
same scale and arranged in order of degree of likeness. But he provided a classification 
system of buildings along the lines of the natural science’s classification of genera and 
species as it was redeveloping at the time. In a series of lectures on Comparative 
Anatomy at the Museum of Natural History in Paris in 1795 Baron Georges Cuvier 
(1769-1832) revolutionized the taxonomy of natural forms established by Linnaeus by 
dividing the animal world into four basic branches characterized by different types of 
anatomical structure.ciii Linnaeus’ system had been based upon an analysis of external 
form; Cuvier based his analysis on the organization of the skeleton in response to 
functional demand.  
Following Cuvier, the Parallele approached the comparative method based on an 
analysis of the organization of the building as a response to the demands of the 
Mechanism of Disposition. Durand reduced typology to a rational system of criteria from 
which to study the collective empirical knowledge of architecture. Implying an 
epistemological framework wherein the evolution of the rationalization process replaces 
traditional metaphysics, it contains no attempt to validate its rationality in terms of an 
extrinsic value structure; nature’s efficient beauty, it contains no doctrine of origins, or 
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reconciliation or universal grammar. It established a formative law for typology one 
whose alteration is only for the purposes of increasing its own rationality.  
The decision to present the buildings according the a priori classification by function 
instead of by style or culture, reveals a modern scientific attitude toward history and time. 
In the Words of Joseph Rykwert: “. . . Durand had made a break with the past, a break 
perhaps more radical than that which Brunelleschi and Alberti had . . . And from that 
time on, in spite of various exceptions, the attitude propounded by Durand dominates 
architectural thinking to the exclusion of all others, since it proposes a wholly 
unhistorical, wholly a-prioristic approach to design, in which the procedure of the 
architect is wholly autonomous, and the past a mere repository of conventions.”civ Such 
an approach allowed Durand to conceive of design composition as an autonomous 
language of form, one that could be freely manipulated according to rationalist precepts. 
It is important to note here that this was merely the logical continuation of the rational 
project of architectural theory as it was proffered in the analysis of Gothic architecture. 
The cognitive process is the same; the object is dissected into its constituent elements, 
whose functions are determined, clarified, expressed and then reassembled in such a way 
as to make the functional mapping readable and intelligible. Only in this case the 
methodology is applied to the Mechanism of Disposition. Architectural beauty moved 
beyond the mere imitation of origins, or the imitation of the mechanistic order of 
structural function, into a broader rationalist theory that included both the Mechanism of 
Structure and the Mechanism of Disposition. For Durand the Parallele served to establish 
a formative law for typology, having done so he then set out to do the same for the design 
process.  
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For Durand, design had to conform to the rigors of geometry; drawing was, in the 
words of Sergio Villari, a’ technographic transcription’, designed to “affirm a radical 
principle of the autonomy of architectural language. The lack of rigor in the choice and 
verification of sources is evidence that Durand did not wish to sacrifice the variety of that 
language to the simplifications of an overly deterministic scientific criterion, . . . “cv  
Durand’s theory of architecture, found in the Précis, was a radical departure from the 
Vitruvian tradition, and classical mimesis. For him it was necessary to know the purpose 
of the art of architecture. Because architecture was the most advantageous of the arts and 
the most costly its objective was, and should be, its public and private usefulness. Such 
concerns and issues he believed were isolated from the metaphysical and transcendental 
concerns postulated by previous mimetic theories of architecture. Previous theories that 
relied on mimesis held to a conception of nature as a reflection of a divinely inspired 
ideal. Such ideals carried with them transcendental values that provided a rational 
justification for architectural praxis along metaphysical lines. The anthropomorphic 
theories of the orders from Vitruvius onwards adhered to this metaphysical justification 
by relating the dimensions of the orders to the human body that in turn was seen as a 
microcosm of the macrocosm. In the Precis Durand claimed that architecture was not an 
imitative art form. He challenged those theories that advocated an anthropomorphic 
understanding of the orders, as well as those theories that promoted architecture as 
imitative of nature, claiming that no such model existed.  
The orders for him were in no way linked to imitation, and Laugier’s ‘Primitive Hut’ 
as type, based as it was on such as position, was also rejected.cvi By associating the orders 
with trees the ‘Primitive Hut’, as type, embodied the values of an ideal nature as defined 
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by Rousseau. It was an attempt at reconciliation between nature and culture. In fact all 
the theories of type in the 18th century relied on just such a justification and subscribed to 
the notion of reconciliation. The use of ideal type forms found in the ‘Revolutionary 
Architects’ Ledoux and Boullee were based on the symbolic use of geometric forms as 
reflections of ideal transcendental values. Quatremere de Quincy’s definition of type 
whilst a major step in the transformation of the theory of type into an operative theory 
nevertheless relied on the same values to form its core principles underlying the universal 
grammar; the ‘Primitive Hut, Cave and Tent’ were merely extensions of Laugier’s 
attempt at reconciliation. By resorting to external a priori values, architecture maintained 
its place as a physical manifestation of philosophy, theology and or cosmology; it was in 
no way autonomous as a discourse.  
With Durand however this essentially changed. He had no interest in such 
reconciliation; he simply rejected the issue as a concern. Durand no longer viewed the 
relationship between architecture and nature as analogy, or as metaphoric symbolism, but 
rather in a normative fashion. Newtonian nature was a collection of atomic particles 
governed by mathematical relationships in an efficient economy of means. It is this image 
of nature that underlies the new truth of architecture, as outlined in the Precis. There 
architecture is subdivided into its constituent elements- walls, columns, openings etc- 
only to be built up into intermediate assemblages- porches, stairs, halls and so on- and 
then again into building types and then on to urban morphologies. Once again the 
cognitive approach to architectural analysis is via the methodology of science. 
This image of nature is most evident in Durand’s own description of the kinds of 
proportions to be found in architecture. Those 1) derived from the nature of the materials 
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and from the use of the final object 2) the forms dictated by custom 3) the clear and 
simple geometric forms that would be easily comprehended. For Durand, only the first 
was an essential element in the determination of architecture, due to its ability to be 
defined through the laws of mechanics and utility. 
In arguing that architecture was not a mimetic art, Durand furthered the trend toward 
divorcing architecture from any transcendental value, leaving architecture open to the 
vicissitude of means and ends, bourgeois values, and the effects of late capitalist ways. 
As extreme as such a comment might sound, it is in many ways valid. As Serio Villari 
has noted: “Such a notion, denying all mimetic origin to architecture, allowed him to 
remove the symbolic value from the orders; it allowed him, that is, to submit the orders, 
essential as they are to architecture, to the grammatical or – better- the normative laws of 
composition.”cvii  
Villari argues that this opened the door to a neutralizing of values and reduced the 
elements of architecture to their linguistic functions. What occurred was that, without 
transcendental value and verification, the only means of assessing value, hierarchy and 
judgment, became economy and use. According to Perez- Gomez: “In the area of 
architectural theory and design, the stage at which theoria was transformed into a self- 
referential instrument for the control of a praxis is best exemplified by the writings of 
Jacques Nicolas- Louis Durand.”cviii  
Durand claimed that: “the purpose of architecture has never been only pleasure, nor 
architectural decoration its object. Public and private utility, the happiness and 
preservation of individuals and society are . . . the purpose of architecture.”cix The 
concern for utility, happiness and preservation led him to base his theory on two classical 
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principles: ‘Convenance’ (‘Propriety’) and ‘Economie’ (Economy). Convenance 
accounted for the ‘Solidity’, ‘Salubrity’ and ‘Commodite’ of the building, while 
‘Economie’ was accounted for by the concepts of ‘Symetrie’, ‘Regularite’ and 
‘Simplicite’. With Durand economy and efficiency became the dominant, if not the only 
acceptable, values in architectural judgment. This can be seen in his approach toward 
composition, plan distribution, construction and detailing.  
While Durand claimed that social demands, economy and convenience should guide 
architecture, he nevertheless used symmetry and simple geometries as design criteria. But 
such design criteria still reveal his primary interest in economy of means to ends, 
particularly when he argues in favor of the use of circles and spheres because of their 
ability to enclose the maximum amount of space with the least perimeter area.cx The 
obvious difficulty in terms of spatial distribution in the use of such geometries led him to 
advocate as more practical the square and cube. 
A concern for Disposition, or plan distribution, had dominated French architectural 
theory since the beginning of the 18th century. For Durand good architecture was a 
reflection of the most fitting and most economical disposition. In the words of Vidler 
“Durand, in describing the ends of architectural activity- the social needs- began the 
nineteenth century project of typological construction on the basis of the inner structure 
or programmatic functioning of things. . . . This art of combination or disposition of each 
type was guided by a program derived from a study of all previous programs of the same 
kind, and subjected to the overriding law of economy. In a stroke, Durand substituted for 
the Vitruvian trinity of commodity, firmness and delight, an entirely modern criterion- 
means and ends judged by their economic coming together.”cxi The disposition of the 
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plan and the economy of its construction became the prototypical problems in 
architecture. It is the design and construction of the most convenient building, using the 
most economical means that becomes the central goal of all architecture, according to 
Durand.  
Reducing architectural composition to the combination of standardized elements and 
forms that make up a repetitive pattern of basic units, consisting of circles and squares he 
then arranged them on his famous mecanisme [his term], a graphic formula derived from 
the grid.cxii Starting in plan, he would transform the grid, identifying the major axes of 
circulation and then the key structural elements of wall and column along its lines. The 
mecanisme, he believed, contained “The general principles that at all times in all places . . 
.” were universally valid. cxiii 
Durand’s mecanisme reduced architectural composition to horizontal and vertical 
lines and their combinations. Each project was conceived of in plan, and extruded into 
volume. The mecanisme had two fundamental advantages according to Durand: its 
reliance on axiality and the underlying grid and its ability to produce an infinite variety of 
projects. “Dealing with the basic combinations we have seen that, following the general 
principles of architecture, the walls and the columns, the doors and the windows . . . must 
each be placed on common axes. It follows naturally that rooms formed by these walls 
and columns and served by these doors and windows must, too, share common axes. 
These new axes may be combined in a thousand different ways and give birth, by their 
combinations, to an infinite number of different general dispositions.”cxiv Durand’s 
methodology of composition was essentially a technographic ars combinatoria.  
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Durand’s mecanisme, transformed the grid from a symbolic device, a reflection of 
divine truth, into a technical one. Here the grid presented space as an abstract concept 
devoid of transcendental value. It contains no qualitative aspect. Space was reduced to its 
quantitative components alone, becoming the full realization of analytic geometry and the 
Cartesian coordinates applied to architectural composition.  
His Precis contains no perspective drawings, only elevations, and he specifically 
prohibited the use of rendering in watercolor. All is reducible to disposition, in doing so, 
space, as habitable and lived, as well as the classical concept of proportion, were factored 
out of the composition strategy. Architecture was reduced to the discourse of surface, 
volume and plane.  
Elements are manipulated according to the rules of the geometric grid. They are also 
reducible to standardization according to the same rules. While Durand himself never 
theorized the potentiality of his system in terms of opening the door to industrialization, a 
project such as Paxton’s Crystal Palace is conceptually dependent upon this systematized 
way of conceiving a building. According to Leonardo Benevolo: “The figures from 
Durand’s treatise can be dated by their style, which conforms to the taste of the time, but 
they predate the work of the nineteenth- century engineers, all of whose typical features 
are already clearly delineated: the compositional method based on mechanical 
progression, the independence of the structural mechanism from the decorative 
refinements, the preference for citing measurements in round numbers and for elementary 
forms, which reduce the designer’s authority to a minimum. These features are to be 
found in the work of Paxton, Eiffel, Contamin, Le Baron Jenny, and Hennebique.”cxv  
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Durand’s compositional method was widely received as revolutionary and had a 
broad impact on architecture in France, Germany and England. It is widely debated that 
both Leo Von Klenze and Carl Freidrick Schinkel both were influenced by his designs 
and used them as starting points for their own.cxvi His method also became the basis for 
the first university course in architecture in England.cxvii 
His notion of economy extended to ornament and detailing as well, believing that all 
unnecessary extravagances and decoration should be removed from the building 
advocating instead that the style of the building should be a direct expression of its 
functioning parts. Ornament was for him superfluous in many ways and an unnecessary 
expense. Durand went further in emphasizing that he believed that form was a reflection 
of the nature of the materials used.cxviii Durand co-opted the term Charactere arguing that 
“If a building lends itself conveniently to the use for which it was destined, will it not 
naturally have a character and, more importantly, a character all its own?”cxix  
The pragmatic concerns of use and convenience postulated a new approach toward 
theory driven by practical application. The symbolic content, and in many ways content 
itself, understood in a classic manner, played little if any role. Architecture now became, 
at least as proposed by Durand, an autonomous discipline, a specialized task beholden to 
the material and formal causality. As we have noted earlier (Chapter One), these concerns 
were reducible to mathematical quantification and proofs. Architecture as an autonomous 
language as taught in the engineering school of the Ecole Polytechnique by Durand was 
now brought in line with all the objectives of science. 
Villari argues, following Kaufmann, that the idea of economy plays a specific and 
absolute role in the theory of Durand.cxx But Villari argues his use of economy should not 
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be seen as an external force, that is to say, solely a concern with economy of materials, 
costs and funding. While these do play a role in Durand’s theory the notion of ‘economy’ 
goes further embodying the very essence of architecture itself, and most specifically its 
system of aesthetic judgment. According to Villari: “The idea of economy gathers and 
organizes the internal grammatical laws of the architectural language; hence, arbitrariness 
of the sign, composition as the entirety of the language of architecture, and the structural 
relation of the part to the whole must necessarily realize, at least formally, the idea of 
economy.”cxxi Durand translated economy of means into an aesthetic prerogative. Any 
superfluous detailing or ornament was not only unnecessary but also uneconomical. 
Architecture and the detail were thus opened to a reduction to the most economical and 
rational expression of means to ends. The result was the actual instrumentalization of 




The eighteenth century saw the reorganization of architectural theory as it 
incorporated the epistemology of science, adopting its rational project and in the process 
opening the door to its eventual instrumentalization. That project was based on the 
redefinition of three key metaphysical categories; causality, reality and mind, each would 
play a part in the establishment of a rational tectonic.  
Understood through mathematical axioms increasingly divorced from transcendental 
values, reality was seen as composed of primary causes of extension, mass and vis inertia 
as a greater and greater emphasis was placed the quantitative characteristics of the ‘thing-
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in-itself’. The discourse of knowledge was, if not completely, to a large part reduced to a 
concern for the formal and material causality; ‘what is it?’ and ‘what are its constitutive 
materials?’. With the doctrine of primary and secondary causes came a new theory of 
mind defined no longer by its faculties, but as a collection of images and sensations 
caused by external mechanical motions. Human consciousness became a passive 
spectator in a world of infinite extension. The resulting duality of mind became the 
hallmark of the epistemology of science and the modern era. The discourses of aesthetics 
and architecture mirrored this new emerging epistemology, embodying not only its new 
causality, but its definitions of reality, and the human mind as well.  
Mirroring the Cartesian duality of mind and the duality of method- deductive and 
empirical- was the division of aesthetics into ‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ that served to 
bring the new aesthetic doctrine in line with the epistemology of science. This duality 
manifested itself most profoundly in the architectural texts of Chaude Perrault, 
Christopher Wren and Guarino Guarini. Trained in the sciences and the scientific method 
their architectural theories were permeated by the epistemology of science. The aesthetic 
duality served to maintain the absolute value of art in the face of its loss of transcendental 
value and the growing realization of the relativity and diversity of ‘taste’.  
Developed along the lines of Newtonian empiricism, ‘Subjective’ aesthetics sought to 
define the subject/object relationship, emphasizing the intellection and process whereby 
the object is brought before the mind. This was done through an appeal to the collective 
unconscious as authority and as an indicator of the principles and laws inherent within the 
human mind. In juxtaposition ‘Objective’ aesthetics sought to identify the clear and fixed 
principles of art along the lines of Cartesian rationalism. Here the work of art is an object 
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not of perception but of pure relations expressed in terms of rules. Art derives its truth 
from a representation of the mechanistic structure of nature understood as functional 
significance. As the writings of Perrault, Wren and Guarini were more broadly accepted 
the full impact of the restructuring of aesthetic and architecture theory along the lines of 
‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ lines began to emerge.  
The Cartesian influence in the academies resulted in the gradual dissolution of the 
classical notion of mimesis and the Vitruvian tradition. Classical aesthetics operated on 
two fundamental premises 1) the hierarchical set of transcendental values present as the 
underlying ordering system of all things and 2) the theory of mathmesis; the belief that 
the fundamental structure of the ordering system was essentially geometrical providing 
proof of the clear relationship between macrocosm and microcosm. The use of geometry 
and mathematical structures, the application of the sophron eros, provided an absolute 
value for art grounding it in metaphysical foundations.  
With the increased removal of transcendental values from the discourse of 
mathematics, aesthetics and architecture had to find another ground for its legitimization. 
That ground would come from an appeal to nature in the form of ‘la belle nature’; the 
view that nature operated according to clear, rational principles and that form was a 
response to the necessities of function. Beauty, whose essence was the imitation of 
nature, became the representation of the ‘fitness for purpose’ of the thing. This would 
take the form of two mechanisms as architecture sought to embody nature’s functional 
significance.  
The first, the Mechanism of Structure, emerged out of the desire of ‘Objective’ 
aesthetics to identify clear and fixed principles along the lines of Cartesian rationalism. 
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The solution, first proposed in the Greco-gothic Ideal, embodied all of the aesthetic 
categories of judgment found in ‘Objective’ beauty; its’ representation of a mechanistic 
understanding of beauty defined as ‘fitness of purpose’, and its’ desire for simplicity of 
form and composition as ideal type. It understood architectural form as the rational 
exposition of structure, the exercise of forces understood intellectually, as an object of 
pure relations expressed in terms of the rationally understood principles of statics. In 
transforming the Vitruvian concept of firmitas into a formative law it translated the 
functional signification of nature into the Mechanism of Structure; architecture is 
dissected into its constituent structural elements, whose functions are determined 
clarified, represented and then reassembled in such a way as to make the functional 
mapping readable and intelligible. While it emphasized the importance of the clear 
readability of the Mechanism of Structure, it still did so within a representational 
structure that validated that rationality in terms of an extrinsic value structure; ‘nature’s 
efficient beauty’.  
With the continued elimination of transcendental value structures came the eventual 
rejection of the orders and all systems of proportion as ‘rules’ for architecture leaving 
only the formative law of the Mechanism of Structur. As architecture increasingly sought 
legitimacy in its own materials and methods it was transformed from a normative tool for 
architectural analysis and judgment to an operative tool for building construction. The 
development of the first means of analysis of statics and material strength provided a 
rational means of material selection and the determination of proportion and size of 
structural components. The Mechanism of Structure opened the door to a rational science 
of construction. A greater interest in rational building techniques and a greater influence 
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of the methods of construction led to a theory of design and detailing of structural 
members based upon the rational determination of material properties. It was the 
mechanics and the strength of materials that allowed the builder to arrive at the 
determination of correct forms and dimensions of any given part of the building in a 
given structural situation. This would eventually lead to the development of engineering 
as a distinct profession separate from architecture and by the middle of the nineteenth 
century its own style- the Engineer’s Aesthetic.  
The second, the Mechanism of Disposition, incorporating nature’s functional 
significance, was derived from the desire of ‘Subjective’ aesthetics’ to provide a rational 
explanation for the empirically observed diversity of form engendered by cultural 
prejudice. The end results were a search for origins in an attempt at reconciliation with 
nature and the introduction of ideal type forms. Clear, simple and rational, the inherent 
clarity of the relationship between part and whole once again became the guidepost for 
architectural judgment. As normative models the ideal type forms were based on a set of 
fixed a priori principles derived conceptually from nature- and hence sought legitimacy 
from their theoretical proximity to her virtues.  
By the late eighteenth century, questions regarding the legitimacy of the imitation 
theory and an increased concern over the diversity of building types led to the desire to 
find other rational means of providing such legitimacy. This would eventually be 
achieved through an appeal once again to the source of nature’s validity; function.  
Maintaining the normative model, architectural theorists developed formative laws to 
explain the development of form and type. They did so by subordinating the architectural 
principle of disposition, i.e. plan arrangement and organization, to the Vitruvian 
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theoretical category of utilitas. The result was the Mechanism of Disposition that applied 
the same rational tactic as the Mechanism of Structure. Derived from the methodology of 
science it analyzed form in terms of its internal spatial components and their utilitarian 
adjacencies. Type was defined by its utilitarian function; the by-product of the rational 
internal organization of its component parts so that they became clearly represented and 
readable in its final form.    
The continued desire to eliminate transcendental value structures lead to the eventual 
rejection of the normative model leaving only the formative law of the transformative 
model; the Mechanism of Disposition. It postulated a new approach toward theory driven 
by practical application. Design composition could be freely manipulated according to 
rationalist precepts. Good Architecture was a reflection of the most fitting and most 
economical disposition. Under the precepts of the Mechanism of Disposition architecture 
became an autonomous discourse; the direct expression of its functioning parts and space 
an assemblage of quantitative components devoid of qualitative aspects, at least in terms 
of design precepts. The disposition of the plan and the economy of its construction now 
became the prototypical problems in architecture. 
The Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition brought architecture in line with the 
epistemology of science by creating theoretical frameworks that limited the discourse of 
architecture to formal and material causes reducible to rational precepts. Transformed 
into an autonomous discourse, architecture was now open to a reduction to the most 
economical and rational expression of means to ends. This rationalist tectonic opened the 
door to the ‘instrumentalization’ of architectural theory. It was now possible to view 
design as a combination of standardized elements and forms whose proportions were 
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derived from the nature of the materials and from functional efficiency. Without the 
transcendental grounding in the ethical structure of sophrosyne architecture as a system 
of production could be transformed from a discourse of phronetic- techne to a rational 


























                                                          
 
ENDNOTES 
i The reference to the Caribbean Hut as an ideal reference immediately brings to mind Semper’s use of the 
same image as the basis of his tectonic theory but they are selected for different reasons. Frezier because it 
is seen as primitive and therefore closer to nature and free from the corruption of custom and culture. 
Semper as the manifestation of four elements of architecture.  
ii Frezier’s theories were published in a series of articles between the years of 1709 and 1712 in the Jesuit 
journal Memoires de Trevoux.  
iii Kruft, A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present, trans. Taylor, Callander and 
Wood, Zwemmer Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1994, pg. 144. 
iv Boffrand, Livre d’architecture contenant les principes generauxde cet art, Paris 1745,facs. Repr. 1969, 
pg. 10. 
v The Term Greco- gothic was coined by the Abbe Jean- Louis De Cordemoy in his Nouveau traite de toute 
l’architecture of 1706, and popularized in the 20th century by Robin Middleton. For a more complete 
analysis of the Greco- Gothic Ideal see, Robin Middleton, “The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Geaco-Gothic 
Ideal: a Prelude to Romantic Classicism”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 25, 1962, pg. 
23, 26, 1963, pp. 90- 123. and Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture The Poetics of Construction 
in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 29- 59. 
vi There are no dates for J.L. de Cordemoy as history has shown those previously recorded were those of his 
aunt. He was the fifth son of Gerauld de Cordemoy (1626-1684) which places his birth in the mid 
seventeenth century making him a contemporary of Claude Perrault, the date of his influential work 
Nouveau Traite de toute l’Architecture, 1706 indicates he was of a younger generation than Perrault.  
vii Middleton has done much to document this trend in thinking in architectural theory. His research is 
presented in the seminal essay  The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Graeco-Gothic Ideal, published in two 
consecutive volumes of the  Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute and in the book, Neoclassical 
and 19th Century Architecture vol. I, written and edited by Middleton & Watkin. See notes below. 
viii See Robin Middleton, The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Graeco-Gothic Ideal, Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institute, vol. 25 no. 3/4  July- Dec. 1962 pp. 278-320 and vol. 26 no. 1/2 1963, pp. 90-123.  
ix Ibid.,  
x This point is made by Middleton who quotes De l’Orme’s text. “Monstrant netre plusieurs autres choses, 
come l’on peult autant bien faire les branches d’ogives de charpenterier ou menuyserie, come de Pierre de 
taille.” Continuing “la facon du pendentif de pierre de taile estant par dessus les ogives, tiercerones et 
liernes.” De l’Orme op. crit. Pg. 110. Preprinted in Middleton, The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Graeco-
Gothic Ideal, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, vol. 25 no. 3/4  July- Dec. 1962. pg. 292. 
xi On the buttress Derand states “Il est a propos que vous soyez averty que ces voutes, comme les autres, 
ayans beaucoup de pussee ont aussi besion de bons arcs-boutans pour les contre-buter et amintenir en 
estat.” In reference to the rib he states “Ces voutes usitees particulierement en France, et autres pais 
septentrionaux, sont composees de nerfs et pendentifs. Les nerfs d’ogives, sont des corps saillans ornez de 
diverses moulures, qui portent et soutiennent les pendentifs.” Derand op crit. 392. reprinted by Middleton 
pg. 293. 
xii Ibid. vol. 1. pg. 290.  
xiii Much of their research and work in this area was a direct result of the construction of numerous Hotel de 
Villes in and around Paris at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries. Clients were concerned 
with the flow of space that facilitated their daily routine. Ease of use and functional relationships became 
central themes in composing plans.  
xiv De Cordemoy, Nouveau Traite de toute l’ Architecture ou l’art de Bastir, Paris, 2nd edit. 1714 facsimile 
reproduction 1966, pg. 3. 
xv It is important to note that the rational interpretation of Gothic architecture in France can be traced back, 
as far as Philibert De l’Orme’s Architecture of 1567. He had conceived of the Gothic columns and ribs as 
an independent, clearly expressed structural scaffold, distinct form the enclosing wall surfaces. It is with De 
l’Orme than that we see the origins of a separation of the structure and enclosure systems. This separation 
was also evident in the 1643 L’architecture des voutes; ou, l’art des traites et coupe des voutes, written by 
Francois Derand, the Jesuit mathematician and architect, the same man so influential on Guarini. He had 
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seen Gothic architecture with its columns, ribs and flying and outer buttresses, as a solution to the problem 
of structural equilibrium. Gothic was a style of structural elegance.  
xvi Frezier’s opposition to de Cordemoy is recorded in his Memoires de Trevoux (1709) and his Triate des 
feux d’artifices (1706). His argument was based upon his disagreement that the use of freestanding columns 
would produce an open spacious effect. Instead he believed the effect would be overcrowding.  
xvii Robin Middleton claims the real source of De Cordemoy’s model are the Perrault brothers. Middleton & 
Watkin, Neoclassical and 19th Century Architecture vol. I, Electra/Rizzoli Milan, 1980, pg. 15.  
xviii Ibid. see Middleton  
xix Perrault had defended ‘Arbitrary’ beauty as the source of development and creativity in architecture and 
there is a sense that he saw it as the more significant of the two. But in many ways the criticism of Perrault 
was unfounded, spurred on perhaps more by the growing influence of rationalism and its epistemology that 
sought clear, absolutist principles that conformed to the methodology of science. This can be seen in the 
criticism of Borromini, held up as one of the chief sources of this problem. Ironically his plans are perhaps 
some of the most rational and organized of the Baroque era. While the plans are rational constructs of 
complex geometries, visually they often appear highly enigmatic. It was the perception of simplicity, clarity 
and order, as aesthetic categories of taste that came into play.  
xx Rousseau occupies a curious position in the history of Western thought both a founder and critic of the 
Enlightenment his writings raised issues and questions that helped to frame the nature of the modern era. 
His First Discourse, in many ways represents the final culmination of the Querelle. Presented in 1750, to 
the Academy of Dijon in response to the question ‘Has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended to 
purify morals?’, Rousseau’s answer was a resounding no. In that sense he was an advocate of the ancients. 
But the First Discourse, and particularly the Second Discourse (1754), showed that Rousseau was not 
advocating a return to classical precedence, but the advancement of reason through a return to origins and 
nature as a means of circumventing the confusion of custom and tradition.  
xxi Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses Jean- Jacques Rousseau, edit. Masters, trans. Masters, St 
Martin’s Press New York, 1964, pg. 37. 
xxii Ibid., pg. 37- 38. 
xxiii Ibid., pg. 37. 
xxiv Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, 
pg. 3. 
xxv Perez-Gomez claims the contradictions between taste and reason had been previously pointed out by De 
Cordemoy, Briseux and Dubos. He views Laugier as making a conscious attempt to reconcile the two by 
recourse to nature. Perez-Gomez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1992, pg. 65 
xxvi Kruft refers to Laugier was a follower of the Rousseau school of thought, “The most important 
representative of Rousseauism in architectural theory is the Abbe Marc- Antoine Laugier.”( Kruft, A 
History of Architectural Theory, pg. 152). But it would be a mistake to see Rousseau as his only source, 
Herrmann notes his reliance on the theories of Newton as commonly understood at the time, (Herrmann, 
Laugier and 18th Century French Theory, pg. 36). As I hope to show, in addition to these two influences, 
his roots in Cartesian philosophy also played a significant role in the development of his approach to 
architecture.  
xxvii Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, 
pg. 64, & Avertissement to the second edition, pg. 156. 
xxviii “The idea held by many people that in matters of taste there is no need for the application of a severe 
rational test is the most fatal of all prejudices.” Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann 
Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, pg. 25. 
xxix Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, 
pg. 22.  
xxx Ibid., pg. 19. 
xxxi Ibid., pp. 11- 12. 
xxxii As Wolfgang Herrmann has pointed out, Laugier hardly applied Newton’s method in a scientific way, 
rather he associated his theory with that of Newton, as it was commonly understood in Cartesian France at 
the time. His method was therefore a populist form of Newtonianism, as opposed to a true scientific 
application of the metaphysics of the great scientist. See Herrmann, Laugier and 18th Century French 
Theory, A. Zwemmer Ltd., London 1962, pg. 36. 
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xxxiii Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, 
pg. 4. 
xxxiv It is important to note that extensive studies of Greek architecture were not available to Laugier and 
were in fact not undertaken until some 20 years after the publication of the Essai. Laugier’s praise of Greek 
architecture in the ‘Introduction’ is based more on an appreciation of Greek sculpture and the growing 
awareness that the principles of Vitruvius were derived from Greek and early Roman architecture and not 
from the Roman masterpieces documented since the Renaissance. In this sense he is not advocating the 
imitation of the classical canon but of its origins. 
xxxv On this issue see Fenelon, Lettre sur les occupations a l’Academie Francoise, (1st ed. 1714) Glasgow 
edit. 1750.  pp. 100, 106. and Voltaire, Temple du Gout, 1733 , Oeuvres, ed. Granier, VIII, p. 561.  
xxxvi Cassirer notes that the concept of Delicatesse expressed lightness and flexibility of thought and the 
ability to understand fine shades of meaning. In aesthetic terms the word referred less to the content of 
thought but to the process of thinking itself. Thus for Laugier the Corinthian column possesses a 
gentleness, harmony, natural ease and grace of design that is understood, by the connoisseur of architecture, 
as a result of the Delicatesse of its creator. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1951, pp. 300- 301. 
xxxvii Domonique Bouhours (1632-1702) a Jesuit priest and critic who wrote widely on many subjects both 
religious and secular including art.  
xxxviii Laugier had of course been criticized on just this issue. Many believed that Laugier was simply 
providing a posteriori rationalization for his own subjective taste. The charge is grounded. His application 
of the Empirical method is loose and unscientific at best.  
xxxix Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, 
pg. 1.  
xl Ibid., pg. 3. 
xli Ibid., pg. 3. 
xlii Ibid., pg. 12. 
xliii That Laugier consciously conceived of the ‘Primitive Hut’ as a rational principle and not as a past origin 
is evidenced in his consistent use of the term ‘principle’ when referring to the hut throughout the Essai.  
xliv Laugier provides this analysis. “The parts that are essential are the cause of beauty, the parts introduced 
by necessity cause every license, the parts added by caprice cause every fault.” An Essay on Architecture, 
Avertissement to the second edition, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, pg. 
12. 
xlv Ibid. 
xlvi Kruft, A History of Architectural Theory, Zwemmer, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1994, 
pg. 152. 
xlvii Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Avertissement to the second edition, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey 
and Ingalls, Inc. Los Angeles 1977, pg. 152. 
xlviii The term functionalism has been applied in many ways over the years. Early 18th century architects, 
such as Mansart, showed a concern with plan distribution and organization that has been called 
functionalism. This is derived from use or utility. Italian theorist of the same period, often considered the 
originators of functionalist theory, interpreted function in a slightly different way See Lodoli below in part 
two. Laugier though is referring to the function of a given architectural element, its structural function. 
According to Kruft: “In the proposition that truth of architecture lies in its structural logic, Laugier 
formulates a new concept of functionalism superseding that which had been current at the beginning of the 
century and had been orientated towards usage. (functionalism understood in terms of use). Laugier thus 
becomes one of the initiators of the nineteenth and twentieth century debate about functionalism.” A 
History of Architectural Theory, Zwemmer, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1994, pg. 153. 
xlix While Laugier provides a single type form from which all architecture is to be deduced later theorists 
found this image to reductivist. The theory of type was greatly explored in the latter half of the 18th century. 
Quatremere de Quincy would expand the idea into three origin type forms, the hut, the cave and the tent.  
l Laugier Discours sur le retablissemeut de l’architecture antique; Paris 1760, quoted Mondain Monval, 
Soufflot, sa vie, pg. 506. Cf. also Laugier, Observations, pp. 120, 122, 159, 180-185, 288. Translation 
Rizzuto. Ste. Genevieve is widely recognized as a continuation of the Greco-gothic Ideal as manifested in 
Laugier’s Essai most particularly in its typological format using Laugier’s perfered Latin cross plan.  
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li Middleton asserts that the precedent for the portico was the temple of Balbek, and the change in level 
from the nave floor to the side aisles on the interior was inspired by Piranesi’s Prima parte di architettura e 
prospettive (1743) pls 16c, d, as well as the chapel of the Communion at St. Jean-en-Greve.  
lii Quoted Mondain Monval, Soufflot, sa vie, p. 423. Reprinted in Middlton, The Abbe de Cordemoy and 
the Greaco-gothic Ideal, The Journal of the Warburg and Cautauld Institute, vol 26. no 1/2. 1963, p. 106. 
trans. Tony Rizzuto. “Le principle objet de M. Soufflot en batissant son eglise a ete de reunir, sous une des 
plus belles formes, lagerete de la construction des edifices Gothiques avec la purete et la magnificence de 
l’architecture Greque.”  
liii Middlton, The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Greaco-gothic Ideal, The Journal of the Warburg and 
Cautauld Institute, vol 26. no 1/2. 1963, p. 108. 
liv There is ample evidence to show that Patte’s rebuke of Soufflot was motivated more by his personal 
issues with Soufflot then with any sound analysis and concern. Patte had gone up for a job as inspector on 
La Madeleine, as Controller of Royal Buildings in Paris it was Soufflot who would have to make the final 
recommendation. Believing that Patte had yet to garner enough experience for such a task he failed to 
recommend him. While Soufflot attempted to make amends with Patte he harbored a continued grudge. 
Ironically, Soufflot in an attempt to appease him sent him to London along with N.H. Jardin to study St. 
Paul’s and to meet with Sir William Chambers as part of the structural research on Ste. Genevieve.  
lv Kenneth Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Century Architecture, The MIT Press Cambridge & London, 1996, pg. 33.  
lvi Middlton, The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Greaco-gothic Ideal, The Journal of the Warburg and 
Cautauld Institute, vol 26. no 1/2. 1963, p. 120. 
lvii Anthony Vidler has done much to explore the idea and development of type in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. His argument is that the concept of type oscillated between mystic symbolism and 
rationality. In either case it is important to recognize that it is derived from the epistemology of sciences 
desire to ground all knowledge in what it defines as first principles. Science as it was espoused during the 
period between 1600 and 1800 continuously vacillated between the Cartesian notion of innate ideas- placed 
in the mind by God- and nature as the ultimate source of reason. In Vidler’s case of mystic symbolism the 
ultimate image is that of Solomon’s Temple, itself an innate idea planted in the mind by God. As such it is 
not out of step with Descartes notion of innate ideas imprinted on the mind as images in wax. See Descartes 
Discourse on Method. It is the clarity of the innate idea that is of importance to Descartes and in the case of 
architectural references to Solomon’s Temple that mysticism is crouched in mathematical figures. While 
still beholden to the mysticism of the classical notion of mathmesis it is nonetheless grounded in 
mathematical reasoning and method. In either case the ‘type’ serves as origin point and is therefore closely 
associated with universal law or first principle. See Vidler, The Idea of Type: The transformation of the 
Academic Ideal, 1750- 1830, Oppositions Reader, edit. Eisenman, Frampton, Gandelsonas, Vidler, Forster, 
Agrest, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1989, pp. 439- 45.  
lviii Anthony Vidler, The Production of Types, Oppositions Reader, edit. Eisenman, Frampton, 
Gandelsonas, Vidler, Forster, Agrest, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1989, pp. 437. Vidler notes 
the first is related to Neo-platonic notions of the eidos as a priori forms found in nature; the second is based 
upon a newer understanding of the production of type forms. But it must also be noted that Laugier’s ‘little 
rustic hut’ -as origin and basic type form for architecture-has less the characteristic of the Platonic eidos- 
whose manifestation in reality is infinitely diverse- and more the characteristic of Descartes a priori innate 
idea whose clarity is its mark of truth and reason. In the Discourse on Method the more pure the 
manifestation of the innate idea- the more it is in possession of clarite- the closer to truth it is, and the more 
exemplary it is of absolute reason. In Laugier’s systematic doubt the origins of architecture and its 
attendant form is reduced to the purest manifestation of the type in an attempt to achieve a more rational 
and true work from which to uncover the first principles of architecture. 
lix This emphasis on internal disposition and its expression on the exterior of the building can be found in 
Salomon de Brosse’ Luxemburg Palace in Paris (1614) and Francois Mansart’s Chateau de Maisons (1642).  
lx Boffrand, Germain, Livre d’architecture contenant les principles generaux de cet art, Paris 1745(facs 
reproduction with La figure equestre de Louis XIV [1743], Farnborough 1969) pg. 10. 
lxi Ibid. pg. 8. 
lxii Ibid. pg. 16. 
lxiii Carolus Linnaeus (1707- 78) was a Swedish Botanist and considered the founder of the binomial system 
of nomenclature and the originator of modern scientific classification of plants and animals. His system of 
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classification was published in Systema naturae of 1735. Despite the artificiality of his system of 
classification it still remains the basis of modern taxonomy.  
lxiv Jacques Francois Blondel, Cours d’architecture, Paris, 1771- 1777, vol. 2, p. 229.  
lxv Late Renaissance theory in particular Mannerist theory was concerned with the expression of personality 
or qualities thus in the case of Serlio we have the development of systems of rustication designed to express 
the personality of the client, or the idea from his set designs where environment is an expression of social 
status and theatrical form; Rustic for Comedy, Gothic for Drama and Classical for Tragedy.  
lxvi Vidler, Anthony, The Idea of Type: The transformation of the Academic Ideal, 1750- 1830, Oppositions 
Reader, edit. Eisenman, Frampton, Gandelsonas, Vidler, Forster, Agrest, Princeton Architectural Press, 
New York, 1989, pp. 437. 
lxvii Boullee was a teacher originally trained as a painter. While he did not build he is most noted for a series 
of large scale drawings and projects and his theoretical work Architecture, Essai sur L’Art, an unpublished 
manuscript that he provided to his students. Influenced by the great Piranesi he maintained a painterly 
interest in the dramatic use of lighting and shade. In his teaching and writings he argued for character, 
grandeur, magic, poetry and the use of emotions rather than intellect in architecture. In this way his theories 
might be considered counter to the Enlightenment episteme. But his work is still characteristic of the age in 
that he limits the use of ornament and works toward a simple geometry.lxvii Boullee like Laugier kept the 
column as a pure form, freestanding and hence no engaged in the wall, composing facades essentially with 
two elements the uninterrupted row of columns and the un-modulated blank wall. He used the columnar 
screen as an honorific distinction.  
lxviii Thus his project for the Ministry of Justice presents the allegory of virtue triumphing over vice with the 
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communicate and maintain the system of political hierarchy necessary to stabilize society; and architecture, 
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situation et des efforts qu’elle peut avoira soutenir, pur qu’il resulte perfection solidité et économie” 
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Chapter 10: The Epistemological Parameters of a Rational Tectonics  
 
“It is good sense, reason, which achieves all: virtue, 
genius, spirit, talent, taste. What is virtue? It is 
reason put in practice. And talent? Reason 
brilliantly set forth. Spirit? Reason well expressed. 
Taste is simply refined good sense, and genius is 
reason sublime.”i 
M. J. Chenier 1842 
 
The Epistemological Parameters of a Rational Tectonics 
 
The epistemology of science could be said to be part of a long standing Rationalist 
tradition in Western thought, one that goes as far back as Plato, in which the notion of a 
perfect vision of the world is accepted. Historically this vision had been caught up in a 
belief in the mathematical or geometrical structure of the world, a world in which a 
method akin to the isolated truths of mathematics would allow for the attainment of 
truth.ii While not the sole tradition of thought in the West it was by far the most dominant 
and influential.iii Within the rationalist tradition there is the belief that with the right 
amount of discipline and logic, knowledge can be attained. Such a vision of a tidy 
rationally ordered universe transparent to human thought has long been a staple of our 
way of thinking.  
There are three propositions upon which all such Rationalist traditions in the West, 
either Christian or Pagan, stood upon: 
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1. The first proposition is that all genuine questions can be answered. This was a 
central tenet of Scholasticism, the Enlightenment and the Positivist traditions and 
could be said to be the backbone of Western thought in general.  
2. The second proposition is that all these answers are knowable, that is to say that 
they can be discovered by means that can be learnt or taught. That there is a given 
technique from which all answers are knowable. 
3. The third great proposition is that all answers are compatible that is to say that 
they do not in any way pose contradictions. Contradictions in knowledge are seen 
as the result of false answers. An example of this is Einstein’s goal of finding the 
formula that explains all formulas, the one law from which all laws are derived, a 
goal still actively sought in physics. 
 
At the heart of these propositions, is the belief that the world is a finely ordered 
rational whole that follows a given plan or structure, and furthermore that that order or 
structure is inherently stable. Even when one assumes change, growth and development it 
is perceived to take place alone a set of fixed and identifiable rules. There is of course 
absolutely no means of proving such a hypothesis; that of a perfectly ordered rational 
system of rules governing the universe, but this is irrelevant, it is the necessary starting 
point for the construction of a worldview in the first place.  
The epistemology of science was certainly part of this larger tradition but it offered a 
particular version or interpretation of such propositions, radically transforming them. 
While it is hardly true that the thinkers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were all of a kind and in total agreement on every aspect of thought they did 
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hold in common a set of basic assumptions which structured the general trend in thought 
at the time. These assumptions established the core of the epistemology of science and 
made it distinct from the previous interpretations of the Rationalist tradition. They are 
essentially what distinguish the epistemological rupture we call Modernity. 
 
1.  An absolute faith in reason.  
Underlying this was a belief that reality, or nature, as the ‘thing-in-itself’ was 
a single, fixed, and stable whole, subject to a single structure of logically 
connected laws and generalizations that governed plants, animals and man. 
What’s more that these laws were discoverable by man and could be verified 
by scientific method, a position not adhered to previously.iv  
2.  The belief in a universal claim to humanity.  
Like Nature, Man is a constant and all men possessed the same universal 
goals, such as happiness, knowledge, justice and liberty. These goals, or 
concepts, are essentially objective, common to all men, attainable and 
compatible. Such a construct begins to formulate Human nature as largely 
unaltered by place, and time, more over the conception of improvement and 
goals not only sets up a teleological structure to understanding human history 
but establishes a frame for value judgments that get carried over into social 
institutions such as religion, politics, art, science and technology.  
4. The possibility of attaining the second by means of the first.  
Underlying this attitude toward knowledge is the belief that if the world could 
be rationally decoded we could create a world in which pain, and suffering, 
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evil and vice no longer existed. We could essentially create a Utopia. 
Conversely along with this belief is it’s inherent opposite; that pain and 
suffering, evil and vice are the product of non- rational thinking. I use the term 
non- rational here as opposed to irrational because the critique is not solely 
against the complete lack of reasoning but usually against all forms of 
thinking and reasoning save a particular kind. The result of this is that ethics 
and virtue are now inextricably linked to knowledge defined as that specific 
kind of reason.v  
 
What the epistemology of science did was to substitute for the myriad means of 
accessing reality and human experience a specific method, the method of logical rational 
deduction found in mathematics or the inductive method of the natural sciences. What it 
could be said to have done was to push the issue to its ‘illogical’ conclusion, literally 
forcing a confrontation with the limits of such an a priori belief.vi 
According to Habermas: “The project of modernity as it was formulated by the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century consists in the relentless 
development of the objectivating sciences, of the universalist foundations of morality and 
law, and of autonomous art, all in accord with their own immanent logic. But at the same 
time it also results in releasing the cognitive potentials accumulated in the process from 
their esoteric high forms and attempting to apply them in the sphere of praxis, that is, to 
encourage the rational organization of social relationships.”vii The relentless development 
of ‘objectivating science’, as Habermas calls it,  radically altered the rationalist tradition 
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not only resulting in a mechanistic worldview but also resulting in the transformations of 
the definitions of truth, nature, man, production, and social structures.  
 
“The eighteenth Century is imbued with a belief in 
the unity and immutability of reason. Reason is the 
same for all thinking subjects, all nations, all 
epochs, and all cultures.” 
    Ernst Cassirer 
 The Philosophy of the Enlightenment  
 
Reason in the form of Episteme 
 
At the core of rational tectonics and architecture is the necessity to rationally define 
both the theoretical principles of design and the construction process. While design has 
always been reasonable it is the definition of reason as defined by the epistemology of 
science that marks the first parameter of rational tectonics; reason in the form of episteme 
as the starting point of design.viii How then is this definition of reason distinct from that 
of Classical tectonics? 
For Socrates, reason reflected on the true nature of things understood as the thing-in-
itself. In its ultimate form, reason should determine beliefs and regulate relations between 
men and between man and nature. The daimonian, in Socratic philosophy, or the Soul, in 
Platonic thought, might have been a mental faculty but it was trained on a reality extrinsic 
to it and in this sense held to a notion of a concrete reality and external truth beyond the 
faculty of thinking and consciousness.  
This extrinsic characteristic of reason could be found not only in Plato and Aristotle, 
but also in Scholasticism and German Idealism where it was based in relations among 
human beings, social classes, social institutions and in nature and its manifestations. Its’ 
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aim was to evolve a comprehensive system or hierarchy of all beings, including man and 
his aims. In this sense reason was the logos of man’s understanding of the world, the 
mechanism of how we situate ourselves within the substrate of the world.  
The degree of reasonableness of human actions was based upon the harmony of such 
actions with its totality. As Max Horkhiemer noted, it was this definition of reason that 
possessed “as its essence a structure inherent in reality that by itself called for a specific 
mode of behavior in each specific case be it practical or theoretical.”ix In the philosophy 
of Ancient Greece phronesis was the vehicle of practical reasoning focused on the 
particularities of a given situation that allow men to function together such that the 
dialectic of techne and phronesis revealed the higher truth. In this sense reason originally 
meant a means for understanding ends, for their determination. In other words its 
emphasis was on ends not means.x 
But this changed with the development of the epistemology of science. The alteration 
in definition was the by product of the new metaphysics and its duality. Reason was now 
an aspect of the res cogitans, the subjective mind, and hence divorced from the extrinsic 
reality of the res extensa. While this shift was undoubtedly brought about by Descartes 
metaphysics and theory of mind, it must be remembered that it was not only Descartes 
reason, but Newton’s laws and the analytic method of his physics; not just abstraction 
and definition, but observation and experience that defined reason as such.  
This definition established reason as a faculty divorced from extrinsic reality, 
disconnecting it from the various structures which make up the lived experience. 
According to Horkheimer “The present crisis of reason consists fundamentally in the fact 
that at a certain point thinking either became incapable of conceiving such objectivity at 
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all or began to negate it as a delusion.”xi Reason became separated from phronesis as 
right action and in the process became highly theoretical and in the end an abstraction. It 
became a form of episteme to use the classical terminology. It is important to note that 
Enlightenment thinkers who so promoted the values of individual reason envisioned it to 
do just the opposite and appear to be unaware of the consequences of this.  
This is fundamentally problematic as thought and reason serve any particular 
endeavor, good or evil, as Horkhiemer claims “Reason has never really directed social 
reality, but now reason has been so thoroughly purged of any specific trend or preference 
that it has finally renounced even the task of passing judgment on man’s actions and way 
of life.”xii In such a context all ethical, moral, political and aesthetic judgments fall 
outside of such concepts and the precept of reason itself. In the end, He asserts “Reason 
has finally renounced even the task of passing judgment on mans actions and way of 
life.”xiii The essential problem with reason defined as episteme is that concepts such as 
justice, equality, tolerance which were once sanctioned by reason are now divorced from 
it, meaning there is no means of linking them to external reality either, in essence they 









“. . . All reality, physical and social, is transformed 
into the ‘ensemble of means’ that actively and fully 
integrates the particular into an objective order.” 
Donald Phillip Verene 
Vico’s Science of Imaginationxiv 
 
Technique as Instrumental Order  
 
The second parameter of rational tectonics is the operational motif of mechanical 
efficiency. In architecture this motif manifested itself in the Mechanism of Structure and 
the Mechanism of Disposition, but its basis lies in the reformulation of techne following 
the redefinition of reason as episteme. As Heidegger has noted, techne is no mere means, 
but rather an operational motif of framing and constructing ‘truth’ in any given age. xv 
How a given age defines techne becomes an important question precisely because it plays 
a significant epistemological role. Technology, therefore, cannot be seen as simply a 
means to ends, a tool, but rather must be understood from the perspective of its 
epistemological parameters, precisely because those parameters pose metaphysical 
limitations. Thus the question is one that concerns the nature of how the form of techne 
constructs truth and thereby creates human ‘being’ in the world. 
What then is the form of techne proposed by the epistemology of science, how does it 
construct truth? The goal of the new science was to establish a rational mathematical 
order of the universe. The task of knowledge was no longer to define what a thing ‘is’, 
what makes it distinct, its ‘essence’, but how it was mathematically related to everything 
else. The world of objects was reduced to mathematical homogeneity, a uniform system 
of exchange, related to each other through a common set of principles. This was done 
through the systematic factoring out of the qualitative characteristics. In the process 
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causality was reduced to the quantitative characteristics as the epistemology of science 
sought a mechanism through which all things could be reduced to a single order or 
formative principle. In its reduction to the formal and material causes the ordering system 
of techne was reduced to those properties subject to the new definition of reason making 
it coincident with reason itself.  
That order was metaphorically expressed in the mechanistic image of the world and 
the formative principle of simplicity and efficiency proven through mathematical 
demonstration. Science presents the world of nature, as clear self-evident means to ends. 
Just as nature is efficient and uses an economy of forces to achieve many ends, the world 
of human creation, the domain of techne, is subject to the same principle of mechanical 
efficiency.  
It is important to note that the mechanical image of nature and the principle of 
mechanical efficiency are neither technology, nor the machine. They are a motif of 
operation, a system of organization. It exists at all levels of thought and not a mere 
outward manifestation of mechanized systems of production in the form of mass 
production.xvi It is mechanical in its precision relating all orders to a means of 
calculability. It is not the possibility of mechanization as a system of organization but 
rather the domination of all systems of organization by the concept of mechanical 
efficiency that is its hallmark. 
In this new form, the choice of means is less a subjective decision between equally 
potential methods as an attempt to attain the best method in an absolute sense. It has 
become the search for the one best means in any given field. Here mathematical 
calculation becomes the determining factor, as opposed to personal preference, tradition 
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or ritual. The final solution is the one which can be demonstrated mathematically to be 
the most efficient means. In essence, means is reduced to the science of means. In the 
process techne becomes a form of rational demonstration. In this sense it has become 
instrumentalized.  
Jacques Ellul has termed this new system of organization ‘Technical Phenomena’, 
Martin Heidegger referred to it as ‘Standing Reserve’ and Louis Mumford ‘Technics’. xvii 
For the purpose of clarity in this text I will use the term techne to refer to the 
philosophical concept of poesis and making in all eras, technology to refer to any specific 
means of production, phronetic-techne to refer to the epistemological structure of techne 
as defined by classical tectonics, and ‘Technique’ to refer to the system of organization 
generated by the epistemology of science.xviii 
As Ellul has noted in technique all forms of ordering are ontologically tied together. 
Cognitively, technique becomes a system of consciousness and thinking that conforms to 
the motif of operation, or system of organization, known as mechanization. Its’ overall 
tendency is to push for the achievement of a highly sophisticated solution to a generalized 
problem. The ordering system becomes reducible to a fundamental law that serves as its 
motif. As science seeks the universal, technique seeks to establish a universal means, a 
motif, that satisfies the needs and requirements of the problem as outlined in the most 
efficient manner. Verene calls this the ‘technical concept’.xix  
In the traditional Aristotelian notion of concept particular objects or events are 
analyzed to extract a series of similar properties out of which a universal classification 
can emerge. This comes at the expense of the essential and accidental properties of the 
particular. At its highest level the universal can provide no determination of individual 
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particularities, the universal and the particular are fundamentally split. It is at this level, 
as pure concept, that it has no ability to connect with or follow the course of a physical 
event or object. In Aristotelian terms it is pure theoria.  
Verene notes this is not the case with technique and the technical concept. In 
technique the relationship between the particular and universal is established as a 
functional procedure; the efficiency of means, which now stands in as technical concept, 
effectively replacing the universal as operative concept. The technical concept becomes 
wholly active and possesses the power to force the particular- be it object or process- into 
the mold of the functional procedure. According to Verene; “Through increased 
consciousness of the nature of procedure, the particular event is made to fit the law of the 
[technical] concept in a specific and workable fashion. As the thought-form of technique 
comes to be understood, all reality, physical and social, is transformed into the ‘ensemble 
of means’ that actively and fully integrates the particular into an objective order. . . . The 
technical concept does not follow nature; it supersedes the reality of nature.” xx The 
technical concept- the motif of mechanical efficiency- effectively replaces the dichotomy 
of particular and universal, reducing the epistemological structure of the world and 
human ‘being’ to the operational motif of mechanical efficiency. It focuses its attention 
on the actual process, the organization of technique, and its own efficiency.  
As Heidegger noted, in its classical form of poesis, techne served as a form of 
revelation, a bringing forth, not only of a product but also an understanding of the world 
and truth. xxi  Yet technique serves to reveal only itself as technical concept. It reveals 
nothing outside its own mechanization. In this sense technique is not only 
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instrumentalized but autonomous and self-reflective, a form of regulation in a perpetual 
state of re-securing itself.  
There are two serious consequences of this restructuring of the epistemology. The 
first is the obvious lose of any relationship to ethics. The epistemology of science 
provides no structure or framework for ethical judgment or evaluation outside its own 
mechanism of efficiency. This in turn leads to the concept that techne, the system of 
organization used- in this case the scientific method or technical phenomena- appear 
neutral. This has far reaching theoretical and practical implications that lead to the 
remaining parameters of rational tectonics. 
 
“Technique in its tendency toward totalization 
literally obliterates the existing framework of 
relationships between man and nature and man 
and culture forcing such relationships to mirror the 
structure of technique itself.” 
Jacques Ellul 
The Technological Societyxxii 
 
Technique and the Means/Ends Equation 
 
Like the definition of reason it is tied to, technique contains no external system of 
ethics from which to guide it. According to Horkhiemer “Reason is used to connote a 
thing or an idea rather than an act, it refers exclusively to the relation of such an object or 
concept to a purpose, not to the object or concept itself. It means that the thing or the idea 
is good from something else. There is no reasonable aim as such, and to discuss the 
superiority of one aim over another in terms of reason becomes meaningless.”xxiii The 
same holds true for technique which has become coincident with it. It is concerned with 
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the adequacy of procedures and attaches little importance to whether the purpose is 
reasonable.xxiv  To discuss the superiority of one aim or end over another becomes 
meaningless if and when the only system of evaluation is the efficiency of means. 
Technique is a means of action and not a means of evaluation of action. This is the third 
parameter of rational tectonics it’s concentration on means as opposed to ends in the 
means/ends equation.  
In classical tectonics the experiential structure of phronesis and its classification as a 
virtue that suffuses knowledge meant it resisted any distinction between means and ends 
or the possession and application of techne. If anything it focused more on ends. It was 
this characteristic of phronesis that made phronetic-techne resistant to 
instrumentalization in terms of the means ends equation.  
Technique does not include the experiential knowledge of phronesis, effectively 
rupturing the concept of phronetic-techne. In the end we are left only with Aristotle’s 
‘official’ techne as a form of episteme and not his more complex version that serves as a 
practicum. It has been removed from the realm of practical wisdom, identified by 
Aristotle as the dialectic of techne and phronesis, to one of episteme or theoretical 
knowledge. It became an abstraction, a technical concept rather than a practicum.  
The sole attendant problem within the system of technique is to determine whether 
the means respond to a given set of technical criteria in the most efficient manner. It is 
structured upon only one criteria of evaluation efficient ordering. It is applied 
instrumentally without discrimination. Epistemologically technique places its truth 
content on the possession of techne rather than its application. It does so in such a way 
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that the possession is understood as a technical concept, a formative law of efficiency of 
means, which serves as the only valid form of judgment.  
This process is anathema to any form of philosophical reflection upon the direction of 
right living. It does not ask questions in regard to the end or the ethic of its production 
and use, only the calculated efficiency of production in the search for the one best means. 
There can be no form of practical philosophy in the traditional sense of the questioning of 
whether this or that means of living is directed toward the good. In this sense technique is 
blind. In technique the lack of any recourse to any system of judgment outside the 
technical concept of efficiency of means essentially ruptures its relationship to traditional 
ethics, itself a means of establishing organizational structures and therefore a framework 
of order and the determination of means. “Technique in its tendency toward totalization 
literally obliterates the existing framework of relationships between man and nature and 
man and culture forcing such relationships to mirror the structure of technique itself.”xxv 
 
“. . . if reason itself is instrumentalized, it takes on a 
kind of materiality and blindness, becomes a fetish, 
a magic entity that is accepted rather than 
intellectually experienced.” 
Max Horkheimer 
The Eclipse of Reasonxxvi 
 
Technique an the assumption of Neutrality 
 
At the root of technique is the epistemology of science and its goals are the same; to 
rationally codify the world and experience according to its own unique form of logic. 
Science it must be remembered was originally structured to address the so called natural 
sciences, physics in particular. It was not and does not address the entire human being, 
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nor can it adequately deal with the reality of human experience. It comes as no surprise 
then that the critique of technique is accused of the same shortcomings. This is the fourth 
parameter of rational tectonics like reason it assumes neutrality.  
Part of the problem with technique is its’ assumed neutrality, This is something both 
Heidegger and Ellul have commented on, but this is only an illusion and is a potential 
threat if we lose sight of how technique actually shapes human ‘being’ in the world. As 
Horkheimer noted “. . . if reason itself is instrumentalized, it takes on a kind of 
materiality and blindness, becomes a fetish, a magic entity that is accepted rather than 
intellectually experienced.”xxvii The same is true of techne, once instrumentalized we may 
potentially lose sight of how techne actually shapes human ends.  
Technique is in a sense a form of falsehood in its objectification of reality it creates 
the illusion of utopia, a world of technical efficiency greater than the world of nature 
herself. According to Mumford “True objectivity must include every aspect of an 
experience, and therefore one of the most important sides, the subject, himself, must not 
be left out. When we are truly objective we do not merely see things as they are, but 
reciprocally things see us, so to say, as we are: how we think, how we feel, what our 
purposes and values are, all enter into the final equation.”xxviii  
Technique moves independently of man, essentially serving its own aim and not man 
in a higher idealized sense. In this way it augments the world by its recreation of it in its 
own image. The fundamental problem is that this image is now independent of man 
forcing man to self augment to the image of technique or risk alienation. In previous 
civilizations, man used technology to adapt the world to himself, his physical, intellectual 
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and spiritual needs. The main characteristic of technique is that this adaptation is 
reciprocal.  
The same can be said for art in general and architectural reasoning or theory in 
particular. Once instrumentalized art and architecture take on a sense of inevitability and 
we are blind to them as systems of organization. Such a condition renders true theoretical 
speculation anathema. Rational tectonics serves, not as a unique means or system of 
organization of the particularities of reality and the human experience, but to reinforce 
the a priori system of organization known as science. It is a radical departure from 
architecture’s role in classical tectonics.  
Classical tectonics operated in a system in which theory served as metaphysics for 
praxis in the dialectic of techne and phronesis that maintained human experience as a 
central aspect in the cognitive features of the design process. In this sense architecture 
and tectonics were still centered on human experience and artistic expression was a 
willful political act of ethics in the application of techne.  
This is not to say that with rational tectonics, architecture loses its claim to truth or 
ethics, but that such concerns are not part of its discourse, as all truth and value 
judgments are calculated in terms of efficiency and means. While rational tectonics can 
and should be seen not only as valid, but as a key principle of the discourse of modern 
architecture, it is a highly instrumentalized principle and too often appears self-evident as 
truth. The problem is not rational tectonics and its application, but the potential to see it 
as the end of all architectural theorization, as well as the only principle guiding the design 
process.  
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We must be reminded that art and architecture are forms of techne. In previous eras 
those forms were seen as a means of coming to terms with the world and the creation of 
the lebenswelt. Art is an intuitive form of understanding beauty, an incontestable form of 
knowledge and mode of thought, one that also generates a mode of thinking. According 
to Francastle “The artist does not merely concretize the sensibilities or thought of his 
milieu through his temperament, thanks to his mastery of an instrument, which is his 
particular technique. Nor does he draw on immanent values in order to give them 
concrete form. He is essentially a creator. Art is a construct, a power to give order and to 
prefigure. The artist does not translate; he invents. We are in the realm of imagined 
realities.”xxix 
 
“In his relation to the world, man has always made 
use of multiple means, none of which were 
universal because none were objective. Technique 
is a means of apprehending reality, of acting on the 
world, which allows us to neglect all individual 
differences, all subjectivity. Technique alone is 
rigorously objective. . . .Today man lives by virtue 
of his participation in a truth become objective. 
Technique is no more than a neutral bridge 
between reality and the abstract man.” 
Jacques Ellul  
The Technological Societyxxx  
 
Technique and Ethos 
 
Techne helps to establish the framework of value judgments and objectives of 
society. In that sense the relationship is symbiotic: the selection of technologies is just as 
much a selection of objectives, as a selection of means. It is not an issue therefore of 
good or bad technologies or its users but of the harmonizing of society’s objectives and 
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goals with its definitions of techne. All forms of techne, of systems of ordering, act as 
intermediaries between man and reality this is true with both art and science.  
Pierre Francastle has indicated that what we are really dealing with is not just a 
technological or speculative progress, but really the joint evolution of social and 
technological activities out of which arose a new ordering system of human 
relationships.xxxi  
The problem with the epistemology of science is not what it includes but what it 
excludes. It inherently degrades all systems and studies outside itself, including religion, 
and human erudition.xxxii The division of causality comes along the lines of technical 
categorization and human expression. That is to say, the causality of the epistemology of 
science is a reduction of it to that which is technically definable at the expense of that 
which is distinctively human in its explanation of the world. With this move all discourse 
on human perception of the thing-in-itself becomes not only secondary but extraneous to 
the discourse of knowledge. In essence it alienates human experience from the discourse 
of knowledge while denying all other subsequent discourses any claim of truth or in 
particular any scientific validity. This is the fifth parameter of rational tectonics; its 
decidedly non-humanistic ethos.  
This was the fundamental problem with Descartes philosophy and continues to plague 
the modern world to his day. Descartes exclusion of the humanistic imagination from the 
discourse of knowledge has meant the exclusion of those very forms of thought that allow 
man access to his own nature. Self-knowledge is not possible within this epistemological 
structure and it’s ordering system; technique. xxxiii   
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Previous definitions of techne were anthropological in their form, the universe and 
the cosmic order were understood through a symbolic system that in essence troped man 
into that order. Thus the figure of the universe was recreated in human form making it 
understandable and interconnected to the order of human existence and being. The 
relationship between reality and lived experience were coterminous. This condition 
allowed man to regulate his environment according to human values through the 
application of technical tools to material nature. Thus technology served human ends in a 
world conceived from the beginning as personified. Technology was a means to a given 
human end. 
In classical tectonics, it was Aristotle who codified that. His division of techne into 
two forms; one practical and generative and the other theoretical and analytic, allowed 
him to establish two epistemological frameworks for dealing with production. Analytic 
techne conformed to the epistemology of theoria while generative techne conformed to 
the epistemology of phronesis. Contained within classical tectonics was a critique of the 
limits of rationalism in its application to techne such that the true knowledge of the 
Craftsman was neither one of these but their union in the final act of poesis. The result 
was that its overall structure was dependent on phronesis.  
In its application phronetic-techne manifests four characteristics: limitation of the 
field of action, limitation of the available means, localization, and freedom of choice.xxxiv 
Phronetic-techne is limited in action in the sense that it is focused on a given task, 
performed at precise and defined times: sowing of fields, the reaping of harvest, etc. It is 
limited in means in that it stressed ingenuity in the use of existing means to maximize 
results. Phronetic-techne is localized because a technology is the product of a given task 
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preformed at a given time for a given end it is subjected to the particularities of a given 
society. It bears the stamp of its particular culture, in this way it is not an autonomous 
process, but rather dependent upon the particular culture within which it exists. 
Phronetic-techne maintains a freedom of choice in that the individual has the ability to 
reject the existing technologies of a given society.  
Following the epistemology of phronesis, classical tectonics emphasized the worker, 
not the tool or the technology. In the process it established the centrality of man, at the 
same time pushing for individual betterment and advance. The result was a variety in 
individual technologies, and a uniqueness of the finished object, as an expression of 
individual ingenuity, talent and skill. Mumford notes that as long as technology involved 
the craftsman who had complete control of his processes there would always be balance 
between efficiency and human value, between the need to produce and the need for 
expression. Phronetic- techne established a centrality of man in the possession and 
application of techne making it anthropocentric or to use Heidegger’s term 
‘anthropomorphic’.xxxv 
The development of technique was from the beginning generated or accompanied by 
the very willingness to accept hard facts and an impersonal view of things. It is the mater-
of-factness coupled with mechanical uniformity and repetitive order that characterizes it. 
By eliminating the qualitative characteristics both the epistemology of science and 
technique eliminated any recourse to experience and the particularity of ‘being’. How did 
this occur? The shift in causality limited the rational understanding of an object as the 
‘thing-in-itself’ reducing it to formal and material causes which can be demonstrated 
mathematically. But the understanding and experience of things is more encompassing. A 
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Church in its materiality may be brick and mortar and may serve as a place of religious 
ritual. But it is the sacredness of the idea of the house of God that manifests it as distinct 
from say a town hall. Thus its meaning in humanistic experiential terms is dependent 
upon both its material and formal causes and its efficient and final causes. As Heidegger 
noted the material and formal causes are self evident in the very materiality of the ‘thing-
in-itself’ but it is the efficient and final causes that reveal its hidden necessity to 
humanity. It is this revealing that goes beyond the objective reasoning of extrinsic reality 
that is the true value of knowledge in a practical sense. This shrinkage of causality 
reduces it, according to Heidegger, to mere reportage, reason and techne no longer serve 
humanity in its quest to situate itself in the world.  
Like Descartes’ pineal gland and Newton’s sensorium, technique serves as an 
intermediary between the subjective human reason of the res cogitans and the extrinsic 
reality of nature distancing man and his environment transforming the human experience 
into a simulacrum. Reality and the lived experience are only an image or representation 
of reality.  
Cognitively, technique does not view man as a complete being but rather focuses on a 
single human element, the magnified eye or hand which is conceptually thought of as 
disembodied. Only in this way can one theorize a series of movements that maximize 
outcome and productivity. This process fragments the operational procedure and removes 
any inherent presence of humanity.xxxvi While the mechanical paradigm was in fact 
justified on functional human need and therefore a human value, its scope was far too 
limited to satisfactorily overcome this. As Mumford noted “Even mechanical function 
itself rests on human values: the desire for order, security, for power; but to presume that 
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these values are, in every instance, all-prevailing ones, which do away with the need for 
any other qualities, is to limit the nature of man himself to just those functions that serve 
the machine.”xxxvii It leads to the sense of alienation because the world is reduced to 
technique in such a way that humanity is factored out of the construction of truth and 
reality. The sense of alienation engendered by the modern era and discussed by men like 
George Simmel is in fact this necessity to accommodation.xxxviii In his famous essay 
entitled ‘Metropolis and Mental Life’ he argued that the structure of modern society 
engendered a sense of alienation that permeated all life. It was the new structure of 
relationships between the individual and the collective engendered by this new social 
form, referred to here as ‘technique’ that forces major adaptation of the individual 
personality. The result was what Simmel referred to as the ‘Blasé’ attitude, indifference 
toward distinctions, which provide meanings to things. It was this attitude that results in a 
sense of alienation. According to him modern man must resist the ‘social-technological 
mechanism’ which threatens to swallow him up. For Simmel this desensitizing represents 
a fundamental alteration in the mentality of modern man a point also made, as I shall get 
to, by Ernst Cassirer. 
This facilitates not the destruction of humanity but rather the necessity of humanity to 
accommodate itself to the necessity of technique. Emotion, feeling and individuality 
become the first casualties. In order to accommodate ourselves we must deny a certain 
percentage or our own being. Such a denial is impossible and can only lead to the 
recognition of our own non-commensurability with the world. With technique man is no 
longer able to grasp his own essence and hence any true self-knowledge or sophrosyne. 
This in many ways becomes the irony of technique in that historically techne was a 
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means of commensurability with the world as man learned to adapt the material world to 
his needs. As Verene has noted the generation of systems according to the framework 
established by technique generates order but not meaning, technology never appears fully 
human in the most substantial of ways. 
The distinction between technique and phronetic-techne is the subject matter at play 
in the intermediary between reality and man. One is abstract theoretical and concerned 
with universals, the other humanistic and focused on man’s creative faculties in 
interpreting reality and generating a distinctly human signification of the lebenselt.  
 
“[Art’s] goal is both to explore the universe and to 
reshape it. Plastic thought, which exists alongside 
scientific or technological thought, belongs to the 
realms of both practical activity and the imaginary.” 
 
Pierre Francastle 
Art and Technology  
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
 
Technique and Design Cognition 
 
With the development of the epistemology of science came the disintegration of the 
classical theory of mimesis. In its place was what has been termed the ‘Theory of 
Imitation’. While both can be said to be imitative theories of art, their subject matter and 
how they function is different. In all imitative theories of art the subject matter is 
historically identified as nature, such that art is a mirror of nature, or an imitation of 
nature. But such identification assumes that the definition of nature holds the same over 
time. With epistemological shifts come significant changes in definitions which are not 
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always apparent. Such is the case with the definition of ‘nature’, too often overlooked or 
misunderstood, this definitional shift was epistemologically important. As I intend to 
show the definitions of nature are not the same and the subsequent restructuring of 
aesthetics delineates a fundamental shift in the cognitive process of design thinking.  
In classical mimesis the subject matter ‘nature, is defined as the creation of the 
sophron eros and harmonia. Art exists in the sphere of mythic time, all new creative acts 
are re-creations of origins that re-presence the creation of the world. It is a re-‘becoming’ 
of the manifestation of sophrosyne and harmonia. The mimetic function of art is 
addressed as necessary not only to the creation of, but the continued manifestation of, 
harmony in the world. The function of the sophron eros, and architecture in its 
manifestation of it, is the literal construction of the ethic of the Good. In this sense we 
can state that mimesis is ontological in its formulation. 
This is fundamentally different from the theory of imitation whose object while still 
nature, is nature understood as an ideal rational principle. Art’s subject matter is pure 
theoria a fixed and permanent principle, a functional significance. Reason as abstract 
universal ideal replaces the sophron eros as the object of imitation. The theory of 
imitation asserts that the work of art that most closely imitates the fundamental purity of 
reason is synonymous with virtue. Art’s role is not to formulate, create or maintain ethics, 
but rather to represent it as an ideal, itself coterminous with knowledge. In the case of 
architecture it is the clarity of representation of the Mechanisms of Structure and 
Disposition as ‘technical concepts’ that is the virtue of good architecture and the sign of 
its reasonableness. It is no longer ontological but representational in its formulation. 
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In both cases art manifests a form of ethic but in mimesis such ethic is negotiated and 
specific to the particular situation while in the theory of imitation virtue is an a priori 
abstraction. Thus we can claim that while both are imitation theories they operate 
differently one is ontological the other representation. One is dialectical, fluid and 
negotiated; the other fixed, immovable and abstract. One defines the subject matter of art 
as in a constant state of ‘becoming’ whilst the other defines it as permanent, a fixed state 
of ‘being’.  
At the heart of the distinction is a significant shift in the cognitive process. What 
Cassirer termed the shift from the ‘imitative’ to the ‘indicative’ gesture. xxxix While his 
discussion of the shift centered on language it was crouched in a broader discussion of 
symbolic form, making it equally applicable to aesthetic theory.  
Mimesis is a form of ‘imitative’ gesture. According to Cassirer, the ‘imitative’ 
gesture implies no distance between object and knowing subject. It is biologically derived 
from the actual mimicry of the object in order to communicate about it. In such a case the 
knowing subject becomes the thing which it is making reference to. Art behaves ‘like’ the 
subject matter and is in fact identical with it serving as its manifestation. From the 
cognitive point of view the work of art as thing-in-itself is an embodiment of the 
underlying principle of sophrosyne and in fact plays a significant role in its manifestation. 
While sophrosyne exists in the objective reality of nature it must be made ontologically 
present in the objective reality of human experience. It is artistic production that not only 
serves didactically to bring about an appreciation of it, but also manifests it as a presence 
in the objective reality of the polis. Thus the principle is not only embodied in the work 
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of art, but sophrosyne is dependent upon the production of the work of art for its 
manifestation.  
In mimesis the apparent reproduction presupposes an inner production. As Cassirer 
pointed out “This form of reproduction never consists of retracing, line for line, a specific 
content of reality; but in selecting a pregnant motif in the content and so producing a 
characteristic ‘outline’ of its form.”xl While this is certainly on its way toward 
representation it is distinct from it. Kunze refers to this as a system of exchange. “The 
mimetic gesture’s intention [is] to reproduce the content of its referent directly, through 
the medium of bodily movement, expression, or sound. Unlike the pointing finger, which 
epistemologically isolates the knower from the known, the mimetic gesture initiates an 
exchange that alters both the signifier and the signified.”xli The mimetic sign in this way 
creates both object and self, in such a way that both are intricately linked to each other. 
Cassirer notes that in the mimetic gesture the ‘I’ remains a prisoner of outward 
impressions and its properties; the more accurately it reports its impressions excluding all 
spontaneity of its own, the more fully the aim of imitation has been realized.”xlii 
The theory of imitation, on the other hand, is a form of ‘indicative’ gesture. 
According to Cassirer the ‘indicative’ gesture is derived from the actual movement of 
grasping, which is both biologically and genetically derived. It is from this movement; 
the physical attempt by an individual to make reference to an object outside itself through 
the act of pointing, the distinguishing of the self from the object, and which also in the act 
of grasping, implies a sense of possession, that we derive the logical or conceptual aspect 
of language. Kunze remarks that this form of signification operates through a system of 
substitution. He states “Indicative meanings presume the possibilities of categories, in 
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which particulars may be grouped and represented by some class characteristic. 
Categories in turn, presume an idealized access to objects. Amidst this possession, power 
and words flow smoothly and continuously from universal to particular. Meaning is 
defined as a link, part of a catena binding the lowest things to the highest, and 
determining their positions.”xliii Here the object to be imitated is grasped through 
properties which must assume abstract categories derived from the negation of 
particularity in the process of generating the universals of categories. Language in this 
instance becomes epistolary, completely symbolic, in the sense that it is an abstract 
symbolic substitute for a conceptual meaning or thing. This shift is directly related not 
just to the concentration on universals of the epistemology of science but to its Cartesian 
theory of mind as well.  
Descartes cogito ergo sum had created a division of body and mind, isolating reality 
from the cognitive faculties of reason whose only recourse to the res extensa were the 
faculty of the senses. The inherent suspicion of the senses and imagination as faculties 
associated with the body, and hence less rational, meant that any comprehension of 
‘beauty’ was a matter of judgment subject to the methodology of doubt and that of 
reason. What the system of representation in the theory of imitation does is by-pass 
objective reality. Art, in this case architecture, represents functional significance which is 
a ‘technical concept’ that has no sensual presence and hence ‘nature’ as thing- in- itself is 
removed from the discourse despite the nomenclature of ‘la belle nature’. This removal of 
objective nature from the discourse of knowledge is part and parcel of the epistemology 
of science, and part of a process that began with Descartes division of the res cogitans 
from the res extensa.  
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Part of the problem with Descartes theory of mind has to do with the definition of 
Consciousness. Consciousness begins with the Ansich, the conception of self- 
consciousness, with the mind, distinct from the body, reflecting on sensations. xliv  Here 
the object is not understood as super sensualist object experienced, as that which it is, but 
rather as a representation of the external object grasped by the mind through the 
intellectual categories. The ‘this as I’ and the ‘this as object’ exist in a relationship that is 
always demonstrative or apodictic. It is this aspect of representation which Cassirer 
claims is cognitively indicative, rather than gestural, and is the distinction between 
classical mimesis and the theory of imitation. Descartes duality requires the intermediary 
of the knowing self or ‘I’. In the case of representation the object is no longer received in 
sensuous form as the thing- in- itself but rather built up by the consciousness according to 
its constitutive traits as a reflective act. According to Cassirer “to reproduce an object in 
this sense means not merely to compose it from its  particular sensuous characteristics, 
but to apprehend it in its structural relations which can only be truly understood if the 
consciousness constructively produces them.”xlv Here the world of sensual objects is 
reflected on and then indicated.  
This is nowhere more evident that in the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition in 
the development of architecture. The cognitive process of design is based upon the 
reduction of both process and appreciation to abstract categories. The conscious ‘I’ does 
not experience the work for its sensual qualities as the thing-in-itself. Design cognition 
does not take into consideration notions of feelings, mood, or expression nor does it 
consider ritual, traditional meaning or symbolism. Rather it builds it up from its 
constituent parts which in turn are abstract representations not of the materiality of the 
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work but of its functional significance, the ‘technical concept’ of mechanical efficiency. 
In the place of genuine human experience and expression are categories and conceptual 
meanings. Design cognition itself has become instrumentalized.  
 
“The simplest operations of the mind were cluttered 
by symbolic verbiage of an entirely non-operational 
kind. In order to come clean, man took refuge in a 
different kind of order, in number, in regularity, in 
drill. Unfortunately, Western man in his search for 
the object, presently forgot the object of his search. 
In getting rid of an embarrassing otherworldliness 
he also got rid of himself?”xlvi  
Louis Mumford 




The foundation and development of rational tectonics is tied to the epistemology of 
science and its increased impact on Western thought. The subsequent restructuring of 
causality forced a restructuring of what constituted truth and the redefinition of ‘nature’. 
As the epistemology of science moved forward it brought with it a complete rethinking of 
architectural theory in line with the increased rational project of science. With it came a 
rejection of the classical concept of mimesis that resulted in the development of the 
duality of beauty and the redevelopment of the idea of imitation in art.  
The new epistemology of science effectively replaced the emphasis on experimental 
knowledge found in phronesis. In its place was the instrumentalization of efficiency of 
means to ends. While superficially based on the idea of the particularity of material 
analysis and physics it was nonetheless a redirection of the formula of mathematical 
calculation, itself reducible to quantitative characteristics at the expense of the qualitative 
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aspects those things that make the object-in-itself unique. It redirected the definition of 
techne away from the discourse of phronesis effectively severing the dialectic of techne 
and phronesis. In its place a new epistemological structure derived from the epistemology 
of science and its method emerged. This in itself opened a whole new set of problems and 
critiques. In the end this change facilitated a restructuring of the design process along the 
lines of mechanical efficiency becoming a didactic explanation of how statical stresses 
and other quantifiable qualities can be manipulated in the means ends equation.  
Rational tectonics made a major contribution to architecture and architectural 
thinking, becoming one if its essential principles. The Mechanism of Structure opened the 
door to a rational science of construction. The development of the first means of analysis 
of statics and material strength provided a rational means of material selection and the 
determination of proportion and size of structural components. It also provided a means 
for the determination of validity of structural representation. The Mechanism of 
Disposition provided a rationally quantifiable means of evaluating the functionality of 
spatial organizations. It also provided a means of categorization of architectural types.  
But as a design process it proved limiting. The definition of techne upon which it 
stands, technique, is highly theoretical, a form of episteme, which bears little 
epistemological connection to the lived experience. As such it can provide no true sense 
of a practicum. It effectively severs theory from practice. The technical concept that 
underlies the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition begins with an assumed model, 
mechanical efficiency, which is then analyzed for efficacy and clarity of representation. 
But there are several problems with this. First, architecture cannot be reduced solely to 
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issues of mechanical efficiency, human need is far more comprehensive. Second, it fails 
to provide a means of determination of ends.  
Unlike the classical concept of décor, which sought judgment on the particularities of 
a given situation, aesthetic judgment now was open to the adherence to cultural standards 
seen as evidence of universal truths. With décor the standard was removed from the 
physicality of the project and rested within an ethical discourse of social propriety- and 
hence, socially determined. It lay in an external value structure. In the case of rational 
tectonics it lay in perceived laws that were fixed through continued use seen as evidence 
of their universality. Here the structure of aesthetic judgment is no longer external but 
internal to the discourse of architecture itself. It becomes not only autonomous and self 
referential but it implies, as does the epistemology of science itself, that the thing-in-itself 
is coterminous with virtue, in its adherence to universality and truth. We might be lulled 
into thinking of technique as neutral but the direct and visible impact of architecture on 
humanity prevents us from accepting the possibility that ends are of no concern.  
Third, lies in the structure of the technical concept itself. Derived from the 
epistemology of science, technique models itself on the scientific method. But this 
method is an analytical one and art and architecture are generative processes. How does a 
system of organization whose essential process is analytical, based upon the dissection of 
an a priori object, address the generation of orders when there is no a priori object to start 
with and when the epistemology is constructed in such a way as to banish both objective 
reality and its particularities of client, site and culture? 
Rational tectonics also raises additional issues specific to the case of architecture. It 
had the impact of focusing the discourse of architecture on the quantifiable aspects of the 
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design process, in such a way that they could be systematically analyzed along the lines 
of function and utility, effectively raising them to a higher status in architectural 
judgment. But it also had the effect of devaluing the qualitative aspects of the buildings 
materiality, form and space. The Mechanism of Structure had the impact of focusing the 
discourse of architecture on the relationships of its component elements and the analysis 
of the material. Materials are selected for the efficiency of their statical structure as 
opposed to their sensual effect, be it visual, tactile, acoustic or olfactory. The Mechanism 
of Disposition had the impact of focusing the discourse of architecture on spatial 
relationships. But it also had the effect of devaluing the qualitative aspects of space 
reliant on experience and perception effectively rendering any concept of the genus loci, 
understood from the perspective of Ancient Greek philosophy or Modern 
Phenomenology unthinkable. Such issues were now seen as relegated to cultural 
prejudice; the arbitrary or customary beauties, themselves now subject to rationalization 
via a Baconian approach to history as teleological and experiential that again revealed 
over time through consistency a universal truth. The particularities of space, place and 
time, materiality, sensual impression and their value in aesthetic judgment and relevance 
to the discourse of architecture could now be called into question.  
Rational tectonics teaches us to reason ‘correctly’ in only one sense. To quote 
Horkheimer “An intelligent man is not one who can merely reason correctly, but one 
whose mind is open to perceiving objective contents, who is able to receive the impact of 
their essential structures and to render it in human language; this holds also for the nature 
of thinking as such, and for its truth content.”xlvii It is also true of the architect. It is the 
task of the architect to see within the particularities of the condition of architectural 
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production its objective contents, its essential structure and to render them in such a way 
as to manifest a truth content within a means of expression that is understandable and 
meaningful. If he/she does not then we are left only with engineering and the calculable 
efficiency of production. It was technique that severed theory from practice and until we 
reexamine this definition in light of architectural production we cannot re-theorize a unity 
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Chapter 11: Tectonics and the Italian Humanist Tradition:  
Vico, Lodoli and Piranesi 
 
The first attempt in the mid- 1700’s to understand architecture outside the 
epistemology of science came with the Italian ‘rigoristi’, the followers of theorist Father 
Carlo Lodoli, whose theories were based on the writings of Giambattista Vico an ardent 
critic of Descartes rationality and geometric method. He is perhaps the most 
misunderstood and least seriously studied theorist of architecture. This fact is not owing 
to his work or relative obscurity, he was fairly well known in his time as a significant 
leader in Venetian intellectual circles.i As I intend to show, the historical occlusion of 
Lodoli’s theory and impact is largely due to problems with the historical interpretation 
and scholarship of his writings. Lodoli taught architecture at his own school in Venice 
where, as Diana Hibbard Bitz notes, the curriculum was based on Vico's On the Study 
Methods of Our Time.ii Lodoli’s ideas on architecture served as a precedent to the later 
tectonic theorists of the 1800’s; but to understand that precedent and to discover the 
underlying epistemological parameters of tectonics it is necessary to understand what 
underlies Lodoli’s thinking. iii Vico represents an alternative to the dominant Western 
tradition, but the basic ideas and premises of his critique were carried on by later 
thinkers, ones who had a more direct impact on the thought of men like Schinkel and 
Botticher.  
While Lodoli based his theory of architecture on the idea that form, details and 
meaning were derived from the nature of materials and their constructive forces; he 
resisted the temptation to ‘instrumentalize’ such factors. Rejecting their reduction to a 
mechanical exposition of forces, Lodoli understood them in relationship to a concept of 
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image formation and representation predominantly derived from Vico’s philosophy of 
mind. Lodoli proved to be a formidable and outspoken critic of the theories of the Abbe 
Laugier; in public debates he formulated an alternative ground from which to conceive of 
architecture.  
The impact of Lodoli’s work was then carried forward by Giovanni Battista Piranesi, 
whose theoretical work should be read as a continuation of Lodoli’s thought and writings. 
This position was first advanced by Joseph Rykwert in The Necessity of Artifice and latter 
by Alberto Perez- Gomez in Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science.iv  
 
The History of Lodolian Scholarship 
 
The scholarship of Lodoli's theory has encountered serious problems over the years  
due to the fact that he died before he could finish his treatise. Only two outlines exist, 
saved by Francesco Foscari and published by Andrea Memmo in his Elementi d' 
architecttura Lodoliana of 1834. They should not be seen as coterminous, but rather as 
extensions of each other. The first draft takes as its subject matter the origin and 
development of the building arts. It also introduces some attributes of Lodoli’s 
architecture. The second draft defines what Lodoli views as the goal of his new theory: 
the unification of form and representation.v It also addresses how he defines the attributes 
of form and the rules and principles of this new form of architecture.  
The incomplete nature of the treatise and its outlines have meant that historically 
Lodolian scholarship has had to resort, additionally, to the texts of the ‘rigoristi’, five 
individuals who either commented on, or attended Lodoli’s lectures at his school of 
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architecture in Venice. Of these Francesco Algarotti, and Andrea Memmo each interpret 
the theory of Lodoli based upon their class notes from his lectures. Francesco Milizia, the 
third commentator, derives his understanding of Lodoli from the writings of Algarotti. He 
is significant in that his comments will be influential in the interpretation of Lodoli in the 
later 18th century. In addition to these three writers, note should be taken of two other 
students of Lodoli, Zaccaria Seriman and Giovanni Battista Piranesi, both of whose 
writings on architecture, while not commentaries on Lodoli per se, contain thinly veiled 
references to him and the contemporary architectural debates in which he was constantly 
embroiled. Theoretically this would seem to present us with a complete picture of 
Lodoli's thoughts, yet historically this is precisely what has not happened. 
Diana Bitz has pointed out that Algarotti's 'Lodoli' is characterized in such a way as to 
make his thought reminiscent of the mathematical methodology of René Descartes. His 
'Lodoli' is a 'rigorist' whose theory is exclusively rational, ahistorical, founded solely on 
utility and in it, function and representation are fundamentally the same things. Every 
detail must be beholden to the structure and nature of the material and all ornament is 
unnecessary and must be removed. According to Kruft "He [Algarotti] presents Lodoli as 
a philosophical purifier of architecture, who proceeds with the 'most rigorist, rational 
examination' of abuses in architecture . . . Everything besides function is affectation or 
falsity. Beauty without function is impossible."vi In opposition to this presentation is that 
of Memmo, whose 'Lodoli' is characterized as a thinker who stands within the rhetorical 
tradition of Italian Humanism.vii  
Modern scholarship is primarily based upon the writings of Algarotti and Memmo 
and can be traced back to a 1939 article by Rudolf Wittkower on Piranesi (Lodoli's most 
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famed student) entitled "Piranesi's 'Parere su l' Architecttura'" published in the Journal of 
the Warburg Institute. Bitz has pointed out that it is in this article that the unfortunate 
modern misunderstanding of Lodoli began.viii While Wittkower cites Memmo, whose 
characterization places Lodoli more in line with his favored authors Cicero, Pufendorf, 
Bacon, Conti and Vico, the description of Lodoli's thought is decidedly that of Algarotti. 
Wittkower therefore, takes Piranesi's attack on the 'rigorists' as an attack on his teacher 
Lodoli. Unfortunately, Emil Kaufmann, in his article "Algarotti vs. Lodoli", emphasized 
this reading of Lodoli as a 'rigorist' as well. Because Algarotti was a social dilettante and 
courtier, Kaufmann was convinced that his interpretation of Lodoli must be the correct 
one. He dismissed the differences between Algarotti and Memmo as minor points. But 
the important issue is that the differences were not, as Kaufmann would will it, 'minor'. 
They were in fact fundamentally different and, as Bitz has shown, Algarotti's 
interpretation is not only unscholarly and biased, but he obviously failed to understand 
the sophistication of Lodoli's teaching and philosophy, a point which Memmo, Seriman 
and Piranesi each in their own way pointed out.ix 
It is the definition of Lodoli perpetuated by Wittkower and Kaufmann that has labeled 
Lodoli as a rationalist, a forward thinking visionary and grandfather of the Modern 
Functionalist aesthetic. The power and influence of these two historians is evident in the 
continual misrepresentations of Lodoli even until fairly recently. I am of the opinion that 
nothing could be farther from the truth than this interpretation of his work. I shall attempt 
to explain why this cannot be a proper interpretation of Lodoli and therefore what is the 
correct reading of his teachings. In this I am more in line with Joseph Rykwert who has 
done much to establish the primacy of Memmo as a source of Lodolian thought.x 
 357
The only way to address Lodoli's architectural theory and how it might be 
distinguished from its predecessors and contemporaries is to look first at the writers who 
have commented on him, Algarotti, Milizia, Memmo, and Seriman. If we then examine 
the key author who inspired him, Vico, it will be possible to venture an outline of 
Lodoli’s theory and approach to architecture. Finally, by looking at Piranesi we can 
identify the real impact of Lodoli’s thought as a critique of rationalist tectonics in 
architecture.  
 
Algarotti & Milizia: the Construction of a ‘Rigorist’ 
 
In 1753 friends of Lodoli, prompted by the publication of Laugier's Essai sur L' 
Architecture, commissioned Algarotti to write Saggio Sopra l'Architettura. Both Laugier 
and Lodoli's theories, though markedly different, share an important feature typical of 
their time; the grounding of architectural forms in primordial origins. Algarotti was not 
the ideal choice, but he was influential in European intellectual circles. Lodoli’s friends 
thought his commentary would bring a greater international reputation.  
That Algarotti was not an acceptable choice, and had ulterior motives, should have 
been obvious from the two conditions that he placed upon the commission. First, was that 
he did not have to speak to Lodoli, who was at this time still alive, and second that Lodoli 
not be allowed to review the text before its publication. Algarotti's text turns out, not to 
be an essay on Lodoli, but rather a presentation of two different approaches to 
architecture. The first is that of the 'philosophic spirit', which is obviously supposed to be 
Lodoli, who Memmo called ‘the Socrates of architecture’, but not directly identified as 
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such. The second was a more traditional position, none other than that of Algarotti 
himself.  
The 'philosopher spirit' uses his Socratic method to defend architecture through 
reason, rejecting the authority of tradition and example, and thereby purging architecture 
of all falsehoods. His main principle is that ". . . nothing must be seen within a building 
that does not have its proper office and is not an integral part of the same construction, 
ornament has to result exclusively from necessity, and all other that architects introduce 
into their work will be mannerism and deceit."xi The philosopher goes on to state that all-
architectural forms, construction and ornament, should suit the nature of the material. 
Ornament should be based solely on construction and material used. 
In opposition to this, Algarotti places his own considerations of what architecture is. 
He considers two principal concerns of the architect: intrinsic solidity, and external 
beauty. In accordance with solidity the architect must consider the characteristics of the 
materials used and alter the proportions accordingly. In this he is in accordance with the 
philosopher. But when it comes to exterior beauty the form itself must be derived from 
the proportions and characteristics of only one material and form of construction, that of 
timber. 
Algarotti believes that architecture is an imitative art and that the model to be imitated 
is the timber hut. While the publication of Laugier's Essai prior to this had advocated the 
origin of architecture in the primitive hut, this idea actually originated with Filarete. He 
was most likely inspired by Vitruvius, who claimed that the Greeks first built in wood, 
and that the forms of the Greek temples were derived from the forms and proportions of 
this type of construction. Algarotti believed that stone forms would be rude. Therefore he 
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advocated the idea that architectural form, following the Greeks, according to Vitruvius, 
should be derived from the archetype of wooden construction. For him the ‘lie’ was more 
beautiful than the truth.xii This was the artistic genius of the Greeks. It was a central point 
for Algarotti; beauty was not always reducible to reason. Rather architectural precedents 
have an authority that may overstep the laws of reason. For him the task of the architect is 
to examine historical architecture in an attempt to determine the variables that make the 
form more pleasing. Algarotti limited his examples to the orders and their proportions, in 
this way he remained a traditionalist. 
Often associated with Algarotti was the Neapolitan theorist Francesco Milizia. His 
Vite De piu Celebri Architetti of 1768 lays out a nine point system for architectural 
design and in actuality is a compilation of the writings of Algarotti, de Cordemoy, Frezier 
and Laugier. Milizia too, bases his architectural theory on the Vitruvian model of 
Firmitas, utilitas, and venustas. For him architecture is an imitative art. Following de 
Cordemoy its model is both the rustic timber hut, as exemplified by the Greek temple, 
and the forest, as exemplified by Gothic construction. The distinction between a man-
made model and a natural one is for him insignificant. This is in contrast to Algarotti, but 
in line with de Cordemoy, Frezier and Laugier. 
In his outlines of architecture, which include not only the Vite but also the Principi di 
Architettura Civile of 1781, Milizia identified himself as a follower of Giovanni Pietro 
Bellori, in that he believed that man could imitate nature and constantly improve upon its 
beauty.xiii His search was for universally applicable rules for architecture. He saw 
architecture as a science, which betrays his rationalist leanings. This was where Milizia 
and Algarotti parted company. Algarotti insisted that architecture was an art. He did not 
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conceive of architecture as a discourse that investigated nature in order to find universally 
applicable laws. Unlike Milizia who saw the rustic timber hut as an abstract universal 
model, Algarotti conceived of the evolution of the orders through a process of 
substitution that was a response to practical necessities, a point derived from Lodoli 
himself. 
It is here that the temporal difference between these too men become important. 
Algarotti was the Baroque dilettante, the last theorist of an older tradition. For him the 
end of architecture was still verisimilitudes, not scientific truths. Milizia on the other 
hand is a product of the Enlightenment; his quest was to turn architecture into a science 
as defined by the epistemology of science and Enlightenment reason. Algarotti had 
created the rigorist 'Lodoli', with unflinching rationalism, as a foil in order to criticize the 
undermining of traditional architecture by the new scientific method. Yet, in his theory 
the role of reason is left ambiguous. When Milizia reads Algarotti, he does so through the 
filter of Cartesian rationalism, this allowed him to conflate the Lodolian ‘rigorist’, with 
Laugier's rustic timber hut, which Algarotti had claimed was the origin of architecture. 
Kruft explains this move in the following manner "On the question of ornament, Milizia 
is once again close to Laugier, interpreting the Orders as an integral part of architecture 
and as the framework of a building, disallowing all ornament not grounded in necessity. 
Any ornament that is made merely as ornament is a vice. Functional necessity dictates the 
form of each architectural element: if it is in appearance, so it must always be in function. 
This formulation is a clear paraphrase of Lodoli. But Milizia reinterprets Lodoli's 
stipulation, which related truth to materials, to mean Laugier's structural 
functionalism."xiv Thus the image of Lodoli as a 'rigorist' was the product of two 
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misinterpretations, one deliberate, the other not, by two theorists whose writings appear 
on both sides of a theoretical divide. 
The issue of Lodoli’s attitude toward ornament is an important one. The definition of 
Lodoli as a ‘Rigorist’ and the grandfather of Functionalism hinged on his rejection of 
ornament. But as Rykwert has shown, Lodoli’s own work fully embraced ornament, 
indicating that this interpretation was flawed.xv  
 
Memmo: Setting the Record Straight 
 
This brings us to Andrea Memmo and his interpretation of Lodoli. Bitz remarks that 
in his Elementi d' Architettura Lodoliana, posthumously published in 1834, Memmo 
recorded the reaction of Lodoli to Algarotti's Saggio Sopra L'Architettura. The reaction is 
recorded in the form of short story. If Memmo is to be believed there is no doubt as to 
whose interpretation is more accurate. 
According to the story, a hunter gave Lodoli a fat pheasant as a gift. He then decided 
to take it to the Balena workshop to be stored until he returned, hoping later to give the 
pheasant to a friend as a gift. Upon his return he discovers that the gift is gone, an 
apprentice by the name of Francesco Algarotti has cooked it with the fritelle of the day. 
The parable is pointed; the fat pheasant is presumably the metaphysics of Vico upon 
whose philosophy Lodoli modeled his school. As a teacher he had hoped to pass the gift 
on to the world in the form of an architectural theory. Algarotti, as a result of his limited 
wisdom, failed to recognize it for what it was. While Lodoli implies that Algarotti's error 
was unintentional and due to his ignorance, the use of the term fritelle is a brusque 
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critique just the same. Fritelle is a common and lowly dish. Memmo implies that Lodoli 
has given Algarotti a tasty philosophic morsel, which he has confused with his own low 
and common thought. Algarotti's other writings never amounted to much. This was 
perhaps the greatest insult to the noble courtier. 
Memmo's text takes as its main goal to set the record straight, and present the true 
theory of Lodoli.xvi He claims that Lodoli did not argue against architecture per se, he 
knew that contemporary architecture was built upon the work of the past. What Lodoli 
intended to do was to reverse the decline in architectonic reasoning, through a critical 
examination of all architecture past and present. He had been particularly interested in 
those specific architects who not only practiced, but also wrote. While the past was for 
Lodoli an important historical source for contemporary practice, he did not advocate 
either an imitation of the ancients, or an imitation of an idealized model, as his 
contemporaries did.  
Memmo's critique noted that Algarotti and his patrons favored traditional systems of 
architectural theory. They rejected the ‘philosophical’ examination espoused by Lodoli, 
who proposed a ‘true’, as opposed to a ‘good’ or ‘correct’ manner of building, which was 
intended to give form to ornament and demonstrate, or ‘prove’ the principles upon which 
it was based. Lodoli’s theory was not based upon utility as it had been for the French 
rationalists, rather, formal elements were to be determined by, and demonstrations of, the 
nature of the materials and how they were used in given situations. Such demonstrations 
were the product of reason. Lodoli’s criticism of traditional theory was only a matter of 
point, where the elements used contradicted the truth. Such truth was determined by the 
energy within the material form, and the overall structure or organization of the building. 
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Such precepts Lodoli himself could trace back to Vitruvius and were therefore grounded 
within the past and tradition.xvii  
Memmo also goes on to attack Algarotti's 'beautiful lie', noting that even he had to 
admit of the temporal pre-eminence of Egyptian architecture. Since Egyptian architecture 
developed prior to the Greeks, stone construction and technology must have existed prior 
to the timber constructions of the Greeks. This was an important fact in the contemporary 
debates of the day and could be traced back to the historical studies of architecture by 
men like Perrault, Guarini, Wren and Fisher Von Erlach.  
The Greeks developed their architecture in timber because it was originally plentiful 
and available. When the countryside was deforested they were forced to develop another 
construction material, or else they were simply influenced by Egyptian stone construction 
techniques. In either case, basic architectural forms and proportions had been developed 
prior to the Greek temple form. This immediately places the conception of the origin of 
architecture in Laugier’s rustic timber hut in doubt. It should be noted, though, that the 
imitation theory continued well into the nineteenth century, as we have seen, in the work 
of men like Quatremere de Quincy (1755- 1849).xviii 
Memmo stressed that the 'beautiful lie', of the Doric order, did not reflect architectural 
truths, but reflected Greek taste.xix If this was so, then the Orders were not essential to 
architecture as an art form. This was Perrault’s argument.xx This was where Algarotti and 
Milizia got it wrong, they, like Laugier, mistook a part of architecture, the Orders, for all 
of it. Lodoli parted company with the traditionalists on this and appeared as a 
revolutionary modern, ala Perrault, to them. xxi But he did not accept Perrault’s assertion 
that the orders originated out of fancy. According to Lodoli the Orders were not the 
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essence of architecture, but they were originally tectonic truths that were subsequently 
maintained as products of cultural taste.  
Parting company with rationalists like Laugier and the latter Neo-Classicists, as well, 
Lodoli refused to accept the column and entablature as fundamental principles of 
architecture to be imitated. Since the orders were in stone, as opposed to their original 
timber, they had ceased to be demonstrations of original architectural reasoning. Lodoli 
rejected them not because they weren’t a reflection of a ‘Positive’ or timeless beauty, but 
because their forms ceased to be true demonstrations of their original meaning. The 
revolutionary character of Lodoli’s thought lay in his rejection of any imitation theory 
when it came to the orders. As I will show below, the detail was for Lodoli a 
representation of the function and materials used in a given situation. The orders revealed 
the truth of a given situation during the dawn of Greek culture. Their continued use was 
nothing more than copying and represented a failure to learn the valuable lesson that they 
embodied: the thought process that creates style in the first place. This was the true 
principle of architecture as revealed in the orders, not the form of the orders themselves. 
It was this that sets Lodoli apart as a true revolutionary, and a precursor of later ‘tectonic’ 
discussions in architectural theory. 
 
Sheriman and the Dream of a New Architecture 
 
Zaccaria Seriman, who was  supposed to be a frequenter of Lodoli's school, made the 
same point poetically clear in Viaggi di Enrico Wanton, a literary work composed in 
1749.xxii. This work takes the form of an imaginary journey, a genre popularized by Swift 
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and derived from Lucian. In this ingenious fable a young Englishman Enrico Wanton is 
shipwrecked in a foreign land on the coast of Terra Australis, in the Paese delle Scimie, 
the land of the monkey-men. Wanton, like Gulliver before him, wanders through this land 
encountering different peoples and cultures along the way. The text is an allegory of the 
contemporary debates on architecture and philosophy. 
Wanton's first encounter is with the Capitol City of Scimiopoli; it reflects the values 
and manners of Venice. Here the excesses of fashion and luxury are the rule of the day. 
The people's greatest fear is the rise of a new form of education and science, which 
values personal, rather than class, superiority. The character of the society is reflected in 
its architecture, which can only be described as an agglomeration of parts, none of which 
seems necessary. The architectural beauty of Scimiopoli can only be defined by its 
multiplicity of ornament, which shows a blatant disregard for materials and proportions. 
The land of the monkey men, and its capitol city Scimiopoli, is allegorical of the 
aristocratic traditionalists and the Rococo fashion they espoused in the 18th century. 
It is here, within this city of excess, that Wanton meets a most unlikely philosopher, 
one who seeks to reduce the architectural forms of this city to majestic and primordial 
simplicity, through the application of mathematical principles. The philosopher argues 
that ornament is unacceptable if it contradicts the truth, and that materials may only be 
used in a manner true to their nature. Wanton is fascinated by this man the locals call 
mad. The 'mad' philosopher is none other than Carlo Lodoli. 
The second half of the journey takes Wanton to the Regno dei Cinocefali, the 
Kingdom of the dog-faced men. This kingdom is depicted as a neoclassical utopia ruled 
by a philosopher- king. For the Cinocefali education consists of schooling in moral 
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philosophy which guides them in the control of their passions and balances both 
individual and communal needs. The society is founded on moral philosophy, not fashion 
and manners. It stands in opposition to that of the Scimie. Any contradictory 
philosophical factions are banished to the Paesi de' Filosofi. 
On his trip through the countryside of this land Wanton first encounters the Fortezza 
de' Venti, or miserable citadel. This fortress is the home of the metaphysicians who 
worship abstraction. Their language is filled with words like force, virtue, quality, form, 
universal, and category. Here the citizens are concerned only with the abstraction of 
esoteric thought in total disregard for the particulars of the body, the result is that the 
society is in disrepair; crops are not tended, work is never done, services never provided. 
This is attributed to the underlying belief of this society that 'the beings of reason are not 
possible in reality.'xxiii The physical characteristics of the architecture of the Fortezza de' 
Venti is that it is a feeble patchwork of materials and construction, in a sterile landscape. 
On his last night in this fortress Wanton dines with a learned nobleman who reveals the 
sole thought upon which all thoughts are based, in this fortress as least. "'Io cammino, 
dunque . . . dunque son vivo---.' ' I walk, therefore, I am alive.'"xxiv The inherent irony is 
an obvious reference to Descartes, who derived existence from thought in his famous 
cogito ergo sum. The nobleman derives existence from an action of the body, yet this is 
in direct opposition to the priorities of his own society. 
The next city that Wanton approaches is the Castello delle Misure, the Castle of 
Measure. This is the city of mathematicians, each citizen a specialist and proponent of an 
aspect of geometry. The city is well built, ordered and ideal. Its’ buildings are reasonable 
and decorous. This capitol city contains numerous academies, which relate mathematics 
 367
to other disciplines such as physics, music and ethics. Its moral philosophy is based upon 
the line and calculus. The reference here is to Spinoza, whose Ethics showed a great 
concern for geometrical rigor and rendered Descartes Principles of Philosophy into 
geometrical form. The citizenry though, have divided into two factions, one debating the 
supremacy of the line, the other of calculus. A wise Cinocefalo explains to Wanton what 
the basic problem is. He uses the analogy of the sword: it has no use if not applied to a 
physical body. When used to cut only the air one should not blame the sword but rather 
the swordsman. Wanton understands the message of the wise man; science when applied 
to intangibles is fruitless and can only be socially divisive. 
Seriman's fable rejects first the courtly society for its excesses, which have no order 
or truth, second the rationalist approach which has no concern for practical needs, and 
third, the society founded on esoteric wisdom which reduces all reasoning to abstractions 
derived from mathematics. The lesson to be learned is that reasoning without experience, 
necessity and human narrative is fruitless.  
When one compares the descriptions of the cities visited in the fable, a strong and 
topical (given the intellectual debates of the time) theme emerges. In order for society to 
be just and serene, wisdom must be applied to practical problems. Without practical 
wisdom, metaphysics fails to provide for the needs of humanity. While mathematics and 
geometry provide order they do not ground morality and ethics in ‘being’. Ethics and 
practical wisdom must engage the particulars of daily life, of the experience of virtue and 
vice.  
Seriman's fable indicates that Lodoli's was an alternative position to the excesses of 
the earlier traditions, the rationalism of the Cartesians and the abstractions of the 
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mathematician. It identifies Lodoli as a wise sage, attempting to simplify architecture and 
society through the application of new principles in order to produce a better society 
founded on truth and the nature of materials. But how did Lodoli set out to accomplish 
this in architecture? In order to answer this question it is important to look at those 
writers who influenced him and how he used their ideas to shape his own theory.  
 
“invention based on a manipulation of the details of 
real images . . . a singling out of parts to reach a 
presentation and an understanding of a whole, i.e. 
a non- trivial representation.” 
Marco Frascari 
The Particolaregiamento in Literature and 
Architecture xxv 
 
Particolareggiamento or the Mytho- poetic Reasoning of the Particular 
 
Lodoli associated with the prominent thinker Antonio Conti, a Venetian nobleman, 
mathematician and metaphysician. Widely known throughout Europe, his tragedy Caesar 
had brought him fame in Italy, France and England. He was also known to have had 
correspondences with both Leibniz and Newton. Conti was one of a group of prominent 
Italian philosopher poets who considered themselves ‘reformed Cartesians’. In addition 
to him, the group included Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Gian Vincenzo Gravina, his 
uncle in Naples Gregorio Coloprese and the Philosopher Giambattista Vico. They 
advocated a form of mytho- poetic reasoning referred to as particolareggiamento.  
Marco Frascari has insinuated that it was this form of thinking that accounts for 
Lodoli’s revolutionary new approach to architecture.xxvi Particolareggiamento refers to 
the idea that the particular takes supremacy over the universal in the formation of ‘truth’. 
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Such a stance is in opposition to the epistemology of science, which gives supremacy to 
the universal.xxvii The term is derived from two Italian words, the noun particolare, and 
the verb particolareggiare. The noun means both a detail, and a particular. The verb 
means to detail, to particularize, to reason by the particular rather than the universal, but 
also to narrate. Frascari defines particolareggiare as: “invention based on a manipulation 
of the details of real images . . . a singling out of parts to reach a presentation and an 
understanding of a whole, i.e. a non- trivial representation.”xxviii  
The most profound and comprehensive application of this position can be found in 
the writings of Giambattista Vico, then Chair of Latin Eloquence at the University of 
Naples. His work proved to be of great interest to Lodoli who, along with his friend 
Antonio Conti, attempted in 1728/9 to have Vico’s New Science published in Venice in a 
revised addition. He was unsuccessful in this, but did manage to publish Vico’s 
Autobiography in 1729. xxix  
Vico had argued that the process of cognition moved from particular to universal, 
insisting that the ‘universal’ represented a form of abstraction. To use an analogy; the 
universal concept ‘couch’ is approached, or understood, only through the generalization 
of traits commonly found in a series of particular ‘couches’, that may differ significantly 
from each other in their individual traits. In this process individual traits of the ‘thing- in- 
itself’, are removed in order to isolate a list of characteristics common to all objects in the 
group ‘couches’. Only in this manner does one arrive at a generalized concept. Cognition 
must therefore, begin with the recognition of a series of individual particulars, that are 
recollected in memory as bearing similar traits and therefore linked, or related through 
their similitude. Only then can the conceptualization of the ‘universal’ take place. 
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For Vico, this became the basis of understanding cognition, indicating that the origin 
of thought itself could be found in the minds’ ability to identify verisimilitudes. This 
became the key to understanding the mind, memory, and imagination.  
 
“Memory is the same as imagination, which for that 
reason is called memoria in Latin . . . Imagination is 
likewise taken for ingenuity [ingegno] or invention. 
Memory thus has three different aspects; memory 
when it remembers things, imagination when it 
alters or imitates them, and invention when it gives 
them a new turn or puts them into proper 
arrangement and relationship.” 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Science xxx 
 
Vico and the Origins of Cognition 
 
The realization that the recognition of common traits among diverse objects or events 
precedes the identification of a universal concept, led Vico to reject Descartes’ notion of 
clear and distinct ideas impressed upon the mind, like so many images in a wax tablet. 
Without the assumption that universal concepts were a priori ideas given by God, Vico 
was left to assume a state of mind that must have existed prior to man’s codifying the 
world with human meaning, in which the world would be nothing but sensory flux. The 
transition from a state of barbarian/ animal, what he called the bestione, to a world of 
human meaning required the subject to alter his or her thinking, from a series of isolated 
sensual experiences in time, to a series of like experiences linked together. This act, a 
product of fantasia, must literally create the idea of the self, as a fixed identity moving 
through time and experience, in the process. Such a moment in time was, for Vico, 
literally the origination of human cognition and the origin of humanity.  
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Vico was left to pose the question: ‘how is it possible for the mind to have anything 
before it at all?’ Since the only knowledge the bestione possesses is knowledge of its own 
body, it must have been forced to describe and ‘think’ of other objects metaphorically in 
relationship to itself. This was how man originally conceived of the world around him, he 
thought in poetic metaphors. The imagination became a central tenet of original 
cognition. As Marcel Danesi states “Vico’s conception of the imagination can be 
summarized as that basic mental faculty which translates sensorial experience into 
images that are stored by the memory system and given expression in the form of 
metaphors. This faculty must have been present in the first acts of transforming sensorial 
experience into a world of meaning.”xxxi It was this ability that allowed man to overcome 
the sense of alienation in nature, through codifying it experientially and assigning 
meaning to objects and events.  
The word ‘imagination’ was derived from the Latin imago; ‘image’, and referred to 
our innate ability to form mental images. As Danesi points out, “This, remarkably, is 
exactly what Vico means when he refers to human mentality as having originated in the 
fantasia in the form of images. The exercise of the imagination is, in fact, the only way 
that figurative meaning can be inferred from metaphorical expression.”xxxii For Vico the 
image, and by extension metaphor, was the primary means by which the human mind, or 
the imagination, came to terms with the world around it.xxxiii This was the origin of 
thought itself. It became the basis of Vico’s ‘poetic logic’, whose corollaries were the 
first tropes of metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche.  
As Donald Phillip Verene has pointed out, this was a theory that identities ‘metaphor 
as the fundamental epistemological element’ and the key structure of original 
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perception.xxxiv Vico himself stated the importance of language as a center-point between 
sense perception and the mind’s ability to grasp and interpret the world when he stated 
that “a man is properly only mind, body and speech, and speech stands as it were midway 
between mind and body.”xxxv  
For Vico the imagination was an aspect of memory, which he claimed was threefold. 
“Memory is the same as imagination, which for that reason is called memoria in Latin . . . 
Imagination is likewise taken for ingenuity [ingegno] or invention. Memory thus has 
three different aspects; memory when it remembers things, imagination when it alters or 
imitates them, and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper 
arrangement and relationship.”xxxvi Memory here was a mental faculty and primary 
component in knowledge construction.  
 
"The first poets attributed to bodies the being of 
animate substances, with capacities measured by 
their own, namely sense and passion, and in this 
way made fables of them. Thus every metaphor is 
a fable in brief." 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Science xxxvii 
 
Vico and the Forms of Thought 
 
According to Vico, Man once thought in images, what he referred to as ‘Imaginative 
Universals’. This was the 'master key' of his The New Science: original thought was 
imagistic and by extension metaphorical. As Verene claims, the 'Imaginative Universal' 
was basically a theory of image. It was Vico’s discovery that the first peoples thought in 
"imaginative genera (images for the most part of animate substances, of gods or heroes, 
formed by their imagination) to which they reduced all the species or all particulars 
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appertaining to each genus."xxxviii It was through these imaginative genera that the first 
men attempted to understand the world around them by animating nature. "The first poets 
attributed to bodies the being of animate substances, with capacities measured by their 
own, namely sense and passion, and in this way made fables of them. Thus every 
metaphor is a fable in brief."xxxix Images, and metaphor, became seen as the fundamental 
category for understanding the world. They were the primary operation of the mind. This 
was what Vico referred to as ‘poetic’ logic. It was for him a form of poetic metaphysics 
and preceded the rational metaphysics of the abstract concept. 
In opposition to this, as a latter development, Vico proposed the 'Intelligible 
Universal', a form of knowledge as ‘rational’ logic. It was derivative of an age when men 
are able to abstract concepts and to think thoughts that have no figurative presence about 
them. The function of the mind was to sort and analyze. This was accomplished through 
the mind's ability to abstract properties that may be common to various objects and 
thereby link particulars into class and genera. Verene summed this up by stating that "The 
essential features of these objects are abstracted through reflection. As the mind rises 
from the perception of individual objects to the essential properties that constitute them 
as species and to the genera according of the species by omitting sensuous content from 
the original perceptions, so the mind can descend from genus to species to individual 
object by adding elements of specific content. According to this view, the universal is 
that which can be conceived as a property common to the members of a given class and 
which can be predicated commonly to all members of the class."xl The 'Intelligible 
Universal' constitutes the basis of conceptual thinking and develops a rational 
metaphysics. 
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Conti’s particolareggiamento and Vico’s ‘poetic’ logic framed an alternative theory 
of mind and epistemological structure. It argued that thought was essentially 
metaphorical, and that the imagination, memory and fantasia were central to 
understanding how meaning is created in the world of human experience. It also 
identified the inherent abstraction of the universal: as a concept that distances itself from 
reality and truth. From this position Vico developed first a critique of Descartes and the 
epistemology of science and then a complete philosophy and metaphysics in the New 
Science.  
Vico’s philosophy essentially exists outside the development of Western philosophy, 
and therefore represents a true alternative to it. By deriving his position from such a 
philosophy, Lodoli was able to posit a theory that was a true ‘other’, from which real 
resistance to the rationalist ‘instrumentalization’ of architectural theory was possible. In 
order to understand the very radical nature of Lodoli’s theory and its implications for 
architectural theory it is necessary to first understand the radical nature of Vico’s critique 










“But I who think am mind and body, and if thought 
were the cause of my being, it would be the cause 
of body. However, there are bodies, which do not 
think. Thus I think, rather, because I consist of body 
and mind. Body and mind united are therefore the 
cause of thought, for were I solely body I would not 
think, but were I solely mind I would understand 
[the reasons forming thought].” 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Sciencexli 
 
Vico’s Critique of the Epistemology of Science 
 
The epistemology of science was structured around two core tenets. The first was the 
assumption of nature’s essentially geometric structure. It was this principle, originating 
first with Galileo that became the basis of Descartes’ geometrical method outlined in the 
Discourse on Method, and was the foundation of Newton’s theories of motion and mass. 
The Second was the development of a specific form of rationality, were reason was 
equated solely with ‘conceptual, ‘logical’ or ‘abstract’ thinking. Irving Horowitz has 
referred to this as ‘Epistemological Rationalism’, which denies the efficacy of the senses 
in gaining knowledge of the world, and insists that ‘truth’ can be derived solely from the 
employment of the powers of reason.xlii This was precisely the basis of Descartes’ 
philosophy and the ‘Cogito ergo sum’, wherein the senses and the imagination were 
denied as means to certain knowledge. While most intellectuals of the eighteenth century 
accepted these tenets they were not without controversy and criticism.  
Vico was one of the earliest and strongest critics who directly challenged the 
epistemology of science on both tenets. He first attacked the geometrical structure of 
knowledge in On the Study Methods of Our Times in 1709. In it he claimed that geometry 
was not a demonstration of the structure of nature, but a mere probability, because we 
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ourselves have made the rules of geometry. According to him: ‘. . . the principles of 
physics which are put forward as truths on the strength of the geometrical method are not 
really truths, but wear a semblance of probability. The method by which they were 
reached is that of geometry, but physical truths so elicited are not demonstrated as 
reliably as are geometrical axioms. We are able to demonstrate geometrical propositions 
because we create them.”xliii  
The postulates in both mathematics and geometry are, in a sense, closed hermetic 
systems that have no relationship, as postulates, to external objects. The point, line and 
plane of which they are composed are human fictions. While true in and of themselves 
the postulates are not true in the sense of their application to the world of physics. They 
may serve to define the objective reality of a given object, but tell us nothing of its inner 
nature, its causes.  
Vico did not devalue mathematics or geometry; on the contrary, he viewed them as 
examples of human constructions that mimic divine creation. We understand the 
postulates of mathematics and geometry in the same way as God understands the natural 
world, because we ourselves have made those postulates. Geometry and mathematics are 
‘true’, because we make them and understand their cause, but the world of nature is not a 
construction of man, it requires a relationship between the human mind, and that which is 
external to it, whose causes are essentially unknown. The geometric proofs, according to 
Vico, prove nothing except their own validity as geometric axioms. Establishing them as 
the basis of method in science was a fundamental problem for him.  
Accordingly, natural science becomes true only in the sense of experimentation, in 
which the experiment itself is a geometrical construction. The truth of the physical 
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sciences is a truth of mathematical demonstration, whose real object still exists outside 
the demonstration in the realm of mathematics. It is a mediated truth, not a real ‘truth’ of 
reality. It is for this reason that, according to Vico, the physical sciences do not provide 
us with the certain truth claimed by Descartes, only mere probability.  
The second tenet of the epistemology of science was its insistence on 
‘Epistemological’ reason; ‘conceptual, ‘logical’ or ‘abstract’ thinking. This originated 
from Descartes’ methodology of systematic doubt and culminated in the proposition 
Cogito ergo sum, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ But was the proposition a truth as Descartes 
maintained? Did philosophic doubt lead to absolute truth? Vico thought otherwise. In On 
the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians of 1710, he took on Descartes’ theory of mind 
head on. When knowledge of the true is unknown men hold to what is certain.xliv Vico 
pointed out that in everyday life men often mistake consciousness for testimony of the 
thing, without real proof. Such is the condition of the skeptic who, while conscious that 
he thinks, is still ignorant of the causes of thought: or how it is that he thinks in the first 
place. Vico argues: “But I who think am mind and body, and if thought were the cause of 
my being, it would be the cause of body. However, there are bodies, which do not think. 
Thus I think, rather, because I consist of body and mind. Body and mind united are 
therefore the cause of thought, for were I solely body I would not think, but were I solely 
mind I would understand [the reasons forming thought]. Thinking is not, indeed, the 
cause of my being a mind, but a sign of it, and a sign is not a cause. Thus the wise skeptic 
will not deny the certainty of signs, but he will deny that of causes.”xlv Truth, according 
to Vico, is knowledge of causes, Descartes’ cogito proves only a consciousness of being, 
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not its cause. Nor for that matter does the cogito provide us with a means of assessing the 
cause of thought; how or why ‘I think’.  
Verene explains Vico’s criticism this way: “Descartes, in Vico’s view, has failed to 
distinguish between what is true, verum, and what is certain, certum; and he thus fails to 
distinguish between scientific knowledge, scientia, and consciousness, conscientia. 
Scientia, whose object is the true, requires knowledge of causes. Such knowledge would 
require the mind to possess the form from which, to make itself. In the cogito the thinker 
discovers himself as a certum; of which he is indubitably aware. The conscientia of the 
sign of his being in not a scientia of its truth . . . From this extraordinary certum, this 
exceptionally powerful act of consciousness, it is not possible to generate verum, true 
knowledge of causes.”xlvi The rationalism of Descartes’ cogito produces only a 
consciousness of signs that indicate or point toward truth, but fail to actually reveal it. 
The cogito doesn’t reveal itself to be the key to truth, but rather the shadows in Plato’s 
cave. This became the basis of Vico’s general opposition to Descartes and modern 
science.xlvii 
The ramifications of Vico’s criticisms were staggering for modern science, the 
‘cogito’ provided a rationality of signs, not causes, and the natural sciences provided 
knowledge of experiments in the form of mathematical demonstrations, but not ‘reality’. 
Under such conditions, was it possible for science to provide access to the ‘True’? 
According to Vico the answer was that it could not, the basic tenets upon which the 
epistemology of science was established provided a false truth.  
Forward looking thinkers like Lodoli and others in the Venetian circle were not 
willing to give up on either truth or science, but they could not ignore Vico’s findings 
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either. Once the argument was put forward it became necessary to rethink science and 
truth along Vichian lines. This point is essential. The distinction between Vico and 
Descartes makes all the difference in the interpretation of Lodoli’s intentions. The 
inability to make such a distinction was the source of the historical confusion. How then 
did Vico define the nature of the ‘true’ and of ‘science’ that formed the basis of Lodoli’s 
theory? 
 
“Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes 
knowledge of the true; philology observes that of 
which human choice is author, whence comes 
consciousness of the certain.” 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Sciencexlviii 
 
Vico on Truth 
For Vico certum and verum are not interchangeable, certum is only part of the 
verum.xlix They are poles within the discourse of knowledge. He would refer to this as the 
verum/ certum principle. Descartes’ confusion of verum and certum led not to a 
philosophical truth, but a philological one. As Vico claims: “Philosophy contemplates 
reason, whence comes knowledge of the true; philology observes that of which human 
choice is author, whence comes consciousness of the certain.”l The task of philosophy is 
to undertake an examination of universals, of that which is held in common among 
things, it is a truth of the whole. Philology, on the other hand, undertakes to examine 
particulars of the historical world.  
The philosophers, Vico claimed, failed by half in not giving certainty to their 
reasoning by appealing to the philologians, who in their case failed by half in not giving 
authority to their findings by appealing to the reason of philosophers.li This is precisely 
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the problem with the epistemology of science. It is derived from philological certains, il 
certo, not from philosophical truths, il vero. It is ignorant of the verum/ certum principle. 
It is a science of facts, not of causes, of the part, not the whole. 
In On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Vico would later outline what would 
serve as the second basis of his understanding of the true. In Latin verum (the true) and 
factum (the made) are interchangeable, from this piece of philological observation Vico 
postulated the convertibility of the true and the made, the verum- factum. Verum is here 
understood in a metaphysical sense as ‘Intelligibility’. Factum is understood from the 
position of ens factum; being made, or the making of ‘being’. What Vico postulated as 
‘truth’, as ‘intelligibility’, was the making of ‘being’. Truth, according to Vico, is not 
only knowledge of the object of study, but also of its causes, the how and why it is made.  
What is true, or intelligible, is fully present as a truth only to its maker. According to 
Vico “. . . the true is what is made; that the first truth is therefore in God, because God is 
the first Maker; that the first truth is infinite, because God is the Maker of all things; and 
that it is complete, because it makes manifest to God since He contains them.”lii God as 
the Maker of the world knows the inner and outer nature of things because He himself 
has created them. Since we have not created the physical world such full and complete 
knowledge is closed to us as a verum, or absolute truth.  
This point is vital according to Vico, because it identifies the distinction between 
Divine knowing and human knowledge. “And just as divine truth is what God orders and 
produces as He comes to know it, so human truth is what man arranges and makes as he 
knows it. In this way knowledge is cognition of the genus or mode by which a thing is 
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made, and by means of which, as the mind comes to know the mode, because it arranges 
the elements, it makes the thing.”liii  
As Donald Phillip Verene has pointed out, the verum- factum is the middle term of 
the syllogism; the ultimate middle term of thought itself.liv The ‘True’, according to Vico, 
is the product of a triangulation between verum, certum and factum. The ‘True’ is 
knowledge of how the ‘intelligible’ is made manifest in ‘materiality’. It implies an 
understanding of the relationship between the universality of the idea, and the 
particularity of the ‘thing-in-itself’.  
Such a relationship is the very object of the art of disegno, an area of theoretical study 
in the arts in Italy that began in the Renaissance. Venice was an important historical 
center for the arts and for aesthetic theory. Theories of disegno had long been topics of 
discussion in the Venetian circles. Vico’s verum ipsum factum provided a serious 
philosophical means of addressing the relationship between ‘intelligibility’ and 
‘materiality’ in the guise of what he calls a ‘new science’. It is no wonder that Lodoli 
became fascinated with Vico’s propositions. It could potentially lead to a ‘new scientific’ 
approach to art and architecture. One that could provide a theoretical ground outside 
rationalist discourse that could resist the ‘instrumentalization’ of architecture and prevent 
the loss of meaning. 
 
Vico’s New Science 
 
Vico’s understanding of the relationship between the verum/ certum and the verum- 
factum led to his major philosophical work, Principles of the New Science of 
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Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of the Nations. The New Science was 
an attempt to reestablish ‘science’ along another trajectory. What was Vico’s ‘new’ 
scientific approach? 
For him science begins with the universal: it classifies objects, through the process of 
abstraction, according to genera and type, essentially removing all secondary 
characteristics that identify the object as a particularity. The scientific method is one of 
analysis, or dissection, in which the object, once classified is broken down into its 
constituent parts, which are then analyzed according to the relationship between primary 
characteristics. The relationship of parts, one to another, is then documented. This 
method provides a consciousness of the constituent parts of the ‘thing-in-itself’, and their 
relationship, but not of their causes.  
In place of this consciousness of physical things, Vico sought knowledge of man’s 
production of knowledge: the very nature of cognition and humanity itself. In order to do 
this, one must overcome the mind’s tendency to be satisfied with a consciousness of the 
‘thing-in-itself’, and seek the generation of the true causes of that consciousness.  
As it is used in the title of his work, the term ‘new science’ encompasses a wider 
meaning than previously used. It refers to both scienzalv and coscienzalvi. According to 
Bergin and Fisch, their distinction can be summed up in the following manner “coscienza 
[is] consciousness of conscience, and scienza, [is] knowledge or science. Coscienza has 
for its object il certo, the certain; that is, particular facts, events, customs, laws, 
institutions, as careful observation and the sifting of evidence determine them to be; and 
scienza has for its object il vero, the true; that is universal and eternal principles . . . The 
pursuit of coscienza, of the certain, is philology or history; the pursuit of the true or the 
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common is philosophy.”lvii Vico’s New Science takes as its methodology both pursuits: 
philosophy and philology. Its method begins not with the classification of objects of 
study as universals, but with an investigation of the particular, as given certain.  
This method also grounds truth in the particulars of time and place, since history and 
praxis cannot be considered outside of such categories. In this way Vico can redirect the 
entire epistemological structure of his ‘new science’ toward those very conditions of time 
and place whose denial had made modern science so problematic to human experience.  
But Vico’s critique of modern science was not just a critique of method, but of object 
as well. The natural sciences take as their object that which is made by God, and as a 
result its ‘truth’ is a mediated one for us. Following the principles of verum- factum and 
verum/ certum, to possess an unmediated ‘truth’, a true ‘intelligibility’, the object of 
science must be something that we ourselves make.  
What Man makes are human institutions; because they are man-made, not only can 
we claim them as true, and know their causes, but in making the human world man makes 
his own history and therefore can truly know its inner and outer nature, its causes. It is a 
truth of the reality of human experience, which is a truth greater than that of geometry: of 
the point, line and plane, which possess no reality outside the human mind.lviii Max 
Horkheimer has commented on this point, making the claim: "Vico takes over the 
principle of the exclusive knowability of the created and even makes it into a yardstick of 
his philosophy- but attributes to it a completely different and radically new meaning. 
What men have created and what therefore constitutes the prime target of cognition- 
those creations in which the essence of human nature and 'mind' is most clearly revealed- 
are not the fictive constructions of mathematical reason but rather the happenings of 
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historical reality."lix The New Science relies on an analysis of human thought as it regards 
what is considered necessary and useful to man in a given situation. In other words, all 
modes of human production must be explained in relation to, or in terms of, necessity, as 
reactions to material needs. The keys to understanding the world of human experience are 
the external conditions of human life and the early psychic characteristics of early man. 
For Vico, the ‘true’ science is not the science of Galileo and Newton, but the science of 
human institutions and history, the humanities, as opposed to the natural sciences.  
Once understood, architecture, a product of human making, becomes a legitimate 
subject of Vico’s new science, one that is to be explained in terms of necessity as reaction 
to material need. This is where Lodoli must have seen the potentiality for a new theory of 
architecture.  
 
"Our new science must therefore, be a 
demonstration, so to speak, of what providence has 
wrought in history, for it must be a history of the 
institutions by which, without human discernment or 
counsel, and often against the designs of men, 
providence has ordered this great city of the human 
race. For though this world has been created in 
time and particular, the institutions established 
therein by providence are universal and eternal." 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Science lx 
 
The Verum of Vico’s New Science: Providence 
 
In the New Science, Vico referred indirectly to the verum- factum when he discussed 
his famous corso e ricorso, the ideal eternal history: the course of historical events in the 
rise and fall of nations. For Vico, all nations order themselves temporally and spatially 
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according to the same principles, these are derived from the nature of human mentality. 
The stages in the development of institutions are the same as the stages of development 
of the human mind and cognition: from the mytho- poetic fantasia of the Imaginative 
Universal to the Intelligible Universal.  
This is the universal, philosophic verum of the ideal eternal history. Each nation is a 
microcosm of the totality of the human world, each stage in its development a microcosm 
of that stage of mentality. The certum and verum, particular and universal reveal 
themselves in a reciprocal relationship. It is in the course of civil history, the rise of civil 
institutions, of laws and customs that the ultimate truth of human making is revealed. The 
examination of human action, or praxis, according to the principles of verum- factum and 
verum/ certum gives the mind knowledge of itself, of its own causes and modifications.  
What Vico claimed to have discovered, as the eternal truth of human existence, is 
man’s singular will to a social and cultured existence, in spite of historical setbacks of 
individual action or nature. True wisdom, as human self- knowledge, can only be derived 
from an analysis of the historical process of making, and not from introspection or 
reflection. Since governments, laws, religions, science and the arts are all human 
creations, they all have their origins in this historical process, they cannot be understood 
from an analysis of an isolated individual, but must be understood from the point of view 
of relationships between individuals, from within their sociability.  
Vico called this Divine Providence, the 'Queen of human actions'. It was this 
providential wisdom that was the goal of his new science. "Our new science must 
therefore, be a demonstration, so to speak, of what providence has wrought in history, for 
it must be a history of the institutions by which, without human discernment or counsel, 
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and often against the designs of men, providence has ordered this great city of the human 
race. For though this world has been created in time and particular, the institutions 
established therein by providence are universal and eternal."lxi 
 
“To recollect is to order things in terms of their 
origin, to obtain a totalization of all the fragments of 
the activity of the human spirit through a 
progressive ordering of things between the origin 
point once found, and the form of the present 
mentality from which the ordering takes place . . . 
What must be sought is a sense of self- identity that 
extends through time from the origin to the present. 
We must re-perceive with our memory what this 
first world is like before it can become an object of 
reflection.” 
Donald Phillip Verene 
Vico’s Science of Imaginationlxii 
  
The New Science as Self- Knowledge 
 
In The New Science, Vico points out that his new science is a rational civil theology 
of divine providence, a philosophy of authority and a history of human ideas from which 
a theory of mind can proceed.lxiii The methodology of The New Science asks that its 
practitioner seek within the philological particulars of history and the course of nations an 
economy of structures, of causes and effects that are common to all. Such common traits 
reveal the philosophical truth of history, its’ providential pattern. The meditation on these 
two givens makes manifest the ideal eternal history as a civil theology. It is a faith that 
despite the diversity of conditions, variations within cultures, and the eventuality of a 
nations decline and fall, the human race will preserve itself and in the end maintain a 
verity of human reality.  
 387
In much the same way the New Science manifests a philosophy of authority. The 
philological ‘particulars’ of history and the course of nations expose the specifics of 
human choice, and how judgments are made. What is revealed is that human action is a 
product of human choice, determined not from rational inference or a priori postulates, 
but from a common perception of things, the sensus communis of a given society. Choice 
and decision derive their authority, and are therefore shaped by, the form of thought at 
any given stage in the development of a nation.  
Likewise, it is in the course and recourse of nations, their rise and fall that the 
providential truth of human making reveals a history of human ideas. In the New Science 
Vico claimed: “. . . the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its 
principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.”lxiv 
This correlation is essential in understanding Vico’s thought. The correspondence 
between the principles of the ideal eternal history and the modifications of the mind 
imply a history of ideas in which forms of thought and forms of society, are co- 
determinate. Logic, language and civil institutions develop together in a specific order 
through time. The discovery of the Imaginative universal as a means of original thought 
meant that the rational and abstract way of philosophical thinking could not have been the 
means of thought of the first men who founded civilization. Likewise, the rational laws 
and civil institutions could not have arisen all at once, but must have developed over 
time.  
The human mind and the reality of human experience are intricately linked, like the 
two terms of a syllogism. By uniting the philosophical verum of the ideal eternal history 
with the philological certum of civil history it becomes possible to understand the 
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universal in the particular and therefore, the true as it becomes manifest in the particulars 
of reality. This implies that civil institutions encode the verum of the human mind and its 
making.  
But to understand this verum of humanity we must, as Vico claimed: “begin where its 
subject matter began”,lxv with the origins of humanity, or humanization: the moment at 
which the world was codified as a world of human meaning. The mind must approach the 
origin through an exercise of the original powers of the mind. To do so means to 
understand such an original moment through fantasia, through memory as imagination, 
and to unfold the world from it. This is not the narration of events, an historical tracing of 
chronology, nor is it an abstract reasoning from philosophical a priori’s. It is an 
explanation of particulars and their causes. It must be a recollection of humanity from 
origins to the present. 
In Vico’s thought the re-making of the moment of origination is an act of memoria as 
recollection, imagination and invention. The origin is a moment of the past that must be 
remade, but in its remaking the subject must confront the other-ness of the past as past. 
This other-ness establishes a dialectic between past as recollection and present as 
ingegno, the placement of the parts in their proper order or relationship. This temporal 
juxtaposition sets up a metaphorical structure whose third term is the imagination or 
fantasia. Vico’s conception of invenzione, which acts as a bridge between the subject 
matter and the means by which it is expressed, calls attention to the shifting of meaning 
from its origins to its potential permutation into new forms. By doing so it deconstructs 
the very structure by which the human mind applies meaning to the world around it. In 
calling attention to the construction of meaning, it achieves a didactic structure. It 
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achieves scienza, through the exposure of the structure of meaning. And it achieves 
coscienza by bringing an awareness of the way in which shifts in that structure have 
occurred, are occurring and might occur.  
Verene explains this process in the following way: “To recollect is to order things in 
terms of their origin, to obtain a totalization of all the fragments of the activity of the 
human spirit through a progressive ordering of things between the origin point once 
found, and the form of the present mentality from which the ordering takes place . . . 
What must be sought is a sense of self- identity that extends through time from the origin 
to the present. We must re-perceive with our memory what this first world is like before 
it can become an object of reflection.”lxvi In the end the proof and truth of the new 
science must be remade by its practitioner, it must be made convertible. This is the real 
value of the verum ipsum factum: the mind through the exercise of the fantasia must 
apprehend its own nature. True self- knowledge comes when the self remakes th




"She is born out of experience no less than from 
reasoning. Experience is a continuous and 
consummate reflection of usage and is perfected by 
operating on the necessary material of any type 
according to the idea of the design." 
Vitruvius 




Lodoli was regarded as a modern, a revolutionary, often depicted as rejecting the past 
and tradition. This interpretation is in many ways unfounded. He neither accepted, nor 
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rejected historical authority out of hand, but rather reaffirmed those traditional doctrines 
and images which passed the test of objective reason, defined in architectural terms. His 
thesis was itself derived from the very historical texts that he called into question. Thus 
we find that his architectural theory, like many before him, begins with a reinterpretation 
of Vitruvius. 
From the ancient Roman architect Lodoli took his definition of architecture as 
theoretical and practical science. "She is born out of experience no less than from 
reasoning. Experience is a continuous and consummate reflection of usage and is 
perfected by operating on the necessary material of any type according to the idea of the 
design." lxix With this statement Lodoli asserts a link between memory, in the form of 
reflection on experiences, and reason. Architecture is the union of memory and reason. 
The nature of the materials used, reason and memory establish the use of architectural 
forms and proportions. Architectural memory is the recollection of this relationship 
through history.  
In addition to this fundamental notion about architecture, Lodoli also took from 
Vitruvius his definition of proper imitation, which became the source of much of his 
criticism of contemporary theory. "The ancients held that what could not happen in the 
original would have no valid reason for existence in the copy. For in all their works they 
proceeded on definite principles of fitness and in ways derived from the truth of nature. 
Thus they reached perfection, approving only those things which, if challenged, can be 
explained on grounds of the truth."lxx Lodoli only sought to provide that challenge which 
Vitruvius mentioned and to hold architecture accountable to this Vitruvian standard. His 
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goal was therefore, not a rejection of tradition and authority, but rather a reaffirmation of 
it.  
It was this very doctrine that Lodoli used to reject the truth of the Doric Order in 
stone and to designate the eternal laws of statics and material function as the true basis of 
all architectural design. Using Vitruvius’ own assertions, Lodoli rejected any imitation 
theory of architecture outright, including the inherent concept of an ideal type. This is 
where Lodoli differed from Laugier and the latter Neo-Classicists, whose theories were 
based on the imitation of ideal type forms. 
Lodoli rejected the idea of the timber hut, both as the sole origin of architecture, and 
the source of the greatest variety of forms. Not only was the cave an original shelter, but 
its priority over the timber hut may be asserted. It was the cave that was the origin of 
stone and vaulted, architecture. It should be noted here that Lodoli is making such claims 
prior to Quatremere de Quincy and in the end comes to a different conclusion.  
The imitation of either the hut or the cave, though, could only lead to aesthetic 
monotony. Variety and stylistic development was for Lodoli the product of reasoning, not 
imitation. Unlike the abstraction of the rationalists, reasoning for Lodoli was a process of 
practical substitutions, as when flaws in detailing were revealed and subsequently altered 
and amended. Over time, through experience, the details were refined and transformed. 
This kind of reasoning was derived from practical experience and was inherently topical. 
There is no application of a priori concepts or categories and hence no abstract reasoning.  
Algarotti elaborated this system of architectonic substitution in his discussion of the 
timber hut. In his exposition, the base of the column resulted from the inclusion of a 
block of wood when it was discovered that humidity and dampness damaged the post. 
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Likewise, the introduction of the capitol was due to the realization that a block at the top 
would help to transfer the loads from horizontal support to a vertical one in a smoother 
fashion.  
This learning through experience led Lodoli to argue that the architectural detail was 
a union of both function and representation. Architectonic innovation and ingenuity were 
the products of necessity and use. The architectonic image was therefore, an image of the 
solution to the complex problem of a particular statistical and physical problem as 
defined by the architect in a given situation at a given moment in time. Architectural 
reasoning was one from the particular. 
Lodoli’s doctrine of the particular fundamentally challenged the Albertian tradition 
that had begun in the 15th century and was left virtually intact up to his time. In the 
introduction to De Re Aedificatoria Alberti divided architecture into two halves; 
Linamenta and materia, the linamentia conceived in the mind of the architect were 
independent of the materia to which they were applied. Alberti essentially established a 
division between theoretical a priori concepts and practice. He was also responsible for 
initiating a separation of ornament from structure. Lodoli’s understanding of Vitruvius 
meant that these aspects of Alberti’s theory were problematic. 
The division between structure and ornament, which had been initiated by Alberti and 
made all the more prominent by developments in structural analysis and the growing 
technical dimension of architectural delineation, had by the middle of the 18th century 
raised the question of meaning in architecture as a central concern.  
Lodoli did not launch an all-out attack on Albertian principles though. Alberti's 
notion of commoditas became for Lodoli a central tenet. As Alberti defined it, 
 393
Commoditas was the concern for utility and function guided by Decorum. The overall 
grace of a building for Alberti was built up from the commoditas of each of its constituent 
parts, which were the product of the suitableness of size and function of the materials in 
that particular setting. The linking of decorum, with its connection to virtue, and 
commoditas allowed Lodoli to introduce the notion of truth into the picture. Since truth 
and virtue were historically linked, reason could be used as a form of judgment in a given 
situation to determine the commoditas of a given detail. This became Lodoli’s new 
standard of decorum. In Alberti's decorum social hierarchy and rank determined the final 
judgment, in Lodoli's decorum reasoned truth based upon the laws of physics and 
mechanics, determine the final judgment. This issue was present in Seriman's fable, in the 
distinction between the Scimii and the Cinocefali. 
 
"Our new Science must therefore be a 
demonstration, so to speak, of what providence has 
wrought in history, for it must be a history of the 
institutions by which, without human discernment or 
counsel, and often against the designs of men, 
providence has ordered this great city of the human 
race. For though this world has been created in 
time and particular, the institutions established 
therein by providence are universal and eternal." 
Giambattista Vico 
The New Science lxxi 
 
Lodoli and the ‘New Science’ of Architecture 
 
Lodoli was a scholar of Vico and a Vichian analysis of architecture would provide not 
only a verum of architecture as an institution, but would solve the issue of meaning as it 
arose in the 18th century as well as, grounding that meaning in the verum of human 
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intelligibility. The application of Vico’s New Science became the basis of Lodoli’s theory 
of architecture. Vico claimed that "Our new Science must therefore be a demonstration, 
so to speak, of what providence has wrought in history, for it must be a history of the 
institutions by which, without human discernment or counsel, and often against the 
designs of men, providence has ordered this great city of the human race. For though this 
world has been created in time and particular, the institutions established therein by 
providence are universal and eternal."lxxii The Science of architecture must therefore, be a 
demonstration, of what providence has wrought in the history of architecture, it must be a 
history by which, without the discernment or counsel, and often against the designs of 
men, providence has ordered this institution we call architecture. For though this would 
have been created in time and particular, the laws established therein by providence are 
universal and eternal. This was the task Father Carlo Lodoli set before himself and for 
which he was so misunderstood. 
When one understands this proposition is it easy to understand why Lodoli had 
become known for his collections and why they were organized in the way that they 
were. Lodoli, it must be remembered, collected paintings and architectural fragments, 
which he arranged according to stylistic periods. While arrangement according to style is 
now common, it was Lodoli who first began this practice. To arrange by style is 
essentially to arrange by historical period and local culture. Lodoli’s collections were his 
first move in coming to understand aesthetics, and the history of art, from the point of 
view of Vichian history, as a corso in the ideal eternal history. Each style is a given 
certum that can be recollected in relation to others as the first step in determining a verum 
of stylistic development. Such a system of classification focuses attention on how a given 
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nation, at a given point in time, chooses to express itself in the work of art. What is 
revealed is the sensus communis, the common sense of a nation, in the determination of 
the rules of composition, form and detailing.  
This is Vico’s philosophy of authority. The philological ‘particulars’ of history and 
the course of nations expose the specifics of human choice, and how judgments are made. 
What is revealed is that human action is the product of human choice, determined not by 
rational inference or a priori postulates, but from a common perception of things, the 
sensus communis of a given society. Choice and decision derive their authority, and are 
therefore shaped by, the form of thought at any given stage in the development of a 
nation.  
History reveals the philological ‘certains’ from which all analysis or experiment must 
begin. As Vico says “All inquiries must take as their beginning the subject of their 
inquiry.” Hence, in the first outline of his treatise, Lodoli begins with an examination of 
the origins of the various styles of architecture: the Egyptian, the Greco- Roman, the 
French or Gothic, and the Spanish or Moorish, This is Vico’s ‘Memory’ as Recollection. 
Lodoli (Re)collects the philological ‘certains’ of architecture.  
The history of built form stands as the history of experiments in architectural 
expression. Whilst no singular experiment can be conceived of as a truth in its own right, 
the recollection of all of these experiments increases the certainty of what they reveal. 
Each stylistic period is understood as a system of building and of theoretical principles; a 
demonstration of what providence has wrought in history. A product of a particular 
nation or culture at a given moment in its history, they represent the philological certum 
that must be examined for the philosophical verum they contain. While any one Style 
 396
may be said to contain the verum of architecture, the certainty of our understanding of 
such a verum is increased when they are understood collectively, and in proper 
relationship to each other.  
Derived from his study of the origin of styles, Lodoli asserted that architecture was 
dependent on ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ attributes. Unlike his predecessors Perrault, 
Wren and Guarini, who attempted to create a value structure that related beauty to an 
abstract definition of truth, and a Cartesian theory of mind. Lodoli did not attempt to 
understand this division through a rationalist filter instead he applied Vichian properties 
to his findings. 
The ‘Primary’ attributes consist of firmness; structural stability, and analogia; 
proportions based on statical analysis of the materials used in a particular situation. The 
‘Primary’ attributes were governed by analogia, derived from nature understood as 
physics. Since man is not the maker of nature the properties of both physics and 
mechanics can only be considered as il certo, according to Vico. They are not absolute 
truths, but represent only a consciousness of the physicality of the material. 
The ‘Secondary’ attributes are derived from commodity and ornamentation, 
properties that were culturally derived, and made to conform to the ‘Primary’ attributes. 
The ‘Secondary’ attributes of commodity and ornamentation are the elements of a Style 
that are made by men and can be properly called il vero, according to Vico. 
Using these attributes Lodoli was able to evaluate the various historical styles. In this 
way he was able to examine architectural production in terms of necessity, as a reaction 
to material needs, grounding his understanding of architecture as a process of making in 
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the particulars of time and place. Thus the study of architecture takes the guise of a 
Vichian science. 
 
The Goal of Architecture 
 
In the second outline of his treatise, Lodoli addressed what he referred to as the goal 
of his new civil architecture: the unification of function and representation. Both are 
derived from his understanding of the ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ attributes and their 
relationship to the elements of style. It is the relationship and combination of the two that 
produces a true understanding of architecture and design for Lodoli.  
Lodoli did not define Function as the rationalists had: as ‘utility’. Function was the 
use of a material in accordance with its properties i.e. its analogia: the internal and 
external forces acting on the material, as demonstrated by the laws of physics and 
mechanics, when that particular material was used in a particular situation in a given 
moment in time.  
Lodoli defined Representation as: “the individual and total expression that results 
from the material used if the latter is disposed according to geometrical, mathematical 
and optical laws for the desired end.”lxxiii Representation is essentially an image of the 
analogia, one that communicates the equilibrium of the forces within the detail. The 
image is one of commoditas.  
Such integration of function and representation is the result of a triad of analogia, 
firmitas and commoditas, and is what we would refer to as architectural expressivity. 
True style, or more precisely the architectonic image present in the detail, is a verum, 
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derived from necessity, and shaped by a given nation, in a given place and time. In 
essence ‘style’ is dependent on the properties of the material used, and the images created 
by the senus communis of a people. Since the nature of human society is constantly 
changing, so too do the requirements of architecture. 
Lodoli only produced one architectural work, the renovation of the hospice at San 
Francesco della Vigna. The best known aspect of this work was the famous Lodolian 
window. The form is derived from an examination of traditional constructional details 
and forms and how they have performed and specifically how they have failed. A 
common problem when monolithic jambs were used in conjunction with monolithic 
thresholds was that the thresholds usually failed, cracking in the center. Galileo had 
examined this condition in his Two New Sciences and claimed that it resulted from the 
upward thrust of the threshold at the center in response to the downward thrust of the 
jambs. Previous attempts at solving this problem resulted in the slippage of the threshold 
or the jambs in the vertical dimension. 
Lodoli's solution is unique and poetic. The threshold is divided into three sections; 
one under each jamb, and the central one which acts as the sill proper. This central 
section is dovetailed under the end sections that prevent it from slipping 'up' in response 
to the ‘downward’ thrust of the end sections. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect is the 
form of the central section that takes its shape from Galileo's 'ideal solid’; the beam is 
straight across the top and parabolic along its bottom side. A stone of this shape weighs 
1/3 less than a rectangular beam of the same strength and its central thickness 
concentrates its compressive strength precisely where historically the sill cracked. 
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Fig. 19 image of Lodolian window 
 
The detail achieves the goal set out by the second outline of Lodoli's architectural 
treatise, that of uniting function and representation. Lodoli defined function as the 
function of the materials, the internal and external statical forces that continuously act on 
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a specific material in a given and particular situation. Representation was defined as the 
expression of a given materials function in a particular condition according to the rules of 
geometry, arithmetic, and optics. It is a solution based upon particolareggiamento. 
Lodoli's detail arises from the statical resistance expressed in a form that in no way is 
solely accounted for in terms of construction techniques alone, whose standard code has 
successfully been resisted. In its place is the production of a detail expressive of the 
particular condition. It is a representation of a given solution, to a given particular 
problem. Lodoli provides us with an image that allows us access to his Ingegno.  
 
"No, an artist, who would do himself honor, and 
acquire a name, must not content himself with 
copying faithfully the ancients, but studying their 
works he ought to show himself inventive, and, I 
had almost said, of a creating Genius; . . . he ought 
to open himself a road to the finding out of new 
ornaments and new manners. The human 
understanding is not so short and limited, as to be 
unable to add new graces, and embellishments to 
the works of architecture, if to an attentive and 
profound study of nature one would likewise join 
that of the ancient monuments . . . new things 
present themselves to us, capable of fertilizing, and 
improving the ideas of an artist, who thinks, and 
reflects." 
Giovanni Battista Piranesi 
Diverse Maniere lxxiv 
 
Piranesi and the Lodolian Legacy 
 
Memmo introduces into his text Piranesi's Della Magnificenza ed Architettura de' 
Romani as an example of elegant inventions. He also cites that Piranesi gave, as a gift, a 
copy to Lodoli. This he does to contradict Algarotti's insistence that Lodoli rejected all 
non-functional ornament. While the gift alone does not prove in any way that Lodoli 
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approved of Piranesi's fantasies it indicates a connection between the two which should 
not be ignored. While the connections are problematic, I believe that they only indicate 
that Piranesi was perhaps inspired by, but not derivative of Lodoli.  
As a young man Piranesi was apprenticed to the uncle (Giovanni Scalfurotto) of one 
of Lodoli's critics Tommaso Temanza. Piranesi soon broke away from this apprenticeship 
and was attracted to the circle of Joseph Smith, the British Consul in Venice, and the 
intellectual circle of which Lodoli was a part. There is also speculation that Piranesi may 
have attended lectures at Lodoli's school. The connection with Lodoli is further 
emphasized by the fact that in 1740 Piranesi left Venice for Rome to work with Marco 
Foscarini, a well-known student of Lodoli. 
Piranesi's most memorable work is perhaps his famous Carceri d' Invenzione series of 
1760. It is within this work that the greatest speculation of the influence of Lodoli on 
Piranesi takes place. This work also forms the backdrop for understanding Lodoli's non-
rigorist approach to ornament. The historical importance of the Carceri series in both 
their early edition, as Invenzioni Caprice di Carceri all Acqua Forte...(published in 
1745), and in the later edition is its radically new depiction of architectural form. Of note 
are two aspects, first the lack of ornamentation, and second the sharp distinction between 
wood and stone architectures, a point that Rykwert has noted.lxxv These hold true and are 
consistent in both editions and call to mind Lodoli's teachings. 
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Fig. 20 Image from Carceri series 
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An aspect of these drawings often noted is the spatial disjunction that occurs within 
them. While initially appearing to be coherent perspectival constructions, upon further 
inspection the viewer becomes trapped in a desperate, and doomed, attempt to rationalize 
the spatial configurations according to Euclidean geometry. The space of Piranesi's 
prisons cannot be rationalized, or at least explained fully through the use of mathematics.  
Ulya Vogt- Goknil has undertaken an elaborate and well-known study of the 
perspectival compositions of Piranesi's drawings with some surprising results.lxxvi Vogt- 
Goknil notes that in the second series the systems of architectural construction, i.e. wood 
and stone, which are each clearly distinct in terms of their form, exist in different spatial 
realities. The stone constructions are set according to one set of perspective lines while 
the wood constructions are set according to another. This is the source of the spatial 
anomalies and disjunction. Each system is understood from a different point of view, this 
implies a shift in both time and place. The world of Piranesi's Carceri cannot be 
understood or rationalized from a fixed perspective in time and space. The mathematics 
of Euclidean geometry does not help to navigate this world. The space of the Carceri is 
not the rational space of natural science, nor is it the space of optical perspective. The 
shifting of time and space indicated by the shifts in perspective indicate that the Carceri 
can only be experienced historically. The space of the Carceri is the space of 







Fig. 21 Image of Vogt- Goknil’s diagrams 
 
Maurizio Calvesi has noted that the inscriptions on the stone structures in the Carceri 
series are references to specific historical figures of ancient Rome.lxxvii He points out that 
these same figures are the figures that Vico uses in the New Science to discuss his Ideal 
 405
Eternal History. Vico uses the history of the Roman nation as his heroic metaphor for his 
ideal history of all nations. Thus Calvesi interprets Piranesi as making a reference to 
Vico's notions of moral philosophy via the device of architectural form. Kruft also notes 
the connection between Piranesi's works and theory and that of Vico.lxxviii Bitz makes this 
observation "If the Carceri refer to the heroic age of Vico's ideal eternal history, they may 
also suggest the principles of Lodoli's ideal eternal architecture [which was derived from 
Vico]. Masonry and timber architectures, both created in a heroic, poetic past, reveal their 
basic differences of space and time through the element of scale."lxxix While the two 
systems exist in the memory as a united historia, their disjunction in time and place sets 
the stage for a duality of origins.  
During the years between 1747 and 1761, Piranesi produced a series of engravings of 
Rome, commonly known as the Vedute. Up until the commencement of the production of 
these prints, roughly 1750, the primacy of ancient Rome was categorically left 
unquestioned. As the final great culture of the ancient world it was seen as the 
culmination of all that had come before it. But this position began to be challenged in the 
1750's most particularly by the French academies and the work of the German historian 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann. Unlike the ideal eternal history of Vico, and in Lodoli's 
history of architecture, which claimed that all nations arise independently and achieve an 
equal level of magnificence, this new school proposed quite a different scenario. Men 
like Winckelmann, Ramsey and LeRoy argued for the supremacy of Greek art and culture 
over Roman, which they began to depict as a decadent copy of the superior original. 
Piranesis continuously argued against the idea of Ancient Greece as a golden age and 
as a period of supremacy in the arts. He also argued against the idea that the Romans 
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imitated the Greeks. It is clear in his writings that he defends the Vichian idea that each 
nation reinvents for itself its own history. Vico’s corso e ricorso is translated into the idea 
that each nation discovers architectural truths for itself. Piranesi like Vico does not deny 
the influences of another culture, but the idea that any culture merely adopts the ideas of 
another.  
Piranesi counters this argument with his polemical work Della Magnificenza ed 
Architettura de' Romani of 1761. In it he claims that the Etruscans, the true origin of 
Roman culture, according to him, brought every kind of art to its ultimate perfection. In a 
direct attack upon Winkelmann's assertion that Greek art was superior Piranesi draws out 
a familiar argument. He accuses the Greeks of an addiction to ornament and useless 
elegance. Kruft outlines his argument in this way "He goes so far as to play Vitruvius off 
against the Greeks, using Vitruvius' observations on the transference of wood 
construction methods to stone against the caryatids of the Erektheion, of whom he says it 
is hardly credible that they would be able to carry so heavy an entablature with such a 
cheerful expression on their faces. It would, he says, have been more appropriate to use 
'satyrs, or sturdy rustics' for this purpose."lxxx The argument is a familiar one; it is 
Lodoli's against the 'beautiful lie'. The architectural truth of the timber construction 
becomes an architectural deceit in stone; it becomes excessive ornament when it is 
transferred into the form of a maiden. It is important to remember that according to 
Memmo, Lodoli did not have a problem with this kind of transference of meaning, 
provided that it was understood, not as an architectonic truth but as a product of cultural 
memory and taste. In addition, the argument cannot be held to be Piranesi's final word on 
architectural invention given his fanciful drawings, particularly those found in the 
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Diverse Maniere of 1769. Rather it must be seen as an ironic pun. The French academics 
used Laugier's structural rationalism, as exemplified by the rustic timber hut, to argue the 
superiority of Greek architecture over Roman. Piranesi used this same argument to 
undermine LeRoy and his cohorts. 
That Piranesi was in Lodoli's camp in opposition to the French Rationalists becomes 
all the more evident when we look at what Piranesi had to say in his Parere su L' 
Architettura of 1765. Ironically it is this same text which was used by Wittkower to argue 
Piranesi's turn away from Lodoli. The Parere is set up in the form of Socratic dialogue 
between Didascalo, the master, and Protopiro, his rigorist apprentice. Protopiro raises a 
quote from Montesquieu; "A building loaded with ornaments is an enemy to the eyes." 
Didascalo uses the rigorist's own argument to defeat him. The master returns to the 
concept of the rustic timber hut and using function as the sole criteria for judgment 
begins to eliminate first the capitols, then the bases, as well as, the entablature, and 
finally the walls. It must be noted that this argument is not that of Lodoli, but that of 
Laugier in his Essai Sur L'Architecture. Piranesi's 'rigorist' is not Lodoli, but Laugier. 
Bitz points out that the brusque character of Didascalo and his use of the Socratic 
dialogue were well known characteristics of Lodoli's teaching style. In the end the master 
claims that such an approach to architecture leaves one with nothing but a vacant place 
and reduces the architect to a mere copyist. 
Didascalo also warns that when architects are reduced to copyists the role of the 
patron and the workmen in design increase. When this occurs the architect is reduced to a 
mere decorator. This is interesting in light of a remark by Vico. For Vico it cannot be 
denied that even in the age of the 'Barbarism of Reflection', when rationalistic thought 
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abounds, that man may and does resort to fantasy. However, they can no longer recognize 
its primary or originating function. Fantasy is deployed as an external substitutive tool to 
activate the functioning of rational concepts on the passions, forcing the mind where the 
rational process cannot take it. "When [in the age of the Barbarism of Reflection] we 
wish to give utterance to our understanding of spiritual things, we must seek aid from our 
imagination to explain them and like painters form human images of them."lxxxi Piranesi 
lived in an age of rationalism, when architects espoused the glories of copying. Piranesi 
for the most part either could not or would not build. Perhaps his etchings are in truth 
polemic commentaries declaring that all of architecture was now really nothing more than 
decoration. The Diverse Maniere can be read as Piranesi’s commentary on the role of the 
architect in the ‘Age of the Barbarism of Reflection’, when architecture looses its truth 
and descends into fantasia, and madness.  
The following quote from Piranesi's Diverse Maniere gives some insight into both the 
mind of Piranesi and that of Lodoli. "No, an artist, who would do himself honor, and 
acquire a name, must not content himself with copying faithfully the ancients, but 
studying their works he ought to show himself inventive, and, I had almost said, of a 
creating Genius; . . . he ought to open himself a road to the finding out of new ornaments 
and new manners. The human understanding is not so short and limited, as to be unable 
to add new graces, and embellishments to the works of architecture, if to an attentive and 
profound study of nature one would likewise join that of the ancient monuments . . . new 
things present themselves to us, capable of fertilizing, and improving the ideas of an 
artist, who thinks, and reflects."lxxxii Such thoughts could have been spoken by Lodoli as 
well. 
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The central attack of both Lodoli and Piranesi is against the ‘Rigorist’ notion of 
stripping down architecture to its essential parts to become an ideal model for imitation. 
This rigor is the application of systematic doubt, used by Descartes, which Didascolo 
calls sophistry. It uses rationality to deny the lessons of history as empirically observed. 
This is Piranesi’s argument and contribution, the collective evidence to refute the abstract 
logic of the Cartesians and Laugier in particular. At the root of their challenge is a 
rejection of the theory of imitation and its notion of an ideal age under such rubric 
architecture and human imagination are in a state of being that denies history they in turn 
argue for a definition of imagination that is historical, a state of ‘becoming’. The question 
therefore is not “In what style should we build?” but “Why are we not studying the 
history of styles to find the principles of design and human creativity that are the 
foundations of architecture?”.  
 
“By all means treasure the rationality that you 
proclaim, but at the same time respect the freedom 
of architectural creation that sustains it.” 
 
Giovanni Battista Piranesi 
Opinions on Architecture: A Dialogue 
 
Lodoli and the Reasoning of the Particular 
 
Lodoli never attempted, as many of his contemporaries did, to produce a system or set 
of rules to govern architectural production. Rather he sought to outline basic principles 
that describe how systems, or styles, arose in the first place. In this way he sought for 
architecture what Vico sought for human meaning. He rejected the search for a true 
‘form’ of architecture. It was his belief that architects of different times and in different 
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cultures, using the same materials would produce different architectural forms and 
solutions to their problems, none was more 'correct' than the others. In this way Lodoli 
showed his adherence to the Italian Humanist tradition and its basis in Roman rhetoric. 
Architecture has no natural model, its model is a man- made invention, a product of 
'human' reality and meaning. Following in the Italian Humanist tradition from Salutati to 
Vico, the creation of human reality is a product of time and place it begins as a particular, 
not as a universal.lxxxiii  
It was because of this that Lodoli was also able to claim that architecture was 
dependent upon cultural taste and traditions and in addition that the caprices and 
inventions of the architect were important. These elements of architecture were derived 
from individual and cultural memory. This memory was Vico's memory seen as 
Memoria; "memory when it remembers things, imagination when it alters or imitates 
them, and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrangement 
and relationship."lxxxiv  
Lodoli was searching for the verum of architectural design: how the mind creates new 
forms of architectural expression. Following Vico’s metaphysics, he grounded his science 
of architecture on the recollection of the twofold aspects of 1) the particular examples of 
architecture revealed in history and 2) the particular forces and strengths of given 
materials. Seeing or finding the verisimilitudes between the particulars of history and 
physics are an act of ingegno, the second form of Vico’s memoria. In a chapter from On 
the Ancient Wisdom the Italians entitled On Ingenuity, Vico pointed out that both 
ingenium and natura mean the same thing. He postulated that it is the very nature of 
humanity therefore, to invent, to create, in a manner imitative of the divine. He asked: “is 
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it because just as nature produces physical things, so human ingenuity gives birth to 
mechanical things. And just as God is the artificer of nature, so man is the god of 
artifacts? . . . Or is it because human knowledge consists solely in making things fit 
together in beautiful proportion, which only those of ingenuity can do?”lxxxv As he uses 
the word it involves the innate capacity to invent, to synthesize, to find similarities in 
diverse things, and to have insight.  
The combination of recollection and ingegno lead to the third form of memoria, 
invention the proper ordering of images. This is how Lodoli presents the methodology of 
creating new images or forms in architecture, through the 3-fold definition of Vico’s 
memoria. This aspect of Lodoli's theory is shockingly absent in Algarotti and Milizia's 
exposition of it. They only admit of its rational component. This is where Algarotti and 
Milizia both failed to grasp a true understanding of Lodoli’s theory. They mistook his use 
of Vichian topical reasoning and mathematics for that of the Cartesians, such as Laugier. 
It should be clear by now that Lodoli was not a 'rigorist' or a proponent of a rationalist 
approach to architectural form or its history. The true 'rigorist' was in fact Laugier and the 
French academies. 
Diana Hibbard Bitz sums up the 'revolutionary' character of Lodoli's theory in this 
way: "Lodoli reinterprets Vitruvian precepts, intuitive demonstrations, in light of the 
mathematical proofs of modern science. What is revolutionary is his application of the 
paradigmatic topic of Gianbattista Vico's New Science, the ideal eternal history of the 
gentile nations, to architectural history and theory. Furthermore, the fusion of natural 
science (mechanics) and representation, building and knowing, in the creation of 
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Vico conceived the New Science as a history of human ideas, the theory of mind 
developed out of it, and the previously outlined method that was taken over by Lodoli 
and represents the real revolutionary character of his theory. A similar view of history 
emerged in the German Auflerung or Enlightenment that prompted the development of 
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Chapter 12: The ‘Romantic’ Revolt in Germany: Hamann and Herder:  
 
“We have been ‘practical’ so long that what we 
have imagined forth is relatively monstrous, and by 
sane standards unreal, untrue to man’s oneness: 
true only to his dualism, Modern man is a traitor to 






Vico was the first critic of Cartesian Rationalism and his New Science revealed the 
inherent problems with the epistemology of science. While his work was taken into the 
field of architecture via Lodoli and Piranesi, his impact was limited and indirect outside 
Italy. But the critique and its impact did not end with him. It would be picked up in 
Germany by two philosophers whose work would have a more direct and extensive 
impact on the intellectual developments of the day; Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) 
and Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). 
Like Vico before him, Hamann rooted his doctrine of knowledge in the denunciation 
of Descartes’ assertion of the mathematical nature of knowledge and the application of 
the mathematical method outside the natural sciences. Both developed a general 
definition of man that was rhetorical in its general formulation and relationship to nature. 
But Hamann came to this position independently. If he knew of Vico’s writings it would 
have come later in his life after having formulated his own thought. Hamann provided the 
first true arsenal of weapons in the revolt against ‘universalism’ and the scientific 
method.  
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While Hamann’s influence was limited, his thoughts were carried on and extended by 
his student Herder who would prove to be the most formidable adversary of the 
Enlightenment.ii Recognized as the father of Nationalism, Historicism and Volksgeist, he 
leveled an attack on the structure of Enlightenment reason and the epistemology of 
science. At the core of his argument was the charge that the very definition of reason and 
its application to our understanding of reality was wrong. Collectively, their work would 
be taken up and advanced by later intellectuals in Germany, including Goethe, Schiller, 
Fichte and Hegel, and serve as the basis of what should be understood as an alternative 
epistemology.  
 
“Everything that a man sets out to achieve, whether 
it is produced by deed or word or by some other 
means, must spring from all his powers combined; 
everything segregated is deplorable.” 
Goethe 
Dictung und Warheit iii 
 
Hamann and the Challenge to the Enlightenment 
 
Throughout his writings Hamann was dominated by three intellectual concerns or 
conceptions; creation, understanding and intentionality. He accepted the traditional 
teleological notion of God as the creator of the universe who creates for his own 
purposes. Where he parted company was in the idea that God’s creation was rational. The 
very idea that God was a mathematician, or architect, was a feeble attempt to 
anthropomorphize the divinity and attempt to define it according to human terms and 
within human limits.iv This was the excess of rationalism, which in the end could only, in 
his view, provide a poverty stricken view of human possibilities. Hamann conceived of 
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God more as a poet, one who continuously creates anew. Poetry here was understood in 
the sense of poesis, of coming into being. God’s creation was a continuous action or 
praxis and this was life.  
According to him, to understand is not an abstract action of the subjective mind, 
rather to understand someone or something, is to understand a voice speaking, or 
something that conveys meaning. To understand history is not to understand a list of 
‘historical’ facts, but to understand the ‘why’ of history; the meaning behind the actions 
taken. This means coming to terms with the intentionality of the historical agent or 
cultural trend. Such intentionality may be conscious or not, it may be individual but also 
collective in the form of groups, cultures, nations or institutions. In this way history 
reveals the course of a people; their goals, desires and ends.v As he saw it, science 
reduced the means by which creation and human expression were accomplished, leading 
humanity down the road to a dead and artificial symbolism. It was better to explore other 
languages and styles of art and in this way to expand the imaginative sources that help us 
to convey the purpose of life in a more sufficient fashion. 
 
“The existence of the smallest things rests on 




The Revolt Against Reason  
 
According to Descartes, knowledge was acquired from innate ideas through deductive 
reasoning. It was the foundation stone of his metaphysics; his theory of mind, his 
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definitions of man and truth were all built upon it. This was for Hamann the first great 
fallacy of modern thought.  
The only real challenge to it had come from Hume who claimed that the real 
foundation of thought was belief. Hume’s basic point had been that from one fact no 
other fact can be logically deduced, necessity is a logical relationship between symbols 
and not reality. Propositions must be deduced from experience and not from methods of 
pure thought as the Cartesians had proposed. If Hume had been a skeptic, Hamann turned 
his skepticism into an affirmation of belief, taking this up as his chief tool with which to 
dismantle the methods and values of the scientific method and the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment.  
According to Hamann there were no innate ideas in any sense including those of 
Descartes, Leibniz or the Platonists. For Hamann there can be no knowledge without 
belief and at its base unreasoned belief.vii All propositions must rest on this, making all 
abstractions in the end arbitrary. He claimed; “Our own existence and the existence of all 
things outside us must be believed and cannot be determined in any other way.”viii And 
“Belief is not the product of the intellect, and can therefore also suffer no causality by it: 
since belief has as little grounds as taste or sight.”ix Our immediate impression of the 
world was derived from our belief and feeling about its existence. “The existence of the 
smallest things rests on immediate impression, and not on ratiocination.”x He stressed, 
far more than Hume ever did, that belief was central to all understanding, going so far as 
to claim that feeling was the source of Wisdom. The very distinction between faith an




This played into his view of man’s relationship to Nature. Man was not a passive 
receptor of perceptions from an objective reality that existed outside the mind. He 
rejected the notion that we ‘perceive’ causes or necessity in nature, rather we believed 
them. Science claims to extract ‘facts’ about Nature, as  ‘thing-in-itself’, postulating 
unalterable, objective ‘necessities’ about its essence when the ‘facts’ were actually 
projections from our own mind. Such ‘facts’ were not perceptions into the ontological 
reality of Nature, but the ontological reality of how the mind, by necessity, must believe 
it to be. There could be no place outside the mind from which to perceive the universe to 
explain, justify or prove its existence.  
Instead he interpreted the world, at least our understanding of it, as a product of our 
own active and creative powers which played a vital role in the empirical attributes 
associated with it. Both our understanding of nature and the traditions that it generates are 
actually an accumulation of our own belief systems. Men, according to Hamann, cut 
reality as they see fit, the world of our experience is as we make it. In order to come to 
know the world we must construct hypotheses, but we must not lose sight of the fact that 
they are our own constructions. To forget this basic truth was to condemn ourselves to 
folly.  
The tendency of reason to start with sense perception and to invent entities from 
which to explain those sense perceptions, as if ideas of pure reason or pure being, was an 
illusion. The world of the a priori was a fiction. There could be no a priori laws of 
nature, or even nature itself, save how we understand it. To conceive of nature outside 
this dialectic was to deny the very existence of the human mind in the process. Vico may 
have said it earlier, but it was Hamann that brought the argument to the main stream. xii 
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For him, the problem with science and rationalism was their inherent tendency to 
abstraction and universalism. The general desire to reduce the world and its rich diversity 
and variety to a guiding law or principle, to a uniformity easily perceived was a rejection 
of the very essence of reality and our experience of it. The world was a series of 
relationships, which cannot be conceived of outside the particularities of time and place. 
To generalize a doctrine of being from terms instead of relations, of substances instead of 
attributes was again to distance oneself from reality, exchanging truth for fictions. No 
abstraction, no generalization, no universal could ever be exchanged for the variety and 
concreteness of lived experience. The very nature of Hamann’s understanding of man’s 
coming to terms with Nature was a patent rejection of the idea that either nature or man 
was a permanent fixed objective reality from which laws could be discovered or defined. 
Hamann was critical of both philosophy and science because they attempt to construct 
systems and abstractions that negate the difference that to him make up the world. The 
tendency toward universalism, at the expense of the particular, was a negation of the 
variety and infinity that was the reality of Nature and Human life.xiii What so much of the 
epistemology of science was doing was creating a world of elegance and beauty, but a 
beauty of harmony and order that denied the savagery and violence of nature. This form 
of Apollonian classicism was for Hamann, and later Herder and Goethe, a shallow form 
of classicism. In a world that sought harmony and the complete resolution of conflict in 
the form of neat little theoretical packages, where truth was the simplest mathematical 
formula, true wisdom was madness, folly. The true seeker of Wisdom was born into the 
world upside down. He or she knows that truth is not a search for a single answer that 
resolves all conflicts in our perceptions of reality, but the tool that exposes our own 
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ignorance of that reality. To understand the truth of being and nature was to understand 
the Bacchanalian revel and the world of Ceres.xiv The rationalists had destroyed Nature, 
because they have failed to learn these lessons.  
In the end, Hamann viewed scientific reason and method as a form of casuistry that 
turned human relations into mechanical ones, transforming living truths into dead rules. 
The great enemy was necessity, either metaphysical or scientific, which transformed 
itself into a pseudo- objective authority, an institution greater than that of tradition or 
religion, one that eventually led humanity on a path to dehumanization and reification. 
This was a sentiment latter echoed by Fichte who claimed “At the mere mention of the 
name freedom my heart opens and flowers, while at the word necessity it contracts 
painfully.”xv  
 
“Passion alone gives to abstractions and 
hypotheses hand, feet, wings; images it endows 
with spirit, life and language. Where are swifter 
arguments to be found? Where the rolling thunder 
of eloquence, and its companion, the monosyllabic 




Man as Experiential Unity 
 
Hamann’s originality was in his definition of Man, it would have the most lasting and 
influential impact on Western thought. He argued that daily experience was enough to 
disprove the basic claims of the Enlightenment definition of Man that trended to dissect 
man into a series of discrete faculties. To understand humanity one had to observe human 
conduct; passions, feelings, thoughts and ways of life - not as the Enlightenment 
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philosophes had done through a priori concepts and categories.xvii  The first task of 
knowledge was to expose the verbal fictions. Reason’s aim was not to increase theoretical 
knowledge as such, but to define the limits of knowledge. 
Experience and life were forms of an unbroken unity; of thought and feeling, of 
theory and practice. There can be no subject-object relationship because there is no 
subject and object, only continuity. Therefore any form of dualism, including that 
between reality and appearance, was a blatant denial of that unity. Only the whole man; 
reason plus the passions, emotions, desires, and physiological reactions, can pursue truth. 
These were the concrete facts of human experience and as such, the true basis of 
knowledge and reality. The denial of the passions and the senses was a denial of far too 
large a part of existence and being.  
Hypotheses that failed to understand or address the experience of life in its fullness 
were only theoretical abstractions unrelated to the practice of life. They denied the 
wholeness of man and nature. We can either attempt to uncover the pattern of continuity 
through direct experience, whether of history or nature, or we can shield ourselves from 
reality through the construction of systems, rules, and endless abstractions that produce 
dualities and distance ourselves from nature and ourselves.  
This prompted Goethe to see him as a great awakener, a man who championed the 
unity of man in the face of scientific fragmentation, specialization and categorization. He 
would sum up Hamann’s basic argument as; “Everything that a man sets out to achieve, 
whether it is produced by deed or word or by some other means, must spring from all his 
powers combined; everything segregated is deplorable.”xviii It is important to understand 
the radical nature of this assertion. Descartes, it must be remembered, saw the 
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imagination, passion and emotion as hindrances to reason and truth and factored them out 
of the discourse of knowledge. Hamann on the contrary was insisting on the necessity of 
their inclusion.  
For Hamann, the self was a mirror of our intercourse with the other. To understand 
ones’ self, was to understand oneself in relationship or communion to others. Man and 
self- knowledge are the product of human communication, of interaction and expression. 
Communication was part and parcel of the web of human interrelationships and without it 
speech and thought were not possible. This web of interrelationships presupposes 
thought, therefore existence does not rely on its products for its justification. Rationalism 
and its abstractions of concept and pure reason therefore, cannot be the means by which 
experience or man is defined. The world is made up of people and their means of 
communication, which enables them to express their own experiences and establish 
relationships. “Through language are all things made.”xix This was the means toward self- 
knowledge, the freedom to experience the fullness of communication and relationships 
that allowed for the fullness of one’s humanity to come forth. 
For Hamann life was action,xx the daily face to face encounters with the experience of 
men and things that led to an understanding of the fullness of life itself. This was how the 
artist created the complete immersion in life, but this was also how men achieved the 
realization of what was most human in them. Accordingly, all human activity, all 
cognitive powers have for their object self- knowledge and it was the foundation of all of 
our activities. Self- realization, self- knowledge was essentially the creative process; 
poesis. True wisdom came from a true participation in life, ‘think less and live more.’xxi 
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In the end, Hamann’s image of humanity was one of activity; as a continuous creative 
endeavor, a combination of poesis and praxis.  
 
“. . . they had told him grammar was a book, 
algebra was a book, geometry another book, 
geography, chemistry, physics, still others: they 
never told him, never permitted him, to guess for 
himself how these things were actually intense 
symbols, complex ratios, representing man’s 
relation to Nature and his fellow man; they never 
told him that his mathematics, etc. etc., came into 
being in response to a desire in the human breast 
to come nearer to nature that the full moon looked 





The Meaning of Words: Language, Thought and Expression 
 
For Hamann, the Enlightenment notion that society was in some way a rational 
construction based upon utility, the great social contract, the relinquishing of freedoms 
for security and prosperity was a folly. It presupposed a rational system of thought prior 
to the foundation of society itself. It in effect projects a later system of thought onto an 
earlier age. The Enlightenment idea, most strongly put forth by Kant that one could put 
down a codified system of rules for thought, such as those found in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, was to completely misunderstand the very nature of both thought and 
communication.  
For Hamann, experience was a concrete fact and as such the true basis of knowledge 
and reality. Its true enemy was system; the construction of words and symbols which 
denote abstractions or numbers. Accordingly, philosophers have taught us to mistake 
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these things for reality itself, in the end confusing reality with idealism. Such divisions, 
present in most philosophical systems, he saw as imaginary or illusory. Analysis and 
synthesis he viewed as equally arbitrary and illusory. While accepting the notion that 
conventional signs were necessary, they were in the end unreal in themselves; ‘cause’, 
‘reason’, ‘universality’, are only counters, symbols used to explain in rational terms 
things outside themselves. The greatest mistake man had made was to confuse such 
words with concepts and concepts with the reality out there. 
According to Hamann, there was no non-symbolic thought or knowledge. The very 
idea that one could create a non-symbolic means of expression that in some way stepped 
outside the symbolic structure of the mind and conveyed a more objective or certain 
truth, such as geometry, was a nonsensical idea. While such a construction might have an 
internal logical structure and provide a means to truth, it could not exist outside of the 
symbolic system in which it participated. To lose sight of this was to lose sight of the fact 
that such a system had its own limitations and could have been a construction of an 
entirely different sort. It was no more certain than any other symbolic construction. The 
very idea that there was an objective world out there and that man and his tools of 
abstraction, language and symbol were a means of achieving a correspondence to such an 
objective reality was a completely false notion for him. 
Hamann was one of the first to argue that thought was symbolism; to think was to 
employ something intentionally to denote other objects. Thought and language were the 
employment of a symbolic system. “Language is the first and last organ and criterion of 
reason.”xxiii Language was what we use to think, not what we use to translate, it was the 
process of using symbols.xxiv For Hamann, language was the organon of thought itself 
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“Where there is no word there is no reason– and no world.”xxv As language advances so 
too did thought and vice versa. Such a position was based on the idea of a dialectic 
existing between reality and the mind’s means of cognizing it as experience. To reason 
was to use language to apply a symbolic system. “Reason is language, logos” said 
Hamann.xxvi To understand, to think, was to create. What was created, was the logos of 
humanity.  
Language and thought are the means of communication, of expression of a given 
people, in a given time, their symbols stood in relationship. Society is a construction that 
exists within this form of exchange which permeates every aspect of it. Language bears a 
verisimilitude to the structure of relationships within the society itself. They are concrete 
relationships, which reveal the nature of reality as it is framed and understood by that 
people within their society. For this reason Hamann states that man can truly create only 
in his native tongue. “He who writes in a foreign tongue has to bend his spirit to it like a 
lover.”xxvii There can be no universal language, no natural religion or natural law as the 
Enlightenment philosophes asserted. To make such a claim was to deny the real 
differences that existed between people as a product of their own geographical, 
biological, psychological, social characteristics and historical experiences.  
Language, for Hamann, was ‘not a mere invention but rather a reminiscence’,xxviii 
since all symbols are in effect images created by passions, stimulated by external sensory 
experience. Language, thought, art, and religion all spring from the same root: our 
response to external stimulation from our continual dialogue with reality and our 
memory. This led him to conceive of language, and the form of art used, as indissoluble. 
Here art, language, and thought all become intertwined as a medium of expression, reliant 
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upon each other and developing as one with the cognitive faculties. Art becomes the 
sensual expression of either, an individual or collective personality, a form of moral 
commitment as opposed to a form of mimesis or imitation, detached from daily life and 
experience.xxix  
The implications are important to understanding the nature of the critique of the 
Enlightenment and universalism. If language and thought develop from sense- experience 
and the passions, then the impetus for such development would, by its very definition, be 
affected by the geographical, biological, psychological and social characteristics of place. 
Hamann saw this as an organic relationship in which thought developed in response to 
such conditions as it shaped the creation of expressive forms of communication.  
This revelation had implications on the idea of history. It implied that the history of 
all means of expression (and this would apply to both art and architecture) should reveal 
the organic relationship between place and thought. To understand any means of 
expression or communication was first and foremost to come to understand the mind of 
its creator to come to terms with his or her culture, system of thought and way of life. For 
Hamann history revealed facts and data about the past, but more importantly it also 
revealed patterns of events about what man was, what his purposes were, this was what 
was truly important about history. The recording of facts and events was trivial in 
historical scholarship, it was the broader patterns that history revealed that tell us about 
who we are. The inherent causality of science did not ask such questions. That was why 
history, as defined by the epistemology of science, could only be a listing of facts and not 
a vehicle to self- knowledge. This was Vico’s point in the corso and recorse of history 
and it would also prove central to Hegel’s later concept of the development of Geist.  
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“Similarities, classes, orders stages, are only . . .  
houses of cards in a game. The creator of all things 
does not see as a man sees, He knows no classes; 
each thing resembles only itself.” 
Herder 
Samtliche Werke xxx 
 
Herder’s Unity of Theory and Practice 
 
If Hamann provided the arsenal of weapons, it was Herder who put them to use. His 
most original contribution lies in the doctrine that permeates his writings; ‘the Unity of 
Theory and Practice’. Like Vico and Hamann before him, he found the dualism so 
common in Enlightenment thought, originating in Descartes but present in Kant’s idea of 
Enlightenment, to be unintelligible.xxxi Mental experience and corporeal faculties, reason 
and imagination, sense and understanding were all part of the continuous flow of reality. 
Man had to surrender himself to the unity of his entire being; mind, intellect, will, 
feeling, imagination, language and action. Only under such conditions could individuality 
and freedom truly live and grow. That was what represented the true union of theory and 
practice for him.  
The breakdown of orders of experience, of corporeal and mental faculties, of 
imagination and reason, were all artificial boundaries constructed by philosophers. As he 
saw it, they dissected experience and transformed it into a series of abstract concepts so 
alienated from reality as to be meaningless. Pushed too far and one has only abstract 
concepts in place of experience. Pushed even further, one has abstractions taken as 
objects in-and-of-themselves that are now mistaken for the thing-in-itself.  
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Leery of the temptation of his age to reduce the heterogeneous flow of experience to a 
series of homogeneous theoretical frameworks, he saw it as an attempt to impose a 
rational order on experience and the diversity of life for no other purpose than the 
aesthetic pleasure of a rationally ordered and simplified whole. Not only did this 
transform reality into a collection of artificial figments, but it distorted the actual facts in 
order to produce tidy scientific classifications and rules. This temptation could not yield 
knowledge or truth in any meaningful way because it was based upon the fragmentation 
of experience and ‘being’. Following Hamann’s lead, he believed that nature and history- 
as we come to understand them- were symbols, cryptograms of the logos which could not 
be accessed through rational metaphysics or the methodology of science. 
For Herder, the quest for knowledge was a quest to see the universe as a single 
process.xxxii In 1775 he wrote: “Similarities, classes, orders stages, are only . . .  houses of 
cards in a game. The Creator of all things does not see as a man sees, He knows no 
classes; each thing resembles only itself.”xxxiii According to Herder, the world was 
organic, interconnected and dynamic. But he didn’t stop there. Reality was made up of 
irregularity, incommensurability and difference that could not be subsumed under any 
universal law. Like Hamann, he did not wish to smooth over the irregularities of reality 
for the sake of a fine and ordered system. The whole of reality must be grasped in its 
fullness in all its particularity, complexity and historically changing manifestations. The 
natural state was one of creative dis-order.  
His central idea was that nature was not the dead world of mass and extension 
described by Newton, but rather an eternal process of creation. This was fundamentally at 
odds with the image of nature as proposed by the epistemology of science. The very 
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foundation of the epistemology of science and the metaphysics of Descartes and Newton 
rested on the conception of nature and reality as a fixed entity constant through time. 
Nature existed in a fixed state of ‘being’. It was the stable constitution of nature that 
made it possible to pursue the idea of absolute truths and fundamental laws, or principles, 
and to assert that knowledge was finite and fully knowable.  
It was this revelation of Herder’s that had the greatest impact on thought. Its’ effect 
lay in its redefinition of truth. Once the concept of nature is re-conceptualized as in a 
state of constant flux, of ever changing, in the process of ‘becoming’, a new 
epistemological structure becomes necessary.xxxiv If nature is ever changing and dynamic 
then our understanding of it and truth must of necessity be understood as conditional, 
something to be continuously renegotiated. For Herder, there could be only one 
conclusion. The entire epistemological notion of a priori laws, formulas or methods in an 
absolute sense becomes meaningless. One has to reject the dogmatic notion that the 
complexity of the world could be reduced to some general law. That is only a search for 
the lowest common denominator, what in the end may prove to be the least important in 
the lives of men. It could only lead to shallowness of theory and crippling uniformity in 
practice.  
The clarity, and rationality posed by Enlightenment philosophy and the epistemology 
of science, while comforting, comes at too high a price; the sacrifice of reality as 
experienced. Our engagement with reality and the search for truth becomes the quest for 
finding the topoi of the human logos one that is contingent, existing in a dynamic and 
fluid reality.  
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“To discuss architecture as a specific art is 
interesting enough in a way. But to discuss 
architecture as the projected life of a people is 
another story. That is a serious business. It 
removes architectural thought from a petty domain 
the world of the book worm and places it where it 
belongs, an inseparable part of the history of 
civilization. Our architecture reflects us, as truly as 




The Sensus Communis: a Doctrine of Critical Regionalism 
 
Herder’s doctrine of the unity of theory and practice also served to shape his 
understanding of the human condition. Based on the idea of ‘belonging’, his thought 
owed much to Hamann’s assertion that thought and language were inseparable and served 
as a unified means of expression tied to a given place and culture. To be fully human, to 
be fully creative, was to belong, belong somewhere to some group or historical stream, 
which cannot be defined outside of the notions of tradition and culture modulated by 
natural forces and physical and biological needs.xxxvi Human groups whether large or 
small were the products of ‘climate’; the local geography, physical and biological needs 
etc. that essentially framed and often determined what became common traditions and 
common memories. 
To ‘belong’ was for him not a passive condition, but rather an active co-operation a 
social action. He claimed “complete truth is always only the deed.”xxxvii His idea was that 
there are certain central patterns by which each genuine culture was identified, to be a 
member of a given group was to think and act in a certain way.xxxviii The central link in 
encoding such traditions and memories were the means of expression, primary among 
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them being language. Herder once claimed: “Has a nation . . . anything more precious 
than the language of its fathers? In it dwells its entire world of tradition, history, religion, 
principles of existence; its whole heart and soul.”xxxix  
For Herder to speak and think in words was to swim in an inherited stream of images 
and worlds, we must accept theses media on trust: we cannot create them.xl Man can 
purify and alter a language, but not create one from nothing. This was so because we 
already think within language, to create a language was to step outside of such a 
cognitive construct, that circle cannot be broken- all ‘new’ languages are only adaptations 
to existing structures. xli  
Because we think in symbols, or language, our thoughts embody the very being of our 
locality and common experiences. This meant that all the arts and sciences are merely 
facets of one continuous pattern, as such; fact and value are not divided. Worship, poetry 
and ritual, all incorporate this communal experience as well, since such social events are 
also symbolic or use symbolic vehicles like language. It is this public use of common 
symbolic systems, which embody common experiences that binds men together into 
natural social groups. Each society, each culture produces a vision of a whole world that 
expresses their collective experience and is intelligible in their arts, science, crafts, and in 
the forms of social and political life.  
Such an idea allows one to be able to conceive of being able to read, in the modes of 
expressivity, this central pattern of belonging. Thus language, history, art and architecture 
as modes of expressivity, reveal such patterns of belonging and are therefore, the actual 
manifestations of the unity of theory and practice, because they have more in common 
with the way of life of their given culture. To understand something is to see how it could 
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be viewed, assessed and valued in a given context, by a particular culture or tradition.xlii 
Thus to understand and explain a work is to transpose oneself into the culture and age of 
the people who created it to see the world as they saw it. To reveal how the work 
communicates the thoughts and ideas of the people who made it. This is central to 
understanding the expressive value of the thing, which cannot be divorced from its 
intentionality and studied as an isolated object. It is this aspect of his thought; that things 
need to be explained via an imaginative transposition into the particularity of their 
construction that makes Herder one of the originators of the secular doctrine of the unity 
of theory and practice. 
In the words of Herder: ‘Not a man, not a country, not a people, not a national 
history, not a state is like another. Hence the True, the Beautiful, the Good in them are 
not similar either.”xliii Each culture is a complete world unto itself and must be valued as 
such. Accordingly one must not judge one culture by the criteria of another.xliv  
This does not mean that he was a subjectivist. To the contrary he believed in objective 
standards that could be derived from an understanding of the life and purposes of 
individual societies, which were themselves objective realities. What he rejected was the 
notion that an objective system of judgment could be created that served as valid criteria 
for all societies throughout history.  
The fact that one culture preceded another in time does not guarantee that the latter is 
superior. The effect of such a doctrine goes against any conception of a steady progress 
on the part of mankind as a whole.xlv It is a patent rejection of the notion of a perfect 
society, a Utopia.xlvi It also rejects any conception that perfectibility could ever be 
achieved through the perfection of technique. If each society is different and change is 
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inevitable and regional difference and variety abound, then there can be no single 
technique or means to ends that satisfies, in the sense of expression, the needs and goals 
of humanity. Any universal technique can only serve at best one society at a given 
moment in time. The universal application of a given technique can only serve to prevent 
the other cultures from flourishing. 
True advance, or what Herder calls ‘Fortgang’, is the internal development of culture 
in its own habitat, towards its own goals; it is the development of human beings as 
integrated wholes. History reveals the great diversity of cultures, comparable but not 
commensurable, each developing in their own way, but in so doing reveals the myriad of 
infinitely diverse ways in which humanity has accomplished this. Fortgang reveals that 
there are many different ways of life and many different truths. Nothing is either true or 
false in the absolute sense. That each culture finds a means of poetically expressing such 
Fortgang was proof of the continued ability of humanity to create truth, freedom and 











“And thus, when native instinct and sensibility shall 
govern the exercise of our beloved art;  
. . . then it may be proclaimed that we are on the 
high-road to a natural and satisfying art, an 
architecture that will soon become a fine art in the 
true, the best sense of the word, an art that will live 
because it will be of the people, for the people and 
by the people. .”  
Louis Sullivan 
The Tall Office Building Artistically Consideredxlvii 
 
The Use and Abuse of History 
 
The ramifications of this attitude toward history are profound. To ‘get it’ one must 
step outside oneself and immerse oneself in the lives of a people, and experience the 
work as they must have. According to Herder one must: enter the time, the place, and the 
entire history of a people.xlviii One must “Be a shepherd among shepherds, a peasant in 
the midst of an agricultural people, an oriental among the primitive dwellers of the East, 
if you wish to enjoy these creations in the atmosphere of their birth.”xlix Every experience 
for Herder, is what it is. To understand it is to grasp what it means to those who 
expressed it in the monuments through which we try to read it. We must learn to see with 
the maker’s eye. All understanding is in this sense ‘historical’.  
As for the use of such insight, Herder believed that only through assiduous historical 
research- a sympathetic insight into the intentionality of a speaker- and a grasp of the 
organon of communication whereby humans understand one another, can one bridge the 
chasm of difference that separates, but does not divorce, diverse civilizations. Language 
expresses the collective experience of a group, but it is a medium that can be studied as 
such, and it is the medium that reveals the self- knowledge that humanity seeks to answer 
its most troubling questions, while revealing our common humanity. Because some 
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qualities are universal in humanity, one culture can study and admire another, even learn 
from it. When properly used history allows one culture to learn from another and build 
upon it, and to even recognize some qualities that are universal in humanity. Whether that 
occurs is dependent upon the events of history and the historical agents. 
Herder never subscribed to the idea that Western man could return to the Greek polis. 
In this sense he openly rejected any notion of the resurrection of ancient Ideals which 
were value judgments from other societies just as alien to our own as their art or religion. 
l To sigh after the ancient Greeks or Romans or Egyptians like Winckelmann, was both 
impossible and absurd. Herder reacted against the growing ‘culture’ that devoured the 
world like a cancer.li He stated: “We speak the words of strangers and they wean us from 
our own thoughts.”lii This option provides no salvation for the ills of humanity. Herder 
believed that renewal was possible, but only if man was willing to “cease to be in 
contradiction with himself” and not to continue to ‘think in other people’s thoughts’liii 
Instead, he sought to create a society in which men can live full lives and attain to self- 
expression.liv 
For Herder the most improper use of history would be to use it to justify the values, 
ideals and goals of the contemporary society of the historian, a condition, which he 
believed was taking place in his day. “The general, philosophical, philanthropic temper of 
our age seeks to extend ‘our own ideal’ of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, 
even to the remotest ages in history . . . Those who have thus far taken it upon themselves 
to explain the centuries of progress have mostly cherished the notion that it must lead to 
greater virtue and happiness. In support of this they have embroidered or invented facts, 
played down or suppressed fact that belie it . . . taken words for works, enlightenment for 
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happiness, greater intellectual sophistication for virtue, and so invented the figment of the 
‘general progressive improvement of the world.’”lv  
Herder did not advocate the imitation of a given culture by another, this was madness. 
Each great culture was an act. The idea of Fortgang, centered on two issues; the 
translatability of symbolic forms and their petrification. Herder did not believe that 
language was completely translatable and as such neither could the ideas or symbolic 
forms of one culture be translated fully into another. Each must be understood as a 
complete entity unto itself with its own beginning, middle and end. That one culture arose 
out of the decline of another, and in so doing took from the previous one certain; ideas, 
forms or techniques, did not diminish either its originality or the sanctity of the earlier 
culture. Even if one accepted the idea that man was continuously advancing, each stage 
was complete unto itself. The Greeks were not a preamble to the Romans, nor was the 
Romanesque to the Gothic. In this sense one culture was never a means to another. One 
culture could not adopt the work of another without re-presenting it through its own sense 
of ‘belonging’ and thereby transforming it into a new means of expression. Inherent in 
Herder’s notion of translatability is its negative formulation. One culture cannot imitate 
the work of another and still maintain it as a valid expression of its ‘belonging’. It implies 
that the imitation of symbolic forms, and this applies to art and architecture, did not serve 
the unity of theory and practice.  
Herder saw language and thought as one, but he saw their eventual relationship as one 
of ambivalence. This led to the potentiality of language to atrophy, while thought 
advanced. The concretization of language in the form of writing was for Herder a 
petrification of language in a moment. Such petrification, he warned, led to dead corpses, 
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forms of expression that no longer spoke to the people who had moved on socially. He 
believed that against these corpses men would eventually revolt. The history of linguistic 
revolutions was the history of the succession of cultures, the true revolutions in human 
history.lvi It was the manifestation of the Fortgang. 
Again, while Herder only spoke of language proper, the thesis applies to all symbolic 
forms; including art and architecture. The succession of cultures leads to the petrification 
of styles, which no longer speak of a collective experience of a people and become dead 
styles. The impact of such a proposition should not go unnoticed. For Herder once the 
petrification set in, the language is dead and of no use for the proper means of expression, 
it becomes a hindrance more than an aid.lvii Aesthetic inventions do not corrupt, only 
living off the inventions of others does, in so doing one becomes mechanical and 
devitalized.  
The true use of history is not as an a priori object to be imitated, but as a source of 
inspiration. Past creations of the Fortgang inspire us to find our own center, our own 
means and modes of self- expression, our own poetry expressive of our national or 
cultural character. It can only be harmful to foist the values, ideals and means and modes 
of expression of one culture onto another. In this sense History becomes a dialectic 
between the particularity of experience and the general idea. The general ideas are 
abstractions, which can be dangerous and misleading, but they are also unavoidable, one 







The ‘Romantic’ revolt rejected the autonomy of reason and its assertion beyond the 
fields of science and mathematics.lviii The duality of the epistemology of science had lead 
to a breakdown of the orders of experience, creating artificial boundaries, dissecting 
reality and transforming experience into abstract concepts that were alienated from the 
actuality of the lebenswelt. It denied the wholeness of man and nature. We experience life 
and reality as a continuum, the world was a unity of thought and feeling, of subject and 
object. This was not some hypothetical philosophical system, but the actual condition of 
reality as experienced. While the unity of experience was something Hamann and Herder 
asserted it was not a reflection of the fixed and static world posed by science and the 
Enlightenment philosophers. Simple observation exposed the world as diverse and rich 
with variety. It was dynamic and interconnected; a continuous flow of experiences which 
at times proved irregular, incommensurable and replete with difference. What was 
needed was an epistemological structure whose propositions could uncover the pattern of 
continuity whether of nature, or history, through direct experience, and see reality and our 
experience of it, as a single process. It would require the redefinition of both Nature and 
Man. 
This came in the re-structuring of consciousness and cognition. Our comprehension 
of the world was determined by our ability to project onto it a symbolic order, as a means 
of coming to terms with our own experiences. Those experiences were constantly 
renegotiated; the by-product of a dialectical exchange between the mnemonic encoding 
of distinctively human experiences and their confrontation with an external other.lix 
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There could be no place outside the mind and the symbolic order it is born into from 
which to perceive reality, to explain, justify or prove its existence. The recognition of a 
collective symbolic order meant that we were not passive receptors of external stimuli. 
 The implications were profound. Our means of accessing the world, the 
‘understanding’, could not be a pure datum of rationality, precisely because knowledge of 
the world as ‘thing-in-itself’ cannot- or does not- truly exist as a certum. There were no 
innate ideas, or for that matter any absolute truths ‘out there’. No longer the product of 
discovery or revelation, cognition and knowledge were now seen as the product of a 
creative process; a form of poesis.  
It was this symbolic order that formed the loci of our common traditions, memories 
and culture. While such a ‘climate’ might over time be modulated by our actions in 
response to natural forces and physical and biological need, it nonetheless remains the 
historical stream from which the patterns of our social behavior emerge. It becomes the 
very fabric of our means of expression. We think and speak within this stream of images 
which simultaneously embody our locality and common experiences, what Herder called 
‘belonging’. That meant that thought and cognition could not be divorced from the 
particularities of place and time. The advance of cultures, what Herder called ‘Fortgang’, 
demonstrated that while each culture, each people, might come to construct this stream of 
images via a similar process, they are nonetheless distinct and at times even 
incommensurable.  
In this sense all knowledge is historical. History becomes a case study of how 
humanity generates a sense of belonging, creates a truth and a means of expression 
serving to grasp the sense of the universal in how symbolic systems are formulated, but 
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simultaneously grasping the particularities of individual cultures and the myriad ways in 
which such fabrications can occur. It is the dialectic between the universal of the general 
idea and the particularity of experience. The recognition of the diversity of collective 
symbolic orders meant that, while the process of their creation might be the same, the 
actions which set them in motion were not. This implies that such cognitive acts of poesis 
required a form of praxis to both initiate consciousness, and to either maintain or alter 
their construction.  
What men like Vico, Hamann and Herder espoused was the idea that reality, as we 
come to know it, within the framework of human cognition, was an ontological 
fabrication fashioned out of the dialectical relationship of self and other in praxis. The 
first task of knowledge was therefore, to grasp the world in its fullness, in the diverse 
particularity of its ‘being’; as an ontological construction. That construction was the unity 
of the symbolic order.  The second task of knowledge was to expose such ontological 
constructions, not as fallacies, but as the reality of human experience and praxis. That 
praxis was the work of the sensus communis; the communion of the self with others in a 
bond of ‘belonging’. The structure of knowledge, the episteme, and its pursuit of wisdom 
was a search for how poesis and praxis form the unity of experience we call reality.  
That was the true Unity of Theory and Practice and it would serve as the basis of a 
new epistemology as it was postulated by the writers and thinkers of the German 
Enlightenment. It would also change the structure of aesthetic theory and in the process 





                                                
ENDNOTES 
 
i Sullivan, Louis, Kindergarten Chats, originally appearing in 1901 in serial form in the Interstate Architect 
of Cleveland Ohio, reprinted in Louis H. Sullivan Kindergarten Chats and Other Writings, Dover Press 
Toronto, 1979pg. 167. 
ii The relationship between Hamann and Herder is troublesome in that there is no record of Hamann 
teaching at the time of Herder’s education despite his reference to him as his teacher. It has been speculated 
that the relationship was one of mentor as opposed to a more formal academic student teacher relationship.  
iii Goethe, Dictung und Warheit,, bk 12, vol 28, , in op. crit., Weimar, pg, 108, line 25, 1887-1919. 
iv This idea of God’s continuous creation was not new Nicolas of Cusa had asserted the same thing at the 
dawn of the Renaissance. He too had argued that if God were infinite and existed outside of human time the 
creation could not be a moment in human history but a continuous and infinite process. 
v Hamann translated this idea to Herder who of course went on to inform the development of the human 
sciences and our ideas about the self. 
vi Hamann; Briefwechsel, edit. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: 
Insel, 7 vols. vii 460.6. 
vii While Hamann’s work at the time was heresy it has become increasingly mainstream, Ernesto Grassi 
referred to the foundation of thought or what he termed the archai as a core belief which could not be 
proven or disproved; he referred to this as the scandal of modern metaphysics. See Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric 
as Philosophy. Feyerabend’s critique of science rests precisely on this assertion. 
viii Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. ii 73.21 cf. Briefwechsel, edit. 
Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: Insel, 7 vols. vii 167.10.  
ix Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. ii 74.2. 
x Hamann; Briefwechsel, edit. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: 
Insel, 7 vols. vii 460.6. 
xi Berlin sums up Hamann’s position on this matter as follows. “The contrast between faith and reason is for 
him a profound fallacy. There are no ages of faith followed by ages of reason. These are fictions. Reason is 
built on Faith, it cannot replace it; there are no ages that are not ages of both: a contrast is unreal. A rational 
religion is a contradiction in terms. A religion is true not because it is rational but because it is face to face 
with what is real: modern philosophers pursue rationality like Don Quixote, and will in the end, like him, 
lose their wits. Existence logically precedes reason; that is to say, what exists cannot be demonstrated by 
reason but must first be experienced itself, and then one may, if one wishes, build rational structures upon it 
whose reliability can be no greater than the reliability of the original base. There exists a pre- rational 
reality, how we arrange it is ultimately arbitrary.” Isaiah Berlin; Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, 
Hamann, Herder, edit. Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton Oxford, 2000, pg. 283. Published in 
U.K. by Pimco, Random House, London.  
xii There is a clear relationship to the thought of Vico here as both philosophers assert that our 
understanding of the world as the ‘thing-in-itself’ can only be understood via our own mind and hence is a 
construction of what it possibly is as our mind can conceive of it.  
xiii Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann, Herder, edit. Hardy, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton Oxford, 2000, pg. 302. Published in U.K. by Pimco, Random House, London.   Berlin 
sums up Hamann’s position in this way: “Philosophy claims to be the explanation of life, but ‘life is action’ 
not a static thing to be analyzed like a botanist’s specimen. An action cannot be described in the categories 
provided by the Cartesians, or even the Lockeans and Leibnizians, for all their talk of movement and 
change. The task of true philosophy is to explain life in all its conditions, with all its peculiarities; not to 
smooth it out or substitute for it ‘castles in the air’ – harmonies, tidy beautiful and false.” 
xiv Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. ii 201.4. This lesson would be 
taken up by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where he claims that we must descend into the 
Bacchanalian revel and understand that the beast descends upon its prey without ever thinking of it as a 
being. 
xv The quote is found in an article on Fichte in Entsiklopedicheskii St. Petersburg, 1890- 1907 , vol. 36, pg. 
50, col. 2 and is left untraced in Fichte. 
xvi Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. ii 208.20. 
xvii While not wholly original here, Pascal and Vico had asserted this before him; it was Hamann’s writings 
that proved to give the critique its full impact.  
 446
                                                                                                                                                 
xviii Goethe, Dictung und Warheit,, bk 12, vol 28, , in op. crit., Weimar, pg, 108, line 25, 1887-1919. 
xix Hamann; Briefwechsel, edit. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: 
Insel, 7 vols. vi 108.24. 
xx Ibid. 9: Insel, 7 vols. iv 288.29. 
xxi Ibid.9: Insel, 7 vols. ii 330.30. 
xxii Louis Sullivan, Kindergarten Chats and other Writings, Dover Books, New York, 1979 pg. 198.  
xxiii Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. iii 284.24. 
xxiv Berlin has summarized Hamann’s position on this matter in the following way: “The notion that there 
is a process called thought or reasoning that is an independent activity ‘within’ man, in some part of his 
brain or mind, which he can choose at will to articulate into a set of symbols that he invents for the purpose, 
but which, alternatively, he can also conduct by means of un-verbalized or un-symbolized ideas in some 
non- empirical medium, free from images, sounds, visual data, is a meaningless illusion.” Berlin, Three 
Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann, Herder, edit. Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Oxford, 2000, pg. 315. Published in U.K. by Pimco, Random House, London.  
xxv Hamann; Briefwechsel, edit. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: 
Insel, 7 vols. v 95.21. 
xxvi Ibid., Insel, 7 vols. v 177.18. 
xxvii Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. ii 126.9. 
xxviii Ibid., 7, 6 vols. iii 41.11. 
xxix This attitude was translated to both Herder and Goethe and is in many ways the very foundation of our 
contemporary attitude to the work of art and in particular architecture as a reflection of the Zietgiest of an 
age.  
xxx Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. viii , 
pg. 315. 
xxxi Herder took to task the idea of duality in Kants Anthropologie where he identifies a distinction between 
individual morality, universal, absolute, free from internal conflict and based on rationality and 
unconnected to nature, history and empirical reality on the one hand and the disharmonies of nature. See 
Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2000,  
pg. 188. 
xxxii This point was first brought to the fore by Hamann as a key aspect of his thought. Herder took this and 
made it the central feature of his philosophy.  
xxxiii Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. viii , 
pg. 315. 
xxxiv The shift from a static fixed and permanent definition of nature to a one that was dynamic and ever 
changing was first proposed in the Renaissance philosophy Nicholas of Cusa who successfully argued that 
if God was infinite that the conception of God’s creativity and hence nature must also be infinite. This 
implied a more dynamic and changeable definition of creation and nature. In fact Cusa argued that nature 
was constantly changing and that the creation of the Bible existed outside the construct of human time and 
was continuous. 
xxxv Louis Sullivan, Kindergarten Chats and other Writings, Dover Books, New York, 1979 pg. 65.  
xxxvi Such an idea lies at the heart of his rejection of the emptiness of cosmopolitanism. 
xxxvii Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. viii, 
pg. 261. Herder wrote this in 1774 long before Fichte or Hegel.  
xxxviii Herder’s ideas here are similar to those of Foucault and his idea of episteme, a specific means of 
thinking that frames not only ones means of thinking but also of conceiving of taking action.  
xxxix Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. xvii , 
pg. 58. 
xl Ibid., vol. xiii , pg. 362. 
xli In his Sprachphilosophie Herder identified Logic as that which was approximate to what is common in 
language. The key to understanding man was anthropology not metaphysics or logic. Logic was only an 
abstraction from language itself. There was no deep logical structure presupposing all logical thought as 
proposed by Descartes or Kant. Like Vico and Hamann, he did not believe language to be a sudden 
miraculous gift from God nor a deliberate invention at a specific point in human development designed as a 
tool to improve life. It was a natural growth, a mental capacity for generating symbols of communication 
 447
                                                                                                                                                 
and intentionality, given man by God but one that developed overtime with humanity. It should be noted 
that at times during his life, Herder a Lutheran clergyman, recanted and claimed language a full gift from 
God but such instances were more likely due to his religious affiliations and not his actual beliefs. He 
continuously reasserted the notion of language as a developing skill in humanity throughout his life. In the 
end he returned to the notion that language was an essential pert of the natural growth of consciousness and 
that all human solidarity rests on our ability to communicate, society would be inconceivable without it. 
xlii Berlin states “differing civilizations are different growths, pursue different goals, embody different ways 
of living, are dominated by different attitudes to life; so that to understand them one must perform an 
imaginative act of empathy into their essence, understand them ‘from within’ as far as possible, and see the 
world through their eyes . . .” Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann Herder. Edit. 
Henry Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2000, pg. 236. 
xliii Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. iv, pg. 
472. 
xlivIsaiah Berlin sums up Herder’s attitude on this very issue “No writer has stressed more vividly the 
damage done to human beings by being torn from the only conditions in which their history has made it 
possible for them to live full lives. He insists over and over again that no one milieu, group or way of life, 
is necessarily superior to any other, but it is what it is, and assimilation to a single universal pattern, of laws 
or languages or social structure, as advocated by the French lumieres, would destroy what is most living 
and valuable in life and art. Hence the fierce polemic against Voltaire, who, in his Essai sur le moeurs, 
declared that ‘Man, generally speaking, was always what he is now.’, or that morality is the same in all 
civilized nations.” Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann Herder. Edit. Henry 
Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2000, pg. 222- 223. Published in U.K. by Pimco, 
Random House, London.  
xlv The Idea of progress so much a part of the modern thinking was already a tenet of thought at the time 
from France, Italy and Germany. Hegel’s teleological notion of the advancement of spirit is part of this 
trend, which Herder rejected. 
xlvi Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann Herder. Edit. Henry Hardy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2000, pg. 238-239. Published in U.K. by Pimco, Random House, 
London.  
xlvii Louis Sullivan, ‘The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered.’, (1896) reprinted in Louis Sullivan 
the Public Papers, edit. Robert Twombly, Chicago University Press, Chicago London, 1989, pg. 104-5.  
xlviii Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. v, pg. 
502. 
xlix Ibid., vol. x, pg. 14. 
l Such a dissent into nostalgia was also chastised by both Vico and Hegel. 
li Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. xxv, pg. 
II. 
lii Ibid., vol. iv, pg. 389. 
liii Ibid., vol. xxv, pg. II. 
liv His conception of a good society was closer to that of Thoreau and his idea of culture to that of Goethe. 
His ideas are close to those of Ruskin, Lamennais and Morris in that he protests against mechanization and 
vulgarization. Herder favored self- sufficiency in artistic creation and natural self- expression. 
lv Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, Weidmann, vol. v, pg. 
511. 
lvi Isaiah Berlin explains this point as such: “the art of writing, the incorporation of thought in permanent 
forms, while it creates the possibility of a continuity of social awareness, and makes accessible his own and 
other worlds to an individual. Also arrests and kills. What has been put down in writing is incapable of that 
living process of constant adaptation and change, of the constant expression of the unanalyzable and 
unseizable flow of actual experience, which language, if it is to communicate fully, must possess. Language 
alone makes experience possible but it also freezes it. Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment 
Vico, Hamann Herder. Edit. Henry Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2000, pg. 
194. Published in U.K. by Pimco, Random House, London.  
lvii Such a concept in architecture increasingly gained prominence during the 19th century as classicism and 
Gothic were increasingly seen as modes of expression of previous civilizations which no longer bore 
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relevance to the contemporary condition. What may have prevented the wholesale rejection of historical 
styles was the philosophy of history both of Herder and Hegel that argued that the collective historical 
pattern revealed the development of human consciousness a collective self-knowledge of humanity. Value 
was still placed on the awareness of the historical styles as a means of revelation of such truths. IT wasn’t 
until Nietzsche and his rejection of history that such a revelation of truth was abandoned. 
lviii All abstraction by its very nature must remove some element of reality from the thing in question. 
Some level of generalization is necessary for us to be able to codify the world in a sense that makes it 
intelligible. There can be no symbols, language or thought without abstraction at some level. To forbid it is 
to forbid thought and self- consciousness. Neither Hamann nor Herder ever meant that all abstraction or 
universality was to be eliminated, neither for that matter did any of the other critics of the Enlightenment 
and the epistemology of science ever intend to put forward such an absurd proposition.  
What was at stake was the degree and nature of abstraction, the level to which it was taken and the 
object to which it was applied. Each level of abstraction, each move toward universality removes the 
concept, further from reality transforming the concrete into the purely theoretical. At some level it becomes 
completely divorced from the real. This may at some point be necessary to formulate a scientific hypothesis 
from which one then later descends to concrete reality.  
lix For Vico this was the innate experience of the body as it was troped onto external perceptions of reality 
in the formation of the Imaginative Universal. For Hamann the self was the mirror of our intercourse with 
the other. Man, more specifically human cognition, was a product of human communication, interaction 
and expression. And for Herder this came in the form of ‘belonging’; the idea that we are always already 
born into a preexisting symbolic order that shapes and helps to define our perceptions of reality and means 
expression. 
Chapter 13: The Unity of Theory and Practice  
 
“. . . behind every form we see there is a vital 
something or other which we do not see, yet which 
makes itself visible to us in that very form. In other 
words, in a state of nature the form exists because 
of the function, and this something behind the form 
is neither more nor less than a manifestation of 





Nature as Poetic Unity 
 
One of the key propositions in the work of Hamann and Herder was that the world 
was in a constant state of flux and change, full of incommensurability and opposition. It 
was central to the doctrine of the Unity of theory and practice, and it influenced later 
philosophers and writers of the Counter Enlightenment.ii At the heart of their worldview 
was precisely this assertion; nature was the continuous process of poesis, an evolving 
unity of life in all its forms and diversity, in its connectivity and its ability to recreate 
itself. This was the true subject matter of its study.  
It was in his studies of botany that Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) began 
to rethink the definition of nature along these lines. In The Metamorphosis of Plants of 
1790, Goethe proposed the idea of the Urpflanze, a theory in which all the parts of the 
plant were seen as variations and developments from one seminal element or organ that 
was then transformed into the subsequent parts. Such transformation Goethe conceived, 
were regulated by laws, but the overall strategy did not have the character of the 
mechanical laws found in Newton’s vision of nature. The result was a vision of nature 
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different from that of the epistemology of science and its coherent systematic laws. What 
Goethe proposed was a vision of nature that was essentially teleological in character. His 
intention in the Morphologie was “to get to know living forms as such, to grasp the 
coherence between external parts that we can touch, to study them as indications of their 
interior, and to grasp thereby the organism as a whole as we observe it”iii.  
As Caroline van Eck explains it: “In order to understand the connection between parts 
of organisms, their functioning and the relation between exterior and interior [in short, to 
grasp what makes them living beings] it is not sufficient to separate their parts as the 
chemist or anatomist does. Instead, we must search for the unifying idea that regulates 
their growth and form.”iv For Goethe, Nature was composed of the relationship, between 
the concrete physicality of a particular living organism and its morphology. Individual 
organisms in their particularity may be identical, similar or dissimilar in their outward 
appearance as they reflect the conditions of their ‘climate’. The ever-changing nature of 
the relationship between the particularity of appearance and morphology is what nature 
and life consist of.     
Goethe’s emerging theory of nature bears all the hallmarks of the Unity of theory and 
practice. There is an over-arching unity that pervades all of nature; its sense of 
continuous dynamic creation that does not override its diversity and incommensurability. 
Each species is the product of its own unity, itself a by-product of its ‘climate’, which 
generates its ‘belonging’ or ‘morphotype’, which is then communicated in its external 
expression. Nature for Goethe was a dynamic will toward creation and development.  
The ideas of the Morphologie essentially began to formulate an understanding of 
Nature and her forms as derived from within, from the idea of the ‘thing-in-itself’. This 
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is, in one sense, a return to the Aristotelian concept of essences, but it also brings to it the 
idea of development. For Goethe, nature was in perpetual transformation and change, 
leading to diversity and infinite variety, but still guided by essential ideas or purposes. 
What this led to, as Caroline Van Eck asserts, was the reformulation of the idea of 
‘purposive unity’.v  
In Aristotle, the idea of purposive unity was the aspect of living nature that was the 
subject of mimesis.vi Both man and nature engage in action that is purposeful, or 
teleological, in the sense that there is a given end that determines the purpose or 
appearance of the thing. Art and praxis likewise bear a verisimilitude to nature in their 
purposefulness. Historically, both Western philosophy and theology assumed a divine a 
priori plan. Prior to the epistemology of science, knowledge of it was considered 
inaccessible to man, while at the same time the ability to identify its presence was 
assumed. After the development of the epistemology of science this knowledge was 
viewed as directly accessible to man through the use of the scientific method. 
The idea of purposive unity permeated much of the philosophical discourse in 
Germany at the time. It had been a part of Kant’s epistemology where it was used as a 
regulative principle that operates as a function of the reflective judgment. For Kant, it 
served as the basis of the idea of system. In the Critique of Reason he stated; “I consider 
a system to be the unity of manifold knowledge under one idea. This is the idea formed 
by reason of the form of a whole, in so far as such a concept determines a priori both the 
size and the position of the parts in respect to each other.”vii Nature operates as if a mind 
had formed its unity independent of its physicality. But it also means that such a 
regulative notion is a fixed concept or idea. According to Kant the actual constructive 
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process was only a copying of an idea preformed, it is an imitation of a transcendental 
idea. Purposive unity, as found in Kant, was an extension of the platonic notion of the 
eidos. Kant’s nature was still the fixed and static nature of Descartes and Newton.  
But following Hamann and Herder, the notion of a fixed idea cannot be reconciled 
with the empirical observation of nature which is more dynamic and diverse. The notion 
of ‘purposive unity’ in nature was then subsequently taken up by later philosophers, but 
transformed, as Goethe had done, into the idea of a dynamic will to poesis in which a 
unity is continuously renegotiated within the exigencies of Nature and ‘climate’, what I 
will refer to here as Poetic Unity.  
I have chosen to use the term Poetic Unity instead of ‘purposive unity’ for several 
specific reasons: the first is that the term purposive unity was used by both Aristotle and 
Kant in reference to Nature only, and secondly because as they used it, it referred to a 
conception of Nature that was teleological and served a fixed and stable end. Hamann, 
Herder, Goethe and the Idealist philosophers in Germany did not accept this definition of 
Nature. Thirdly, the term purposive unity refers to the creative force of the ideal and not 
its actual manifestation in sensuous form. Furthermore, the concept of Poetic Unity was 
applied in a broader form including the definition of man, knowledge and art, and 
therefore a new terminology is warranted.  
The idea of Poetic Unity can also be found in the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854). In Naturphilosophie of 1797 he proposed that the 
Kantian dualism of opposition between nature and appearing nature was due to the 
objectification of nature as it is theorized in the cognitive process as an opposition to the 
self. As he saw it, the objectification was the result of the epistemology of science’s 
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search for fixed laws which failed to account for the living dynamic forces in nature, 
including those in the self. viii   
If nature, as object, is never absolute, or unconditioned, then there must be something 
non-objective within it. That non-objective aspect of nature was its original productivity. 
Schelling’s term is translated as ‘productivity’, but it is essentially what I am calling 
Poetic Unity. He postulated that the dualism of nature’s productivity and ‘appearing’ 
nature was the result of the fact that nature’s ‘productivity’ cannot appear as itself, but is 
only manifest in the products of its existence. Furthermore, such products, while 
exhibiting such productivity, exhibit only one interpretation of it, a given Poetic 
particularity, and thereby inhibit the appearance of the productive force as a continuous 
or infinite aspect of nature- the universal of nature’s Unity. As productivity, nature cannot 
be conceived of as an object, since it is the subject of all possible real predicates. But this 
means that there is always a dialectic between subject-productivity, and object- nature as 
predicate or particularity, which prevents nature from ever reaching a state of stasis. 
Nature for Schelling is grounded in the universality of its productive force, its’ will to 
poesis, but full of contradictions and incommensurability in its particularity. It is a 
dynamic Poetic Unity.  
This new conception of nature as a Poetic Unity was not limited to Goethe and 
Schelling, but was present in the work of many of the Idealist philosophers in Germany. 
They abandoned the idea of a preordained plan, that is to say, one that had established a 
priori ends such as Reason, Harmony, Virtue and the Good. They all viewed nature, at 
least as we come to understand it, as a dialectical construct between man and reality. That 
meant that ‘nature’ was constantly renegotiated and potentially different in the eyes of 
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diverse cultures. ‘Nature’ was in a constant state of ‘becoming’. This also meant that ends 
were not fixed, but fluid and negotiated. Yet they still held to the idea of unity. The 
content of the form ‘nature’, its essence, was no longer an a priori harmony or reason, but 
the will to, or stratagem of, poesis as a creative act that coursed through all of nature and 
life. Its manifestation in the exigencies of matter was what I have termed Poetic Unity.  
 
“Nature gave man reason, and freedom of will 
based upon reason, and this in itself was a clear 
indication of nature’s intention as regards his 
endowments. For it showed that man was not 
meant to be guided by instinct or equipped and 
instructed by innate knowledge; on the contrary, he 
was meant to produce everything out of himself. 
Everything had to be entirely of his own making . . 
.”  
Immanuel Kant 
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purposeix 
 
Freedom and the Autonomous Self 
 
The image of man as proffered by the epistemology of science and the metaphysics of 
Descartes was one of homo rationis, an image challenged by men like Vico, Hamann and 
Herder.x They had conceptualized man along the lines of homo fabricanus or homo 
artifex. In their eyes, all human action was in essence a creative act in which man laid his 
or her stamp on the world. Our very engagement with reality was a form of praxis which 
simultaneously brought forth both, our own understanding of reality, and our own sense 
of identity as both individual and collective. In this sense all forms of praxis not only 
transform reality and our perceptions of it, but also form the basis of our interpretation of 
‘reality’ that serves as a unified framework for the communication of intentions and free 
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will. By the end of the century this concept was beginning to reshape the definition of 
man along the lines of what I have referred to as Poetic Unity. xi  
A key impetus for this redefinition came from an unlikely source, the writings of one 
of the Enlightenments greatest philosophical proponents Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).xii 
One does not think of Kant as a ‘Romantic’ or Idealist philosopher, he was more of a 
rationalist and certainly a firm believer in science. He viewed the writings of Herder with 
suspicion, seeing his generalizations as far too vague and his thought lacking in logic. 
That feeling was mutual, as Herder viewed Kant as too pedantic, dividing all of 
experience into categorical fragments. But it was in Kant’s moral philosophy, specifically 
his concept of freedom that they found the justification for the redefinition of man along 
the lines of the emerging definition of Nature as Poetic Unity. 
According to Kant, man is ‘man’, not because he has to be, but because he chooses to 
be. Other things in the world may be subject to causality, or follow some rigorous schema 
of cause and effect, but free will allows man to be the human he wishes. Kant, like Vico 
before him, had insisted that the most significant aspect of man was his free will, not his 
reason. It was Vico who claimed the will was “. . . the property of human nature which 
not even God can take from man without destroying him.”xiii That meant that man 
chooses freely between right and wrong. Virtue, and the values it constructs, was the 
result of human choice and action.  
Kant came to this not through Vico, but through Rousseau’s Emile. For Rousseau all 
men are experts in moral matters, all men can clearly identify what was right and what 
was wrong. This of course assumes first that there was a clear and identifiable a priori 
right and wrong and that there was an innate a priori faculty in all men that served as a 
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moral compass. Kant certainly agreed with this and it led him to assert that what was the 
manifestation of individual morality was what proceeded from individual choices, only 
those actions of which the individual was author.   
It also meant that no matter the circumstances, no matter how hemmed in by the 
constraints of the world, man always possesses some degree of innate freedom. In this 
sense man was not so wholly determined by either nature, or culture, as the French 
philosophes had asserted. Reality served only as a datum within which man operated and 
exercised his innate freedom. It was this idea that underlay his famous essay ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ If I am made to do what I do by someone else, regardless of 
intentionality, I am being deprived of the innate freedom that exists within me and serves 
as the primary quality of my humanity. For Kant it was the very concept of freedom of 
will, of the power to choose, that was what makes man, ‘man’.  
For Kant, the adherence to the rules of nature presents an ethical dilemma. If I am to 
obey some form of natural morality, if I am to obey some rule of social behavior, if I am 
to obey some mechanistic precept, then I must relinquish my freedom of will. According 
to Kant; “By ‘Personality’ I mean freedom and independence of the mechanism of nature. 
If I am the plaything of nature, if causal forces which operate on trees and stones and 
animals operate on me too, how can I be said to be free?”  
With Kant our relationship to nature changes, no longer the model or ideal to follow, 
the ground from which truth was to be found, it now became the indifferent stuff upon 
which man enacts his will. For Kant nature was at best a neutral surround, at worst an 
enemy of man, even if he was a part of it. Clearly man was a part of nature and a natural 
object, his emotions were ‘natural’, and what makes man, ‘Man’ was ‘natural’. In his 
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philosophy we find the beginning of the concept of nature as a force- at times hostile to 
man’s will- set over and against the self, as opposed to the idea of the self as coterminous 
to, or reflective of nature’s harmonious order. It is in his voluntary acts that man was 
truly free and in so rises above nature’s necessity. If man was to be free, then he must 
obey only those laws and rules that he himself has made. Man was freest, and rose to his 
greatest height when he stood over nature, when he molded it to his own will, 
transforming it to reflect his sense of being.  
It was this aspect of Kantian thought that had the greatest impact; the idea of the 
autonomy of the self, that I am the author of my own actions. The result was that what 
humanity works for was not happiness or efficiency, but the dignity of man, freedom and 
respect for men as choosers of their own destiny, even if that choice was wrong. Kant’s 
position led to the idea that any form of domination over an individual’s free will was a 
form of evil. Any use of individuals for purposes that are not their own, but that are of the 
user, was a form of degradation and as such a maiming of their very being. xiv This was 
so because it prevented their becoming what they both can and wish to be. It was th
removal of their self- determining liberty, an important God-given aspect unique to men.  
e 
Kant had demonstrated that value, right or wrong, was the product of our choices, not 
an intrinsic quality of the thing-in-itself. We chose our actions and in the process create 
value. Man freely commits to pursue a given kind of existence. It is therefore unjust to 
use men as a means to ends since they are ends in themselves. And if a man was to 
sacrifice, it must be to something higher.  
Not only did this inadvertently support Herder’s insistence on the plurality of ideals 
and the determination of such ideals by a given group of individuals. But it also dealt a 
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blow to any form of determinism; mechanical or cultural.xv Free will was, at least for 
Kant, a primary datum of human consciousness, therefore liberty was not a given status, 
rational or otherwise, but rather rested in the value itself, that is to say, in the ability to 
choose. Kant’s premise meant that Virtue was not a fixed a priori to be discovered, but 
rather a value structure that was created. And this meant, intended or not, that both Virtue 
and Man could not be the fixed a priori asserted by the epistemology of science and the 
Enlightenment philosophes.xvi 
Kant’s writings proved highly influential on the writings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(1762-1814) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), they would use his moral philosophy to 
redefine the nature of Man along the lines of Poetic Unity. This would be accomplished 
in Fichte’s theory of knowledge and the self and Schiller’s theory of free will and Man. 
Together they would formulate the ontological ground of human cognition and 
consciousness along the lines of Poetic Unity.   
 
“Action, action is the soul of the world, not pleasure, 
not abandonment to feeling, not abandonment to 
reasoning, only action; only by action does one 
become the image of God, the God who creates 
ceaselessly and ceaselessly rejoices in his works. 
Without action, all pleasure, all feeling, all 
knowledge is nothing but a postponed death.”  
Jakob Micheal Reinhold Lenz 
Uber Gotz von Berlichingenxvii 
 
Life = Praxis 
 
Like Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) saw the world as one of difference, 
but to an even greater extent. According to him, we do not approach the world from the 
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perspective of a neutral episteme, but rather a certain attitude or framework. What one 
kind of person wants of the world was different from what another wants, while there are 
commonalities, the relationship of things will always appear as distinct, if not at times 
contradictory. Things are not as they are independent of me, but are as they are because I 
make them such. Goethe made this point in Faust; the beginning is not knowledge, but 
logos, not understanding, but our attempt to adapt the world to our will. We know 
because we are called upon to act. While related to Kant’s idea of will, Kant never went 
that far. For Fichte and others in the Counter Enlightenment, the will of man was to take 
action in the world. We are not passive observers, but active creators. As such nature is 
not the thing-in-itself for me to examine, but rather nature was what it was because I take 
it to be that. Our understanding of the world was what it was, because it was 
conceptualized as an answer to an unformulated question; what was its purpose in terms 
of my will. It was through this filter that the world was comprehended, every object, the 
thing-in-itself, was defined in terms of the purposive behavior of Man. It was this aspect 
of our reality; that it was constituted by our own sense of purpose that becomes the very 
source of the self for Fichte, as the idea of Poetic Unity was introduced into the definition 
of Man. 
One thing that he accepted from the 18th century empiricists, Hume in particular, was 
the idea that when one speaks of the self there was a problem in that the self was not a 
thing, an object of direct perception, but rather a concatenation of experiences from 
which both the human personality and history were formed. Fichte proposed the doctrine 
that it was natural for the self to emerge in cognition. As opposed to the concept ‘me’ 
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which is something introspective, the ‘I’, he asserted, was formed through what he called 
Anstoβ, or ‘impact’. It was this category that dominated all experience for him. 
Accordingly, there was an external resistance to the self, and it was in the recognition 
of it that the idea of the ‘self’ and the ‘not self’ emerged. Without the ‘not self’ there 
could be no ‘self’ experienced, cognition and reality existed within this dialectic.xviii I am 
who and what I am, because I am aware that I am seeking something from that which is 
outside me. This same confrontation of the ‘potential self’ with the ‘other’ served as the 
motivation for Vico’s Imaginative Universal, and Schelling’s understanding of the 
objectification of nature that lead him to identify that Nature must be composed of both 
an objective and non-objective aspect; its ‘productivity’ or Poetic Unity. It would also 
serve as the basis of Hegel’s double-Ansich in the Phenomenology of Spirit.    
Like Herder and Hamann before him, Fichte comes to the conclusion that 
consciousness does not begin with disinterested contemplation, but rather with action or 
praxis. For Fichte: “We do not act because we know, we know because we are called 
upon to act.”xix  I ‘am’ not because I ‘think’, as Descartes asserted, but because I take 
action. No longer the passive state of Cartesian reason, knowledge becomes a practical 
instrument provided by nature for the purpose of effective life and was always knowledge 
in relation to some action, whether it was survival, adaptation etc. In response to 
Descartes Cogito ergo sum, Fichte proclaimed volo ergo sum, ‘I act therefore I am’. 
The ramifications of this growing distinction had profound significance. Up until that 
time the idea of ends or goals (of life, or art or morality) were for the most part 
conceptualized as something found, discovered in nature or the world around us. Fichte 
asserts that such ends are not discoverable, but rather made- the by-product of a creative 
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act. If Nature impinges upon our being, forcing us to take action, it then, according to 
Fichte, becomes the material out of which we create our freedom again. Fichte asserted 
that our world is what we dream out of our inner life, our experiences are determined by 
our actions. “I am not determined by ends, ends are determined by me.”xx Praxis, ideals 
and ends are necessary objects of human manipulation if man is to be man. I in a sense 
invent, or create, them. If they are made, then they were no longer propositions as science 
defines them. The idea of truth or falsehood, or compatibility drops away precisely 
because such things as ends and goals are not answers per se, but forms of praxis. While 
not derived from Vico’s axiom  verum ipsum factum- the true is convertible with the 
made- it was nonetheless reminiscent of it. 
What men possess is an indomitable will, much like nature, and that meant that 
knowledge was not of values, but of their creation, this was what men achieve. What 
humanity does was create values, create goals, create ends, and in the end creates its own 
vision of reality, in a process that most closely follows that of creation and poesis. Since 
Poesis is the bringing into being of that which previously did not exist, there can be no 
copying, adaptation, or learning of rules, no external checks and balances, no a priori 
structure that must be learned in order to proceed. The process is one of invention, 
creation and making in which ends, or goals, are established and materials and means are 
adapted to suit such ends. Means and ends are developed simultaneously in accordance 
with desire and imagination. In this way we make our world as we see fit.  
For Fichte, and his friend Schiller, the end of man was self- development and he was 
thus constituted by his own Poetic Unity. The important thing was to act. The true 
function of man was to realize his own vocation to constantly seek, overcome obstacles 
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and realize ones full potential. In Fichte man, like nature according to Herder, was 
defined as being of necessity in a state of ‘Becoming’. This led him to distinguish 
between those who are alive in the fullest sense and those who are dead, those who are 
only echoes of ‘self’ and those who are speaking voices. Pushed to its end Fichte’s 
postulation implies that an individual was wholly identifiable, wholly alive, only in the 
moment of resistance, in opposition. To be alive was essentially to be constantly engaged 
in the creation of the self and world. For Fichte anyone who does not create, who simply 
accepts what life, or nature, has to offer, was dead.  
The result was a new definition of man. If Vico, Hamann and Herder had postulated a 
world as a dialectic creation of the self and reality, Fichte gave it ontological grounding 
in a new theory of self. Man is generated in action- praxis, the continuous creation of 
‘self’ and world. For Fichte, if man was to fully achieve the unification of theory and 
practice, to be complete and fulfill his potential, he must take action and be a creator, he 











“Reason indeed demands unity, but Nature 
demands multiplicity, and both systems of 
legislation lay claim to Man’s obedience. It will 
therefore always argue a still defective education if 
the moral character can assert itself only through 
the sacrifice of what is natural; and a political 
constitution will still be very imperfect if its is able to 
produce unity only by suppressing variety. ”  
Friedrich Schiller 
On the Aesthetic Education of Manxxi 
 
Poetry as a Form of Resistance 
 
The Enlightenment thinkers looked to nature as a moral and aesthetic guide. 
Rousseau and Laugier even chastised culture for leading us away from it. Friedrich 
Schiller (1759-1805) would have none of it, as he conceived it, Nature was amoral, and 
fully willing and capable of destroying man, often in the most ruthless and hideous 
manner. It was this fact that was the constant reminder for him that we are not truly a part 
of nature. He once claimed: “The very circumstance that nature, regarded as a whole, 
mocks all the rules that our understanding prescribes for her, that she proceeds on her free 
and capricious career and treads in the dust the creations of wisdom without regard for 
them, that she snatches up what is significant and what is trivial what is noble and what is 
common . . . she often dissipates man’s most arduous achievements and indeed her own 
most arduous achievements in one frivolous hour and devotes centuries to work of 
unnecessary folly.”xxii Schiller regards this as the essence of nature. It was typical of how 






Fig. 22 Image: Gasper David Friedrich, The Arctic Sea (The ‘Hope’ in Pack Ice) xxiii 
 
Humanity, and its system of culture, were morally directed, had a distinction between 
right and wrong, between desires and will, duty and interest and acted accordingly. There 
was in Schiller a sense of the necessity of man reshaping the sense perceptions of the 
external world in a form that was unique to him that placed him in a constellation of 
thought along with Vico, Hamann, Herder and Fichte. “Nature begins with Man no better 
than with the rest of her works: she acts for him where he cannot yet act as a free 
intelligence for himself. But it is just this that constitutes his humanity, that he does not 
rest satisfied with what Nature has made of him, but possesses the capacity of retracing 
again, with his reason, the steps which she anticipated with him, of remodeling the work 
of need into a work of his free choice, and of elevating physical into moral necessity.”xxiv 
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Man’s nature was his free will, which compels him to move beyond nature and transform 
it in conformity with his inner will. He must remake sense perception in his own image 
for man to first emerge as self, but it was in this act, the construction of self and 
intellection, that freedom was first achieved. It was also the key to where the essence of 
man was to be found. For Schiller, man was only man if he was given the opportunity to 
rise above nature and mould her to his morally directed will. The question was ‘How?’  
Fichte provided the ontological grounding of the ‘self’ in resistance to nature as the 
‘other’. It was Schiller who provided the ontological structure of that resistance by 
extending the idea to free will and the development of Man. In a move that shows his 
allegiance to his friend Fichte he says “We exist because we exist; we feel, think and will 
because there is something other besides ourselves.”xxv In his On the Aesthetic Education 
of Man in a Series of Letters of 1794, he gave us an image of man similar to that of 
Goethe’s image of Nature in The Metamorphosis of Plants and Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie. For Schiller man was both ‘self’ and ‘condition’. While the 
‘conditions’ of our material being may change, the ‘self’ persists. If the self persists then 
it cannot be grounded in its ‘conditions’, but must be grounded in itself.xxvi Since the 
‘conditions’ do not persist they must result and must be grounded in something other than 
the self. According to Schiller, this ground was time, as ‘Time is the condition of all 
becoming’. As he sees it the self cannot have a beginning in time, but the conditions, 
must begin with time. If there was a constant, of reality, it is not an external order, or 
harmony, but the absolute self of human consciousness that served as its morphology or 
productivity.  
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Schiller comes to the conclusion that the subject matter of activity is received in the 
self as an external other, as something that is changing within and through time. It is the 
realization of this ever-changing ‘condition’ accompanied by the never changing ‘self’ 
that transforms experience into a unity. “Only as he alters does he exist; only as he 
remains unalterable does he exist. Man conceived in his perfection would accordingly be 
the constant unity which amidst the tides of change remains eternally the same.”xxvii It is 
the ‘conditions’ of our being that are the source of the diversity of our being, while it is 
the persistence of the self that serves as the source of the unity of our being. Like Goethe 
before him, Schiller was attempting to grasp the coherence between the external parts of 
man that we can touch, to study them as indicators of his inner self and thereby grasp 
Man as a whole. 
For Schiller, this duality of ‘condition’ and ‘self’ is manifest in the dialectic of two 
basic impulses the material, or sensuous, impulse, and the formal, or rational, impulse. 
The first proceeds from the physical existence of man and concerns itself with his setting 
within the bounds of time and the determinations of material reality. Schiller sees this 
impulse as the necessary phenomena in which mankind is ultimately rooted. While it is 
the source of the arousal of mankind’s potentialities it is simultaneously the medium 
which makes their potential impossible. The formal impulse emanates from man’s 
absolute ‘self’, his rational nature.  “Every individual man, it may be said, carries in 
disposition and determination a pure ideal man within himself, with whose unalterable 
unity it is the great task of his existence, throughout all his vicissitudes, to 
harmonize.”xxviii It is the absolute indivisible unity of the self as it strives to set the self at 
 466
liberty by bringing unity to the diversity of its manifestations. This is Poetic Unity in Man 
as defined by Schiller. 
For Schiller, both impulses are necessities of mankind, and he repeatedly notes the 
importance of their balance. “Every exclusive domination of either of his two 
fundamental impulses is for him a condition of constraint and of force, and freedom 
consists solely in the co-operation of both his natures.”xxix And again; “Nature should not 
rule him exclusively, nor Reason conditionally. Both systems of law should subsist in 
complete independence, yet in complete accord with one another.”xxx It is when man 
sublates both to each other, that he is free. But this is not always the case. The quest for 
their unity in sublation was the true purpose of man and the will. It is therefore the 
precondition for Self-knowledge. 
 Like Vico before him, Schiller conceived of humanity as having gone through three 
fundamental stages in its development.xxxi Each governed by a different relationship 
between the impulses. In their development it was the material impulse that emerged 
first. This was a savage stage where Man was governed by the material impulse driven by 
the nature of matter, the sensuous, necessity, passion and desire, without any sense of 
ideals. “So long as Man in his first physical condition accepts the world of sense merely 
passively, merely perceives, he is still completely identified with it, and just because he 
himself is simply world, there is not world yet for him. Not until he sets it outside himself 
or contemplates it, in his aesthetic status, does his personality become distinct from it, 
and a world appears to him because he has ceased to identify himself with it. 
Contemplation (reflection) is Man’s first free relation to the universe which surrounds 
him.”xxxii  
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The second stage of human development was one in which humanity turns to the 
formal impulse and reason in order to improve its lot in life. This barbarian stage was not 
an improvement, but a mere substitution of one impulse for the other. It was the 
domination of the formal impulse and reason over the material impulse and nature. 
Schiller called it the Vernuftstaat; the rational state, when man adopted rigid principles, 
worshiping them like idols, as if they came from some unquestionable authority. It was 
reason turned into fetish.  
The third state for Schiller, and the one to which he aspired, was an ideal state where 
passions were not divided from reason, necessity not divided from freedom. It was this 
third stage, and the necessary conditions for it to emerge, that was not only the focus of 
Schiller’s writings, but the very basis of Idealism in both philosophic and artistic terms. 
In Schiller’s construct once we accept the idea of the antagonism of the dual impulses 
we must confront the reality that there are no means of returning to a unity without the 
sublation of the material impulse to the formal. But this was not an answer. The sublation 
of the material impulse to the formal impulse resulted in perpetual uniformity, not a true 
unity. This was the condition of the Vernuftstaat, and as he saw it, the condition of his 
own age.  
He had Kant in mind when he chose his nomenclature. The Verstand, is often 
translated as the ‘understanding’ in Kantian terms.xxxiii But it is clear that the attack was 
against the entire rational project of the Enlightenment as outlined by the epistemology of 
science. “The intuitive and the speculative understanding took up hostile attitudes upon 
their respective fields, whose boundaries they now began to guard with jealousy and 
distrust, and by confining our activity to a single sphere we have handed ourselves over 
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to a master who is not infrequently inclined to end up by suppressing the rest of our 
capacities. While in one place a luxuriant imagination ravages the hard-earned fruits of 
the intellect, in another the spirit of abstraction stifles the fire at which the heart might 
have warmed itself and the fancy been enkindled.”xxxiv The very idea that Man, Virtue 
and Art, that the entirety of human existence was conceptualized as an imitation of 
precepts and laws supposedly found in nature as the Enlightenment philosophes 
espoused, was abhorrent to Schiller. This was a form of determination, a hindrance to 
free will, and it represented an oppressive state of being.  
The problem of the Vernuftstaat is that it suppresses the material impulse leaving man 
only a fragment of his potentiality. “Man himself grew to be only a fragment; with the 
monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he never develops the 
harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature he becomes 
merely the imprint of his occupation, of his science.”xxxv For Schiller this is the real 
problem with the epistemology of science. It is not in its inherent duality, but in its 
tendency toward determination and suppression, as man is reduced to only one aspect of 
his being.  
The determination and suppression took place in both early stages as each was 
dominated by only one of the impulses. But for Schiller the suppression in the 
Vernuftstaat was the least tolerable. “But Man can be at odds with himself in a double 
fashion: either as savage if his feelings rule his principles, or as barbarian if his principles 
destroy his feelings. The savage despises Art and recognizes Nature as his sovereign 
mistress; the barbarian derides and dishonours Nature, but- more contemptible than the 
savage- he continues frequently enough to become the slave of his slave.”xxxvi  
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Kant had argued if society was unjust- if it inhibited human freedom and man’s 
ability to be distinctly human- then it should be resisted. If a society was not given to a 
healthy morality, if everything one did was obstructed, then resistance to such a society 
was justified even warranted. Schiller used this; the Ideal of Freedom came in the form of 
resistance to any form of oppression. This peppers all of his writings.xxxvii He called for a 
resistance to the Enlightenment project and the epistemology of science, which if they did 
not create the condition of the Vernuftstaat, served to keep it in place. How does one 
become liberated from the Vernuftstaat?  
There must be sublation, but that sublation must be reciprocal. “When therefore 
Reason introduces her moral unity into physical society, she must not injure the 
multiplicity of Nature. When Nature strives to maintain her multiplicity in the moral 
structure of society, there must be no rupture in its moral unity; the triumphant form rests 
equidistant from uniformity and confusion. Totality of character must therefore be found 
in a people that is capable and worthy of exchanging the State of need for the State of 
freedom.”xxxviii It is therefore not enough to possess reason if one wishes to achieve 
enlightenment and freedom. xxxix Freedom can never be dependent on time, but conditions 
in time cannot be dependent on Freedom. Both conditions react to each other, without 
form there can be no matter and without matter there can be no form.xl There must be a 
sublation of Reason and Nature; of man’s dual impulses. 
For Schiller this condition only existed in totality in the creative act of poesis. This is 
the moment of free self-expression where man escapes the oppression of the material 
impulse and necessity and rises above it. But it is also where man escapes the oppression 
of the formal impulse and reason. It is the moment when man is most free. When he 
 470
moves beyond Nature and transforms it in conformity with his will. It is when the soul is 
completely free to exist in a world of pure praxis.  
Schiller sees poesis as a form of ‘Play’ in which man invents the rules and then 
chooses to follow them and this is the ultimate freedom and the state in which humanity 
is most fully human. The material may be given by nature, but it is transformed by human 
ideals and its value is derived from that. Schiller argues for a position in which human 
ideals, ends and objectives are not to be discovered by intuition, by scientific means, by 
sacred texts, by listening to experts. They are not to be discovered at all, but are to be 
invented, generated in and through the creative process. There is a similarity here to Vico 
and Hegel on this point. For Schiller, these ideals are invented and as such are in 
opposition to nature. They are directed against her idealism and serve to transform nature 
and educate ourselves. Poesis becomes the means of resistance from the shackles of 
necessity in the Vernuftstaat. It comes through the act of poesis in which man re-accesses 
his own Poetic Unity. 
 
“Nature is constituted by the organic union of all her 
forces, humanity by the organic unity of all 
individual wills.”  
Johann Gottlieb Fichtexli 
 
The Return of the Sensus Communis  
 
By the 1780’s the increasing skepticism regarding the notion of harmony, reason and 
good sense began to led to a view of the world devoid of any order or morality. Ironically 
it was the result of the very idea of Kantian Morality as it developed in philosophical 
circles. Kant had asserted that man had an aspect that allowed him to understand good 
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and evil and that given the choice would choose the good. But this notion of a universal 
desire for good was increasingly viewed with some skepticism. Did all men seek the 
good? Surely in history there were some that must have seen that their choices were evil. 
If man is free to exercise his will for either good or evil, if life provides more than a 
single option in terms of both means and ends, if some of these options are not 
compatible, then tragedy and chaos are inherently built into the very fabric of reality and 
human existence. This lead to the increasing belief that man needed to remove, or detach 
himself from the reality of the lived world in order to exist in the pure world of the 
imagination, creativity and art. Historically, it is this position that is often referred to as 
‘Romanticism’. In the work of Schiller such figures are seen as heroic precisely because 
they are willing to give up, or do battle with, the world for the sake of their principles and 
ideals. The retreat into one’s own inner world was not a solution. Such individualism 
could only lead to inaction in the face of opposition. Complete individualism and the 
pursuit of the self had the potential to lead to nihilism and destruction. It needed to be 
countered if man was to learn to accept the necessity of the material world, mould it to 
his will and to return to a more balanced acceptance of the lived experience as one unity.  
Sometime around 1803 there was a change in Fichte’s writings regarding individual 
freedom. If the world was full of inconsistency, incompatibility and violence, then the 
only way to combat that was through moral regeneration, the production of an ethic: to 
take action in the world. If his earlier writings are more influenced by Kant and Schiller 
he now was more directly influenced by Herder and the notion of ‘belonging’. Man was 
not solely an individual acting out of the individual will, but the product of the actions of 
other men just as surely as his own. Thus the individual was a part of a continuous stream 
 472
of humanity, no longer an empirical being in space, but a particular member of a larger 
group or nation. Such an individual was an imperfection in its particularity; the only 
perfection of humanity could come from the collective unity of a group, or humanity as a 
whole. Fichte now turns to the sensus communis, where the individual will is sublated to 
the collective action of the whole. According to him; ‘The life of reason consists in this, 
that the individual forget himself in the species, that he must risk his life for the life of all 
and sacrifice his entire life to theirs.”xlii And also “The individual does not exist; he 
should not count for anything, but must vanish completely; the group alone exists.”xliii In 
his writings there is the idea that behind the empirical individual is a transcendent self, a 
kind of spirit running through the universe, as a great unifying principle to which all 
individuals seek to unite. If Schiller had provided an understanding of the unity of the 
self, Fichte now posited it for humanity as a whole. The self must take its place among 
this collective consciousness.  
For Fichte this was the Beruf, the purpose of man was to become a contributor to the 
collective, over and above the nihilistic tendency of individualism and the self. According 
to Fichte “Nature is constituted by the organic union of all her forces, humanity by the 
organic unity of all individual wills.”xliv In Fichte, the sensus communis becomes the loci 
of the truth of mans’ Poetic Unity. This sense of the creative collective will puts him 
more in line with the developing ideas of Hegel, Schelling and Holderlin in the 
Systemmprogramm of 1796, which I shall return to later. The world of man, like the 
world of nature, was in a constant state of ‘becoming’, continuously recreated as a 
conscious or unconscious collective action of the a people. Man emerges in poesis, but if 
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mankind is to fulfill the full potential of Poetic Unity, it must be but a moment of praxis; 
the collective activity of the sensus communis.  
 
“The very essence of spirit is action. It makes itself 
essentially what it is; it is its own product; its own 
work.” 
G.W.F. Hegel 
Reason in Historyxlv 
 
Poetic Unity and the Image of the World 
 
The Idealist philosophers challenged the idea that the philosophical problem began 
with the rational definition of being. Instead they proposed that the more central question 
was that of ‘being’ itself or ‘How does being originate in cognition?’ From Vico to 
Fichte the answer lay in the passions. Our visceral response to phenomena elicits a 
reaction in the form of an emotion, fear, pain, anger, love, etc. It is the reminiscences of 
such reactions in time that bring about the sense of awareness. That meant that the 
passions proceeded reason within the construct of cognition, a point clearly asserted by 
both Vico and Schiller in their constructions of the development of man.  
But this only raises the question of the logos of being; ‘How do we experience the 
objectivity of being?’ It is not enough to recollect a sensory experience, true self-
awareness requires a response to such recollections. It is in the recognition of the emotion 
as an oppositional response to an ‘other’; I fear this (as in Vico’s Imaginative Universal) 
or I resist this (as in the case of Fichte) that the ‘self’ emerges objectively. Such 
recognition implies action or praxis; ‘I must fear’, ‘I must resist’. The logos of being, is 
not brought about by the other, but by the specific act. Thus cognition is not the result of 
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ratio, but of praxis as a generative movement/moment, that creates the logos of 
consciousness.xlvi  
The ontology of cognition therefore, is rooted in the historicity of experience. The 
logos emerge in a concrete reality, the particularity of experience. As Ernesto Grassi has 
noted; “All beings, in their openness to being, are expressions of a call, an appeal that 
must be answered in the urgency of every moment. The appeals, in whose realm we exist, 
are ever changing and new, and the meaning of beings is transformed according to the 
modality of our responses to the appeals.”xlvii It is this condition that underlies Herder’s 
‘belonging’ and it results in the sensus communis. But it is also what underlies the idea of 
Fortgang and the emerging primacy of history as a means of expression and coming to 
terms with the advance of consciousness. Nowhere is this more evident than in Hegel 
where praxis is the agent of Geist in history. In Hegel, Geist is reason, but not in the 
abstract of the Verstand, but as Vernunft; as a self-actualizing spirit in history. “The very 
essence of spirit is action. It makes itself essentially what it is; it is its own product; its 
own work.”xlviii 
If the self emerges in a dialectic of self and other, we are still left with a series of 
lingering questions. ‘What of the logos of the other, where is it to be found?’ The other, 
the phenomena of external stimuli emerges from the senses in so far as they serve as the 
instruments of cognition and not from ratio, in an abstract manner. Thus reality, as we 
come to cognize it, emerges in the passionate historicity of experience and originary 
praxis. The source of its objectivity therefore does not reside in itself, but in our own 
construction of self. It therefore possesses both objectivity and subjectivity. Reality 
cannot therefore be understood as the thing-in-itself independent of man. This is what 
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Fichte implied when he claimed Nature is only Nature in terms of its purposefulness for 
man. The meaning of Reality or Nature cannot be said to be demonstrative or for that 
matter a certum, precisely because knowledge, scientia, originates in the concrete 
situation of man’s historicity.xlix Reality and Nature find their meaning as human 
constructs; the dialectic is yet another form of action; poesis, the act of making.  
In classical thought, most notably in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, poesis and 
praxis are distinct. l While both are clearly activities in their formulations they differ. 
Their distinction lies in their ends. Grassi explains it thus; “Although poesis is an action, 
it is not an originary action. It is a means for the realization of a product, of an ergon, 
which however, is not peculiar to it. That is why the action comes to an end once the 
work is carried out, its purpose accomplished. Poesis is not an activity with an end in 
itself; it is an instrument and its goal lies not within it, but without it. Praxis, instead is an 
originary activity whose product, ergon, dos not come into being on account of 
something else but only of what is proper to it.”li Neither poesis nor praxis can be said to 
possess objectivity in any form. As an action poesis is only evident in the product and not 
as a stratagem independent of it. Praxis exists solely in the exigencies of a moment of 
time; it is only evident in the resultant action and its effect. Their existence therefore, is 
only evidentiary in their resultant ergon. 
But what of their products? The ergon of praxis as defined by the Idealist 
philosophers is not the polis as it was for the Ancient Greeks, but the resultant dialectic of 
self and other; poesis. The ergon of poesis is the ontology of reality as we make it, but it 
is also the ontology of the self within the dialectic. Poesis and praxis are part of the same 
historical moment. It is the contiguity of the two; praxis as the originary moment of 
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poesis, as stratagem, that represents the Poetic Unity at the center of their worldview. For 
the Idealist philosophers poesis and praxis are part of every entity of our coming to terms 
with reality. Nature, Man and life were defined as action in both its formulations as a 
Poetic Unity which serves as the logos of being.  
The unity of theory and practice must be understood through a cognizing of the 
structure of poesis within an historical moment of praxis. That is to say the loci of reason, 
of philosophy, lies in understanding the organon of expression as a condition of the 
particularities of time and place of the genus loci and a given situation. As Richard 
Bernstein has noted; “Geist as activity itself is praxis. Theoria in its purest form, as 
philosophy, is nothing but the articulation of the rationality ingredient in praxis. There is 
then the ultimate harmony of theory and practice, theoria and praxis, not in the sense that 
philosophy guides action, but rather in the sense that philosophy is the comprehension of 
what is; it is the comprehension of the logos ingredient of praxis, i.e., praxis as the self 
activity of Geist. There is then the ultimate unity of theory and practice, a unity that 
becomes intelligible when we understand that Geist is at once praxis, and in its self 
reflective form theoria.”lii Theoria is the knowledge of how praxis becomes evident in 
the stratagem of poesis. Such knowledge is brought about through the analysis of erga, 
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xxi Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 32. 
xxii Schiller, Friedrich, ‘Uber das Erhabene’: vol.  21, pg. 50, lines 7-17, in Schiller’s Werke, 
Nationalausgabe, Weimer, 1943-. 
xxiii This image of nature emerged in the work of the Romantic Painters Gasper David Friedrich in 
particular. His The arctic Sea (The ‘Hope’ in Pack Ice) shows a field of pack ice shards, only after careful 
observation does one perceive the fragments of the sailing ship the Hope crushed between them. Gasper 
David Friedrich, The Arctic Sea (The ‘Hope’ in Pack Ice), 96.7 x126.9cm Oil on Canvas, 1823/24 
Hamburg Kunsthall. Image reprinted here from Gasper David Friedrich, The World of Art Series, Angelo 
Walther, Henschelverlag, Kunst und Gesellschaft, Berlin, 1985, plate 21.  
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xxiv Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 28. 
xxv Ibid., pg 61. 
xxvi For Schiller as for the other Idealist philosophers the ‘self’ as individual is only a particularity of the 
absolute spirit, Geist, of humanity. In the Letters Schiller speaks in terms of both the particularity of the 
‘self’ as a constant state of ‘being’, the ‘absolute’ self and as the universal Geist of humanity which is the 
return of the ‘self’ to the unity of the ‘absolute’. There is a great affinity here to the philosophy of Plotinus 
and his concept of the ‘One’ the singularity of human spirit or the soul of which each individual is both a 
particular and distinct part and which it seeks to some day return.   
xxvii Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 62. 
xxviii Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 31. Schiller inserts a note after this remark referring the reader to Fichte’s Lectures 
on the Vocation of the Scholar, inferring that either the idea comes from his friend or that they are both 
working on the same idea here. 
xxix Ibid., pg. 86. 
xxx Ibid., pg 119. 
xxxi Schiller’s three stages of man bear an unusual verisimilitude to those of Vico in their structure. The first 
two the savage akin to Vico’s barbarism of Sense, the Barbarism with Vico’s Barbarism of Reason. Both 
see man as achieving his full potential only when both are brought into balance in a third stage.  
xxxii Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 119. 
xxxiii It should be noted that Hegel too rejected the Verstand in his writings for much the same reason.  
xxxiv Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 39. 
xxxv Ibid., pg 40. 
xxxviIbid., pg 34. 
xxxvii This side to Schiller’s condemnation of nature united with Kant’s notion of liberty and justice 
eventually lead to the idea of great sinner in Dostoevsky, superman in Nietzsche and the great Romantic 
Hero figure who is willing to destroy an unjust world for the sake of humanity. Ayn Rand’s Howard Roark 
is an architectural example. 
xxxviii Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 34. 
xxxix “It is, therefore, not enough to say that all intellectual enlightenment deserves our respect only insofar 
as it reacts upon the character; to a certain extent it proceeds from the character, since the way to the head 
must lie thought the heart. Training of the sensibility is then the more pressing need of our age, not merely 
because it will be a means of making the improved understanding effective for living, but for the very 
reason that it awakens this improvement.” Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a 
Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, 
trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing Co. New York, 165, pg. 50. 
xl This same idea was also found and expounded in Fichte’s Foundation of the Whole Theory of Science. 
xli This quote is taken from a transcript of Isaiah Berlins lectures on The Assault on the French 
Enlightenment, Part 3 Fichte and Romantic Self-Assertion, posted on The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library. 
While quoted by Berlin there is no reference given to its exact location. If Berlin's reference to post 1803 is 
correct then it comes from Fichte’s Berlin period and is most likely a quote from either The Characteristics 
of the Present Age or from Addresses to the German Nation. 
xlii Fichte, Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin 1971, SW vii 35. 
xliii Ibid., SW vii 37-8. 
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xliv The romantic love of Gothic is based in Fichte on the harmony of medieval society in which all 
individual souls worked for the greater good of society. It is this appreciation for the harmony of the 
purposive unity of the Gothic society that became the source of Gothic appreciation. It is present in the 
writings of Pugin, Ruskin and Morris. Gothic is viewed as the cultural expression of a society in which the 
collective wills of its individuals freely subjugate themselves to the collective purposive unity of the sensus 
communis.  
xlv Hegel, Reason in History trans. Hartman, Prentice Hall, , 1995, pg. 89. 
xlvi Grassi argues that this point was made by Plato in the Cratylus. The point was in reference to the origins 
of names as Plato challenges Cratylus on the idea that nomenclature is an arbitrary sign. For Plato language 
begins with action or praxis. Grassi notes that this is also the case with Herder. See Grassi, Ernesto, The 
Primordial Metaphor, Medieval and Renaissance Tests and Studies, Birmingham, New York, 1994, pp 24-
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xlviii Hegel, Reason in History trans. Hartman, Prentice Hall, , 1995, pg. 89. 
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Medieval and Renaissance Tests and Studies, Birmingham, New York, 1994, pp 10- 14. 
l “Making and acting are different . . . so that the reasoned state of capacity to act [i.e. phronesis] is 
different from the reasoned state of capacity to make [i.e. techne].” Or again “phronesis cannot be . . . 
techne . . . because action and making are different kinds of thing.” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1140a 
2-5 &1140b 1-4. The traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s discourse on poesis and praxis is that they are 
distinct, but taken as a whole his theory of action becomes problematic. As D.F. Pilario has noted in his 
book Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis there are three general interpretations of Aristotle on this point. 
The maintenance of a distinction, proposed in the interpretations of Charles and Reeve. The possibility that 
some events could be double- faced and considered both from different perspectives as proposed by Ebert 
following Penner. And the third proposed by Askill that Aristotle has no coherent theory of action and so 
the point is mute. See Pilario, D.F., Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis Exploring Theological Method 
with Pierre Bourdieu, Peters Publishers, Leuven, 2006, pp. 14-15. 
li Grassi, Ernesto, The Primordial Metaphor, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, Binghamton, 
New York, 1994, pg 27-28.  
lii Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971, pg 34. 
Chapter 14: Art and Human Knowing 
 
Imbedded within Poetic Unity and the idea of poetry was the notion of poesis as both 
stratagem and praxis. Inherent within it were certain aesthetic precepts. They were: 
 
• Art was experiential, originating in the particularity of life.  
• Art was an originary act, a conscious or unconscious generative activity that 
set in motion the process of self-actualization. 
• Art had a cognitive function, producing signification and meaning. 
• Art was an expression of a given people in a given age in a given location, a 
manifestation of the sensus communis. As such its’ signification was 
historical.  
• Art was a vehicle to the truth of human consciousness.  
 
That meant that art was not a representation of an external other (nature or otherwise) 
precisely because it was the source of the generation of our cognition of that external 
other and our worldview. The writings of Schiller, Goethe and Hegel were an extension 
of the notion of Poetic Unity from a theory of nature and cognition, to consciousness and 
aesthetics. All saw art as an originary act, as a means of expression and a manifestation of 
the sensus communis and spirit of the age. And in each of their Aesthetics art was defined 
as a generative activity and therefore could no longer be seen as representative. That 
formed the basis of a rejection of the aesthetic tradition. Goethe and Hegel’s work would 
challenge the theory of imitation, so central to Enlightenment aesthetics. While they took 
 482
direct aim at the theory of ‘la belle nature’ their attack applied equally well to all theories 
of art that posed an ideal model, including mimesis.  
Both Goethe and Schiller would challenge the notion that art was a vehicle to 
rationality. Schiller would instead define it as the means to overcome the Vernuftstaat. 
Both would draw a parallel between consciousness and art that would restructure 
aesthetics. This new definition of Art would find its metaphysical grounding in Hegel’s 
Lectures on Fine Art and The Phenomenology of Spirit as it was given prominence in the 
discourse of knowledge. Art now became a primary vehicle to the comprehension of 
Truth in the philosophical sense.  
 
 “A poet is a creator of a people; he gives it a world 
to contemplate, he holds its soul in his hand.” 
Herder 
Sammtliche Werke i 
 
Poetry as the Novum Organum of Philosophy 
 
With Poetic Unity the imagination was no longer a human faculty that built up the 
world of art, it was the human faculty that provided access to a whole metaphysics, one 
that would transform the perception of art and its relationship to truth. This can certainly 
be seen in the philosophical texts of the time.  
For Hamann, life was action, a continuous creative endeavor, a combination of poesis 
and praxis. And it was also part of Herder’s philosophy. One of his central tenets that he 
never abandoned was that thought and language, were forms of action.ii For him, the 
purest form of action was poetry, because it stimulated, directed and spurred one on to 
praxis. iii This idea of poetry/action was embodied in his idea of Fortgang, of advance 
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(the central concept in creating the Unity of Theory and Practice out of the disparate 
histories of civilizations). It was this central idea that prompted him to make the claim 
that; “A poet is a creator of a people; he gives it a world to contemplate, he holds its soul 
in his hand.”iv At issue was not specifically the art form of poetry, but rather the concept 
I have termed Poetic Unity as an originary creative act; a conscious or unconscious
generative activity composed of praxis and poesis that set in motion the process of self 
actualization. It was in the creative act that a people were created and a world given to 
contemplation. This idea was echoed by Fichte in his volo ergo sum. This was the work 
of the Poet; it was the essence of art.  
 
In his critique of reason, Goethe did not reject science or functionalism, but the 
inherent abstract reason of the epistemology of science. He once claimed: “It was, in 
short not in my line, as a poet, to strive to embody anything abstract.”v Abstract reason 
what Kant called Vernunft, the “Understanding”, was in Goethe’s mind, anathema to art. 
“I am rather of the opinion, that the more incommensurable, and the more 
incomprehensible to the understanding, a poetic production is, so much the better it is.”vi 
In the words of Novalis; “Poetry is what is absolutely and genuinely real. That was the 
kernel of my philosophy. The more poetic, the more true.”vii In his 1795 text On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller would make the following statement; “In a word, 
there is no other way to make the sensuous man rational than by first making him 
aesthetic.”viii Fichte’s idealism was based upon his conception of the ‘productive 
imagination’, and in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism art was the 
culmination of philosophy. This idea found resonance in Friedrich Schlegel. For him, the 
task of the poet was to strive for what he called ‘transcendental poetry’.ix  
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In the Systemprogramm of 1796 Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel had set that as their 
goal, to make poetry philosophical and philosophy poetic.x While historically 
overlooked, it has proven to be the most important philosophical text of the 1790’s. In it 
they claimed that the idea that unites all the rest was the idea of beauty in the Platonic 
sense. “I am now convinced that the highest act of Reason, the one through which it 
encompasses all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness only become sister
in Beauty- the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet.” And 
latter on; “Until we express the Ideas aesthetically, i.e. mythologically, they have no
interest for the people, and conversely until mythology is rational philosophy must be 
ashamed of it.” What the Systemprogramm asserted was that art had to become 
philosophical in order for the people to become rational, but conversely philosophy h
to become aesthetic if philosophers were to be profound. Accordingly, “Poetry gains 
thereby a higher dignity, she becomes at the end once more, what she was in the 
beginning- the teacher of mankind; for there is no philosophy, no history left, the maker’s 




er sciences and arts.”xi  
As Cassirer noted, Goethe titled his autobiography Poetry and Truth (Dichtung und 
Wahrheit) not because it was in anyway meant to be imaginary, but because he believed 
that in order to formulate a truth about his life he needed to give to the disparate facts of 
his existence a poetic or symbolic form.xii The poet does not provide us with momentary 
fragments of data, or outbursts of emotion and impassioned feeling. He or she provides us 
with an image of human life as a whole, in its greatness and in its weakness. “Art does 
not undertake to emulate nature in its breadth and depth. It sticks to the surface of natural 
phenomena; but it has its own depth, its own power; it crystallizes the highest moments 
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of these superficial phenomena by recognizing in them the character of lawfulness, the 
perfection of harmonious proportion, the summit of beauty, the dignity of significance, 
the height of passion.”xiii Goethe’s fixation on the ‘highest moments of phenomena’ is 
not the imitation of things, or the overflow of emotion. It is an interpretation of reality, 
not by conceptual thinking, but by intuition, not through abstract thought, but through 
sensual medium.xiv Art had to be imminent, it had to be what Schelling called ‘the 
infinite finitely presented’, and what Hegel referred to as a ‘concrete universal’. In 
Idealism the boundary between art and philosophy grew thin and transparent, as Reason
the subject matter of philosophy- was increasingly associated with the aesthetic act. Art 
became elevated to a new role; it became a
- 
 Novum Organum.xv 
 
“Has, creation a final goal? And if so, why was it not 
reached at once? Why was the consummation not 
realized from the beginning? To these questions 
there is but one answer: Because God is Life, and 
not merely Being.”  
 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling 
Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human 
Freedom  
 
The Overturning of an Aesthetic Tradition 
 
With Poetic Unity we began to see emerge a new definition of art that would 
eventually overturn the existing tradition of Western aesthetics. It would begin with an 
outright challenge to ‘Subjective’ aesthetics and its growing focus on emotion and 
aesthetic pleasure, but it would quickly proceed to an attack on ‘Objective Aesthetics’ 
and the idea that the role of art was to reveal the underlying a priori laws of Nature. At 
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it’s core, and this is a point often lost, was the Idealist philosopher’s challenge to the 
abstract reasoning of the epistemology of science.  
In his Nouvelle Heloise, Rousseau proposed a new conception of art as the ideal of 
‘character’. For him, art was not the description or reproduction of the empirical world; it 
was an overflow of emotions and passions. Additionally, there was the emerging idea of 
art as the creation of beauty for the purpose of appreciation, or aesthetic pleasure. This 
was derived from ‘Subjective’ aesthetics, particularly as espoused by Kant and 
Baumgarten. These conceptions of art as emotive or subjective have often been referred 
to as Romanticism and are associated with the Sturm und Drangxvi movement in German 
literature and music. The criticism of these conceptions has been that they went too far in 
postulating the idea that the infinite, metaphysical truth was a personal vision of spirit 
and that art was the singular expression of it. This view of art comes with a risk; art can 
become too subjective and lose contact with the real, with the concrete exigencies of 
matter. It opens itself to the same charges of nihilism and destruction examined earlier. 
Idealist aesthetics are often lumped into this category and summarily dismissed as 
Romanticism. I intend to show that the aesthetics of Idealism in no way subscribed to this 
idea of art as wholly emotive or subjective. Furthermore, such critiques are more the by-
product of a superficial reading of certain texts, then a studied examination of the 
collective writings of the period.  
Goethe and Hegel played a key role in the dissolution of traditional theories of art, 
challenging them and the growing trend toward aesthetic appreciation outright in their 
writings. As Goethe commented in his ‘Von deutscher Baukunst’; “Do not let a 
misunderstanding separate us, do not let the effeminate doctrine of our modern 
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esthetizisers so enfeeble you that you can no longer bear what is meaningful but rough, 
lest in the end your sickly sensibility can tolerate only what is polished but meaningless. 
They would have you believe that the fine arts sprang from our supposed inclination to 
beautify, to refine, the things around us. That is not true! . . . Art is creative long before it 
is beautiful, And yet, such art is true and great, perhaps truer and greater than when it 
becomes beautiful. For in man there is a creative force which becomes active as soon as 
his existence is secure. When he is free from worry and fear, this demigod, restless in 
tranquility, begins to cast about for matter to inspire with his spirit.”xvii  
The only true art for Goethe was the one that sprang from the creative impulses of 
man’s primal being.xviii “And so the savage decorate their coconut-fiber mats, their 
feathers, their bodies, with bizarre patterns, ghastly forms and gaudy colors. And even if 
this creative activity produces the most arbitrary shapes and designs, they will harmonize 
despite the apparent lack of proportion. For a single feeling created them as a 
characteristic whole. This characteristic art is in fact the only true art. If it springs from a 
sincere, unified, original, autonomous feeling, unconcerned, indeed unaware of anything 
extraneous, then it will be a living whole, whether born of coarse savagery or cultured 
sensitivity.”xix As Cassirer has noted we must be careful not to interpret Goethe’s 
statements to mean that art is merely the expression of emotion and inner life. If it were, 
it would only be imitative of an inner subjectivity.xx Art was expressive, but it was also 
formative, as applied in a sensual medium. This was the true origin of art.  
For Hegel, ‘Subjective’ aesthetics proved a major concern. Its very nature lies in the 
conception of art as tied to the individual human mind in possession of the powers of 
creativity. As such, art was relegated to an autonomous subjective realm of existence. 
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One need only recall that such a subjective realm lies within the res cogitans to realize 
that it ran the same risk of internalized abstraction as the Vernuftstaat. It was on this point 
that he leveled his attack. 
In the Lectures on Aesthetics he came to the conclusion that the aesthetic theories of 
his time no longer saw art as a means of expressing or even revealing the truth of 
reality.xxi “We have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping them. 
The impression they make is of a more reflected kind . . . Thought and reflection have 
spread their wings above fine art . . . The development of reflection in our life today has 
made it a need of ours, in relation both to our will and judgment, to cling to general 
considerations and to regulate the particular by them, with the result that universal forms, 
laws, duties, rights, maxims, prevail as determining reasons and are the chief regulator. . . 
Consequently the conditions of our present time are not favorable to art. . . Art, 
considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past. . . Art invites 
us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for 
knowing philosophically what art is.”xxii According to Hegel, aesthetics had become a 
denigrated form of philosophical reflection, a form of abstract thought; a moment in the 
Vernuftstaat. It was the death of art. It comes then as no surprise that he would outright 
reject the entire aesthetic tradition, including that of Kant and Baumgarten in his own 
time. xxiii  
Goethe and Hegel’s attacks were not limited to ‘Subjective’ aesthetics; they were also 
directed towards ‘Objective’ aesthetics and the theory of ‘la belle nature’. But it should 
be noted that, here, their attacks applied equally well to all theories that saw art’s role as 
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reflective of a priori laws existing in either nature or an ideal model, and that included 
mimesis.  
For Goethe, the insistence that art was an imitation of nature was an unsophisticated 
connoisseurs’ approach. In his dialogue ‘On Realism in Art’ of 1798 he claimed that: “the 
unsophisticated art lover demands that a work of art be natural and true to life so that he 
can enjoy it in his ‘natural’, often primitive and unsophisticated way.”xxiv Art was not the 
imitation of nature, no matter how that was to be understood. Because the human mind 
was a product of nature the work of art could be said to reflect nature’s rule, but it was a 
rule of human cognition as a part of nature, not nature understood from a mechanistic 
vantage point. According to Goethe the artist must move beyond the scientific definition 
of things to capture what it means to ‘be’ in the world of things. He implied that the 
rationalist approach toward aesthetics by-passed reality as understood by the human 
mind, literally factoring out the human will in the process. The key to artistic expression 
lay in the artist’s ability to learn from nature, while at the same time endowing that 
knowledge with a decidedly human character.  
He came to this interpretation of art not from his knowledge of modern aesthetics, but 
rather from his studies of ancient art. In his 1798 essay On the Laocoon Group he 
claimed: “The artists of antiquity were not laboring under our present-day misconception 
that a work of art must appear to be a work of nature; rather, they identified their works 
of art as such by a conscious arrangement of components, employed symmetry to clarify 
the relationship among these components, and so made a work of art comprehensible.”xxv 
His analysis of the most famous of Hellenistic sculptural groups reveals deep insight into 
his own formulation of aesthetics.  
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Goethe notes that nature in her formulation of things exhibits multiple variations in 
the form of particulars. It is the very particularity of the objects of nature that are the 
source of its beauty and vitality. The artist learns from this observation of nature the 
concept of ‘Individuation’, which Goethe defines as knowledge of the variations in 
appearance and function of the parts, where particular qualities are isolated and 
highlighted. From this, individual components can exhibit significant relationships 
among themselves, as individual characters emerge.xxvi The concept of ‘Individuation’ of 
the particular appears throughout Goethe’s writings and is the cornerstone of his 
aesthetics. It is the relationship of individual members to each other and the articulation 
of their difference in unity that appears as the source of the greatest form of expression.  
Underlying Goethe’s rejection of the theory of ‘la belle nature’, and ‘Objective 
Aesthetics’, was his critique of Enlightenment reason which he saw as anathema to art. 
The abstract reason of the epistemology of science moves from the universal to the 
particular as a mater of course in its system of classification. He saw artistic creation and 
the poetic as a move in the other direction; from the particular to the universal.  
According to Goethe the artist must be profound, thorough and persevering and 
possess the intellectual breath necessary to fully grasp the subject matter in order to 
locate the moment to best portray it.xxvii It is in this way that the artist raises the subject 
above the particular and carries it into the realm of the Ideal, or universal. The Ideal is 
therefore not a set of rules or parameters, nor an ideal type or model, as professed in 
‘Objective’ aesthetics. It is not an eternal concept. Rather it is the selection of a particular 
moment that the individual subject raises to the level of the universal. The implication is 
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that in all cases this moment is present, but it is the great artist, or poet who is able to 
recognize it. For him, the artist actively transforms the particular into a universal.  
That Goethe saw the universal arising from the particular and that this was the very 
essence of artistic creativity is evident in his Conversations of Goethe with Eckerman. In 
it he wrote: “A particular event becomes universal and poetic by the very circumstance 
that it is treated by the poet.”xxviii Latter on in the same text he claimed: “apprehension 
and representation of the individual is the very life of art. Besides, while you content 
yourself with generalities, everybody can imitate you; but in the particular, none can- and 
why? Because no others have experienced exactly the same thing.” It was the 
representing of the particular that was the beginning of composition for him.  
This is perhaps most clearly stated in his Maxim 278, written in 1825. “It makes a 
great difference whether the poet starts with a universal idea and then looks for suitable 
particulars, or beholds the universal in the particular. The former method produces 
allegory, where the particular has status merely as an instance, an example, of the 
universal. The latter, by contrast, is what reveals poetry in its true nature: it speaks forth a 
particular without independently thinking of or referring to a universal, but in grasping 
the particular in its living character it implicitly apprehends the universal along with it.”  
For Goethe, art was not an imitation of nature, nor was it derived from universal 
ideas. It was formative, the creative expression of a people, that gathered the diverse 
particularities of existence into a universal whole, itself a manifestation of a universal 
truth. The insistence that art was a particular that manifests the universal along with it 
would find resonance and epistemological weight in the writings of his friend Hegel in 
both his philosophy and aesthetics in what he would refer to as a ‘concrete universal’. 
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Hegel’s aesthetics were integral to his broader philosophical project and should not be 
addressed independent of it. That project stood in contradistinction to traditional 
philosophy which opposed concepts such as reason and sensibility, imagination and 
logic. He viewed the western philosophical tradition as one immersed in what could be 
seen as either an existentialist or essentialist attitude toward the concrete.xxix In both 
positions the tendency toward the separation of particular and universal resulted in 
opposition, establishing a real epistemological chasm within the structure of our 
comprehension of lived experience. Hegel saw their inherent opposition as the main 
problem with both historic positions. The problem extended to a critique of 
Enlightenment reason. Cartesian rationalism and the epistemology of science, defined the 
relationship between the particular and the universal through the opposition of the res 
extensa and the res cogitans.  
Like Hamann and Herder before him, Hegel believed knowledge had its origins in 
sense perception, universal concepts were secondary productions derived from only those 
features, or characteristics, held in common, as such, they had less reality than the 
particulars of sense perception. Abstract reason, which sought truth in universal concepts, 
failed to grasp that they were an abstraction from the particular, an abstraction produced 
by the removal of intelligible information from the particular. When pushed to the 
extreme, as Hegel believed Newton had done, the universal became divorced from the 
particular. Because of this it could have no ontological weight. It was only the by-product 
of our innate ability to abstract.xxx   
For Hegel, like Hamann and Herder, reality was not the other of thought; hence any 
opposition between appearance and understanding was not a valid one. In The Philosophy 
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of Right he would assert that the existing forms of logic had become inadequate.xxxi  As 
Gadamer notes; “The point is that the chorismos and the Platonic hypostasizing of ideas 
needs to be dispensed with just as does the claim that nature can be explained by 
‘principlia mathematica’. Ontologically, the difference between idea and appearance is as 
invalid as that between the understanding and what it explains. . . . The dichotomization 
of reality into universal and particular, idea and appearance, the law and its instances, 
needs just as much to be eliminated as does the division of consciousness into 
consciousness on the one side and its object on the other.”xxxii  
According to Hegel, this was the central concern of philosophy in the modern era. 
Where philosophy in the Ancient world sought to free man from the constraints of 
particularities of reality, philosophy in the Modern world had to free man from the 
constraints of the universal; the abstract reason of the Vernuftstaat. There had to be a 
reformulation of the definition of reason.xxxiii 
For Hegel true Reason, as opposed to Kant’s Understanding, was the unity of thought 
and reality. In the Philosophy of Right He called this ‘unity’ a ‘concrete universal’; a 
unity of form and content. In it he claimed; “What is rational is actual, and what is actual 
is rational. . . . The great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and transient 
the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For since rationality 
(which is synonymous with the Idea) enters upon external existence simultaneously with 
its actualization, it emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, shapes and 
appearances.”xxxiv And again; “for the form in its most concrete signification is reason as 
speculative knowing, and content is reason as the substantial essence of actuality, 
whether ethical or natural. The known identity of these two is the philosophical idea.”xxxv 
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It was essentially a reformulation of the philosophical concept, or Begriff and it proved 
central not only to his philosophical project, but to his aesthetics as well, proving to be 
the vital link between the two in formulating his new definition of truth, a point I shall 
return to later. 
If the fundamental problem with the philosophical tradition had been its duality and 
its inherent opposition, the aesthetic tradition faired no better. Mimesis, ‘Objective’ and 
‘Subjective’ aesthetics were based upon the duality of image and original that generated 
an inherent opposition between what was perceived as truth and what was perceived as a 
lesser vehicle to it. In each case they were constructed on an opposition.  
In classical mimesis, art emulated nature in its forms, its orders and its underlying 
organization. It was a re-presencing of creation, where the work of art served as a 
microcosm of the macrocosm. It conceptualized the role of the artist as working to 
analogically emulate the central guiding principle of creation found in nature, 
aesthetically defined as harmony.  
It was replaced with a new aesthetic theory, known as ‘la belle nature’ that sought to 
represent the rationality found in nature as an idealized model. ‘La belle nature’ was a 
theory that saw art as indicative of the physical set of rules of operation in nature defined 
mechanistically. In the case of ‘Objective’ aesthetics art’s goal was to reveal the 
mechanistic laws that govern Nature as defined by the natural sciences. In the case of 
‘Subjective’ aesthetics the goal was to reveal how the mechanisms of the rational 
subjective mind operated. In both cases art was beholden to the structure of the 
epistemology of science and the Cartesian duality of mind that established the framework 
of the res extensa and the res cogitans. The work of art was therefore a representation of 
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the mechanistic organization of nature in its physical components. The model being the 
purity of reason exemplified in nature, not Nature herself as an organism or system of 
relationships. Enlightenment aesthetics was based on the idea that Nature was first 
rational and that the function of art was to reveal that rationality.  
Both mimesis and ‘la belle nature’ were aesthetic theories in which the work of art 
was conceptualized as a copy, image, or re-presencing of an external other: Nature. Or 
more accurately the criteria of judgment was structured on how precisely the work, as 
object, replicated the idea of nature as defined by the epistemology. In the former it was a 
mimetic gesture of natures’ underlying harmony, in the later it was an indicative gesture 
of natures’ rationality.xxxvi In both, aesthetics served to answer the question ‘how does art 
reveal the a priori laws discovered in nature?’ In this way Art became a vehicle to truth, 
but via the paradigm of Nature as idealized model.  
Hegel saw such theories as the demise of art. If art only revealed the a priori laws of 
nature, as in mimesis and “la belle nature”, then it would appear to add nothing 
significantly new to nature’s own presentation. Moreover, art ran the risk of being 
presumptuous in being unable to match the diversity and manifoldness of nature; it had to 
be seen as lacking. According to him, such theories could not provide the ‘reality of life 
but only the pretense of it’. They only brought ‘forth technical tricks, not works, of art’, 
whereas art’s true aim was ‘to bring home to our senses, our feelings, and our inspiration 
everything which has a place in the human spirit’.xxxvii He could not accept that this was 
the end or highest achievement of art. 
William Desmond notes Hegel’s basic critique lies in the inherent duality of the 
premise. All such theories (this includes mimesis and ‘la belle nature’) seek to articulate a 
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basis from which the claims of art can be either supported or refuted. “This view seeks to 
ground Art in an extra-artistic paradigm or model which, if revealed or portrayed by the 
artistic imitation, might lend its weight to the cognitive claim of art. In the artistic 
imitation we may perceive what is imitated; in art’s portrayal we may recognize its 
paradigm.”xxxviii Such aesthetic theories present art as an alternative means by which to 
access the concept of truth found in the paradigm or model. In the case of mimesis it was 
nature understood through the filter of Ptolemaic cosmology. In the case of ‘la belle 
nature’ it was understood through the filter of the natural sciences. This inherently leads 
to either a positive or negative view of art in relationship to truth; the negative asserts that 
the work is a distortion, lacking the complexity of the original, while the positive asserts 
that the work reveals or manifests a truth heretofore concealed.xxxix   
That this structure contains an inherent duality between the paradigm and the work is 
an aspect that needs to be examined more thoroughly. The work of art is placed within 
the context of a non-artistic reality to which it must make reference. Within this 
asymmetrical relationship is an inherent hierarchical structure that is metaphysically 
composed of image and original. In point of fact, the original exists unto itself, but the 
image cannot exist outside its reference to the original to which it can never be identical. 
The result is that the original possesses a dimension that resists its complete 
appropriation. While the original may have been imminent in the work of art it is still 
transcendent in relation to it. It is this duality, with its inherent disjunction and 
asymmetry (between the image and the original) that is the source of the negative 
interpretation. Any possession of, or claim to, truth or virtue depends on the external 
original, making art derivative and of secondary importance. At its core, such theories 
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maintain a position in which the work of art has no real epistemological existence outside 
its relationship to the model. This relationship exists in all dualistic theories including 
those whose paradigm are nature, an historical period or ‘Golden Age’, a perfected 
‘Style’, work or ‘model’ (such as the ‘Primitive Hut)’. They all include this disjunction 
and asymmetry. This is certainly the negative formulation of such theories. But as 
Desmond points out, it does not fare much better in relation to the positive formulation 
either. Within these theories the work of art is always already an image of the other. It is 
not an original act in itself. 
What stands then as the inherent condition of all such theories of art is that the work 
of art must be denied any real autonomy, it cannot be addressed on its own terms as a 
human activity, as a creative act, nor can the work of art, or art in general, have any real 
access to truth independent of the model, art fails to be a vehicle to truth distinct from 
that of the model, as it derives its cognitive dimension from the epistemological 
definition of the model. Art becomes a lesser vehicle to understanding truth, one that, as 
in Plato’s allegory, is prone to providing less access to knowledge and hence lacking in 
significance.xl  
But the idea of Poetic Unity asserts that Truth in the form of human knowing emerges 
from the aesthetic act. Hegel’s intention was to prove that art was not an imitation, either 
objectively or subjectively, that it was an autonomous discourse on truth that contained 
within itself its own end and intrinsic worth. In the Introduction to the Aesthetics Lectures 
on Fine Arts he claimed; “. . . art’s vocation is to unveil the truth in the form of sensuous 
artistic configuration, to set forth the reconciled opposition just mentioned [that of image 
and reality, paradigm and work], and so to have its end and aim in itself, in the very 
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setting forth and unveiling.”xli The aesthetic quest proved the same as that of philosophy; 
‘How to reconcile opposition?’  
Desmond poses the question; “however positive a conception of imitation we have, is 
it sufficient to do justice to what appears as the creative dimension of art? Even if 
imitation is positive, is it positive enough? Since, relative to the problem of dualism, 
positive imitation does not totally overcome the disjunction between image and original 
must we not instead seek a conception of art in which creation instead of imitation 
dominates?”xlii This was precisely what Idealist aesthetics, based on Poetic Unity and its 
aesthetic precepts, set out to do. Enlightenment aesthetics posed the question ‘How does 
Art reveal the a priori laws discovered in Nature?’ The question was based on the idea 
that Nature was first rational and that arts function was to reveal that rationality as a 
priori law. The aesthetic precepts of Poetic Unity challenged traditional aesthetics, 
instead posing the question; ‘How does Art create human meaning and expression within 











“Art must abandon actuality and soar with 
becoming boldness above necessity; for Art is a 
daughter of Freedom, and must receive her 
commission from the needs of spirits, not from the 
exigency of matter. But today Necessity is master, 
and bends a degraded humanity beneath it 
tyrannous yoke. Utility is the great idol of the age, 
to which all powers must do service and all talents 
swear allegiance.”  
Friedrich Schiller 
On the Aesthetic Education of Manxliii 
 
Art and Self Actualization in Schiller 
 
Nowhere was this more evident than in Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
where Art became the means by which man re-accessed the Poetic Unity of theory and 
practice. It was in the creative act of poesis, what he called the play impulse, were the 
mutual sublation, of the material and formal impulses occurred, allowing man to resist 
the Vernuftstaat and advance to a higher state of unity. “It is then no mere poetic license, 
but also philosophical truth, to call Beauty our second creator.”xliv By allowing for the 
unification of the opposing impulses in man, poesis served as a precondition for man’s 
self determinacy and the creation of meaning and expression. “The transition from the 
passive condition of perceiving to the active one of thinking and willing is only effected, 
then, through an intermediate condition of aesthetic freedom, and although this condition 
in itself decries nothing in respect to our judgment or our opinions, and consequently 
leaves our intellectual and moral values completely problematical, it is yet the necessary 
condition by which alone we can attain to a judgment and to an opinion. In a word, there 
is no other way to make the sensuous man rational than by first making him aesthetic.”xlv 
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While art did not produce freedom, virtue or justice, it allowed man to be a whole unto 
himself, such that he was the source of his own means and ends.  
Schiller went further, the aesthetic not only allowed for man to be a whole unto 
himself, but it was a whole in itself. “[Art] combines in itself all the conditions of its 
origin and of its continued existence. Here alone do we feel ourselves snatched outside 
time, and our humanity expresses itself with a purity and integrity as though it had not yet 
experienced any detriment from the influence of external forces.”xlvi His conception of art 
was not a reflection, or copy, of some external material exigency, but rather a new 
creation in itself, a new reality, precisely because it embodied both material and form. It 
was the manifestation of a particular human potentiality as material nature was 
transformed through the rational impulse in the form of an idea. Its reality therefore, was 
not a reflection on an a priori other, i.e. Nature, but the production of a uniquely human 
world. For Schiller, as it was for Herder, Art was the expression of man. It was the 
manifestation of a particular in Man’s self-determinacy.  
The Poetic Unity necessary for the Unity of Theory and Practice played into the 
aesthetic not solely in terms of the development of consciousness, but of the actual work 
of art. According to him, the object of the sense impulse was life, while the object of the 
form impulse was shape, in the figurative and literal sense. Their combination in the play 
impulse resulted in his idea of living shape, a concept that denoted all aesthetic qualities 
and what may be referred to as Beauty. “. . . there shall be a partnership between the 
formal and the material impulse, that is to say a play impulse, because it is only the union 
of reality with form, of contingency with necessity, of passivity with freedom that fulfills 
the conception of humanity.”xlvii  
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Necessity and want cannot be overlooked in his construction of self, but neither can 
they be overlooked in the work of art, particularly in architecture, but if they dictate they 
become shackles and restrict both freedom and the development of Poetic Unity. “for as 
long as necessity dictates and want impels, imagination is bound with strong chains to the 
actual; only when want is satisfied does it develop its unrestrained capacities.” While 
Schiller never wrote on architecture specifically, his impact on it was clear; necessity and 
want, the utility of the epistemology of science, needs to be satisfied, but if it was the 
totality of the work then there was no true imagination and no true development of the art 
form, because there is no true development of the self, of Man. There must be more to the 
work.  
For Schiller, the form (verba) was, in his terms, the Ideal. By the term ‘Ideal’ neither 
Schiller nor I, are referring to the contemporary aesthetic term ‘concept’. Rather the use 
of the term ‘Ideal’ references that creative force in man found in any symbolic form. It is 
the expression of the human Spirit as a reflection of its particular ‘Climate’.  
I quote him at length here so that his point is made clear. “And the artist must not 
only overcome, by his treatment, the limitations which are inherent in the specific 
character of his type of art, but also those belonging to the particular material with which 
he is dealing. In a truly beautiful work of art the content should do nothing, the form 
everything; for the wholeness of Man is affected by the form alone and only individual 
powers by the content. However sublime and comprehensive it may be, the content 
always has a restrictive action upon the spirit, and only from the form is true aesthetic 
freedom to be expected. Therefore, the Real artistic secret of the master consists in his 
annihilating the material by means of the form and the more imposing, arrogant and 
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alluring the material is in itself, the more autocratically it obtrudes itself in its operation, 
and the more inclined the beholder is to engage immediately with the material, the more 
triumphant is the art which forces back material and asserts its mastery over form.”xlviii 
Schiller asserted that it was not the material and its value that contributed to the value of 
the work of art, but the form; the Ideal. More importantly, its value as a work of art lay 
precisely in just how much the material was transformed. It was our ability to read in the 
work the overlay of the human spirit on the material in its transformation that provided it 
with its power to inspire us.xlix Goethe had made a similar assertion when he claimed that 
“all great works of art portray some aspect of man.”l 
In Schiller’s construction of the self, the dialectical relationship between the material 
impulse and the formal impulse, was resolved in unity, but not at the expense of the first 
two terms. The material and the formal still exist as independent impulses, but they are 
subsumed within a greater unity by their mutual sublation. The same holds for the work 
of art. While the work of art was a whole unto itself, a world, it nevertheless was still 
comprehended as both material and Ideal. The similarity here to Vico’s conception of the 
poetic metaphor that holds together its divergent components - as a unity in difference - is 
palatable.  
For Schiller, it was the mistake of the Vernunft to see only the material, when it was 
the ideal that was the source of its transformation. In the critique of art, ignorance and 
intellect are not far apart as each attached its intelligence to the perception of art, the 
former to its sensual aspect the immediate presence of the object, the latter only through 
the referring of its concepts to the data of experience. In both cases the focus of interest 
and reflection was on the material aspect and not the form of the work, its appearance or 
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‘shape’, which according to Schiller was the presence of man’s will enacted on the 
material of nature, making ‘living shape’ as he called it. This was not the logical 
appearance of the thing-in-itself, but the appearance of spirit in the work of art that makes 
it a whole.  
Schiller’s understanding of art placed him in direct conflict with the definition of 
architecture, as formulated by the epistemology of science and its Mechanisms of 
Structure and Disposition. Both were shackled by the domination of need and necessity in 
their simulation of reality at the expense of the development of the potential of the art 
form to be expressive of the ‘Ideal’.  
According to Schiller; “Since all actual existence derives its origin from Nature, as an 
extraneous power, but all appearance comes originally from Man, as percipient subject, 
he is only availing himself of his absolute proprietary right when he separates the 
appearance from the essence and arranges it according to his own laws. With unrestrained 
freedom he can join together what Nature sundered, as soon as he can think of it together, 
and sunder what Nature combined, as soon as he can separate it in his intellect.”li What 
Schiller here distinguished was the difference between the outward form, its shape- what 
should be understood as the aesthetic means of expression, style or ‘art-form’- and the 
necessary material form- the actual material and its construct which lay at the core of it as 
object, as the thing-in-itself- what should be understood as the means of fabrication and 
craft, what we might refer to as its ‘core-form’.lii Schiller asserted the necessity of this 
art-form in both its presence, but also its authenticity. “As soon as it is deceitful and 
simulates reality, as soon as it is impure and requires reality for its operation, it is nothing 
but a base tool for material ends and can prove nothing for the freedom of the spirit.”liii 
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There was an introduction of an ethic of truth in the art form, as well as a requirement to 
ascend above the mere expression of material need.  
But one must be careful. While Schiller asserted the centrality of the formal impulse 
in the identification of art, as in the development of man it must not become dominant 
and suppress the material impulse. This again would only lead to a Vernuftstaat in art. 
Rather, Schiller believed that the material must be given honor and its properties taken 
into account. “When the fine artist sets his hand to this same block, as little does he 
hesitate to do it violence, only he forbears to show it. He respects the material at which he 
works not in the slightest degree more than the mechanical artist does; but he will try to 
deceive the eye which takes the freedom of this material under its protection, by an 
apparent deference towards the material.”liv  
It was the unity of the material and the formal in the work of art, their mutual 
sublation to each other that produced the ‘living shape’ the true work of art. As he 
himself stated; “But as with the enjoyment of Beauty, or aesthetic unity, there occurs a 
real union and interchange of matter with form, and of passivity and activity, by this very 
occurrence the compatibility of both natures is proved, the practicability of the infinite in 
finiteness, and consequently the possibility of a sublime humanity.”lv Schiller saw beauty 
and art as midway between matter and form, passivity and activity. It was this locus that 
allowed it to combine the conditions of perceiving and thinking. Its ability to combine 
oppositions, and in effect cancel them out, gave it a dialectical structure. In beauty the 
impulses still exist, but in a greater whole whose existence was the Poetic Unity 
necessary for the Unity of Theory and Practice.   
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This was the source of his critique of the aesthetic theories of the Enlightenment. 
‘Subjective’ aesthetics fails to arrive at a concept of beauty because it cannot distinguish 
the particularity of the thing-in-itself in the sensuous impression. While ‘Objective’ 
aesthetics can never arrive at a concept of beauty precisely because it cannot comprehend 
the work of art in its totality forever seeing it in parts. According to Schiller; “The former 
want to think of beauty as it operates; the latter want to have it operate as it is thought. 
Both must therefore miss the truth, the former because they seek to rival infinite Nature 
with their limited intellectual capacity, the latter because they are trying to restrict infinite 
Nature to their own intellectual laws.”lvi  Goethe and Hegel had begun to lay the ground 
work for a rejection of all such theories in art, but Schiller closed the deal. 
For Schiller, it was through the mutual sublation of material and formal, the creation 
of a dialectical unity that was true Art.  In its final form, true Art embodied in its formal 
impulse the emergence and forward movement of the human Spirit in the form of the 
‘Ideal’, which served as the expressive component of the actual work of Art. But it also 
manifested the properties of its materiality, its craft and its process of coming into being. 
Within the structure of his aesthetics there was an inherent connection between the 
advance of consciousness and the advance of artistic styles. Both the self and the work of 
Art were unities that contained both a formal and material impulse, whose mutual 
sublation was the source of the dialectic of being. As man progressed from one state of 
being to another the foci of art moved from material, to formal, to dialectical. It was this 
connection between art and consciousness that served as the basis of his assertion that 
“there is no other way to make the sensuous man rational than by first making him 
aesthetic”. The key here is to understand that his definition of rational is not that of the 
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Vernunft, but that of the higher state of man in the Ideal. It is in the creative act of 
generating the dialectical unity of material and formal impulses that moves man from the 
state of consciousness in the Vernuftstaat to the ideal state where consciousness accesses 
the Unity of Theory and Practice.  
It must be noted that Schiller’s connection between the advance of consciousness and 
the advance of artistic styles would also be found in Hegel’s aesthetics. It implies that one 
could ‘read’ in the progression of artistic forms the movement of consciousness and the 
Human Spirit. This places it as the heir to Herder’s concept of ‘Fortgang’ the internal 
development of culture in its own habitat, towards its own goals; the development of 
human beings as integrated wholes. As I intend to show, it was also in line with Hegel’s 
reformulation of the Begriff, the unity of thought and reality, of form and content, or what 
he would term a ‘concrete universal’. 
It also squares with Goethe’s categorization of the movement toward true art six years 
earlier in ‘Simple Imitation, Manner and Style’, where the movement was from a focus on 
the material aspect of nature, to the subjective expression of spirit, to a third stage that 
embraced both the essence of the work in its materiality and the expression of spirit. A 
point I shall return to shortly.  
Schiller’s ideas became a standard of Idealist aesthetics and philosophy and should 
not be under-estimated. Art was increasingly seen not only as a means of accessing man’s 
potentiality, but as a necessary guide to reason. Two years after the publication of On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man, G.W. F. Hegel (1770- 1831) along with Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) and Friedrich Holderlin (1770-1843) would assert a 
similar idea; that reason must be made poetic in the Systemprogramm of 1796. Friedrich 
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Schlegel too sought to dislodge logic as the ‘organon of truth’ when in a series of lectures 
delivered between 1800 and 1801 at the University of Jena he claimed that science relied 
on experimentation and constructions that are a creative methodology and hence more 
tuned to the artistic impulse then was acknowledged.lvii  Shortly afterwards Schelling 
would expound on the idea in his System des Transentalen Idealismus of 1800 and the 
Philosophie der Kunst Vorlesung of 1802. Like Schiller, Schelling believed that Poetic 
Unity was manifested in the work of art. True knowledge of the ‘Absolute’ for him was 
based on an understanding of both the conscious and unconscious motivations of the self. 
Philosophy and reason served as poor vehicles for such an exploration precisely because 
reason was likely to bias the consciousness of which it was a part. The work of art on the 
other hand, was a conscious work, but one that also revealed the unconscious will of the 
artist and thus combines both conscious and unconscious. Thus it was through the study 
of art that philosophy gained access to the nature and construct of Poetic Unity and 
thereby the Unity of Theory and Practice, a point later echoed by Hegel in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
“I am rather of the opinion, that the more 
incommensurable, and the more incomprehensible 
to the understanding, a poetic production is, so 
much the better it is.” 
Goethe 
Conversations of Goethe with Eckermannlviii 
 
Art and Self-Actualization in Goethe’s Faust 
 
There can be no doubt that Goethe’s aesthetic theory was influenced and worked out 
in conjunction with his friend Schiller and we can find important similarities in their 
work. Most notably in the three stage development of art and the concept of sublation that 
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is part of Schiller’s notion of both the development of consciousness and the genesis of 
art.  According to Schiller, the oscillation between the material and formal impulses, and 
their eventual sublation to each other proved to be the dialectical structure of Poetic 
Unity.  
In his 1789 essay ‘Simple Imitation, Manner and Style’, Goethe categorized the 
movement toward true art as a three- step process that began with the simple imitation of 
nature. But this only brought the artist of moderate talent to the threshold of style. 
Manner was the stage at which the artist had managed to express ‘what he has grasped 
with his soul’. At this stage the artist developed his art into “a language that expresses his 
spirit directly and characteristically . . . he will approach the things of the world with a 
greater or lesser degree of deliberateness or spontaneity and will accordingly recreate 
them. . . “lix But style according to Goethe was different it “rests on the most fundamental 
principle of cognition, on the essence of things- to the extent that it is granted us to 
perceive this essence in visible and tangible form.”lx Style emerged only when the artist 
managed to capture the essence of the thing, that very characteristic that distinguished it 
from all others. Most significant in Goethe’s three step process is the movement from a 
focus on the material aspect of nature, to the subjective expression of spirit, to a third 
stage that embraces both the essence of the work in its materiality and the expression of 
spirit.  
In his book Goethe’s Theory of Poetry Faust and the Regeneration of Language, 
Benjamin Bennett argues that a similar structure and conceptual framework underlies 
Goethe’s Faust. His analysis reveals how Goethe saw the process as both human 
experience and art form, claiming that Goethe’s masterpiece is a poetic image of the 
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struggle of the levels and movements of consciousness, what he terms the ‘rhythm of 
consciousness’. If his argument is to be accepted, and I believe it is, then one can make 
the argument that Faust is an application of what I have termed Poetic Unity, to the work 
of art. Moreover, it may be argued that it serves as an example of what the work of art, as 
a self-reflective form of philosophy, is. 
Bennett argues that we must not view Faust through the concept of reality. That is to 
say, any examination of it in terms of which individual scenes are grasped as corporeal 
facts, mental entities, or fictions, misses the point. For Bennett, Faust must be understood 
as a series of relations as opposed to the establishment of positions. According to him 
there is no overall continuity. As he sees it; “Goethe in the end prefers not to smooth his 
fiction into a semblance of unfolding human experience. Ordinarily we expect in drama a 
system of physical, social, and psychological relationships that make up the basic 
fictional world. Subtle symbolic or verbal relations, echoing patterns of image or action, 
literary and topical allusions, all exist on a different plane, as commentary upon the basic 
world, as means of universalizing it and bringing it into life poetically. But in Faust the 
fragmentation of the work’s ‘world’ aspect has the effect of nullifying the distinction 
between those different planes on which relationships are established.”lxi Instead he 
argues one must ‘read’ it as a series of relations between levels of consciousness.  
I find Bennett’s argument compelling for three reasons. First, the sense of 
fragmentation of experience implies an intentional awareness on the part of Goethe to 
address the disjunction and diversity that underscores the lived experience as argued by 
Herder. It should be noted that Goethe used a similar strategy in his work Wilhelm 
Meister where he continuously shifted between scientific and poetic literary structures, 
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and in his own autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit. Second, if, as Bennett argues, the 
relations between what might be understood as reality and fantasy are instead relations of 
consciousness, then Faust as a work of art may be read both as a manifestation of 
Schiller’s definition of both consciousness and self-consciousness in the creation of self 
and as a manifestation of the true work of art. Thirdly, and this gets more specifically to 
Bennett’s argument, Faust is a reading of how consciousness becomes self-conscious and 
hence it is a vehicle to truth. As I intend to show, this last point brings the work in line 
with Hegel’s understanding of the relationship of art and truth.  
According to Bennett’s analysis of Faust the structure of Goethe’s text reveals the 
process of ascending and descending consciousness. “. . . the normal direction of 
reflective consciousness is upward; the availability of my earlier consciousness as an 
object of my present consciousness ordinarily constitutes my experience of time. But if 
the process were irreversible, its content would become insupportable . . . Therefore there 
must also be in our experience an opposing or simplifying movement, a movement 
downward, by which the process of consciousness is resolved into a kind of oscillation, 
the natural ‘pulse’ of ‘self-establishment’ and ‘self- relinquishment’ that Goethe speaks 
of in Dichtung und Wahrheit.”lxii The point here made is that if the self were constantly 
on the ascension to a higher level of consciousness the content of that consciousness 
would become too great, too complex for the reflective mind. Thus the reflective mind 
must at times descend or submerge itself in a downward movement narrowing its horizon 
to the point where life as activity becomes possible again. This movement is from the 
general to the particular, toward embodiment and the concrete. Bennett’s point is that 
Goethe is arguing that all of life is this constant oscillation, or pulse, between these two 
 511
moments. It is the upward movement to the self-reflective consciousness that looks back 
upon consciousness to assess, understand and ‘articulate’ it. This movement is the 
movement of reflection, a move in the direction of philosophy. But it is the downward 
movement, the submergence’, into the particular, the concrete, self-consciousness’ return 
to its own activity, that generates a sense of the whole as a unified image. It is a poetic act 
that in the end makes the reflection of the self-consciousness possible as an image of 
truth. But it must also be recognized that such a movement is actually initiated by the 
self-consciousness. Thus philosophy and art become opposite poles of consciousness, but 
not in a hierarchical structure. True human experience and knowledge is the continuous 
movement between the poles of consciousness, between reflection and submergence, 
between praxis and poesis.  As Bennett states; “The notion of consciousness as a pulse 
helps elucidate, among other things, the idea in Faust that precisely man’s ‘erring’ 
provides him with a privileged relation to nature and truth. On the one hand error, or the 
alienation of thought from nature, is unavoidable, since consciousness itself is ceaselessly 
in flux, never achieves an un-shifting perspective upon things. Consciousness, regarded 
purely as perception, is knowledge of the truth; but consciousness is itself by nature 
process or change, and so must ‘err’ from the truth. On the other hand, however, 
precisely the flux or pulse of consciousness turns out to be a participation in nature’s own 
creative activity; nature thinks through us, in that our thoughts are a ‘thinking in the path’ 
of hers. Thus truth is ‘revealed’, but in a form other than knowledge.”lxiii This 
recollection of the movement of consciousness toward self-consciousness and truth is 
central to the philosophy of Goethe’s friend Hegel.  
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Schiller’s concept of sublation to a higher unity reestablishes the relationship between 
nature and intellect. Nature, no longer a concrete entity existing in contradistinction to 
intellection, is conceptualized as a pulse-like interaction between consciousness and 
phenomena. Its essence is revealed in our own conscious experience of erring that both 
establishes and enacts that interaction. A point made by Goethe in the Poem “Im ernsten 
Beinhaus war’s”; “What can man achieve in life more than that divine nature reveal itself 
to him? The way she lets all solid things melt away into spirit, the way she presents 
herself as preserving solidly all that the spirit creates.”lxiv Bennett sees this as an 
indication that consciousness does not move in a single direction, that the movements 
themselves are the experience of consciousness.  
It is this that suggests the connection between Goethe’s theory of consciousness and 
Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man. For Goethe, like Hamann, Herder, and 
Schiller, all thought begins with experience as an operation of consciousness. It is the 
oscillation between the two poles of consciousness, material and formal to use Schiller’s 
terms, that is the experience of consciousness. This oscillation is not a momentary event, 
but a continuous rhythm, an opposition that in the end must be mediated by human 
community in an attempt to perfect human nature.  
For Schiller the achievement of human totality comes in aesthetic play when both 
basic drives are active together. This same concept is present in Goethe where the idea of 
human consciousness, composed of two opposing tendencies which imply each other, 
oscillates as one becomes dominant and calls forth the other. It is the pulsing oscillation 
that gives us access to our own consciousness and totality. For both it is in the practice 
and experience of art that this is most evident. Thus art provides us with the most ready 
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intuition of our total human nature and its purpose therefore, is to provide us with such 
intuition. Bennett explains the theory of poetry in Goethe thus; “The truth conveyed by 
poetry cannot be grasped as a possession; it must be experienced as an intuition of our 
total humanity, proceeding from a combination of opposed conscious movements. 
Therefore both the creation and the proper understanding of poetry require that we 
relinquish the standpoint of conceptual knowledge, which we normally associate with 
truth, in favor of involving ourselves in a particular type of experience; and from the 
point of view of the abstract knowledge that human nature is constituted by two opposed 
tendencies the consciousness that directly experiences those tendencies together is an 
object, hence approachable only by submergence. . . . the duty of poetry with respect to 
truth is to ‘veil’ it, that the truth is more fully true in its poetically submerged form.”lxv 
The point here is not that ‘poetry’ represents a lower level of consciousness or that it 
denies the oscillation, rather that ‘poetry’ serves to objectify the experience of 
consciousness, to manifest it as a particular presence or concrete experience. It is this 
‘objectification’, the creation of an ergon that reveals the stratagem of poesis as the 
experience of consciousness. It is this that underlies the idea of poetry in Idealist 








“. . . nothing is known that is not in experience, . . . 
that is not felt to be true, not given as an inwardly 
revealed eternal verity, as something sacred that is 
believed . . . For Experience is just this, that the 
content- which is Spirit- is in itself substance, and 
therefore an object of consciousness. But this 
substance which is Spirit is the process in which 
Spirit becomes what it is in itself; and it is only as 
this process of reflecting itself into itself that it is in 
itself truly Spirit.” 
G.W.F. Hegel 
Phenomenology of Spiritlxvi 
 
Hegel and the Experience of Consciousness 
 
As with his philosophy, Hegel’s aesthetic quest was a search for reconciliation and he 
found his inspiration in Schiller; “It was Schiller who must be given great credit for 
breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and abstraction of thinking and for venturing 
on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as 
the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production.”lxvii Hegel had been close with 
both Goethe and Schiller and so it is no surprise to find that they shared similar views on 
the experience of consciousness and art. What underlay his most ambitious work, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, was the concept of a continuous rhythmic oscillation of 
consciousness that served as both the origin and method of his ‘science of the experience 
of consciousness.’  
Like Vico and Fichte, Hegel began with an examination of how the mind had 
anything before it at all. According to him, there was a distinction between the absolute 
(that which exists beyond our understanding of reality) and cognition, the act of knowing 
in its basic sense. Cognition required an object as its function and therefore, implied an 
opposition between that object and the knowing subject. If this distinction was always 
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already present in any conception of cognition, then all forms of knowing had to contain 
a correspondence between two moments that were not reducible to each other. The 
originary moment of cognition was therefore, the generation of ‘this’ as ‘I’ and ‘this’ as 
‘object for the comprehension of the ‘I’. As with Vico’s ‘Imaginative Universal’ and 
Fichte’s ‘Anstoβ’, they only came into existence in the presence of the other. Thus, 
consciousness began with the division of being, a doubling of what Hegel called the 
Ansich, the ‘in-itself’. The Ansich served as the method of the Phenomenology, and was 
the key to understanding Hegel’s conception of the experience of consciousness as it 
moves through its stages of development from consciousness (sense-certainty, 
perception, and understanding, the verkehrte Welt), to self-consciousness, and finally to 
the state of ‘Absolute Knowing’.lxviii  
For Hegel this origin is troubled. At the first phase of consciousness, what he refers to 
as ‘sense certainty’, the Ansich is not yet graspable to consciousness. As Verene has 
noted, consciousness cannot hold both moments of this Ansich before it at once, we either 
experience the object or feel our apprehension of it.lxix Consciousness attempts to assign 
to one of the Ansichen, one of the ‘This’, the concept of certainty. It first asserts that the 
object before the ‘I’ must be a certainty, but this upon reflection would mean, that the 
object exists independent of the ‘I’; that the ‘I’ is inessential. But while it struggles to 
hold on to this within the tension of the generative activity that created the division it falls 
back upon the assertion that the ‘object’ is there for the ‘I’. The objects of experience are 
there because we sense them to be there. In the stage of sense certainty there is still the 
conception that one must predetermine the other. According to Hegel; “One of the terms 
is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate being or as the essence, 
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the object; the other, however, is posited as what is unessential and mediated, something 
which in sense-certainty is not in-itself but through the mediation of an other, the ‘I’, a 
knowing which knows the object only because the object is, while the knowing may 
either be or not be.”lxx What the self has done is to forget that the two are mutually 
dependent, a condition that reoccurs throughout the stages of consciousness and self-
consciousness.  
According to Hegel, the next phase, perception, occurs after consciousness has 
secured the external ‘object’ and the ‘I’ in sense-certainty. The original Ansich is now the 
‘being for consciousness’ that initiates yet another doubling creating a new Ansich, as 
consciousness identifies this first Ansich as something for consciousness to perceive. 
Consciousness gets to this new stage not by sensing, but by recollecting the first Ansich.  
This now generates the desire not just to sense the object, but to comprehend it as 
thing and its properties. This is a movement toward abstract reason, as the object 
becomes something to be understood. For Hegel, this is the most dangerous stage of 
consciousness, if the self forgets its own past it retreats into itself, becoming what he 
called the ‘Beautiful Soul’. This is the dawn of what Schiller called the Vernuftstaat, and 
what Vico referred to as the ‘Barbarism of Reflection’. Here the Understanding 
(Verstand) defines the object, not by our sensual relationship to it, but by its qualities or 
abstract concepts. “This true essence of Things has now the character of not being 
immediately for consciousness; on the contrary consciousness has a mediated relation to 
the inner being and, as the Understanding looks through this middle [Mitte] of the play of 
forces into the true background of Things. The middle [Mitte] which unites the two 
extremes, the Understanding and the inner world, is the developed being of Force which, 
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for the Understanding itself, is henceforth only a vanishing.”lxxi In the process it 
engenders a sense of alienation from the particularity of being creating the opposition 
between appearance and the supersensible world that severs the particular from the 
universal.  
For Hegel, this brings on the, verkehrte Welt or inverted world, the questioning of the 
certainty of the Understanding. Consciousness has forgotten its own recollection of the 
first doubling within the Ansich and once again dissolves itself into the object, once again 
believing that one of the ‘this’ of consciousness must precede the other. For Hegel, this is 
the founding of self-consciousness and its’ parallel with the Cartesian cogito; as the 
‘understanding’ now asserts the only certainty is itself. The result, as in the previous 
stage, is an assertion of the ‘I’.lxxii Reason therefore, comes onto the scene as a kind of 
forgetting, as consciousness returns to the ‘this’ as ‘I’. It forgets the image of the world is 
its own construction.  
For Hegel, this is the ultimate problem for philosophy; the tendency to forget the 
course of consciousness and believe that truth is accessible directly at the level of either 
the ‘this’ as ‘I’ or the ‘this’ as object for the comprehension of the ‘I’. The first holds that 
truth exists in the object independent of the ‘I’. The second holds that truth exists in the 
reflective reasoning of the subjective ‘I’.  
At the stages of consciousness (sense-certainty, perception or understanding), the 
verkehrte Welt, and of self-consciousness, the Phenomenology reveals the failure of the 
self to bring the two moments together. Like Schiller’s oscillation between the rational 
and the formal impulses, the Ansich proves to be a continuous oscillation between the 
two moments of the ‘in-itself’. The experience of consciousness moves from the rational 
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fixation on the object; as ‘thing in-itself’ with its own inner propertieslxxiii, to the 
subjective inner of the self as ‘I’ divorced from the external world with its own inner 
subjectivity.lxxiv In these two moments the object is either objectified and meaning 
projected onto it as an external other, or the object is eliminated as something outside the 
self.  
But if the experience of Consciousness were only the continuous oscillation between 
the ‘in-itself’ and the ‘in-itself for consciousness’ there would be no movement of Spirit. 
There must be another action that takes place. As Bennett noted in Goethe, there must be 
submergence. According to Hegel; “. . . what first appeared as the object sinks for 
consciousness to the level of its way of knowing it, the latter is now the new object. 
Herewith a new pattern of consciousness comes on the scene as well, for which the 
essence is something different from what it was at the preceding stage. It is this fact that 
guides the entire series of the patterns of consciousness in their necessary sequence.”lxxv 
As consciousness reaches the end of one stage it exhausts itself. As the moments of 
experience accrete and become laden with new experiences, it must stop and grasp again 
its own form.  
For Hegel, consciousness must re-collect its own experience. It must descend or 
submerge toward embodiment and the concrete. It must move from the universal back to 
the particular. Each descent and submergence establishes the necessity of the re-cognition 
that engenders a new return to immediacy, a new, generative activity. It generates the 
sublation of the ‘this’ of the ‘I’ and the ‘this’ of the object for the comprehension of the 
‘I’ of the previous Ansich. This sublated image, or Bild, becomes the new object for 
consciousness that generates yet another doubling of the Ansich. Hegel calls this action 
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‘Erinnerung’, or recollection, and it is part of the necessary sequence of the experience of 
consciousness.  
The similarity of Hegel’s Ansich/Erinnerung to Schiller’s opposition between 
material and formal impulses and the ‘rhythm of consciousness’ in Goethe’s Faust, 
should not be missed. It is this combination of oscillation, submergence and sublation 
that defines the human experience for all three.  
 
“It is this too which constitutes the more concrete 
meaning of what was described above rather 
abstractly as the unity of form and content; for the 
form in its most concrete signification is reason as 
speculative knowing, and content is reason as the 
substantial essence of actuality, whether ethical or 
natural. The known identity of these two is the 
philosophical idea.” 
G.W.F. Hegel 
The Philosophy of Right lxxvi  
 
Art and the Concrete Universal  
 
Both Schiller and Goethe saw the oscillation between the material and formal 
impulses as having an established parallel with art. Both were forms of Poetic Unity. 
Hegel too would see this parallel, but he would transform it into the basis of his 
metaphysics and a new epistemology.  
For him, the universal need for man to produce art, lay in the self’s need to elevate 
the inner and outer worlds into a spiritual consciousness, in the production of a sensuous 
form in which man could recognize himself. The process of presencing is a struggle for 
the manifestation of Spirit in the realm of appearance; because of this the artwork always 
makes present some aspect of it. According to Hegel; “. . . the concrete content itself 
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involves the factor of external, actual, and indeed even sensuous manifestation. But then 
in return this sensuous concrete thing, which bears the stamp of an essentially spiritual 
content, is also essentially for our inner [apprehension]; the external shape, whereby the 
content is made visible and imaginable, has the purpose of existing solely for our mind 
and spirit.”lxxvii The work of art transcends itself as material without losing the sense of 
the materiality of the sensuous object itself. Material is spiritualized and Spirit is given 
material form. There is a strong affinity here with Schiller’s idea of sublation, the mutual 
submission of the formal and material impulses into a unity, found in his conceptions of 
both man and art.  
As Desmond explains; “The self objectifies itself in the sensuous, but this is not a loss 
of self. Rather the self recovers itself in the sensuous; and so only by losing itself does it 
begin to find itself as articulate.”lxxviii Hegel saw this as what lay behind the artistic claim 
that; the work determines itself. The individual artist begins by determining a work, but 
then must struggle with Spirit itself, which begins to necessitate its own self-
determination. Eventually, leaving the artist determined by it. The aesthetic experience of 
the work of art is the perception of just this dialectic of determination.lxxix For Hegel, this 
is art’s fundamental role as a human activity. “Art has no other mission but to bring 
before sensuous contemplation the truth as it is in the spirit, reconciled in its totality with 
objectivity and the sphere of sense.”lxxx  
Like Schiller, Hegel called this manifestation of the truth of Spirit, the Ideal and it 
was for him the essence of Art. Unlike the Platonic eidos that exists as a transcendental 
abstraction that can only be mirrored in sensuous form, the Hegelian Ideal can only 
become manifest in sensuous form. As Desmond has noted; “the art work makes 
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concretely articulate a complex process of emergence both in the artist and his expressive 
powers, and in his material and its susceptibility to aesthetic form.”lxxxi The Ideal only 
becomes actualized as the beautiful when it is made objective externally as a particular 
sensuous form giving ‘immediate vision to sense and sensuous imagination’. As Hegel 
himself asserts “. . . what is objectified here is the Idea of the beautiful in the totality of 
the world- views implied by it [the work of art]. The work of art therefore is even now 
still to be regarded as an inherently articulated totality, yet as an organism.”lxxxii And 
again: “. . . the content of art is the Idea, while its form is the configuration of sensuous 
material. Now art has to harmonize these two sides and bring them into a free reconciled 
totality.”lxxxiii True art was the reconciliation of the idea with a concrete particularity. The 
nature of artistic concreteness lies in its internal complexity and differentiation which 
contains the manifestation of some universal significance embodied in sensuous form. In 
Hegel’s view the work of art exists in the between of pure intellection and materiality. 
This space of the between is a world unto itself, that in itself is a making of a truth. The 
‘unity in difference’ of the dialectic is identical to what I have referred to as Poetic Unity.  
According to Hegel “This unity of universal and particular, freedom and necessity, 
spirit and nature, which Schiller grasped scientifically as the principle and essence of art 
and which he labored unremittingly to call into actual life by art and aesthetic education, 
has now, as the Idea itself, been made the principle of knowledge and existence, and the 
Idea has become recognized as that which alone is true and actual.”lxxxiv He would credit 
Schiller for the idea, that the work of art in its particularity manifests an apprehension of 
the universal, but a similar argument was also made by Goethe in his Conversations of 
Goethe with Eckerman and in his Maxim 278. In this way the artistic process saved 
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particularity from arbitrariness and universality from irrelevancy. This was what Hegel 
meant when he referred to art as a ‘concrete universal’, and it would serve as his model 
for reason.  
 
“The goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows 
itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection 
[Errinnerung] of the Spirits as they are in 
themselves and as they accomplish, the 
organization of their realm. Their preservation . . . is 
History, but on the side of their comprehended 
organization [philosophy], it is the Science of 
Knowing in the sphere of appearance 
[Phenomenology] . . .”  
 
G.W.F. Hegel 
The Phenomenology of Spirit lxxxv 
 
Absolute Knowing in Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
For Schiller and Goethe, the endless combination of oscillation, submergence and 
sublation was the experience of consciousness. But this was not the endpoint of either 
consciousness or cognition. Likewise for Hegel, the experience of consciousness did not 
stop at self-consciousness this was not the termination of the Phenomenology. There was 
yet another stage, a more ‘comprehensive’ one that he called ‘Absolute Knowing.’lxxxvi It 
was Spirit that knows itself as Spirit. lxxxvii  
At the heart of Absolute Knowing is Hegel’s concept of Erinnerung, or Recollection. 
It is what originates the submergence within consciousness, its’ return to the concrete 
particularities of experience to re-collect them. Throughout the stages of the 
Phenomenology Spirit forgets this submergence leading to the creation of yet a new 
doubling of the Ansich. But not in Absolute Knowing, here the self, as Spirit, has full 
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recollection of its own experience. According to Hegel, “Through this movement of 
action, Spirit has come on the scene as a pure universality of knowing, which is self-
consciousness, as self-consciousness that is the simple unity of knowing. It is only 
through action that Spirit is in such a way that it is really there, that is, when it raises its 
existence into Thought . . .”lxxxviii  
At this stage, Thought makes itself the basis of itself. It questions the duality of the 
Ansich; that the object, as appearance is distinct from consciousness. It recognizes that 
the ‘in-itself’ and ‘in-itself for consciousness’ are the reality of being; that the ‘and’ is the 
essential element. According to Verene; “Absolute knowing freely releases itself into the 
world of metaphysical thought not because it has attained a unity between the two 
moments within the being of the subject, but because it has overcome all illusion that 
there is such a phenomenon. It takes up the quest for unity in different terms; it attempts 
to think the ‘and’ of its two moments as a unity.”lxxxix Spirit recreates the image of its 
experience of being; as “both in essence and in actuality, or in and for itself.”xc 
This new image is dialectical, one that does not seek a third term because it is the 
realization of the ‘and-ness’ of this relationship, the two moments of the Ansich exist in 
conjunction, they cannot be reduced to the other nor can they be compressed into another 
moment. Like Fichte before him, Hegel makes the point; there is no synthesis, no 
reduction to singularity, the two moments are reliant on each other for their existence 
they cannot be thought of independently. According to Hegel, in order to achieve this 
realization there has to be a resolution of opposition, not in the form of a synthesis, but of 
a coincidentia oppositorum, what he termed Aufhebung.xci It is the sublation within a 
‘unity in difference’ that serves as the structure of the Hegelian dialectic. Absolute 
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Knowing is the sublation of the subject and object; a ‘unity in difference’. The self as 
Spirit, has come to recognize the Ansich for what it is; a Poetic Unity.  
Absolute Knowing is brought on by the submerging action of Erinnerung and the 
sublating of the duality of the Ansich. They are two actions and their analysis reveals two 
modes of thought, two modes of speech that redefine Truth and arts relationship to it 
within a dialectic of art and philosophy.  
The method of the Ansich is the generative action that creates the image of the self, 
the arché of ‘Being’. Verene sees it as a form of ingenium. He claims; “Ingenium 
connotes at once the power both to form imagistically and to form through an intellectual 
principle. It contains both a sense of imagistic and conceptual forming. Through 
ingenuity a new and needed object is produced through a reshaping of what is already at 
hand. In other words ingenuity is a way of doing something that gets its method 
immediately from the content before it. Each time it makes up its method 
immediately.”xcii The resulting image, or Bild, is what brings meaning to experience. 
Thus the experience of consciousness in its origin and method, takes the form of artistic 
ingenuity.xciii This is a poetic act, a form of poesis. The Ansich of the Phenomenology 
reveals that the same activity- poesis- operates in two areas of our being; cognition and 
expression. It is the same action applied in different directions. Thus we find in Hegel, 
like Schiller and Goethe, a parallel between the oscillation of the moments of 
consciousness and their sublation in the stratagem of poesis.  
But the creation of the image, the Bild, requires the action of Erinnerung to formulate 
a dialectical image of itself as a ‘unity in difference’. This is not simple memory or 
mental retention, but rather a more complex power to recall what is already in 
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consciousness to make it known again. It therefore carries with it a sense of inner 
awareness, where consciousness is both inside the memory being recalled and outside it 
as the very power calling it forth. It is this aspect of self-awareness and calling forth that 
makes it a form of praxis.  
In Aristotle praxis is a voluntary or goal-oriented action, in Kant it is practical reason. 
Both senses are present here as Erinnerung is the action of submergence, the conscious 
attempt to re-collect the experience of consciousness, to make sense of it and in that 
process to return to the practical aspect of experience. Contained within it is both 
contingency; the particularities of experience, and the conceptually-grasped organization 
of them as history. The creation of this conceptually grasped history Hegel calls a 
Begriff.xciv   
Erinnerung is not the same form of logic as the logical syllogism. It is not a form of 
abstract reason, precisely because of its inherent submergence. It requires the ingenuity of 
the Bild for its renewal. It must return to the particularity of being, the sensual experience 
of consciousness. As such, it is not a mere symbolic image, a picture thought 
(Vorstellung). In the new memory-image the concept appears in conjunction with the 
image, resembling the structure of Vico’s poetic metaphor, the ‘Imaginative Universal’. 
xcv It is a form of ‘concrete’ thinking, thus distinct from the abstract reason of the 
Verstand.  
As Verene notes the Begriff is a concrete universal in which the particular is formed 
in a dialectical, non-abstract manner and by a means of which consciousness can think or 
know a thing as it actually is. For Hegel everything that was true was concrete. In the 
Philosophy of Right Hegel asserted; “the great thing to apprehend in the show of the 
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temporal and transient is the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is 
present.”xcvi And   “It is particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to 
universality, i.e. its individuality.”xcvii  As T.M. Knox has noted, for Hegel “The essence 
of thought is its concreteness, and the concrete thought is what Hegel calls the concept. . . 
. Again, the concept is the universal which particularizes itself, the thought which actively 
creates and engenders itself.” xcviii  
For Hegel, the image and concept; the Bild and the Begriff are two forms of thought 
and speech. As consciousness moves, the Begriff comes to an end point only to be 
renewed through the ingenuity of the Bild. This renewal comes in the form of a new 
metaphor born of the memory of consciousness that generates a new doubling of the 
Ansich. The metaphor is given conceptual life as a new Begriff ensues within the 
resulting movement of consciousness.  
As Verene has noted, Hegel’s dialectic is not a method in the sense of a formula, but 
rather a stratagem, a form of ingenuity, it is the continuous activity of creating the Bild 
that leads to the Begriff. This stratagem is necessary for Spirit as it moves, it must always 
stop and recollect itself, reformulate its image of itself, and cognize that image before it 
can move on.  
It is this back and forth oscillation of metaphor and reason, of poetic and discursive 
logic and poetic and discursive speech that is the very structure of consciousness 
according to Hegel. But it also serves as the foundation of his epistemology. Truth in its 
ultimate form as ‘Absolute Knowing’ is the union of the Bild and Begriff, the sublation of 
sensuous and rational thought. 
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 “Mnemosyne, or the absolute Muse, art, assumes 
the aspect of presenting the externally perceivable, 
seeable, and hearable forms of spirit. This Muse is 
the generally expressed consciousness of a 
people. The work of art, of mythology propagates 
itself in living tradition. . . . This work of art is a 
general possession, the work of everyone. Each 
generation hands it down embellished to the one 
that follows; each works further toward the 
liberation of absolute consciousness.” 
G.W.F. Hegel 
On mythology, ‘National Spirit’ and Artxcix 
 
Kunst-religion: Art and the Sensus Communis 
 
In Hegel’s philosophy poesis was given epistemological weight as art and reason 
were redefined as a concrete universal. No longer a revelation of, or a means toward 
truth, art became a model for it, as art and reason were re-conceptualized as two forms of 
Poetic Unity; one in expression and the other in cognition. But we must be careful not to 
assume that Hegel saw art as the highest form of knowledge. Art provides us with an 
image, or Bild of the creation of meaning within the particularity of time, but in Absolute 
Knowing, there must be a union of the Bild and Begriff. Art must become self-conscious 
of its own self-actualization. If Aristotle asserted that techne was a poesis that then 
needed to be analyzed, retraced in reverse to find the principles of its own formulation, 
Hegel applied a similar concept. To truly enter into the discourse of knowledge and reach 
its own fulfillment in Absolute Knowing, Art must sacrifice its own aesthetic 
characteristic. It must re-collect the particularities of its being as a conceptualized history. 
Art must create a Begriff. This was the basis of Hegel’s ‘science of art’, or Aesthetics.c  
For Hegel, what unites all forms of knowing; philosophy, art and religion, is the 
creative articulating power of Geist that serves as their motivator. ci  It is given sensuous 
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form in art and serves as the source of arts creative expressiveness. This is art’s true 
content, and it transforms the work of art into a dialogue between man and the divine. 
Desmond gives us Hegel’s definition of great art as: “attempting to realize this double 
aim: to reveal the dignity and glory of man in his original and creative powers; and to 
strain to display the bond between these powers and what is absolute. Great art strains 
both inwards and upwards . . . [it] both gives us images of the divine in man, and thus in 
man gives us images of the divine.”cii In this sense, art takes on a dimension akin to 
religious phenomena; a point made by Hegel in the Phenomenology, when he spoke of art 
as a Kunst-religion.ciii He was not the only one to assert this position in fact the entire 
circle of Idealist thinkers saw art in this way including Schiller, Goethe, Von Humbolt 
and Holderlin.  
The idea of Kunst-religion exposes a dialectical relationship between poesis and 
historical signification that is the key to understanding Hegel’s Aesthetics. Because art is 
the manifestation of Geist- its literal presencing- its’ development is also present and 
readable in the historical development of art. In the Lectures on Fine Arts, Hegel tells us 
Geist moves through three different relationships of meaning and shape.civ “The forms of 
art are nothing but the different relationship of meaning and shape, relations which 
proceed from the Idea itself and therefore provide the true basis for the division of this 
sphere.”cv Because such relationships proceed from the Ideal, their movement is Spirit’s 
self-awakening, not at the level of the self as individual, but at the level of Geist as 
universal signification. 
Hegel identifies these different relationships as Symbolic, Classical and Romantic.cvi 
In the first stage the Symbolic, Spirit searches for expression in the external forms of 
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nature, in the material. In this sense it is abstract. In the second stage the Classical, Spirit 
manifests a form appropriate to it; there is a true unity of form and idea. In the third stage 
the Romantic, Spirit dissolves the unity of the Classical as it recognizes the true subject 
matter of art is the universality of the Spirit. But it searches for meaning in the abstract 
once again.cvii Unlike that of Winkelmann, Hegel’s tripartite division is not referring to a 
simple evolution of aesthetic refinements or styles. He is not, as is often asserted, 
providing a rigid prescription of teleology or progress, nor is he asserting an ideal age. 
Like Vico and Schiller before him, he is postulating three unique means of expressivity 
that are reflective of three different stages in the development of consciousness and Geist. 
For Hegel, there is a correspondence between the state of consciousness and the type of 
relationship. It would be a mistake to see the Romantic as arts culmination; a perfected 
style or epoch. The term Romantic does not designate a style of art from the late 1700’s. 
It would also be a mistake to see the Romantic as the synthesis of Symbolic and 
Classical. He is referring to a state of consciousness in the post-classical world, a period 
dominated by Christianity and its emphasis on the spiritual over the physical. 
It must be remembered that it was in the Romantic age that Hegel claimed the death 
of art, because it ‘invites us to intellectual consideration and not for the purpose of 
creating art’. This was also the age of Vico’s ‘Barbarism of Reflection’ and Schiller’s 
Vernuftstaat. It was the age that Hegel sought to overcome in his philosophy. In fact we 
sense in Hegel the necessity for a dialectic of Classical and Romantic; an age when Geist 
knows art as its own manifestation as in and for itself, and once again able to manifest the 
physical form appropriate to it. While Hegel uses the term Classical to refer to the age 
when form and content are one, he is not espousing Classical art as an ideal model. 
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Rather he is identifying the ideal state of consciousness within which to create art that 
was a true concrete universal.  
Goethe had made the same point. Unlike classicists of his age, who viewed the 
Ancients as superior in their artistic ability, and hence should be imitated as a model, 
Goethe saw a people whose fundamental means of conceiving the world made them 
superior poets. His interest in classicism was less an interest in antique art as a model, but 
in antique culture as a model for the production of great artists. According to Goethe, the 
reason for our appreciation of the ancient works of art lay in the nature of their creative 
drive, their cognitive processes and their minds. In answer to the question why do we 
appreciate their poets and historians he stated: “Because the figures they put before us 
restrict themselves in the range of their interest to such subjects as themselves, their 
nation, their own lives and those of their fellow citizens. Because they concentrate all 
their thoughts and desires and energy on immediate reality. Hence it was not difficult for 
the like-minded poet to immortalize their reality. For them actuality had the unique 
significance that the imagination and emotions have for us today. The ancient poet lived 
in his imagination, just as the ancient historian lived in the political world, and the 
ancient scientist in the world of nature. They all adhered to the immediate, the true, the 
real; even the products of their imagination have bones and marrow. . . . Emotions and 
thinking were not yet fragmented, and the all but irreparable rift in the healthy oneness of 
man had not yet occurred.”cviii His fascination with the antique was a reflection of his 
interest in the way in which the ancient peoples lived in the ‘immediate reality’ in the 
concrete. If there was any reason to hold the work of the Ancient world in high esteem is 
was not because it was an ideal model to be imitated, but because the structure of the 
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society was such that it created the most ideal conditions for art to flourish. For Hegel 
this was the age when the unity of form and content was most easily attainable.  
Hegel’s philosophy was in many ways a philosophy of history, in truth it was an 
assault on History as defined by the Enlightenment. That definition was the by product of 
the epistemology of science’s definition of time as understood by Galileo and Newton; 
the disintegration of time into a series of disconnected moments. History becomes the 
mere recording of the particularities of time, a vehicle in which the past is relegated to the 
‘past’, to be imitated perhaps, but not lived as a vital force. For Hegel, this understanding 
of history provides no access to the Absolute. This was why he called for the end of 
history.cix 
Hegel used art as a means of combating this definition of time and history. Aristotle 
had claimed poetry was more philosophical than history.cx The same premise underlies 
Hegel’s understanding of art and time. He claimed: “Just as little can the representations 
of art be called a deceptive semblance in comparison with the representations of 
historical narrative, as if that had the more genuine truth. For history has not even 
immediate existence, but only the intellectual presentation of it, for the element of its 
portrayals, and its contents remains burdened with the whole mass of contingent matter 
formed by common reality with its occurrences, complications and individualities. But 
the work of art brings before us the eternal powers that hold dominion in history, without 
any such superfluity in the way of immediate sensuous presentation and its unstable 
semblances.”cxi  
Unlike histories descent into the ever-changing flux of and fragmentation of time and 
particularity, Art is the attempt to gather essential meaning from life itself, by providing a 
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universal significance to man’s historical existence uncluttered by the insignificant 
contingencies of everyday life. In this way it reveals the essential strivings of humanity 
through the course of time. 
Hegel saw the advance of art through history as the movement of Geist; the collective 
spirit of a given culture. “Those who are called geniuses have acquired some special skill 
or other whereby they make the general forms of a people their work . . . What such 
geniuses produce is not their invention, but the invention of a whole people, or the 
finding that a ‘people’ has found its essence.”cxii The meaning inherent in the process of 
artistic production was not derived from the individual work of art as in ‘What does it 
mean?’, but rather in art’s relationship to the larger economy of the human Spirit. It was 
this relationship that revealed an important element in the constitution of humanity as a 
whole, and it was precisely this knowledge that founded a greater awareness of the self. 
In this way, Hegel’s aesthetics, deals with both the particular and the universal as the 
basis of self-knowledge. Just as the given work of art represents an end in itself, so too 
does the larger development of a given art form in the course of a culture’s history.  
The German Aufhebung comes full circle. Following Herder’s sense of ‘belonging’, 
Fichte asserted that the individual forget himself in the species, his purpose was to 
become a contribution to the collective. It was in the sensus communis that the loci of 
man’s Poetic Unity was to be found. For Hegel the same was true for art, the artist must 
sacrifice his own individual expression to the expressive will of the sensus communis.  
“[the artist] is like someone who finds himself among workers who are building a stone 
arch, the scaffolding of which in invisibly present as an idea. Each puts on a stone. The 
artist does the same. It happens to him by chance to be the last; in that he places the last 
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stone, the arch carries itself. By placing the last stone, the artist sees that the whole is one 
arch; he declares this to be so and thereupon is taken to be the inventor. . . . So is the 
work of art the work of all. There is always one who brings it to its final completion by 
being the last to work on it and he is the darling of Mnemosyne.”cxiii Herder’s notion of 
Fortgang, the advance of symbolic form and thought in a given culture, becomes the 
means by which to answer the question of how aesthetics presents the Begriff.  Art 
reveals not only the originary activity of Poetic Unity in the creation of individual work, 
but the development of meaning and expression as Geist moves through the sensus 
communus, presenting us with a concept of humanity as a whole. 
For Hegel, Aesthetics is a form of Erinnerung, a re-collecting of the processes of 
signification at the level of both particular and universal. Its task is both the examination 
of the process of poesis, as a Bild and its historical manifestation as an expression of the 
sensus communis; as a Begriff. In order to transcend to the level of ‘Absolute Knowing’, 
to reach its own fulfillment, art must become both Bild and Begriff. Art must grant an 
Absolute dimension to man. When this is achieved it becomes metaphysics and the true 









“The minstrel is the individual and actual spirit from 
whom, as a subject of this world, it [the world] is 
produced and by whom it is borne. His ‘pathos’ is 
not the stupefying power of Nature but 
Mnemosyne, recollection and a gradually 
developed inwardness, the remembrance of 
essence that formerly was directly present. He is 
the organ that vanishes in its content what counts, 
is not his own self but his Muse, his universal 
song.” 
G.W.F. Hegel 
The Phenomenology of Spiritcxiv 
 
The Dialectic of Art and Philosophy 
 
As has been pointed out by several commentators on his writings, Hegel’s 
philosophic system has a decidedly aesthetic ring about it due to its emphasis on dynamic 
form, organic unity and wholeness. What He had done was establish a dialectic of Art 
and Philosophy, and the two means of human activity they represent; expression and 
cognition. Their relationship was dialectical. But it also implied permeability. 
Hegel’s system sought to examine man’s struggle to bring the concrete from 
obscurity to articulation. It was this process that in the end prevented philosophy from 
launching off into abstraction, from becoming esoteric and autonomous. According to 
Hegel it was the philosophical examination of the artistic process and what was learned 
from it that opened philosophy to the realm of concreteness, giving it a richness that was 
otherwise lost. What Hegel took from art was its ability to manifest the concrete. It was 
this ability that for him was the ultimate goal of philosophy, to match the imaginative 
unity present in art, through the manifestation of a comparative conceptual unity. Hegel 
referred to this as speculative reason, and it was his answer to the Vernuftstaat. In the 
end, art and philosophy are complementary modes of human articulation, one a form of 
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imaginative concreteness and the other a conceptual concreteness. Philosophy gained its 
ground through its’ opening to art. 
Art was the articulation of meaning as imaginative emergence and it was this that 
made it a means toward truth in its own right. The lesson learned from art was the 
significance of the process of origination and it was central to his philosophy. Just as the 
work of art was an emergence in sensuous form, a concrete universal, so too was the 
philosophical concept a process of emergence from the interplay between the knower and 
the known. The philosophical concept, the Begriff, must contain the self-awareness of its 
own origination in the process of dialectical articulation.  
Art embodies the concept of concreteness or finality in a process of becoming. And 
this too, must also be true for the philosophical concept. Hegel used the image of the 
circle to imply a continuous dynamic movement of perfecting in which the ends, always 
returns to the origins. For Hegel there are particular experiences that from the start 
represent the unity of particular and universal and therefore embody this notion of 
beginning and end. The real philosophical concept is circular, not in the sense of its logic, 
but in that it reaches out to both origins and finality as it embodies an articulate 
recollection. As Desmond pointed out “The philosophical concept is the teleological 
recollection of a process of origination within which the concrete world comes to appear 
as an articulated and rich whole. As a kind of microcosm of articulation that gathers and 
recollects the significance of such a world, the philosophical concept, like the art work, is 
itself a kind of world.”cxv  
In this sense, his philosophical quest was similar, if not the same, as Hamann and 
Herder’s quest for a continuity of the lebenswelt. It was Hamann who first asserted that 
 536
thought and language, reason and expression, were inseparable and served as a unified 
means of expression of the sensus communis. This served to shape Herder’s 
understanding of the human condition based on the idea of ‘belonging’. According to 
him, man must surrender himself to the unity of his entire being.  
The true Unity of Theory and Practice was the search for how poesis and praxis form 
the unity of experience we call reality. Hegel provided an epistemological answer with 
the dialectic of Art and Philosophy. In the end there must be Aufhebung, Art and 
Philosophy must sublate themselves to each other, bringing thought and expression 
together in a unity. This was the real meaning behind Hegel’s statement that ‘art becomes 
in the end what it was in the beginning-the true teacher of mankind.’ The philosopher 
gains a greater understanding of the nature of truth by examining the means of self-
actualization first found in the creative activity of artistic making. The philosopher must 
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Chapter 15: Tectonic Reformulations: Philosophy and Architecture 
 
For the Idealist Philosophers in Germany, art proved the penultimate example of 
Poetic Unity. It not only provided access to an understanding of self-actualization, but to 
the nature and structure of reason. In its historicity as an expression of the ‘Fortgang’ it 
also revealed the movement of Geist providing greater insight into man’s condition in the 
world, making it a valuable philosophical tool. By the 1770’s architecture, the most 
prolific of the arts and the one that most impacted human life, took center stage as men 
like Goethe, the Brothers Schlegel and Hegel began to reexamine it, in light of the new 
aesthetic doctrine.  
In traditional historiography, the architectural musing of these men have been viewed 
within the context of their own literary body of work, and occasionally as ancillary 
theoretical texts within the discourse of architecture. Their commentaries on Gothic 
architecture are commonly seen as extensions of a ‘Romanticizing’ of it in line with 
“Subjective” aesthetics and Associational theories of art. Likewise, their commentary on 
Classical architecture is seen through the lens of Neo-classicism. Ironically, this is often 
interpreted as a validation of the classical as an ideal art form and postulated as proof of 
their conversion to Classicists. As I intend to show, this could not be further from the 
truth.  
Part of the problem with this interpretation lies in the dominance within art historical 
circles of Johann Joachim Winkelmann (1717-68). German aesthetic culture during the 
early 1700’s was dominated by him and his views on art helped to shape the early 
emergence of Neo-classicism in the German speaking world and beyond. Establishing 
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ancient Greek culture as the highpoint of cultural development Winckelmann sought to 
set up Greek art as an ideal model to be emulated. In emphasizing their grandeur and 
simplicity he showed his allegiance to the same aesthetic sense of taste as the French 
Neo-Classicists and the Abbe Laugier. In fact, he adopted the aesthetic categories of the 
French and English Enlightenment. 
In his contribution to architecture, Anmerkungen uber die Baukunst der Alten 
(Observations on Ancient Architecture 1762), Winckelmann made the distinction 
between the ‘essential’ (Wesentlichs) and the ‘ornamental’ (Zierlichkeit). The ‘essential’ 
was related to the materials, construction and typology of the building, the ‘ornamental’, 
like Alberti before him, was a necessary, but added component. Winckelmann, like 
Laugier, assumed a lack of ornament at the origins of architecture and so its addition had 
to be consistent and serve its purpose, any excess led to ‘pettiness in architecture’. In 
order for architecture to be beautiful ‘ornament’ had to align itself with simplicity.  
Winckelmann’s insistence on ‘noble simplicity’ and the supremacy of Greek over 
Roman prototypes led to a series of confrontations with Piranesi who saw in his writings 
shades of the rationalist discourse he so opposed. Their debates are interesting in that 
they literally carry on the same theoretical argument between Lodoli and Laugier, a 
generation earlier. The difference was that the latter debates were carried out on a larger 
more international stage, with arguably greater impact on aesthetic theory.  
There was though a fundamental difference between the French approach to art and 
the German. Winckelmann had grounded his history of art in the evolution of individual 
cultures and their climatic and natural influences, not unlike that of Lodoli and Vico. This 
difference led to a greater association in Germany between artistic development and 
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cultural identity that played a key role in how German thinkers developed their attitudes 
toward art and architecture. 
It is true that the texts of Goethe, Friedrich Schlegel and Hegel relied on an 
appreciation of Gothic on its own terms and as an expression of a people. But it is 
important not to attribute their commentaries on Gothic architecture solely to 
Winkelmann’s influence. They were more directly influenced by Hamann and Herder 
both of whose writings went farther in defining art forms as an expression of ‘belonging’. 
Furthermore, the Idealists placed that expression within the context of the movement of 
Geist. Additionally, Goethe, August Schlegel and Hegel translated Schiller’s ideas of the 
sublation of material and formal impulses into their analysis of architecture, defining it as 
a form of Poetic Unity, and laying the ground work for the later idea of art-form and 
core-form which was to prove so central to German theory in the first half of the 1800’s. 
It was Hegel who would transform the idea of a Kunst-religion into an aesthetic theory 
that saw architecture as an expression of the movement of Geist, transforming its history 
into a form of recollection, one that provided access to the arena of Absolute Knowing. 
I propose to examine these texts in relationship to each other and within the broader 
epistemological context of Idealism. I would assert that their reexamination of 
architecture meant redefining it as an expression of the ‘Fortgang’ (a manifestation of the 
sensus communus) along the lines of Poetic Unity (as a sublation of the material and 
formal impulses) and as a form of Erinnerung (a reflection on the movement of Geist). 
Furthermore, I intend to show that their texts proved an important foundation step in 
restructuring Western architectural theory, owing to their direct impact on the work of 
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Friedrich Gilly and Karl Friedrich Schinkel, as well as the theoretical discourse 
surrounding style in Heinrich Hübsch and Karl Bötticher.  
 
 “It is the business of the architect to satisfy this 
universal need.”i 
“I cannot state strongly enough how my hard-won 
knowledge of natural things, which, after all, man 
needs as materials and uses for his benefit, 
constantly helps me to understand the procedures 
of artist and artisans.”ii 
Goethe  
The Italian Journey 
 
Goethe on Architecture 
 
In comparison to his other works Goethe’s commentaries on architecture appear small 
and secondary. They have rarely been translated into English and when they are, they are 
included in collections of Goethe’s writings and not in collections of architectural theory. 
For this reason, he is often overlooked in English language commentaries. Yet his 
cultural prominence and influence would make it unlikely that German speaking 
architects of the time did not heed his comments on the subject.iii  
Goethe wrote a total of four essays on architecture, which collectively show the 
development of his thought. The first, the 1772 von deutshcer Baukunst, (‘On German 
Architecture’) is the best known and most frequently cited. Two essays entitled Baukunst; 
one from 1788 and one from 1795 demonstrate a new found appreciation of the classical. 
They were written after his sojourn in Italy during the years of 1786 and 1788, when he 
experienced the work of both the Ancient Greeks and Romans and Renaissance art for the 
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first time. The last was a commentary, written in 1823, reflecting on the 1772 essay 
entitled ‘On Gothic Architecture’.  
In Germany there was a growing appreciation of Gothic architecture on its own terms.  
While still appreciating it for its structural prowess, German writers increasingly 
interpreted the decoration as an expression of the German Volk; of the sensus communus. 
This was evident in Goethe’s On German Architecture. This was more than likely 
attributable to the influence of Herder who introduced him to the idea that Gothic 
architecture had the power to move the human soul and express the national character 
when both men were in Strasbourg together in 1770.iv  
What struck Goethe about the Strasbourg Cathedral was that despite his ‘training’ in 
‘good taste’, it moved him emotionally.v He praised its architect, Erwin von Steinbach, 
for having created such a noble work. The totality of its construction seemed to consist of 
‘thousands of harmonized details’ that appeared to fuse the ‘countless parts into unified 
masses. What made the Gothic Cathedral significant was the ability of the master masons 
to ‘elevate the arbitrary vastness to harmonious proportions’. What they had exhibited 
was a true understanding of creativity, the kind best exemplified by nature herself. Gothic 
architecture embodied nature’s creative process by manifesting a unity in difference.  
This point was central to Goethe’s aesthetics. Art was a reflection of the human mind 
and intellect, whose essence was to be creative in the manner of nature. The cognitive 
role of the imagination and poetry was central to understanding nature and truth. vi  What 
Goethe had done in his analysis of the Gothic Cathedral was to see in the work the 
multifarious individual imaginations, the particulars of being, but also the expression of a 
unity, the collective will of a people, their ‘belonging’.  
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This must be understood in contradistinction to the century’s long tradition of the 
Greco-gothic Ideal within architectural scholarship. In concentrating on the rationality of 
the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition, eighteenth century theorist had overlooked 
the real importance of the Gothic. It was an expression of the sensus communis, a 
manifestation of the ‘Fortgang’. Criticizing the theorists of his time for not being able to 
appreciate the Gothic on its own terms, Goethe made the claim that had they felt more 
and measured less, they might have been able to create works with their own inherent 
beauty. The essay essentially challenged the systematic way of evaluating architecture 
that had emerged in the 18th century. At the heart of his critique was the questioning of 
the attempt to establish fixed principles and rules for the development of art. Such rules 
and the strict adherence to a priori principles would, according to Goethe, only lead to 
stagnation in architecture, turning the noble art form into simple mechanical operation. 
Goethe saw Laugier’s Essai as doing just that and attacked it head on. Pointing out that 
the primitive hut that Laugier proposed was not historically the first, he rejected it as the 
‘principle’ from which all latter works should be derived. Simpler forms of the hut were 
still in use and widely available, therefore Laugier had not begun at the beginning, but 
rather at the point where the form adhered to his own a priori design criteria. Goethe 
began with the circular logic of Laugier’s argument exposing its epistemological flaw. 
“Thus none of your conclusions are able to ascend to the realm of truth, but merely float 
in the atmosphere of your own system. You want to teach us what we should use, because 
what we do use cannot be justified according to your own principles.”vii His point was 
that knowledge of architecture and building comes from observation of how we live and 
construct our world, not from abstractions. Careful observation showed that far too often 
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the intercolumniations were walled up and that buildings were not composed of columns 
but of walls. “It seems to me dear Abbe that you should have been concerned when you 
encountered the unseemliness of walled-in columns so often, and saw that moderns even 
walled up the intercolumniations of antique temples. If your ears were not deaf to the 
truth, these stones would have preached the truth to you.”viii The emphasis on the column, 
so much the focus of architectural theory since the Renaissance, and the basis of both 
Laugier’s ‘principle’ and the Greco-gothic Ideal as a whole, was for Goethe only a ‘thin 
veneer of truth and beauty’ applied to the noble art of building.  
Goethe’s point was that the importance of a work of architecture lay not with the 
symmetry, proportions and calculations inherent in its structure, but in its ability to 
endow them with significance and meaning, as an expression of both the individual artist 
and the collective ‘Fortgang’. It was how the idea transformed the material in such a way 
that it emotionally connected to a people, and not the mechanics of the material itself that 
was important to it as an art form. This of course had been central to Idealist aesthetics.  
Historically, Goethe’s trip to Italy has been seen as a defining moment in his thought; 
one in which his confrontation with the works of Andrea Palladio proved constitutive of 
his transformation into a Classicist. ix  Italy, it is true, opened his eyes to the beauty of 
classical art, poetry and architecture and allowed him to understand the beauty of 
classical composition. But this should not be seen as an acceptance of Enlightenment 
aesthetics. Rarely does one reject previous thoughts and ideals in favor of new ones. It 
was his close friend Friedrich Schiller who pointed out that Goethe’s work was not 
‘classical’. x As I intend to show, underlying this ‘apparent’ shift in taste was a consistent 
definition of art. 
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Historians cite his appreciation of the Villa Rotunda as evidence of a new 
understanding of art as independent and self- contained; what has been termed 
“Autonomieästetik”.xi His comments in The Italian Journey praise the villa’s sculptural 
form and its ability to provide visual and tactile aesthetic satisfaction. But an increased 
appreciation for the classical in Goethe’s thought should not be seen as a capitulation to 
“Subjective” aesthetics as claimed, or evidence of a turn toward Neo-classicism. More 
recent scholarship refutes this.xii William J. Lillyman argues that a closer reading of 
Goethe’s ruminations on classical architecture as a whole undermine the idea of 
appreciation based on the Villa Rotunda commentary. xiii  I find his argument interesting 
in that, if correct, Goethe’s “classicism” is actually an assertion in architecture of what I 
have termed Poetic Unity found in his overall aesthetics.  
Goethe’s investigation into classical art began prior to his Italian trip with his study 
and critique of Enlightenment aesthetics. That criticism was not aimed at classical art per 
se, but rather at the theory of “la belle nature” and imitation, so central to both 
“Objective” and Subjective” aesthetics and Neo-classicism in general. His attack on 
Laugier was based on this critique. Goethe did not yield on this position in Italy. On the 
eve of September 22, 1786 he attended an assembly held by the Academy of Olympians 
in Vicenza, the topic of discussion that night was “whether invention or imitation had 
been of greater benefit to the fine arts”, a subject close to Goethe’s own theory. 
Interestingly, Palladio was cited throughout the discussion as exemplary of both 
positions. Goethe’s commentary on the discussion was telling. “In general the proponents 
of imitation won greater approval, for they said nothing but what the multitude thinks and 
is capable of thinking. At one point the audience, with loud handclapping, gave its hearty 
 552
approval to a very crude sophism, whereas it had not reacted to many good, indeed 
excellent statements in favor of invention.”xiv His feeling that the better arguments put 
forth were in favor of invention, as well as his continued distaste for the theory of 
imitation was evident.  
It was Goethe’s fascination with the Gothic that inspired his interest in architecture 
and this had brought him to the writings of both Laugier and Blondel. From them he 
gained access to the classical, never having read the great classical theorists, Vitruvius, 
Alberti, Vignola or Palladio prior to the Italian trip. It was only in Italy that he 
encountered Palladio’s Il Quatro Libri and after having read it proceeded to Vitruvius’ 
De Architectura. Thus his understanding of classicism was solely through the filter of 
French theory whose premise- the theory of “la belle nature”- he had already rejected. 
French theory focused on function derived from the Vitruvian idea of utilitas, Laugier 
had used the term “besoin” meaning human need or utility. According to Lillyman, 
Goethe took to Italy a “firm conviction about the necessary functionality of classical 
architecture and classical art in general.”xv The trip served to verify the necessity of 
utility and function to classical architecture.xvi Throughout his writings on the Italian 
journey, he continually stresses the classical buildings ability to satisfy human need, 
using the German word “Bedürfnis”, meaning to fulfill a need or want.  
But it would be a mistake to see this as a rejection of his earlier convictions on either 
art or architecture in favor of a theory based on utility and function. Goethe never 
asserted that architecture was either an autonomieästhetik or mere utility and function. As 
I have attempted to demonstrate, his aesthetic theory was based on the idea of Poetic 
Unity; a union of the material and formal impulses. This was still evident in Italy where 
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after visiting the Arsenal in Venice and seeing workers building, he states the following; 
“I cannot state strongly enough how my hard-won knowledge of natural things, which, 
after all, man needs as materials and uses for his benefit, constantly helps me to 
understand the procedures of artist and artisans.”xvii For Goethe, the art of architecture 
was based in the nature of materials which were manipulated to answer functional needs. 
Combined they constituted the material impulse of architecture and were an important 
aspect of it as a work of art. His confrontation with classical architecture only served to 
reinforce his earlier conviction, shared with Schiller that art begins in the material 
impulse.  
For Goethe art was the union of material and formal impulses, which sublate 
themselves to each other. He never wavered on this position. If classical architecture 
fulfilled the functional needs of a people answering to the material impulse, this was not 
enough to rise to the level of art. It had to also serve the formal impulse. Gothic had 
revealed to him architecture’s ability to do just that, to express the spiritual needs of a 
people as an expression of the sensus communis. In Italy, he found classical architecture 
to possess the same ability. The Amphitheater in Verona fulfilled a necessary material 
need as a theater, but according to Goethe it also served a universal need; presenting to 
the populace a vision of itself as a unified nation. xviii A function it continued to serve in 
modern times. Goethe found in this classical work what he had found in Strasbourg 
Cathedral. As Lillyman notes, what Goethe discovered was that “in mature classical art 
and architecture the artist found a grand concept with which to satisfy a human need.”xix 
But once again, one must not mistake this for a change in position.  
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On several occasions he confronted works of astounding beauty, which he felt were 
questionable as great works. Among them works of the Italian masters including Palladio 
and Sanmicheli. And this brings us back to the Villa Rotunda. It was no doubt beautiful 
and inspiring, but according to Goethe, it failed to serve the needs of a noble family. xx 
Likewise the Teatro Olympico was an important and historically significant work, but 
Goethe had reservations about whether it could really function as a contemporary 
theater.xxi It was beautiful and certainly inspired man to “feel the magnificence of a true, 
noble existence”, but in terms of its current material use it was insufficient. Goethe 
expressed similar concerns regarding Sanmicheli’s Porta Palio in Verona noting it was 
beautiful, but failed to achieve its stated goal, because the artist misunderstood the 
material conditions of the site. xxii If these structures failed, it was because they were not 
anchored in the material impulse of their intentionality, they stressed the formal impulse 
over the material. They contained no true sublation. A similar fault could be made of 
structures in the other direction. “I contemplate the magnificent buildings erected by that 
man and see how they have been disfigured by people’s narrow, base needs, how these 
designs were mostly beyond the abilities of the builders, how poorly these choice 
monuments to a lofty human spirit harmonize with the life of the rest of mankind, then it 
occurs to me that this after all is the way of the world.”xxiii   The failure to harmonize the 
material and formal impulses resulted in a less than ideal work, one that might forever be 
seen as lofty and beautiful, but destined to bend to the yoke of necessity over time. Too 
great of an emphasis on necessity and need also failed to result in sublation and degrades 
the noble work.   
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Goethe did not change his aesthetic theory. What he discovered in Italy was that great 
classical architecture was a marriage of a higher ideal, a didactic turn and the material 
necessities of site and use. It was a union of formal and material impulses. It proved to be 
a Poetic Unity; a true work of art. He had come to understand the classical in a manner 
that no longer excluded it from his earlier position. What’s more, he now saw the 
classical as a better example of sublation, while the strength of Gothic lay in its greater 
ability to express spirit, a point Hegel would later further articulate.  
While Goethe was reticent about some of Palladio’s works he nonetheless saw in him 
the same understanding about classicism. In Palladio, he found an artist who managed to 
successfully blend the material needs of his clients with a higher ideal in the formation of 
a new architectural version of classical architecture. For Goethe, this was best 
exemplified in Palladio’s own Casa Cogollo,xxiv his Il Redentori and the unfinished 
Clarite. But it was certainly evident in his villas as well.xxv His oeuvre served to 
transform building types according to contemporary needs, it was anything but imitation. 
This according to Goethe made him a great Poet. 
When Goethe finally read Palladio’s Il Quatro Libri it inspired him to take on 
Vitruvius. “Since Palladio relates everything to Vitruvius . . . through his words and 
works, his manner of thought and action, [he] has already brought Vitruvius closer to me 
and interpreted him better than the Italian translation can do.”xxvi  It was then having read 
Vitruvius’ own relation of utilitas to venustas and firmitas that he changed his 
terminology replacing “Bedürfnis”, which stresses a lack or want within the subject, to 
“Zweckmasigkeit”, which stresses an aspect of the work, its innate functionality. That 
subtle semantic shift brings Goethe’s understanding of utility more in line with his 
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previous position on the material impulse as something that emerged in the process of 
creation.  
After the trip Goethe published the two essays entitled Baukunst, of 1788 and 1795 
respectively. In the first, he revealed his new found interest in the clarity and order of the 
classical style, in the second he turned his attention to materials, function and the 
aesthetic effect of architecture. Such concerns were not entirely new. The first 1772 essay 
had praised the clarity of the structural members of the Gothic cathedral in their ability to 
communicate their function. Once again this was not a capitulation to functionalism or a 
rationalist conception of truth to materials. Goethe did not assert an absolute principle, as 
Laugier had done, instead recognizing Palladio as a man of greatness he concluded that 
‘out of truth and falsehood [he] creates a third entity, whose borrowed existence 
entrances us.”xxvii The recognition that art was the product of a disturbed relationship to 
truth was an important one, one it should be noted is also present in Piranesi.xxviii It 
essentially undermined the attempt to classify architecture as a science reflecting the a 
priori principles of nature as understood through the natural sciences. For Goethe there 
still had to be something other than the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition.  
Closer in thought to Lodoli, Goethe believed that a strict adherence to materials and 
statics could not lead to art in architecture. “As long as only the immediate function was 
envisaged, and materials were allowed to control what was built rather than to be 
controlled, no art was possible.”xxix There is another component necessary in architecture 
that must resist the ‘purist’ tendency to reduce the art of building to its materialist 
component. That component was for Goethe poetry. “It is the poetical part, the fiction 
that makes a building into a work of art.”xxx The fact that Goethe did not fully alter his 
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position on architecture in response to his trip to Italy is confirmed by his own 1823 
reevaluation of the earlier essay of 1772 On German Architecture. In On Gothic 
Architecture he quoted at length from Francois Blondel’s Cours d’Architecture. Blondel 
had claimed that any appreciation of a work of art was the result of regularity and 
symmetry, because the satisfaction perceived was related to the proportions established. 
It was a product of the relation of parts among themselves and to the whole. Goethe felt 
that he had come to ‘the same conclusion’ in the 1772 essay, but by intuition and not 
measurement and examination. In the end it was the emotional impact rendered by the 
poetics of the details and their composition that was of greatest significance, rather than 
functional usage of materials or clarity of structural principles that accounted for the art 
of architecture.  
For Goethe, as architectural styles progress, they are shaped by the cultures that 
produce them and those developments in turn shaped the very nature of humanity. In the 
1772 essay On German Architecture he identified architecture as a manifestation of the 
‘Fortgang’, an idea adopted from Herder. Italy, and more so Sicily, had made that all the 
more self-evident. “For as the centuries evolve from the serious to the pleasurable, they 
form man as they do so, indeed they create him thus. At the present time our eyes and 
through them our whole inner being are drawn towards and decisively influenced by 
more slender architectural forms, so that these dumpy, skittle-shaped, densely serried 
masses of columns appear to us cumbersome, even monstrous.”xxxi The realization that 
humanity and art changed through time introduced a form of relativism into Goethe’s 
understanding of aesthetics that could only have reinforced his belief that rules and 
imitation were extraneous to the true development of art.  
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Within his collective writings Goethe was able to relate architecture to Idealist 
aesthetics, explaining how mature architecture was a Poetic Unity and how, as an 
expression of the ‘Fortgang’ it manifested the historicity of Geist. This was echoed in the 
writings of other Idealist philosophers who also wrote on architecture, including Friedrich 
and August Schlegel.  
 
 “Therefore the architect must observe a vast 
amount of relations; it is not sufficient that he puts 
parts together, observing fixed mechanical rules of 
their proportioning both in itself and in relation to 
other parts, but he must contemplate them in their 
living coherence: his work must be one, designed in 
accordance with one indivisible idea, in which every 
part determines all the rest, and is conversely 
determined by them.”xxxii 
 
August Wilhelm von Schlegel 
Kunstlehre 
 
August and Friedrich Schlegel on Architecture 
 
Like Goethe, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) saw Gothic architecture as a 
combination of a lofty idea, the concept of the infinite, and the material necessities of 
construction. In his Principles of Gothic Architecture of 1805, he remarked that while the 
cluster of pillars was characteristic of the Gothic style it was derived from “the necessity 
of combining the side aisles with the nave and choir, the pillars of the latter aiding in the 
support of the former.”xxxiii Thus within Gothic there was an underlying structural logic 
and clarity that accounted for the grounding symmetry that was present in it. This was 
related to both the choice and selection of materials and a response to the local climate 
and culture. “Every nation, country and climate should have architecture suited to its 
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particular requirements. . . . The form of our buildings rests, like other social customs, 
and ordinary habiliments, on natural causes, the variations of temperature, and similar 
influences and the destructive consequences of disregarding must be apparent to anyone . 
. . who has ever studied their reciprocal influence with attention.”xxxiv Schlegel here 
asserted the mechanical concerns for structure and materials were a product of location, 
and therefore a response to the genus loci. But such concerns were not dominant in the 
determination of architecture. They were filtered through the aesthetic sensibility of 
Gothic culture and “Its predilection for variety and multifarious combinations.”xxxv The 
truly great works of Gothic architecture were an expression of a people, one that “. . . 
unites an extreme delicacy and inconceivable skill in mechanical execution with the 
grand, the boundless, and the infinite, concentrated in the idea of an entire Gothic fabric; 
a rare and truly beautiful combination of contrasting elements conceived by the power of 
human intellect, and aiming at faultless perfection in the minutest details, as well as the 
lofty grandeur and comprehensiveness of the general design.”xxxvi  It was the combination 
of both the material impulse, in the form of structural logic, and the formal impulse, in 
the form of a grand idea.  
His brother August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) was one of the most 
outspoken critics of imitation in the arts. Like Goethe, Schiller and Hegel, his views were 
based on the epistemological critique of what constitutes the real object of knowledge. 
The mechanical and geometrical understanding of nature were abstractions not its 
ultimate reality, its truth. For him, imitation understood mechanically, as Hutchenson 
defined it, was only a passive copying of a dead, empirical nature, one that could only led 
to paradox and futility. The real question then was why copy nature at all since such 
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copies can never reveal the same level of truth or beauty that the original did.xxxvii 
Consequently, art should ignore the accidental and concentrate on the meaningful, which 
should be amplified by art to make it evermore available.xxxviii  
It was in his Kunstlehre of 1801, that Schlegel developed his ideas of art and 
architecture. He could not reject the impact of nature on architecture, all building was 
building in materiality and therefore must adhere to the laws of physics and the nature of 
the materials of which it was constructed. But he rejected the idea that architecture was 
an imitation of the mechanics of nature or the mathematical proportion of either plant or 
animal life.  
For Schlegel, architecture was the product of the human mind that provided its idea; 
therefore, it was directed to some end or purpose. While the satisfaction of ends tied it to 
materiality and the physical world, it was not a simple response to practical need or 
utility. Schlegel maintained it was an art; therefore it must also answer to a call for 
beauty. To do so architecture must move beyond the material impulse. Once the concerns 
with structural solidity and material performance were met the architect was free to 
design the form and its ornamentation. In this, Schlegel perceived the architect as 
following the methods of nature, which did not conform to geometrical laws, but to its 
own inner will.xxxix When it does, it frees itself from the constraints of materiality and 
utilitarian need, becoming a form of Freedom in Schiller’s sense of the term. 
Schlegel in the end discussed architecture’s relationship to nature in two ways: first in 
its material utilitarian sense and then in the sense of life and spirit. What made it art and a 
manifestation of the free was the latter. When it manifests spirit, architecture bridges the 
division between necessity and freedom. According to Schlegel; “Therefore the architect 
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must observe a vast amount of relations; it is not sufficient that he puts parts together, 
observing fixed mechanical rules of their proportioning both in itself and in relation to 
other parts, but he must contemplate them in their living coherence: his work must be 
one, designed in accordance with one indivisible idea, in which every part determines all 
the rest, and is conversely determined by them.”xl In its ability to embody both the 
material- the utility, geometry and mechanics- as well as the formal- the unity, diversity 
and freedom- architecture proves to be a Poetic Unity.  
If Goethe and the brothers Schlegel were able to demonstrate how architecture 
manifested Poetic Unity, the task of addressing its relationship to the broader economy of 
the dialectic of Art and Philosophy fell to Hegel.  
 
“Architecture . . . is the art whose medium is purely 
external, so that here the essential differences 
depend on whether this external object has its 
meaning within itself or whether, treated as a 
means, it subserves an end other than itself, or 
whether in this subservience it appears at the same 
time as independent.”xli 
G.W.F. Hegel  
Lectures on Fine Arts 
 
Hegel on Architecture 
 
Volume I of Hegel’s The Lectures on Fine Arts begins with a discussion of the 
notional essence of art. The work of art, a manifestation of Geist, is the objectivization of 
the Ideal in sensuous form, what Hegel refers to as a concrete universal.xlii It then 
proceeds to the particulars of arts manifestation. Just as Geist moves through its stages, as 
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outlined in the Phenomenology, art moves through three different relationships of 
meaning and shape,xliii identified as symbolic, classical and romantic.xliv  
In volume II, Hegel turns to the individual arts; architecture, sculpture, painting, 
music and poetry. For my purpose here, I will only address his discourse on architecture. 
It is important to note that his remarks are no minor reference. While architecture is 
treated within the broader economy of his ‘science of art’, his treatment of the subject 
should be seen as his own theory of architecture. Furthermore, his centrality as an 
intellectual powerhouse of the German Enlightenment makes it highly unlikely that it did 
not have an impact on architectural theorists of the time.xlv 
In the Phenomenology, Hegel began by asking the question; ‘how does the mind have 
anything before it at all?’ Likewise, in The Lectures on Fine Arts he does not begin with 
a discourse on the principles of an individual art form, but with the question ‘how does 
meaning emerge in art?’ In its earliest stage, art has not yet found an adequate material or 
form for the expression of spirit. It therefore “has to be content with merely seeking a 
true harmony between content and mode of presentation and with an external relationship 
between the two”.xlvi The first task of art consists in giving shape to what is objective 
itself, the physical world of nature, the external environment of the spirit. It endows such 
“things” with meaning and form, which are not immanent in them in their objective 
existence. Art begins with spirit’s search for its own material existence.  
According to Hegel, this task first takes place in the medium of architecture. Its very 
nature- immersed in materiality- makes it the symbolic art form par excellence. It is 
important to note that this is not a denigration of architecture as so many commentators 
claim.xlvii Rather, it makes architecture a key component of Hegel’s aesthetic theory. It is 
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where the essence of art first emerges and takes shape, the first step in spirit’s movement 
to self-actualization in an external symbolic form. Architecture, therefore, is the 
necessary starting point of any true aesthetics. It is the originary moment in the dialectic 
of Art and Philosophy, a point too easily overlooked. Thus the origin of architecture 
becomes central, not only to Hegel’s aesthetics, but his entire philosophical system as 
well.  
In Enlightenment architectural theory, the primitive hut, as espoused by Laugier, was 
central to the discourse of origins.xlviii While acknowledging that this was a common urge 
born out of the desire to visualize the thing in its simplest mode, Hegel saw this as a 
dangerous thing for the philosopher. The image of the primitive hut had become so 
intelligible that the image appeared to have no need of further explanation. According to 
Hegel, this was to confuse this simple mode, summed up pictorially in an image, with the 
essence of the thing.  
Referencing Goethe’s 1772 On German Architecturexlix, he challenged this theory 
directly. The theory of the primitive hut focused on the relationship of parts and the 
nature of the materials within the image. While the material in question affected the 
nature of the external form and its articulation, this was only the empirical particularities 
of the manifestation of architecture. In terms of the origins of architecture, the issue of 
original material, or form, was secondary. As Hegel pointed out, Vitruvius and Aloys 
Hirt (1759-1837) claimed origins in wood, others stone.l The primitive hut was only a 
means to an end that presupposed a purpose external to it, i.e. shelter. It established only 
a system of differences relative to the means of building.  
 564
The original interest of art was the reconciliation of the idea with a concrete 
particularity. “Art has no other mission but to bring before sensuous contemplation the 
truth as it is in the spirit, reconciled in its totality with objectivity and the sphere of 
sense.”li The primitive hut was insignificant in terms of content and subordinate to the 
real question at hand. It failed to address the key aspect of architecture; its role as an art 
form in the manifestation of meaning and signification. For this reason, philosophically it 
must appear as accidental. 
Hegel’s discourse presupposes a distinction between building and architecture. 
Philosophically, building is insignificant to the discourse of origins. Aesthetically, what is 
of importance is how objective reality is transformed into symbolic form. The art of 
architecture begins not with the primitive hut as means, but with the first attempts to 
identify ends by fixing meaning in the physical environment. Thus for Hegel the archai 
of architecture lies not in type forms, but how ends are identified materially, how 
meaning emerges architecturally. Any theory of architecture must be one that postulates 
its limits as a symbolic form. It is here that he begins his theory of architecture.  
According to Hegel; “The original interest [of art] depends on making visible to 
themselves and to others the original objective insights and universal essential 
thoughts.”lii It is the application of meaning to a material and in the case of architecture it 
is a construction for no other means than to communicate an idea. “Architecture . . . is the 
art whose medium is purely external, so that here the essential differences depend on 
whether this external object has its meaning within itself or whether, treated as a means, 
it subserves an end other than itself, or whether in this subservience it appears at the same 
time as independent.”liii Like Art, architecture too finds within itself three different 
 565
relationships of meaning to shape, or content to form, likewise identified as symbolic, 
classical and romantic. It is by examination of the three relationships that Hegel attempts 
to find its true essence as the origin of art and its’ limits as a symbolic form.  
In its formative symbolic stage architecture is vague and general; its meaning is 
mutable with no fixed sets of meaning associated with either mass configuration or 
spatial configuration. This is owing to the fact that there is no tradition to establish such 
fixed meanings. The essence of symbolic architecture is the search for a relationship of 
meaning to shape. For Hegel, this makes it a proto-architecture in that, as media, 
architecture has not fully realized its own potential. What is not yet established is a 
morphology of architectural signification. But it is an essential stage to pass through 
when the mode of signification is first being explored and refined.  
As with the first stage of consciousness in the Phenomenology, the symbolic moves 
through three stages in its relationship of meaning to shape. In the first stage architecture 
is a kind of memorial that serves to mark a signification - a clearing in the woods, a 
marker or stele- that identifies a genus loci as a unifying point of assembly around an 
idea. “. . . the aim of architecture consists exclusively in visibly setting forth now this and 
now that aspect for contemplation, in symbolizing them, and by human labour making 
them pictorial. . . . the primary purpose . . . is only the erection of something which is a 
unifying point for a nation or nations, a place where they assemble.”liv Unlike the 
theorists of rational tectonics who set the origins of architecture in the first building, 
Hegel establishes its’ archai, in “marking” as the first means of signification, and 
“assembling” as the first programmatic function. 
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At this early stage, the form is incidental. As Hegel notes, the Tower of Bel serves as 
a unifying idea of a people, but it is not a space of assembly, because it serves none of the 
ends of worship, which take place outside it.  
In its next stage of development, symbolic architecture adopts more concrete 
meanings creating individualization between objects. It does this by deferring to 
sculptural forms in its details. In the process architecture and sculpture become confused. 
Hegel cites as examples phallic columns, obelisks and sphinxes. One might also add to 
that list the Ashoka columns of early Indian cultures and Totem poles of the native 
peoples of North America. What distinguishes such elements from sculpture is their 
disposition. According to Hegel, in symbolic formations; “. . . architectural purpose is 
purely an accessory and only a matter of external arrangement.” Because of their 
exteriority, these arrangements are essentially paratactic. Such parataxis itself is often 
symbolic referring to external symbolic systems such as numerology or the zodiac. 
Architecture has not yet found its own form. Rather it resorts to external symbolic forms 
to communicate its content; meaning is sensed through the appropriated form of another 
object.  
What is learned from the symbolic origins of architecture is that its true origin lies in 
it’s subservience to some purpose, and that purpose is not utilitarian (i.e. pragmatic 
function), but an idea (i.e. socialization, worship, politics, memorialization).  
For Hegel, symbolic architecture is limitless, because a limit on how Spirit expresses 
itself, has not yet been imposed. This leads to the last phase of symbolic architecture, 
when it begins to exclude the systems of representations of sculpture and begins to 
become a structure for other meanings. Hegel cites works like the rock cut tombs of 
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Ellora in India as an example of this kind of transition. As he claims, architecture “does 
not merely excavate and form caves, but is manifest as an inorganic nature built by 
human hands where necessary for achieving a human aim.”lv Here the configured 
disposition of forms and spaces define a place of assembly where the ritual or function 
takes place. Architecture’s pragmatic function as assembly begins to manifest itself as 
motivator of form. Thus we begin to see the transition to architecture proper. 
If in its origins it adopts imagery from nature or other sources as a means to 
communicate its’ true purpose, it now recognizes itself as “thing” and “properties” and in 
so doing begins to recognize the necessities of its own construction. These necessities are 
the means of spatial definition; the roof and supports. Such elements serve a load bearing 
function, that is mechanical in relation, and belong to the province of gravity and physics. 
Architecture as enclosure can be shaped only in a manner external to it, that shaping is 
not organic, but abstract and mathematical.lvi Architecture has begun the transition to the 
classical. 
Hegel’s theory of architecture is founded on two premises. Its’ purpose, the higher 
idea or content (the real social purpose in human terms, i.e. worship, assembly, politics 
etc.) and the particularization of its parts which serve the needs of its purpose. It is the 
‘purpose’ of architecture, its proper meaning that rules and determines the classical work. 
“Therefore we may so conceive the transition that on the one hand the previously 
independent architecture must modify organic forms mathematically into regularity, and 
pass over to purposiveness, while conversely mere purposivness of form has to move 
towards the principle of the organic. Where these two extremes meet and mutually 
interpenetrate, really beautiful classical architecture is born.”lvii Architecture has begun to 
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grasp it own truth as a concrete universal, one made up of real need and independent 
purpose. As an art form it manifests the Ideal in a form appropriate to the material needs 
of its own construction. For Hegel, the truth of architecture is “the unity of these two 
principles.”lviii  
Architecture now “devises the substance of its plan and figuration in light of spiritual 
purposes, while its’ shape is the product of the human intellect and has no direct 
model.”lix According to Hegel; “Classical beauty has for its inner being the free 
independent meaning, i.e. not a meaning of this or that but what means itself and 
therefore intimates itself.”lx In classical architecture signification and meaning becomes 
self-referential. It is the display of differences of kind in the elements of construction, 
whose forms are determined by their use which in turn are shaped by artistic ends 
organically. Its differences “come into appearance as differences, on the other hand it is 
equally necessary for them to be united into a whole.”lxi Architecture recognizes itself, its 
structure, as a unity in difference.  
What distinguishes the classical is the awareness of the essential nature of 
architecture; “its productions are subservient to an end and a meaning not immanent in 
itself. It becomes an inorganic surrounding structure, a whole built and ordered according 
to the laws of gravity.”lxii While the system of arrangement in classical architecture is still 
essentially paratactic, it is controlled owing to the rational ordering of its parataxis. Thus 
the paratactic systems of ordering in classical architecture are governed by the necessary 
relations of its structural members whose overall proportions are determined by the 
necessary mathematical calculations of weight transfer leading to an expression of 
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statical forces. This rational ordering comes from architecture’s grasp of itself as 
structure.  
Following Vitruvius and Hirt, Hegel sees architectural signification containing an 
expression of structural support and transfer. According to Hegel architecture is 1) 
formed masses carrying a load, 2) such masses are bound together to give support and 
stability and 3) for the purposes of enclosing and partitioning.lxiii Thus the primary 
elements of architecture are identified as the roof; whose purpose is to define space, 
beams; which transfer the loads of the roof to the columns in a controlled manner, 
columns; whose purpose is support, and the wall; whose purpose is to act as boundary 
between spaces. A wall may also serve as a support and if this is the case then the column 
should not be present in the form of a half column, engaged column or pilaster. The clear 
expression of their difference is important.lxiv  
But one must not mistake this for the theory of Hirt or Laugier. Hegel is not reducing 
classical architecture to functionalism, or the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition. 
His theory, like Goethe’s, is closer to that of Lodoli. Their final form in beauty is the 
expression of their relationship to their supportive function determined by art. For Hegel 
it is the relationship between these two motivators of architectural form that is the 
guiding principle.  
In the case of the column “architecture has nothing but the mechanical determinant of 
the load bearing and the spatial distance from the ground to the point where the load to be 
carried terminates the column. But the particular aspects implicit in this determinant 
belong to the column, and art must bring them out and give shape to them. Consequently 
the column’s specific length, its two boundaries above and below, and its carrying power 
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should not appear to be only accidental and introduced into it by something else but must 
be displayed as also immanent in itself.”lxv The transfer of support from beam to column 
results in the capital, and the transfer of support from column shaft to foundation results 
in the expression of the base. The function of the capitol and the base is imminent in their 
articulation from the shaft, but their particular form, Doric, Ionic or Corinthian is a matter 
of artistic expression.  
It is this relation of core-form and its mathematical determinacy combined with the 
art-form as expression of that determinacy that for Hegel gives us entasis. Because the 
lower section of the column carries in addition to the original load the weight of the 
column it is thicker than the top, the gentle curvature of entasis is only the artistic 
interpretation of it. “in its ascent the shaft of the column tapers slightly, usually from a 
third of its height; it decreases in circumference and diameter because the lower parts 
have to carry the upper, and this mechanical relation between parts of the column must be 
made evident and perceptible.”lxvi  
Hegel’s column bears all the hallmarks of Schiller’s work of art. It contains the 
necessary material form- the actual material and its construct that lay at the core of it as 
object; its’ core-form, and the aesthetic means of expression or style; its’ art-form. Both 
are immanent and emerge simultaneously as a concrete manifestation of the idea of 
support.  
In romantic art, Geist has come to recognize its true content as the universality of 
itself. As Hegel notes, Geist posits external reality “as an existence inadequate to 
itself.”lxvii It now abandons the unity found in the classical, in an attempt to find 
reconciliation within itself. The result is a new totality composed of subjective being and 
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external appearance- whose sole purpose is to express its’ turn toward the inner life. The 
purpose of romantic architecture now becomes the expression of the inner life of spirit.  
In this quest, it turns away from exteriority and the exigencies of matter and the real. 
If the classical temple looks out to the world with its colonnade, the Gothic cathedral 
turns inward. Because its aim is to construct an enclosure for the spirit, its interior 
acquires a more essential importance. Likewise, if classical architecture is governed by 
the necessary relations of its’ structural members, in the romantic function- as utility and 
means to an end- is surpassed as the building transcends any specific pragmatic end.  “It 
has and displays a definite purpose; but in its grandeur and sublime peace it is lifted 
above anything purely utilitarian into an infinity in itself. This elevation above the finite, 
and this simple solidity, is its one characteristic aspect.”lxviii  Architecture is no longer 
tied to a symbolism that makes reference to its purpose via an external form, nor does it 
express in the form of mathematical calculation. “In this way architecture acquires 
elevation to the infinite as the significance which it is driven to express in architectonic 
forms, a significance independent of mere purposiveness.”lxix  
As David Kolb points out, romantic architecture, like the symbolic, is identified by its 
unrestrained subjective excess best expressed in its flourish of details.lxx In classical 
architecture particularization, diversity and variety gain their greatest scope. The resulting 
dissection of its’ component parts is then unified via mathematical abstraction. In the 
romantic, unity is achieved via a confluence of its particularities. For Hegel this is the 
true characteristic of romantic architecture. In the Gothic cathedral the multiplicities of its 
elements succumb to a single vision of upward ascension. The romantic pillar rises 
upward bearing its load without effort defying gravity once again achieving unity of the 
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whole that goes beyond measure. Construction is dematerialized as the material and the 
particular are transformed into the immaterial and the infinite. The turn inward means 
that architecture turns from external form to spiritual enclosure, from self-referential 
expression to unity in multiplicity. Its’ elements coalesce within the infinite as a single 
solidity, producing a higher unity in the universality of Geist. Like Goethe and Friedrich 
Schlegel before him, Hegel sees in the Gothic cathedral a rush of individual particulars, 
an excess of decoration, but like Goethe, he finds a unity of both the particularity of its 
individual parts and the life of the substantial whole that transcends them. 
In his essay Before Beyond Function, David Kolb argues that symbolic, classical and 
romantic architecture are organized around relationships of identity and function.lxxi 
According to him, there are six distinct levels discernable in Hegel’s theory. They are; (0) 
Absence of Purpose, (1) Pragmatic Purpose, (2) Self-showing, (3) Expressing the 
People’s Basic Thoughts, (4) Doing What Architecture Does and (5) Doing What Art 
does. The six are fully distinct in the classical but mixed in the symbolic and romantic. I 
find Kolb’s argument useful here in that his taxonomy allows me to effectively relate the 
nuances of Hegel’s discourse on architecture first, to my previous argument about the 
sublation of the formal and material impulses, and second, to Hegel’s understanding of 
the science of aesthetics as a form of Erinnerung.  
I would assert that the first four levels establish the dialectic of material and formal 
impulses within a framework of identity and function. (0) ‘Absence of Purpose’, is the 
recognition that the work of architecture as object “in-itself” can be described in terms of 
its material and chemical properties in the manner of the physical sciences. But this 
misses the essence of architecture as an art form and therefore does not serve the 
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aesthetic inquiry that Hegel seeks. Therefore, the first level apropos to inquiry is (1) 
‘Pragmatic Showing’ where, according to Kolb, the building is identified as a 
manifestation of both subjective and realized purposes. Here the building is understood as 
a tool to serve a pragmatic function, what is conventionally known as a building program. 
(2) ‘Self-Showing’ moves beyond the pragmatic level, expressing the embodiment of the 
building’s performative essences. This is a self-referential function in which architecture 
speaks of its own ontology. I would assert that the first three (0, 1 and 2) of Kolb’s levels 
of identity and function address the material impulse of architecture. While there is a 
sense of notional essence in both (1) “Pragmatic Purpose” and (2) ‘Self-Showing’, it is 
subservient to the performative nature of architectures materiality as opposed to any true 
reference to an external purpose. Thus the first three levels do not address in any 
substantive way the Ideal or formal impulse of architecture as a work of art.  
The following level, (3) “Expressing the People’s Basic Thoughts” expresses the 
thoughts of a people, the sensus communis. In Kolb’s words it “embodies the relation of 
an articulated inner unity of meaning that is fully expressed in the perfected particularity 
of an outside. . . . So the architecture is also expressing a category or metaphysical vision 
of human life and cosmic form.”lxxii It expresses the embodiment of its notional essences. 
Here the performative is subservient to the formal impulse identified as the primary 
purpose of architecture; manifesting the Ideal.  
It is in my reading of the last two levels of function (4) “Doing What Architecture 
Does” and (5) “Doing What Art Does”, that I believe Hegel’s theory of architecture 
becomes a form of Errinnerung. They represent the philosophical inquiry that Hegel 
seeks in his aesthetics. It is here in historical analysis, itself a from of recollection, that 
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we come to understand the theoretical implications of the dialectic, including the 
movement between material and formal, and their sublation relative to Hegel’s 
philosophy. 
Kolb states of level (4) “Doing What Architecture Does” that “For ‘us’ the buildings 
particular mode of unity and its achievement on the second and third levels fit in as a 
stage in a narrative which is not the narrative of this or that people but the story of 
architecture as a whole relating inner meaning and function to outer form and 
expression.” This knowledge is not accessible to historical peoples precisely because it 
requires a comparative analysis between the modes of expression. It is an understanding 
of the history of architecture that provides us with a theoretical understanding of how 
architecture as a symbolic form emerges and advances.  
The characteristic of symbolic architecture is that meaning is not yet immanent in the 
work itself. There exists a separation of meaning and form. Its’ primary purpose, its ends; 
“marking”, is disjunct from its means; the erection of physical markers. In its later stages, 
the use of paratactic strategies allow for elaboration and/or additional meanings, but fails 
to overcome this disjunction. Because of this exteriority, signification comes not through 
the work, but through its reference to a programmatic function external to it; “assembly”. 
Therefore, the relationship of meaning to form in symbolic architecture is identified by 
the paratactic relationship to “Pragmatic Purpose”. In its earliest phase the form implies a 
“Pragmatic Purpose” which occurs outside the work. In its next phase it implies its 
meaning through its appropriation of an external form as it becomes confused with 
sculpture. And in its last phase, as a transitioning to architecture proper, it becomes an 
enclosure for “Pragmatic Purpose” while it simultaneously begins to transition from a 
 575
paratactic relation of difference to the self-referential one of “Self-Showing”. It is the 
exteriority of meaning in the symbolic that prevents the formal impulse of ‘Expressing 
the People’s Basic Thoughts’ from becoming fully distinct within the work, instead 
making it subservient to the “Pragmatic Purpose”. If my reading is correct, the symbolic 
only manifests level (1) “Pragmatic Purpose” as a distinct function.  While the material 
and formal impulses are present the subservience of level (3) to level (2) means that 
architecture proper begins with the recognition of the material impulse and its 
performative essence.  
The romantic, in its’ turn toward the inner life of spirit as an expression of Christian 
worship, concentrates its manifestation on (3) ‘Expressing the People’s Basic Thoughts’ 
as its primary function. Seeing a reflection on difference as superfluous to its purpose, it 
refuses to be defined by the performative functions of its elements of construction. 
Sacrificing the self-referential expression of its own ontology, it chooses to be defined 
solely by its notional function. In so doing, it moves beyond the system of relations of the 
Understanding and mathematical calculation. According to Hegel, in the romantic 
“nothing is left to the artistic representation but to refuse validity to the material and the 
massive in its purely material character and to interrupt it everywhere, break it up, and 
deprive it of its appearance of immediate coherence and independence.”lxxiii The romantic 
has turned away from both level (1) “Pragmatic Purpose” and level (2) “Self-Showing”, 
which are now subservient to level (3). The formal impulse has become dominant and 
now suppresses the material impulse.  
For Hegel, art is the balance of self-articulated inner meaning and proportioned outer 
form and this is best manifested in the classical. Here the role of architecture is the 
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creation of spatial limits and enclosure of an external purpose. It acknowledges its’ 
material nature by providing a rational order to its parataxis through self-reference to its’ 
ontological making. The shape or form is controlled by the speculatively fixed content of 
“Self-Showing” which serves as its’ core-form, but it is the expression of its grounding 
categories of ‘Expressing the People’s Basic Thoughts’ that provides the opportunity of 
its’ art-form. Means and ends, building and Ideal, achieve organic unity owing to the lack 
of excess found in both the symbolic and romantic. Levels (1), (2) and (3), are manifest 
in such a way as to balance the material and formal impulses. It manifests both its 
notional and performative ontologies.  
Hegel’s description of the development of architectures takes us through the 
oscillation between the material and formal impulse. It is in the classical that architecture 
reaches its form as a concrete universal by achieving balance between the two within a 
Poetic Unity. But Hegel is loath to declare the classical as the culmination or apex of 
architecture. To understand this reticence we have to move to Kolb’s level (5) “Doing 
What Art Does”. According to Kolb, this is where the examination of the narrative of 
architecture is understood within the larger narrative of art. It is here that the 
philosophical observer recognizes “the building as functioning within the movements and 
transitions involved in art as a mode of absolute spirit coming to itself.”lxxiv It is the 
understanding of architecture as a manifestation of Geist and a step along the way toward 
‘Absolute Knowing’.  
I would interpret this level as applying Hegel’s definition of art to the recollection of 
architecture attempted in level (4). For Hegel, art is a manifestation of Geist and as such, 
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it should manifest its advance as identified in the Phenomenology. I would assert, 
throughout Hegel’s discourse on architecture this was alluded to in the subtext.  
In the Phenomenology, consciousness begins with the division of being, a doubling of 
what Hegel called the Ansich, the ‘in-itself’, and then progresses through three levels in 
its development toward self-consciousness, (sense-certainty, perception and 
understanding). According to Hegel, symbolic architecture too moves through three 
stages. In this formative stage it has not yet established a morphology of architectural 
signification. There is a disjunction between meaning and shape. Architecture has yet to 
develop  an understanding of the relationship of the ‘this’ as ‘object’ and the ‘this’ as 
‘object for the comprehension of meaning’ and oscillates between the two. It first 
concentrates on the material object as “marker” and then on its symbolic content in the 
use of sculptural form. In this latter move it has begun to perceive its own symbolic 
function, grasping for the first time the necessity to relate the ‘this’ as ‘object’ to the 
‘this’ as ‘object for the contemplation of meaning’. It is here in the third stage of the 
symbolic that architecture begins to understand itself as ‘thing’ and ‘properties’. This is a 
move toward abstract reason as the object becomes something to be understood. 
Architecture now searches for a means to establish their relationship and generate a true 
morphology of signification within itself.  
As with the self of the Phenomenology, architecture has come to recognize the 
necessity of its own double. It has begun the transition toward self-consciousness by 
recognizing that the selections of forms appropriate to it are the forms that express the 
necessary relationships of its own performative ontology. Architecture now recognizes 
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the necessity of itself; as spatial enclosure and structural support. For Hegel, this marks 
the threshold of the transformation to architecture proper and the classical.  
In the Phenomenology this move to self-consciousness is also the most dangerous 
stage, if the self forgets its own past it retreats into itself, becoming what he called the 
“Beautiful Soul”. In this stage of consciousness the Understanding defines the object, not 
by our sensual relationship to it, but by its qualities or abstract concepts. In the Lectures 
on Fine Arts Hegel warns us of this occurring in classical architecture.  
Its balance and organic unity make the classical the best manifestation of architecture 
as a concrete universal. But it runs the risk of forgetting its true purpose. Potentially 
losing sight of itself as an art form, it degenerates into the abstractions of its own 
mathematical calculations, becoming nothing more than the desire to show the transfer of 
the statical stresses of the building in their movement from the roof to the foundation in a 
clear and rational manner. This was the basis of Hegel and Goethe’s critique of the 
architectural theories of their time. While they both referenced Laugier and the primitive 
hut, the focus of their critique was the tendency to frame the discourse of architecture 
within the framework of the Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition, found within the 
Greco-gothic Ideal, at the expense of its true purpose in the higher ideals of human 
society and the development of Geist. For Hegel, the classical in architecture is an 
advance over the symbolic, but only in so far as it does not forget both its material, or 
performative, essence and its ousia in marking and assembling, its formal or notional 
essence. It must remember to sublate the material and formal impulses and understand 
itself as a Poetic Unity.  
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In the Phenomenology, Hegel warned that the move toward abstraction engenders a 
sense of alienation, creating the opposition between appearance and the supersensible 
world. This in turn brings on the verkehrte Welt as self-consciousness questions the 
certainty of the Understanding.  
If the goal of art is to bring forward spirit in outward sensuous form, the romantic 
does it best. But in its inward movement it forsakes its own materiality. “Nothing is left 
to the artistic representation but to refuse validity to the material and the massive in its 
purely material character and to interrupt it everywhere, break it up and deprive it of its 
appearance of immediate coherence and independence.”lxxv But it does so at the expense 
of the very nature of architecture as media. It has forgotten the nature of its’ own truth, 
its’ double, that the selection of forms appropriate to it are the forms that express the 
necessary relationships of its’ own performative ontology. For Hegel, this is the problem 
with “Romantic” art in general; its’ inward subjectivity loses connection to the concrete 
and its access to truth as a concrete universal. It is the end of architecture.  
For Hegel, architecture lies in a spectrum of the arts at its beginning precisely because 
of its inherent materiality. At the other end of that spectrum are music and poetry which 
themselves have no materiality. Their goal is to become more concrete. Architecture only 
achieves its true form as a concrete universal if it transcends its material essence and 
moves toward the notional. Hegel’s analysis of the movement of architecture provides us 
with an image of the oscillation between material and formal impulses. But it must be 
mindful of the necessity of sublation. If it forgets this, it becomes the “Beautiful Soul” 
and loses itself in mathematical abstraction, or it creates the verkehrte Welt and forgets its 
own essence.  
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We exist in an age of the Vernuftstaat where, according to Hegel, art is no longer 
possible; it is dead. But what is so often overlooked is Hegel’s insistence that knowledge 
and spirit take the form of a circle, that art in the end becomes what it was in the 
beginning. Hope comes in the form of a new submergence into the concrete. As we are 
told in the Phenomenology, such a movement is effected by Errinnerung, recollection. 
Architecture must recollect its own path; its own history as a symbolic form. Hegel’s 
discourse on architecture, by effecting levels (4) and (5), attempts a philosophical inquiry 
that moves beyond self-consciousness toward “Absolute Knowing”. But more 
importantly, it implies a framework for architectural theory, one that examines how the 
Ideal is manifest in a form appropriate to material needs. It is the recollection of the 
necessity of sublation by recognizing that the truth of architecture lies in the unity of real 
need and independent purpose: its performative and notional ontologies. This requires a 




As Friedrich Schlegel noted, it was not enough for architects to put together the 
component parts of architecture; they had to contemplate them as an indivisible idea. 
Like Goethe’s morphology of Nature and Man, the Idealist philosophers sought the 
underlying principles that explained the unity in difference that was the history of 
architectural style. Their epistemological position engaged architecture along two 
philosophical avenues of questioning; ‘How does meaning emerge in the media of 
architecture?’ and ‘How is architecture intelligible?’  
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The answer to the first question was addressed at the level of art. As a manifestation 
of Geist, the search for meaning in Architecture began with the search for its own coming 
into being. As August Schlegel noted, all building was material and had to address the 
laws of physics and nature, but it was not an imitation of nature. Architecture was a 
product of the human mind therefore; it was directed towards some end or purpose. It was 
in the marking of a genus loci, a place of assembly and identity (assembly, nation etc.), 
that the origin of architectural meaning was to be found. Thus the manifestation of an 
independent purpose in a spatial configuration, a covering and its supporting system 
proved to be a principle of architecture one that served as the unity in difference 
exhibited in the diversity of history. 
The answer to the second question was addressed at the level of architecture and its 
own materiality. Architecture was based in the nature of the materials. It was in its’ 
parataxis, the structural logic of the covering and supporting system that architecture 
became comprehensible as ‘thing and properties’ it was self referential.    
It was in an examination of its ontology that architecture proved to be a union of the 
material and formal impulses; a true concrete universal. In their examinations the Idealist 
Philosophers provided a theoretical framework; one that examined both the noetic and 
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Geist. This is derived from his idea of art as a concrete universal and the necessity of a sublation of material 
and formal impulses. The challenge of the sublation is unique to each art. Architecture’s materiality 
necessitates its movement toward the incorporeal while poetry’s incorporeality necessitates its move 
toward the concrete. The result is that different forms become the most appropriate for Geist’s expression 
in its varoius stages. In the case of Absolute Knowing  poetry is the most appropriate form because it lends 
itself more easily. Hegel’s concern is that in some stages the art form looses connection with its own 
essence and hence the balance of material and formal impulses is disturbed.  
xlviii While the conception of the primitive hut could be traced back to Vitruvius and was frequently made 
reference to in Renaissance texts, notably Filarete’s Trattato di architettura of 1465, the principles of 
architecture were never seen as wholly derivative of it. It was the Abbe Marc Antoine Laugier whose Essay 
sur l’ architecture of 1753 first proposed a theory of architecture derived from the primitive hut given as an 
a priori image to the mind. According to him it was this clear and simple image that embodied the essence, 
or ousia, of architecture and from which all of its essential components and truths should be derived. The 
most significant alteration to this theory of origins at the time was that of Quatremere de Quincy who 
argued in his De l’architecture egyptienne consideree dans son origine of 1803 that there could be no one 
true origin. He proposed instead that there were three basic building archetypes the hut, the tent and the 
cave each of which leading to an alternative building system. All true architecture was a reflection of the 
primitive hut, or cave or tent, and all value judgments regarding the validity of a given work were therefore 
determined in relationship to these models.  
xlix Hegel references Goethe who challenged Laugier’s idea that the hut was the origin of architecture in his 
1772 essay On German Architecture. Hegel actually quotes Goethe where he attacks Laugier’s argument 
that the primitive hut was the origin of architecture.  
l Aloys Hirt was a German art historian and archeologist of Greek and Roman antiquities. Hirt also served 
as Goethe’s tour guide on his Italian journey. In 1809 he published "Die Baukunst nach den Grundsätzen 
der Alten" where he strongly promoted neo-classicism. In 1810 he became the first professor of art history 
and theory at the University of Berlin. He later founded the Bauakademie in Berlin where the Architect 
Karl Friedrick Schinkel was one of his students.  
li Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. II, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, pg. 623. 
lii Ibid. pg. 635.  
liii Ibid. pg 634.  
liv Ibid. pg 637. 
lv Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. II, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, pg.653. 
lvi Ibid. pg. 654. 
lvii Ibid. pg. 656 
lviii Ibid. pg. 659. 
lix Ibid. pg. 662. 
lx Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. I, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, pg. 427. 
lxi Ibid., pg 674. 
lxii Ibid., pg. 660. 
lxiii In many ways he prefigures later architectural theorists who articulate the distinction between the roof 
and its supports as a primary motivator for architecture. 
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lxiv Hegel’s understanding of the proper use of the column comes from Goethe’s On German Architecture 
of 1773 were he expressed the desire for a lack of confusion and the clarity of the column as support. 
Likewise his identification of the chief function of the wall as enclosure also comes from Goethe. 
lxv Ibid. pg. 668 
lxvi Ibid. pg 669. As Knox has pointed out, it is unusual that Hegel would not have recognized entasis as an 
optical correction but instead chooses to see it as a result of the desire to express the compressive stress of 
the columns loads. See footnote pg 677. This may be due to his personal lack of familiarity with the 
advances of architectural archeology at the time.  
lxvii Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. I, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, pg. 518. 
lxviii Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. II, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, . pg. 685. 
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lxx David Kolb, Before Beyond Function, Bates College, TTP://Abacus.bates.edu/~dkolb/bbfunction.html. 
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lxxii Ibid. pg. 7. 
lxxiii Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. II, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975,  pg. 696.  
lxxiv David Kolb, Before Beyond Function, Bates College, TTP://Abacus.bates.edu/~dkolb/bbfunction.html.. 
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lxxv Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. II, trans. T.M. Knox, Clarendom Press, Oxford 
1975, pg. 696. 
Chapter 16: Poetic Tectonics: Architecture and Idealism 
 
The influence of French thought on aesthetics and architecture in Germany was 
certainly evident by the mid 1700’s and could be found in the works of theorists like 
Johann Georg Sulzer (1720- 79), Christian Traugott Weinlig (1739- 99) and Karl Phillip 
Moritz (1756- 93). Sulzer had called for a true taste of Antiquity, one that required a 
‘noble simplicity’. He rejected the architecture of the middle ages as ‘barbaric’. He also 
advocated an organic- functionalist approach toward building. He claimed: “Every 
organized body is a building; each of its inner parts is completely appropriate to the use 
for which it is intended; but all the parts are unified in the closest and most convenient 
relationship the whole has in its own way the best outward form . . .”i Weinlig combined 
the functionalist doctrines of both Lodoli, as understood via Algarotti, and Laugier, 
taking over Laugier’s evolutionary theory of the orders and the primacy of material 
concerns. Moritz was perhaps the most influenced by the French and functionalism in his 
concerns. “The most beautiful capitol does not bear or support any better than the plain 
shaft; the most sumptuous cornice covers and warms no better that the flat wall.”ii Thus 
for him the expressivity of the ornament should reflect the statical pressure and 
construction of the detail.  
Eighteenth century German theory, while borrowing from the epistemology of 
science, conceived of architecture as a reflection of society’s social structure and moral 
fortitude. As noted earlier, Art historians often credit this to the early prominence of 
Winkelmann. But Sulzer, who measured architecture according to its socially educative 
effect, expressed a similar concern. It was the task of the arts in general to cultivate 
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morals and architecture was not excluded from that concern. According to him 
architecture should assist in producing universal happiness. “From frequently repeated 
enjoyment of pleasure in the Beautiful and the Good arises the desire for these, and from 
the adverse impression made on us by the Ugly and the Bad results an antipathy towards 
anything that is against the moral order.”iii Sulzer saw architecture as reflective of ‘a 
national state of mind’ (‘Gemuthszustand einer Nation’) one that should do honor to the 
nation. The same attitude was evident in the 1785, Untersuchungen über den Charakter 
der Gebaude, in which its anonymous author insisted that architecture was not an 
imitation of nature, but the depiction of ‘the condition of men’.iv It was the social status 
and psychological condition of the occupant that was expressed in the character of the 
building more so than the function. This difference helped to maintain a concept of 
architecture as a humanistic discourse, a reflection of the human mind and its progress, as 
opposed to an analogue of a mechanistic nature. 
It was perhaps this alternative concern with architecture as a reflection of society, 
coupled with Winkelmann’s notion of its’ evolutionary development, that made many 
German theorists more receptive to the work of Hamann and Herder and Idealist 
aesthetics  as they began to reformulate architectural theory in a manner less dependent 







“When science and art unite at a common central 
point, when they work in concert, and when they 
place equal reliance on the lessons of experience, 
then they will progress more swiftly toward their 
goal; and each stands to gain by mutual extension 
of their powers to encompass even the remotest 
social purposes.” 
Friedrich Gilly 
“Some thoughts on the Necessity of Endeavoring to 
Unify the Various Departments of Architecture in 
Both Theory and Practice” v 
 
Friedrich Gilly and the Architecture of the Systemprogramm 
 
In the Late 1700’s an unlikely prophet of German architecture would emerge. 
Friedrich Gilly (1772- 1800), the son of David Gilly (1748- 1808) a well- known German 
architect and professor, proved to be a young protégé. vi  He first came to major 
recognition with his 1796 competition entry for the Friedrichsdenkmal, a monument 
dedicated to the memory of Fredrick the Great of Prussia.vii In a letter to the philologist 
and archaeologist Carl August Boettiger (1760- 1835), the writer Friedrich Gentz said of 
the younger Gilly “. . . this young man possesses one of the foremost artistic geniuses of 
our country and our age. I am far from indicating the true extent of his abilities – though 
this in itself says much for him - when I tell you that in his twenty- fourth year he was 
hailed by all those best qualified to judge as the first architect of the Prussian State.”viii 
His praise was not singular. After an exhibition of Friedrichsdenkmal drawings at the 
Berlin Academy Exhibition in 1797 both the playwright Ludwig Tieckix (1773- 1853) 
and the poet Wilhelm Wackenroderx (1773-1798) hailed him as a national genius.xi The 
younger Gilly died young and produced little in the way of built work or written texts, 
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but the ideas embodied in what he did accomplish managed to express the will of his age 
and inspire a generation of architects.  
His earliest drawings and writings identify him as a significant new voice in German 
architectural theory. In particular, his essay entitled On the Views of Marienburg, Castle 
of the Teutonic Order in West Prussia, Drawn in the Year 1794 by Mr. Gilly, Supervisor 
of the Royal Building Administration. Written as an accompaniment to the 1795 
exhibition of his sketches from Marienburg, at the Akademie der bildenden Kunste, it 
should be paired with Goethe’s earlier 1772 On German Architecture, as signaling a shift 
in German theory. Like him, Gilly chose to view Gothic architecture as a poetic 
expression of the will of a people, an expression of the ‘Fortgang’.  
 
 
Fig. 23 Image View of the Exterior of the Chapter House of Marienburg 1794- 76 
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Earlier writings on Gothic architecture had chosen to view the period as either 
degenerate in its excess of ornament and lack of pure form, or as an example of rational 
structure whose expression was unfortunately obscured by decorative motifs. The latter 
position underlay de Cordemoy’s Greco-gothic Ideal and in fact persisted right up to the 
time of Viollet- le- duc (1814-1879). In his Observations of 1765, Laugier proved to be 
more sympathetic with the Gothic than the position espoused in his earlier Essai, but he 
still held to an appreciation of the Gothic that was derived from the rational clarité of its 
structure.  
What fascinated Gilly about the Gothic mason’s art was the variety of expressiveness 
found in the manipulation of its stones. Where others saw Gothic vaulting as a rational 
exposition of statical forces, Gilly saw shooting stars that transformed the massive 
vaulting into poetic interpretations of the night sky. Aside from his obvious appreciation 
of its picturesque qualities, Gilly saw Gothic as the poetic interpretation of medieval 
man’s Lebensvelt. Focusing more on its oneiric qualities, he commented on how the 
castle rose above the ground as far as it burrowed deep within the earth. The sketches 
themselves reveal an almost Piranesian fascination with the expressive potentiality of 
stereotomic form and light. His sketch of the refectory at Marienburg depicts a lone man 
leaning against one of the columns staring up at the rib vaults in silent contemplation. In 
it architecture bears historic witness to man’s past achievements and serves as inspiration 
for today’s poet.xii Architecture’s expressive potentiality is one designed to stimulate 
man’s contemplation of the Ideal, in the Hegelian sense. Gilly saw the Gothic not as a 
degeneration of the Classical ideal, but like Goethe and later Hegel, its transformation 
into a higher form of art. 
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Fig.24 Image Refectory of Marienburg Friedrich Gilly 1974. 
 
Gilly’s sketches concentrated on the expressivity of the forms, reinterpreting certain 
aspects of the Gothic in classical terms. This allowed him to understand certain heavy 
piers as ‘masculine’ Doric forms and still others as slender ‘feminine’ Ionic ones. It was 
this ability to transcend stylistic purity and understand the Classical alongside the Gothic 
as two interpretations of the same expressive potentiality that lead him to his own 







Fig. 25 Image Loggia Design date unknown 
 
In a series of studies for a loggia from his sketchbook, Gilly provided one of the 18th 
century’s most radical visions of architecture. He stripped the post and lintel forms of 
their historical garb and associations. The images present massive piers and beams which 
far exceed their necessary dimensions. They are determined not by utility, but by the 
desire to convey strength, permanence and solidity. By reducing them to a simple 
relationship between idea and form, they revealed a sense of the monumental. Gilly 
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exposed the raw expressive power of construction and how the manipulation of form, 
proportion and light affects its poetic reading. Gilly’s images present us with pure poetic 
form. 
Early 20th century historians saw in his sketches evidence of a rationalist approach 
toward design and functionalism and interpreted them as an origin of modern 
architecture. As I intend to show, Gilly was by no means a rationalist or functionalist in 
the Modern sense. This interpretation denies not only his theory of architecture, but the 
context within which it was formulated. It projects onto the first real architectural 
alternative to rational tectonics, the 20th century doctrine of functionalism.  
Gilly was well versed in then contemporary French theory. His library contained 
several works by the most important writers of the 18th century, including Charles- 
Etienne Briseux, Jacques- Francois Blondel, Marc Antoine Laugier, Marie- Josep Peyre, 
and Antoine- Chrysostome Quatremere de Quincy, all of whom proved influential on his 
ideas. But he did not accept many of their core tenets. A closer reading of his work 
reveals that his theoretical agenda was aimed in an altogether different direction, one 
guided by the tenets of Idealism. As Bergdoll has noted, Gilly read the writings of 
Schiller and Goethe as part of a reading society. He asserts that Schiller’s On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man was highly influential on him.xiii  I intend to show how his 
work is better seen as aligned to that of Schiller, Goethe and Hegel. 
Gilly was close to Goethe and directly influenced by him. In The Metamorphosis of 
Plants of 1790, Goethe proposed the idea of the Urpflanze, a theory in which all the parts 
of the plant were seen as variations and developments from one seminal element or organ 
that was then transformed into the subsequent diverse parts. For Goethe, Nature was 
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composed of the relationship between the concrete physicality of a particular living 
organism and its morphology. Individual organisms in their particularity were seen as 
reflections of the conditions of their ‘climate’. The ever-changing nature of the 
relationship between the particularity of appearance and morphology was what accounted 
for the infinite creativity of nature.  
Gilly’s sketches present us with a similar study of architectural form. The loggia form 
is reduced to its basic seminal Urflanze of construction. The image is the recognition of 
an idea that orders our cognition of the construction type ‘trabeation’. Fichte had called 
the ability to generate such images the ‘productive imagination’; the complex process of 
the Anstoβ that generates order from the dialectic of cognition and reality. For him this 
was the primary role of the artist, who must transcend material necessity through the 
inner principles of the productive imagination if he is to achieve what he called ‘primal 
beauty’.xiv Such Ur forms were not of any given age, rather they existed outside time, 
like some architectural mythic image. As Fritz Neumeyer has claimed “this imagined 
building seems timeless, archaic, and utopian, all at once. It evokes associations that 
stretch back in time to Stonehenge and forward to the modern skeleton constructions




xv It is this quality that 
allows them to transcend individual subjectivity and move beyond the contingencies of a
given style to rise to the level of the 
The Ur form may have served as a principle of architecture, but it did not have the 
character of the mechanical laws of Newton’s nature. Unlike Laugier’s Primitive Hut, it 
did not establish a principle to be imitated. Instead it served as the framework upon which 
each culture could build its own means of expression. The continuous ever-changing 
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“climate” of human culture was the source of infinite interpretations and expressions, 
making architecture an extension of nature’s creativity. Intentional or not, Gilly was able 
to create an image of architecture in line with Herder’s understanding of symbolic forms, 
Goethe’s definition of nature and Fichte’s concept of self.  
This had implications for architectural history. Historical analysis was no longer the 
study of disconnected styles, the study of stylistic components and their mechanical 
relationships. Winkelmann may have been the first to view the history of architecture as a 
history of cultural advance, but it was Gilly who provided the mechanism for that 
analysis. History now focused on how individual cultures transformed the Ur form into 
an individual expression of the ‘Fortgang’, making it an examination of the artistic 
processes itself- and posing the question; ‘How does Architecture create human meaning 
and expression within the exigencies of man’s material existence?’ 
Gilly’s sketches, particularly those from Marienburg, reveal a keen interest in 
picturesque compositional qualities, as well as the Sublime, most likely derived from 
Piranesi, but it would be a mistake to see him as an advocate of a ‘Subjective’ aesthetics. 
This is evidenced in two essays of 1799, A description of the Villa of Bagatelle, near 
Paris and A description of Rincy, a Country Seat near Paris. While admiring the Villa at 
Bagatelle, its English-styled gardens left him less than impressed. He criticized its 
superficiality; the artificiality of its ‘natural’ landscape and its fascination with sham 
follies. The associations they triggered might ‘stimulate the richly stored mind’, but such 
experience was no substitution for reality. For Gilly, the follies distracted the spectator 
from the appreciation of the same qualities in actual working structures. Although he 
accepted the critique of the formal French garden style as having “imprisoned” nature, 
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Gilly still saw in it “a strong impression of sublimity”. The Picturesque seemed to him to 
have “transformed” the gardens into “diminutive, artificial models of gardens”, 
prompting him to assert that; “the art of gardening in France has by now perhaps lost 
more than it has gained by taking a different path.”xvi  
His impression at Rincy was different; the buildings in the garden there served real 
functions. According to him, there “the poet discovered the ideal that is so delightfully 
depicted in his accounts of country life and of its simple pleasures. Here, all embodies 
that judicious combination of utility and beauty . . .”xvii It was that combination of utility 
and beauty that underlay his whole approach to architecture and demonstrates his 
allegiance to Idealist aesthetics, most specifically the idea that true art was the balanced 
combination of material and formal impulses.  
This was nowhere move evident than in his most famous essay, Some Thoughts on 
the Necessity of Endeavoring to Unify the Various Departments of Architecture in both 
Theory and Practice. In it he criticized the growing tendency to conceive of architecture 
through the filter of the epistemology of science. An obvious criticism of ‘Objective’ 
aesthetics, it should be seen as the first architectural treatise to directly challenge 
eighteenth century theory along the lines of Idealism.  
The essay was written as a commentary on the development of architectural education 
shortly after the establishment of the Bauakademie in Berlin. The essay, the prospectus 
and the aims of the new school were published in the same edition of the Sammlung an 
editorial aimed specifically at the professional audience with the intention of bringing art 
and science closer together. Gilly took the editorial staff at their word and launched an 
attack on the prospectus of the Bauakademie, which focused its aims on a scientific 
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understanding of architecture. The Bauakademie was modeled on the Ecole centrale des 
travaux publics in Paris, later renamed the Ecole Polytechnique, and so its emphasis was 
on practical and technical problems associated with engineering and civic structures. As 
the official state school of architecture it would have established an interpretation of 
architecture along the lines of the Ecole Polytechnique and the epistemology of science.  
What was at issue was how the state was choosing to define architecture within the 
prospectus. Gilly questioned what relationship such modern disciplines as mechanical 
engineering, hydraulics, river engineering and mining had to monumental building. These 
disciplines had historically been related to architecture. Treatises had long contained 
sections on the construction of fortifications, bridges and roadways, and thus fallen under 
the auspices of the profession. But more recently, they had developed further into 
individual discourses, ones that addressed specific problems using specific techniques. In 
essence, they had evolved their own aims, methods and concerns which set them apart 
from those of architecture. “In many cases it is merely a tenuous and contingent 
connection or the initial application of certain common principles that has caused such 
highly disparate subjects to be associated as if they were closely akin.”xviii Gilly’s 
concern was that lumping them all together under the title construction, or Bauen, within 
a college of architecture forced architecture to conform to the aims of the engineering 
sciences, as opposed to the art of architecture itself, which according to Gilly, was a 
world apart from such aims.  
Gilly’s concerns were not overstated. The late 18th century was marked by various 
attempts to establish a science of architecture. The growing reliance on mathematics and 
scientific method to justify value judgments in architecture was becoming more evident. 
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In Germany men like Christian Wolff and Leonhard Christoph Sturm had treated 
architecture as a branch of applied mathematics and had brought a strong rationalist 
sensibility to the profession.  
At issue was the tendency that by this time had become evident, the tendency of the 
epistemology of science to move toward specialization. Such specialization resulted in a 
fragmentation of knowledge that Gilly perceived as fundamentally at odds with the 
necessities of architecture. Gilly noted that the fragmentation tended to place a 
concentration on the scientific aspects of architectural knowledge at the expense of 
understanding the discipline as an art form. “So vast is the range of the several arts and 
sciences, and so numerous are the fields of action that they encompass, that practitioners, 
mindful of their own limitations, must for their own sakes restrict themselves to one or 
another aspect of their chosen subject; they may nevertheless, on occasion, profitably 
adopt a more elevated vantage point and survey the whole, of which their own work is a 
part, and which endows that work with its characteristic form and purpose.”xix This same 
concern with the fragmentation of knowledge lay at the center of both Herder and 
Hegel’s critique of Cartesian rationalism. 
Paraphrasing Goethe, Gilly remarked that in antiquity the status of architecture was 
more closely associated with the arts than sciences. “Whatever may have been its status 
or its connection with the sciences, it was then, more than at any other time, that 
architecture naturally enjoyed a close alliance with the arts.”xx The history of architecture 
was for him a movement from such intimate connection with the arts to one of 
craftsmanship, (one assumes that he is referring to the Gothic era) and then to one of a 
scholarly pursuit. This represented a true decline. “With the spread of learning, 
 600
architecture came to be treated as a largely scholarly pursuit. The age of the manuals now 
dawned. Mathematics, in particular, took architecture in hand and even presumed- if only 
in an appendix- to solve the problem of taste.”xxi One must assume that the reference was 
to either Vignola or Perrault, both of whom used mathematical tables to demonstrate the 
proper proportions of the columns. Gilly read the history of recent architectural theory as 
a continuation of this tendency. What had resulted was a ‘pernicious onesidedness’ that 
allowed for the reduction of architecture to individual or national taste. His assessment of 
history was that the duality of beauty made architecture beholden to either an objective 
mathematical interpretation or a subjective taste. The result according to him was that 
“Architecture had long since been admitted as a true companion of the fine arts; but few 
now came forward to defend this right or even its right to the name of art. Some conceded 
it half a vote in the congress of the arts, but others struck it entirely from the list, citing its 
ignominious subservience to necessity and utility. And so architecture came to be 
considered merely a mechanical pursuit, and it was subordinated first to one superior 
authority and then to another: its task was to serve and be useful.”xxii  
There are echoes here of Schiller’s assertion in On the Aesthetic Education of Man 
that art bends its’ knee under the yoke of necessity. For him likewise, this proved 
unacceptable. Quoting Goethe at length he revealed the essence of his comments to be a 
critique of his own age and its episteme. “If art be controlled and subdued, if it be made 
to conform to the dictates of its age, it will wither and perish . . . If the arts are to flourish 
and advance, there must be a universal and active love of art, with a predisposition 
toward greatness . . .  It is vain to expect that elegance, taste, and fitness for purpose will 
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spread their influence through every craft; for this can never happen until a feeling for art 
has become general, and until those qualities are in demand.”xxiii  
For Gilly, Architecture had to respond to the greater issues and concerns of society 
and not just the practical and economical concerns of a specific project. It required 
therefore, that the architect move above the individual disciplines of the building trades 
and focus on how they were interrelated and related to society at large. “The art of 
architecture itself, in its own proper domain, is also characterized by an extraordinary 
multiplicity not only in the individual topics with which it deals but also in its associated 
purposes, wants, and inquiries. Its study, like its practice, involves a great variety of 
interconnected topics; its essential concerns therefore demand to be considered from 
distinct points of view. These concerns nevertheless connect to form a whole once they 
are seen in terms of the points of contact that arise in practice between them; and this 
connected view becomes necessary because the purposes and wants themselves 
necessarily form connections.”xxiv This according to Gilly would amount to ‘an outline of 
the entire education of an architect.’  
What Gilly was calling for was an architecture of the whole, for “an art that is as 
useful as it is pleasurable; an art that is the natural ally of order, tranquility, and the 
blessings of civilization; an art that involves human activity of every kind in its pursuit of 
mutual advantage; an art that– wherever it flourishes- is itself a sign of a cultivated 
society.”xxv This was what he believed he saw at Rincy: a union of utility and beauty.  
It reveals a deep seated commitment to the principles of Idealism. Like Schiller’s 
assessment of art before him, Gilly cast contemporary architecture within a dialect of 
material and formal impulses. The theories of men like Wolff and Sturm, and the 
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prospectus of the Bauakademie focused far too much on the material impulse of 
architecture at the expense of the formal impulse, leaving the true role of architecture as 
an art form, the manifestation of the Ideal, by the way side. This was the condition of the 
Vernuftstaat in architecture and it would have to be overcome if the profession and 
society were to advance.  
In order to do this there had to be sublation. Gilly’s solution was a paraphrase of the 
Systemprogramm. The architect must learn to value the scientist and the scientist to value 
the architect, and none should claim the vanity of being the Baukunstler, or artist of 
construction. Only when art and science unite at a common central point would they both 
progress more swiftly. “When science and art unite at a common central point, when they 
work in concert, and when they place equal reliance on the lessons of experience, then 
they will progress more swiftly toward their goal; and each stands to gain by mutual 
extension of their powers to encompass even the remotest social purposes.”xxvi It was the 
union of art and science that brought society to its highest potentiality and this could be 
accomplished within architecture, which served as both the reflection of society and as its 
motivator. 
At the heart of Gilly’s argument was the conception that art and science had to stand 
on equal footing for society as a whole to progress to greatness. Architecture stood at the 
crucible of such a union, and truly great architecture could only be the product of an age 
that understood such a balance. If Goethe and Hegel saw architecture as central to the 




Fig. 26 Image of the Friedrichsdenkmal 
 
Gilly’s sketches and writings formed the basis of a new theoretical approach toward 
architecture, but it was the competition entry for the Friedrichsdenkmal that provided the 
new and influential image that inspired a generation; what Bergdoll has referred to as a 
comprehensive program for architecture.xxvii  
Unlike the other entries that proposed statues, monuments or singular structures, Gilly 
redesigned an entire district of Berlin at Leipziger Platz. That move, bold as it was, 
signaled a concern for architectures’ relationship to the polis and its ability to manifest 
the higher ideal in the built fabric of the city. He chose the Leipziger Platz for its location 
and scale. The area was one that, in his mind, owed much of its success to the late King. 
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While well frequented, Gilly saw it as removed from the hustle and bustle of the main 
areas of Berlin, a quality he saw as necessary in a monument to such lofty ideals.  
The spatial sequencing here was important. One would arrive along the road from 
Potsdam to approach the new propylon of Berlin rising from the groves of the Tiergarten. 
Gilly’s new Potsdamer Tor served as a hinge linking the road to Potsdam, home to 
Friedrich the Great’s Sansoucis Palace and the beginning of Friedrichstradt, a street laid 
out under Fredrick I and finished under Fredrick II. As David Leatherbarrow has pointed 
out, it symbolized tolerance under the reign of Frederick the Great.xxviii This made it a 
powerful metaphor for yet another higher ideal. The Potsdamer Tor combined Greek and 
Roman motifs with Langhan’s Brandenburg Gate into the sterotomic solids of 
revolutionary architecture, the entire sequence recalling the influence of classical form on 
the development of Berlin. The monument, axially aligned with the gate and 
Friedrichstadt, would be visible through the triumphal arch of the gate. In a bold move, 
Gilly raised the monument on a massive plinth with two barrel vaults at ninety degrees 
cut into it allowing visual passage through the monument and onto the street beyond. The 
triumphal arch of the gate was echoed in the barrel vaults of the plinth, visually linking 
them together as a single urban intervention.  
The competition brief called for a project that inspired the higher ideals of morality 
and patriotism. Gilly took that charge to heart, envisioning a Heroum one that, while 
referencing the heroic Prussian King’s life directly, inspired the subject to contemplate 
and celebrate the higher ideals he now stood for.xxix Gilly used the monument to create an 
architectural image of the Greek ideal as proffered by men like Alois Hirt and 
Winkelmann. Inspired by the images in his father’s copies of Stuart and Revett and J.D. 
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LeRoy, he created a tour de force of memory and imagination that moved beyond the 
academic classicism of the age. In its place he proposed a sublime dialogue on the 
opposition of dark and light, of individual finitude and the infinite that called the subject 
to confront the Ideal in the same manner as the great Gothic Cathedrals of yore.  
Liepziger Platz was large and open, with no significant large structures allowing the 
monument to control the space without competition. Around the elongated octagonal 
square Gilly placed a double row of trees designed for promenading and viewing the 
monument. The base of the Heroum was constructed of black basalt stone. Along the 
triumphal path at the center of the structure, visible from the street, Gilly proposed 
placing the sarcophagi of Friedrich the Great upon a base of black marble rising from a 
pool of unfathomable depth, above it a great vault of stars. In the dark somber chamber, a 
memorial to the life of a hero, we as spectators are drawn to the inner subjectivity of our 
own experience and asked to confront the finite, the mystery of our own mortality.  
Above the dark nether world of the base, a second podium, lighter in color, with 
monumental stairs at its corners rises. Compelled toward the light, the visitor is 
confronted with alternating views of the city and the sky, meant no doubt to symbolize 
reality and the Absolute. Atop this second podium, a Doric temple, open to the sky. Gilly 
turned to the Temple of Jupitor-Seapis at Pozzuoli, near Naples as a precedent.xxx In 
notes written on the Friedrichsdenkmal, Gilly stated “I know of no more beautiful effect
than that of being enclosed on all sides- cut off, as it were, from the tumult of the world- 
and seeing the sky over one’s head, free, entirely free. At evening.” It was this image
seclusion that physiologically draws one to view upon the open sky and contemplate the 




asserted this form of monastic seclusion was necessary for aesthetic contemplation. As 
Neumeyer has noted “Many of Gilly’s designs are about creating this dialog with the 
Absolute by architectural means. This is as true of the tiny Temple of Solitude in its 
parkland setting as it is of the vast, urban “temple of Solitude” that was the 
Friedrichsdenkmal.” xxxi  
Gilly moved beyond the then contemporary fashion of archeological classicism, 
instead choosing to manipulate mass, proportion, light and texture to create an 
architectural language that spoke more directly to the senses then speech. Bergdoll has 
noted that this aspect of Gilly’s work places it in line with the ideas espoused by Le 
Camus de Mezieres in Genius of Architecture and Schiller in On the Aesthetic Education 
of Man. As he has claimed, the project provides us with a recapitulation of the history of 
Greek architecture as an evolution of materials and construction. The massive black stone 
base with its hexagonal stones and battered walls provide the foundation for the more 
refined stone work of the podium upon which rests the stoic purity of the Doric order. It 
is as if we see before our eyes rising from the nether world to the sky, the movement 
from archaic earthwork and brute construction to the idealized classical tectonic form. In 
Bergdoll’s estimation “Gilly proposed an image of architecture in which an exploration 
of the tectonics of construction led to the embodiment of higher ideals, and in which the 
world of Ideal forms, with all the stereometric purity and abstraction that was the 
hallmark of Gilly’s style, continually framed views of the real world.” xxxii While it 
predated Hegel’s Phenomenology of 1807 and his lectures on architecture of the 1820’s, 
it nonetheless incorporated the idea of Recollection so central to them. 
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In 1799 Gilly founded the Privatgesellschaft jünger Architekten, the Private Society 
of Young Architects, with Heinrich Gentz (1766- 1811). In addition to several notable 
young architectsxxxiii the group included a young student named Carl Friedrich Schinkel 
(1781-1841). He would later claim that it was Gilly’s Friedrichsdenmal that made him 
want to become an architect.  
 
“Very soon I fell into the error of pure arbitrary 
abstraction, and developed the entire conception of 
a particular work exclusively from its most 
immediate trivial function and from its construction. 
This gave rise to something dry and rigid, and 
lacking in freedom, that entirely excluded two 
essential elements: the historical and the poetical. I 
pursued my researches further, but very soon 
found myself trapped in a great labyrinth . . . ”xxxiv  
 
Karl Friedrich Schinkel 
Das Architektonishe Lehrbuch 
 
Schinkel and the Birth of Poetic Tectonics 
 
A young Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781- 1841) came in contact with the work of 
Friedrich Gilly in 1797 when he saw his design for the Monument to Frederick the Great 
on display at the Berlin Academy Exhibition. Within a few months time he met Gilly and 
they became great and dedicated friends.xxxv In 1798, Schinkel moved into the Gilly 
household and began studying with Friedrich and David Gilly at their private architecture 
school.xxxvi A year later, Schinkel enrolled in the newly formed Bauakademie in Berlin. 
After Friedrich’s untimely death in 1800, David Gilly gave Schinkel his son’s notes and 
sketch books. Historians have noted that throughout his career Schinkel turned to them 
for inspiration.  
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Fig. 27 Image Karl Friedrich Schinkel ‘Medieval Town by the Water’ 
 
Schinkel began painting after returning from his trip to Italy in 1805. The large 
canvases depicted Classical antiquity and Medieval Rome as ideal models of social 
reform. It was also at this time that he did the huge stage set for Mozart’s Magic Flute. 
Both he and Casper David Friedrich are considered to be the most important Romantic 
painters of the age. But after having seen the formers’ Monk by the Sea of 1809, Schinkel 
gave up painting professionally and turned his full attention to architecture.xxxvii He 
would prove to be one of the most widely known and influential architects of the early 
1800’s. His career was vast and diverse. Alongside architecture and planning, he 






Fig. 28 Image Casper David Friedrich ‘Monk by the Sea’ 1809 
 
Like Goethe, historians have been quick to identify him as a Classicist. This attitude 
owes much to Goerd Peshckin. In his analysis of Schinkel’s theoretical development he 
claimed that after coming under the influence of Goethe and the philosopher Karl 
Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (1780-1819),xxxviii Schinkel embraced classical architecture 
and the idea that art and architecture should express rational laws and the honest 
expression of structure.xxxix Peschkin called this phase of his development (the third of 
five) ‘Classicist’.xl According to Peschin “After Schinkel turned classicist he again 
regarded antiquity as the supreme ideal. Hence he sees the history of architecture as a 
development of simple to complex forms of construction. For him the greatest simplicity 
embodies perfect dignity as in post and lintel construction where the beam demands 
larger blocks of stone or better material than those used for spanning an arch.  For 
Schinkel, progress consists in the fact that technology can achieve its aims with less and 
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less materials.”xli Peschin’s description appears to align him with the ideals of French 
Neo-classicism in its emphasis on simplicity of form and economy of construction. But 
there are several problems with this assessment.  
First, Solger was influential very early in Schinkel’s career and was responsible for 
exposing him to the tenets of Idealist aesthetics. Schinkel met Solger in 1801 and he 
would become Schinkel’s mentor for the early part of his career.xlii  Muller has claimed 
that he was also influential on Hegel.xliii There are several points that they share; most 
notable was that art was the manifestation of the Ideal. But also that art was the teacher of 
mankind. Hegel had made the point earlier in the Systemprogramm of 1796. And in the 
Aesthetics, Hegel too saw architecture as the most material of the arts, meaning that it had 
to address the Ideal to a greater degree to overcome its inherent materiality. As I have 
shown, that gave it an important place in Hegel’s philosophy as well. 
Solger’s aesthetics were consistent with the main tenets of Idealism. His 1815 master 
work, Erwin, Vier Gesprache über das Schone und die Kunst was based on his University 
of Berlin lectures of 1811-12 and as Bergdoll notes, reflected his early exchanges with 
Schinkel.xliv In it he argued that the artist was one of life’s teachers and that the duty of 
the artist was to make the Ideal knowable through the manipulation of the phenomenal. 
Solger believed architecture was the best medium for the Ideal precisely because, as the 
most accessible and material of the arts, it had to manipulate the real the most in order to 
transcend it. While architecture derived its function from necessity, it served a higher 
moral purpose in the human and social needs it addressed. 
Solger was not the only one to make the connection between architecture and a higher 
moral purpose in German literature. Goethe had made a similar point, first about 
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Strasbourg Cathedral in On German Architecture (1772) and again in Italian Journey 
(1786) about the Roman amphitheater in Verona, when he claimed that true architecture 
provided a vision of humanity’s universal needs. The same could be said of Schiller, who 
insisted that our ability to read in the work the overlay of the human spirit provided it 
with its power to inspire us. For him the Ideal manifested itself as the creative force in 
man and was found in any symbolic form. Central to his theory of both Man and 
Aesthetics, Schiller called this the formal impulse and made it a necessary component in 
his theory of sublation. Far from directing Schinkel toward Neo-classicism, Solger 
initiated him into the ideas and aesthetics of Idealist philosophy. That initiation would 
evolve into a full-blown membership. 
The second problem with Peschin’s assertion that Schinkel was a Classicist was the 
implication that Goethe influenced him toward classicism after their acquaintance 
in1816. The problem with this assumption lies in the idea that Goethe was a classicist and 
that what they took from their studies of classicism was uncritical. Just as more recent 
scholarship challenges the image of Goethe as a Classicist; more recent scholarship of 
Schinkel challenges his classicist image as well.  
Many historians have sought to link him to the Neo-classical tradition by associating 
him with J.L.N. Durand.xlv Goalen sees this as an ironic twist, given the high admiration 
for Schinkel and the relatively low one afforded Durand, by these same historians.xlvi He 
notes that while there are compositional similarities between their work (in particular 
Schinkel’s Altes Museum in Berlin and Durand’s un-built project for a Museum) there is 
little comparison in their intentions. Durand sought a system of rational composition. 
Schinkel consciously sought to bring the “principle of Greek architecture . . . to terms 
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with the conditions of the epoch.”xlvii For Durand details were of little concern and 
applied only after the composition was finished. Schinkel on the other hand, began with 
an understanding of how the details determined the outcome of such a composition. In 
Schinkel there is constant adjustment to the exigencies of the conflicting systems in the 
plan of the Altes Museum. In his work there is a concentration on the creation of 
individual autonomous scenes that collectively contribute to the experience of the edifice, 
something completely absent in Durand. 
According to Betthausen, the image of Schinkel as a Classicist is inaccurate because 
most of his more innovative buildings have, since his death, been destroyed leaving only 
the grand classical structures as his legacy.xlviii He notes the shift to the Neo-classical 
style after 1810 was not motivated by a stylistic preference, but by outside forces, most 
notably Friedrich Wilhem III’s increasing desire to turn away from references to the 
national spirit of the Wars of Liberation. Among Prussian leaders, Gothic architecture 
was seen as having Nationalist associations. The classical style was increasingly more 
fashionable among the Bourgeoisie who were his patrons, and this would account for its 
extensive use in his work.  
 Schinkel was accomplished in the classical style and its vocabulary was the one he 
most applied, but he was equally accomplished in Neo-gothic.xlix He maintained a 
fascination with the Gothic throughout his entire career. Bergdoll claims that the 
development of designs in multiple styles speaks to the essence of his project and not 
about stylistic purity. He sees the multiplicity as a reflection of Wilhelm von Humbolt’s 
notion of diversity of languages.l  
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A more thorough analysis of his influences and oeuvre reveals that he was intimately 
connected to the theoretical constructs of Idealism. In 1803, while in Rome, Schinkel met 
and became friends with Wilhelm von Humbolt. During the years of 1808 and 1810 
Humbolt would restructure the educational system in Germany and in 1809-10 he would 
found the University of Berlin with Fichte. Together they would bring an entire 
generation of philosophers and scientists to Berlin, changing its intellectual culture. His 
friendships with Wilhelm von Humbolt (1767-1835) his brother Alexander von Humbolt 
(1759-1869) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, are well documented.li And between the years 
of 1816 and 1824 Schinkel was in direct contact with Goethe. Additionally, historians 
such as Barry Bergdoll have noted the direct influence of August and Friedrich Schlegel
and associated his work with the ideas of Schiller.
 
tudied.liii 
liiSchinkel’s friendships and contacts 
placed him at the center of the new intellectual circle of Idealist thinkers during his 
formative years when he was developing his theoretical perspectives on architecture. As 
Wolf has argued, it is in this context that his work should be s
Alex Potts has observed a greater influence of Hegel than has been historically 
recognized, a point I fully agree with.liv Hegel, who was working in Berlin from 1818- 
1831, had begun to give lectures on Architecture and Aesthetics in 1820. It is likely that 
Schinkel, if not in attendance at those lectures, may have gained familiarity with the 
positions put forth by the eminent philosopher through their mutual friend Goethe. In the 
case of Schinkel this was his most fruitful and complete period of theoretical exploration, 
1825-30, the period in which he was elaborating his notes for the Lehrbuch. Thus 
Schinkel and Hegel were both in Berlin developing their theories of architecture at or 
around the same time.  
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Therefore, Schinkel’s theoretical formulations in the Lehrbuch come after his 
correspondences with Goethe and after Hegel’s public lectures on architecture and art. It 
is not my intention here to imply that his ideas should be attributed to either; he was an 
original and inspired thinker. Rather, I wish to situate him within this broader 
constellation of thought and demonstrate that his work reveals a consistency throughout 
his career with that agenda.  
Schinkel identified architecture as a manifestation of the collective Geist and, as I 
intend to show, a sublation of the material and formal impulses. He expressed a distain 
for imitation, and rejected the supremacy of function and use found in French theory. 
Furthermore, his work reveals a critical stance toward history, one similar to, if not based 
on, the idea of “Recollection” found in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology. And he also called 
for a new architecture; a combination of Gothic and Greek, similar to that implied by 
Hegel in his Lectures on Aesthetics, which he believed would result in a poetic unity of 
Spirit and reason, what I have termed Poetic Tectonics.  
Both Hegel and Goethe were essential in establishing the idea of art as a 
manifestation of Geist, wherein some universal significance was embodied in sensuous 
form; Hegel’s concrete universal. This had been central to Idealist philosophy and 
aesthetics and it proved to be highly influential on the development of Schinkel’s 
thought. For Schinkel, architecture proved to be the manifestation of higher Ideals in the 
built environment.  
Encouraged by Solger, Schinkel began reading Fichte during his time in Italy from 
1803-05.lv It was through his writings, that Schinkel would begin to see architecture as a 
medium for the conveyance of ideas. They would eventually meet through their mutual 
 615
friend Wilhelm von Humbolt, and in 1810 Schinkel began to attend Fichte’s lectures at 
the University of Berlin. As I have shown, it was Fichte, along with Schiller, who had 
been pivotal in translating the concept of Poetic Unity into a theory of the self and 
consciousness. And I believe it was Schinkel, following Gilly, who then translated it into 
a systematic means of understanding architecture.  
According to Fichte, consciousness did not begin with disinterested contemplation, 
but with action or praxis. What humanity did was to create its own vision of reality, in a 
process that most closely followed that of creation and poesis. For him, as for his friend 
Schiller, if Nature impinged upon our being, forcing us to take action, it then became the 
material out of which we created our freedom again. Our understanding of the world was 
what it was because it was defined in terms of the purposive behavior of man. It was this 
aspect of our reality (that it was constituted by our own sense of purpose) that became the 
very source of the self for Fichte. Schiller also espoused such ideas. Man had to remake 
sense perception in his own image for the self to emerge. It was here that freedom was 
first achieved. This was Man’s nature; his free will. Man was only man if he was given 
the opportunity to rise above Nature and mould her to his morally directed will. For both 
Fichte and Schiller, the end of man was self- development. That meant the individual 
possessed a duty not only to him/herself, but to society as a whole. Conversely the 
collective state had an important role in the cultural edification of its people. 
A similar position was held by Schinkel’s good friend Wilhelm von Humbolt. In his 
1793 essay ‘Concerning the Study of Antiquity’, he used the term Bildung to refer to the 
development of the entire individual through knowledge and cultivation. It formed the 
basis of his approach toward education, particularly in his development of the 
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pedagogical structure for the University of Berlin. He believed that no individual could 
effectively contribute to a cultivated and humane existence of the state without first 
achieving it in themselves. For Humbolt, the state served as the agent of that process in 
its educational system.  
All these philosophers asserted the necessity of self-development as a condition of 
freedom, transforming it into a moral imperative. The idea of Bildung would become a 
cornerstone of architecture for Schinkel. Increasingly, he saw architecture as having to 
demonstrate immediate visible images of freedom and life. He would claim that 
“Freedom consists in the first place of ethical feeling: to submit oneself freely to a higher 
law on the basis of reason, or poetic feeling is something sublime and beautiful.”lvi For 
Fichte that submission was necessary to prevent subjectivism and nihilism, a belief he 
shared with Hegel. The self must take its place among the collective consciousness, what 
Fichte called the Beruf, and Hegel called Geist.  
According to Schwarzer “Schinkel’s legacy to aesthetic idealism lies in his vision of 
architecture as the forming of purpose into higher ideals. . . . [He] understood the 
supreme goal of architecture as that of working toward the artistic education and 
betterment of society. In order to serve a greater cultural function beyond immediate use, 
architecture had to transcend its material origins and relationship. It had to become an 
ideal image.”lvii That image would be the manifestation of the Ideal in the generation of 
architectural form. This would bring Schinkel’s own aesthetic theory in line with the 
general tenets of Idealist aesthetics. More significantly, by establishing the moral 
necessity of architecture to presence the Ideal as its basic criteria as an art form, he laid 
the ground work for its adherence to Schiller’s concept of sublation.  
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Schinkel would take the Idealist concept of ‘self’ and its relationship to the structure 
of aesthetics and transform it into a perceptual theory of architectural form. Goethe 
believed true art sprang from the creative impulses of man’s primal being.lviii That idea 
would be echoed in Fichte’s Die Tatsachen des Bewuβtseyns. Vorlesungen, gehalten an 
der Univeritat zu Berlin in Winterhalbjahre 1810-1811. In it he concluded that art 
comprised the absolute and boundless representation of man’s freedom and existential 
being. He envisioned art as the result of a complex process of self-imaging of the sensus 
communus. The role of the artist was to embrace this unconscious system of 
representation and generate images of ‘primal beauty’. This was the basis of his notion of 
the ‘productive imagination’. 
For Schinkel, this found its visual analog in architecture in what he called ‘primal 
forces’. As in Fichte’s concept of ‘self’, they existed within a dialectic of cognition and 
reality, in that their physical reality was coincident with their visual recognition. They 
were Urphanomene (primordial phenomena), what Schinkel called the ‘primitive style 
principle of architecture’. It was an expression of the ‘primal force’ of the incarnate self, 
a constant reflection of the collective unconscious. Each form representing a unique 
cultural moment, an expression of Spirit in architectural form. The study of which 
became the search for the inner essence, the indeterminate, poetic character of form and 
its structural relationship through history.lix  
For Schinkel they were represented in expressive, ‘poetic’, Grundformen (ground 
forms) that proved to be basic constructional motifs, simple structural systems whose 
images were more beholden to their perceptual impression than to actual structural 
proportional systems. They had less to do with their technical expression and more to do 
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with aesthetic expression. According to Wolf; “In Schinkel’s tectonic ground forms, 
visible static forces no longer represent other things in the world, but are paratactic signs 
of vital forces. As objects of perception, they do not escape the world of illusions, but 
employ physical distortions (such as entasis) to achieve greater visual or psychological 
effect.”lx  
Wolf asserts that Schinkel grounded his theory of the Urphenomeme in theories of the 
unconscious, particularly those described by Jean Paul Richter (1763-1825)lxi and Carl 
Gustav Carus (1789-1869).lxii Richter’s Vorschule de Äeshtetik of 1804 argued that the 
unconscious revealed the instinctual self, and our innate drives, it was therefore the 
source of an ‘involuntary poetry’. For Carus this unconscious memory of the self was 
represented in expressive, ‘poetic’, Ur forms that proved to be the basis of tectonic modes 
of expression.  
While I do not disagree with Wolf that Schinkel was familiar with these theories- he 
transposed sections of them into his notes for the Lehrbuch- I have to disagree with his 
assessment that they were the source of inspiration. It is important to note that Carus 
text’s Vorlesungen über Psychologie of 1831 and Psyche of 1846 were written after 
Schinkel had begun the Lehrbuch in the mid 1820’s. Therefore, Carus’s texts should not 
be seen as inspiration for the ideas, but rather as a possible latter source for their 
validation. Richter’s text of 1804 places it early enough to have impacted Schinkel’s 
thought, but one has to acknowledge that the basic idea of an unconscious motivator of 
artistic expression was already present within the intellectual circles Schinkel inhabited, 
most notably in Herder’s ‘Fortgang’ (not surprising given the fact that Richter and 
Herder were friends), in Fichte’s ‘productive imagination’ and in Hegel’s Geist.  
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Rather than see Schinkel’s Grundformen as a reflection of emerging theories of the 
unconscious, I believe it should be seen as an extension of Gilly’s Ur forms, which would 
have served as a more direct inspiration. He was in possession of his sketchbooks 
containing his notes and drawings of them. Thus, the idea of a poetic understanding of 
construction, a ‘primitive style principle’, was available to him prior to the publication of 
Richter’s text of 1804.  
As I have asserted, this idea was related to Goethe’s definition of nature in the 
Morphologie. For him, nature eternally created new forms, each a variation or 
modification of a simple order. Following Bergdoll, I believe this too should be seen as a 
potential source for Schinkel’s idea.lxiii Goethe and Schinkel began their contact in 1816 
about the same time Schinkel began to develop his ideas on architectural form. But he 
would have been familiar with Goethe’s general idea of nature prior to that from another 
source. In 1804, the same year Richter’s text was published, Alexander von Humbolt, the 
younger brother of Schinkel’s good friend Wilhelm von Humbolt, would return from his 
vast trip to the Americas, a trip that would formulate his ideas on nature. lxiv Echoing 
Goethe, Humbolt claimed nature was not a fixed system, but an ongoing process of 
creation, one of continuous ‘becoming’. He believed that one could unlock the secrets of 
its morphology and dynamics, claiming that man could “trace the stable amid the 
vacillating, ever-recurring alteration of physical metamorphoses” and unlock the 
morphology and the dynamics of change within the natural realm.lxv For Humbolt the 
chain of connections that link all natural forces were dependent on each other, like 
Goethe’s Urphlanze, they created a unity in difference. Thus Schinkel would have been 
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intimately familiar with this concept and should have recognized Gilly’s attempt to 
translate it into a theory of architecture.  
Schinkel’s Grundformen was derived from Fichte, whose concept of the self was part 
of the broader intellectual framework of Idealism. Central to it was the idea of unity in 
difference, an underlying order that exhibited a continuous variation and diversification 
through time. It was present in the writings on nature of Goethe, Schelling and Alexander 
von Humbolt and in the theories of the ‘self’ of Fichte, Schiller and Hegel.  
According to Schiller, “Only as [man] alters does he exist; only as he remains 
unalterable does he exist. Man conceived in his perfection would accordingly be the 
constant unity which amidst the tides of change remains eternally the same.”lxvi Both 
Goethe and Humbolt believed that it was paralleled in man’s creativity. It was Goethe 
who claimed; “Just as the soul of nature has played itself out in the forms of its individual 
creations and the relationship of their parts one to another, so the human spirit has left its 
mark on the forms of art; from that a whole world of form has come into being.”lxvii 
Schinkel reinterpreted Goethe’s position in his own statement that “Architecture is the 
continuation of nature in her constructivity. This activity is conducted through that 
natural product: Mankind.”lxviii Man’s architectural analog, Schinkel’s Grundformen, was 
a constant unity amidst the changing tides of history and culture, yet another form of 
unity in difference. Nowhere was this connection more evident than in the work at 
Potsdam where the architecture created a heightened sense of the dialectic of historical 
progress.lxix  
Schinkel now began to re-conceptualize the history of architecture as a continuity; 
one that included both Gothic and Classical as an expression of Geist. Like Goethe and 
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Hegel, his analysis of the Classical and Gothic styles resulted in an understanding of 
them as manifestations of two distinct cultural predilections; one focused on reason and 
materiality, and the other on expression and Spirit.  
In his analysis of Classical architecture, Schinkel saw clarity and order, its forms 
encompassed by rational laws that governed its statics. “In the buildings of Antiquity it is 
presented as something already in existence, something permanent, encompassed by 
rational laws, thus conveying an agreeable serenity.” lxx By providing a rational order to 
its parataxis, classical architecture possessed legibility; it acknowledged its material 
nature through self-reference. In this way it provided a balance of self-articulated inner 
meaning and proportioned outer form. 
Schinkel now saw architectural form as the combination of several different 
constructional units- pier, arch, column, beam, wall, vault, etc.- that generated a 
conceptual framework for both the enclosing walls and the ceilings. These were the 
product of the type of space enclosed and the type of spanning system it generated. He 
now focused on two fundamental points; 1) the construction of the enclosing walls, and 
2) the construction of the ceilings. It is important to note that Schinkel’s findings were 
not that distinct from those of Hegel. 
In his analysis of Gothic architecture, Schinkel saw the emergence of spiritual 
enlightenment. lxxi  What was central to its form was the expression of its overcoming the 
contingencies of matter. In that sense it became expressive of the idea of universal 
Christian spiritual enlightenment. In the memorandum for his 1810 design for a 
mausoleum for Queen Luisa he noted that Gothic architecture was “Spirit fully victorious 
over mass and material”, capable of inspiring the observer with “the infinite and the 
 622
eternal.”lxxii He conceived of Gothic as a rush of particularities rising up as one. “In the 
medieval pointed arch proportion is seen as something in the process of formation- it 
grows before our eyes.”lxxiii Again, his interpretation was not that distinct from Hegel 
who saw in the Gothic cathedral the multiplicities of its elements succumb to a single 
vision of upward ascension. 
Central to Idealist aesthetics was the necessary sublation of material and formal 
impulses. Both Goethe and Hegel saw Gothic as the higher expression of Spirit in 
architecture, but they were critical of its loss of self. In expressing Spirit it had turned 
inward and lost sight of itself as construction. It denied its own materiality. If it excelled 
at the expression of Spirit, it faltered as an art form. Gothic proved to manifest the formal 
over the material. For them, the classical was not much better. It too often manifested the 
material over the formal. For both, the classical was not ideal, but at its best, it was a 
better example of the necessary sublation. Because of that, it served as a better case study 
for the development of an art form that would allow for a resistance to the Vernuftstaat, 
one that could lead to cultural advance.  
For Schinkel, the goal of art and architecture was the edification of the people. 
Finding the correct case study for how to successfully achieve that became essential. Like 
Goethe and Hegel, He too would turn to the Classical to find the underlying principles of 
architecture. Not because he became a Classicist or because it was an ideal model to 
copy. But because he too believed that Greek culture was a model of civic virtue and 
individual self-cultivation. According to Schinkel, it provided a “reference point and 
point of departure . . . from which artistic culture of consequence could be 
continued.”lxxiv Like them, he too found Greek architecture to be the better expression of 
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sublation. It was the best measure for a true demonstration of Bildung (cultural advance),
in architecture, one that did not sacrifice the art forms inherent material nature. He would 
claim; “For the artist there is only one age of revelation- that of the Greeks. To build in 
the Greek style is to build correctly, and from this point of view the best products of the 












lxxv But Schinkel was no longer thinking of ‘Greek’ 
stylistically, rather as the essence and purity of an idea. This was the lesson of Class
itecture.  
Schinkel’s comment, ‘to build in the Greek style is to build correctly’, has be
to justify an interpretation of him as a Classicist. Likewise, the focus on the self
referential aspect of architecture and its materiality has been used to justify an 
interpretation of him as a Materialist.lxxvi But he was not adhering to the theory of the 
Greco-gothic Ideal or advocating the Mechanisms of Structure and Disp
 espousing a rationalist or materialist position in architecture at all.  
In point of fact, he consistently refuted this interpretation in his own texts. In the 
Lehrbuch he claimed “Mere need does not give rise to beauty, nor does every accid
utilitarian factor have to be taken into account to endow something with character, 
otherwise chaos results. Only someone who moves freely above (material) need wi
capable of beauty, provided that in his freedom he still endows the object with the 
characteristic aspect that makes it individual.”lxxvii And in the Philosophical Noteb
stated “Architectonic relationships rest upon general static laws, but first become 
significant through their correspondence and analogy to the personal existence of man 
and second, to the similarly formed and organized essence of nature, whose static laws 
always provide the foundation for mechanical laws, primarily for the restful exi
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the individual and lastly for its progress.”lxxviii Basing architecture on arbitrary 
abstraction, the immediate trivial function or construction was for Schinkel an error in 
judgment that could only give “rise to something dry and rigid, and lacking in freedom” 
pre    









of science and art was a necessary precursor to Bildung had already been asserted by 
cisely because it excluded “two essential elements: the historical and the poetical.”lxxix
The Idealist critique was not a rejection of science per se, only the assertion
was the only valid means to truth. Knowledge of the human condition and our 
understanding of the world required more, it required art (more specifically the process
poesis or poetry). Both Wilhelm and Alexander von Humbolt viewed the relationship
between science and art as fundamentally different investigations that were equally 
essential to any understanding of nature and the human experience. It was this idea of the
necessity to sublate science and art in education that
he University of Berlin he founded with Fichte. 
Friedrich Gilly had argued the same point in Some Thoughts on the Necessity of 
Endeavoring to Unify the Various Departments of Architecture in both Theory and 
Practice. Commenting on the development of architectural education shortly after the 
establishment of the Bauakademie in Berlin he claimed; “When science and art unite at a 
common central point, when they work in concert, and when they place equal reliance
the lessons of experience, then they will progress more swiftly toward their goal; and 
each stands to gain by mutual extension of their powers to encompass even the remotest 
social purposes.”lxxx It was the union of science and art that brought society to its highes
potentiality and this could be accomplished within the discipline of architecture, which 
served as both the reflection of society and as its motivator. Humbolt’s idea that the un
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Gilly a decade earlier. A proper architectural education was one that sublated science and 
art.  
According to Wilhelm von Humbolt “The character of reality never reveals itself in 
reality itself . . . art represents the character of nature not as it is in itself, but as it is 
comprehensible to our sense organs, harmoniously predisposed for them.”lxxxi It was art 
that allowed us to contemplate the larger order of things. It made nature’s unity in 
difference comprehensible in human terms. For this reason it served as a necessary 
companion to science in the quest for knowledge. Schinkel would essentially restate this 
idea when he claimed; “The compulsion aroused by this premonition to investigate the 
interrelationships of a given number of phenomena has produced science; the compulsion 
aroused by the same premonition to contemplate in context as large a group of 
phenomena as possible has produced art. Therefore the vocation of art is a representation 
of its object in a manner that makes evident as many of its connections as possible.”lxxxii 
It was the combination of both premonitions that lead to the fullest comprehension of 
nature and man  
For Schinkel, the totality of nature was one that included the mechanical, chemical 
and organic forces as well as, the spontaneous forces that constitute the realm of 
freedom.lxxxiii It was for this reason that history, invention, archeology and technology 
were all interrelated aspects of the proper research agenda.lxxxiv It was the union of 
science and art that proved the path to Truth. For Schinkel, the same was true for the 
discourse of architecture. It had to involve ‘the historical and poetical’. 
Schinkel spent his entire career studying architecture as a symbolic form. I would 
argue that his methodology was decidedly etymological. Etymology traces the 
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development of form from one language to another by analyzing it into component parts, 
identifying its cognates in other languages and tracing them to a common ancestral form. 
His entire approach to research basically followed this model. The Grundformen, poetic 
expressions of architectural phenomena, were the origins of the various architectural 
‘languages’. Composed of a series of relationships of component parts, their endless 
possible combinations produced what we would call a style. New technical innovations 
and materials generated new developments in the spatial formatting and it’s detailing, 
resulting in stylistic development- the ‘etymological’ alterations- over time.  
He may have found inspiration for this in his friend Alexander von Humbolt. In his 
lectures at the University of Berlin, Humbolt claimed that it was in the study of language 
that the mind was made receptive to understanding the structure of all things. He later 
made this point in Cosmos where he wrote; “. . . the unity which I seek to attain in the 
development of the great phenomenon of the universe, is analogous to that which 
historical composition is capable of acquiring . . . in tracing the physical delineation of 
the globe, we behold the present and the past reciprocally indicated, as it were with one 
another; for the domain of nature is like that of language, in which etymological research 
reveals a successive development, by showing us the primary condition of an idiom 
reflected in the forms of speech in use in the present day.”lxxxv For him, etymology 
revealed the larger order of things.  
His etymological research would take a two pronged trajectory. One he referred to as 
the Trivialbegriff des Gegenstandes- the banal requirements of the object- its’ material 
and construction technology. Reflecting the material impulse, it was the study of the 
endless combinations of component parts within a given construction technology. The 
 627
other he referred to as the Artistischen poetischen Zwecken -the artistic or poetic aim of 
the object, its higher purpose. Reflecting the formal impulse, it was the study of the 
development of an artistic motif from one architectural language to another. The study of 
both was essential because he firmly believed that both scientific and artistic research 
must remain in dialogue in the search for a new modern style worthy of being the 
successor to the great historical traditions. It was their interconnectivity and sublation that 
was for him the truth of architecture. 
For Schinkel, as it had been for Gilly, the science of architecture was the study of the 
material nature of construction; its material impulse. He examined the Grundformen in 
terms of materials and the construction process. But the methodology was not that of the 
natural sciences, instead it took on a more etymological tone. His examination of 
Classical and Gothic had brought him to see architecture as an amalgam of parts that 
combined to form basic construction technologies; the post and lintel, and the arch and 
vault. For Schinkel the history of technical advances in form served as a textbook, not a 
model to be copied. Style developed over time as new technical innovations and materials 
were not only incorporated, but aesthetically treated in successful ways. According to 
Schinkel; “Style is achieved in architecture if the construction of a complete building 1) 
takes its visible characteristics in the most practical and beautiful manner from one single 
material, or 2) takes its visible characteristics from various kinds of materials- stone, 
wood, iron, brick- each in its own peculiar way . . .”lxxxvi The combination of the parts, 
material selected and the proportions selected, accounted for the difference in style. What 
he had learned from his study of Greek architecture was that the essence of trabeated 
construction was to be found in a set of harmonic and constructive relationships. 
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This led to his idea of architecture’s self-representation. As he claimed; “All the 
essential structural elements of a building must remain visible; as soon as basic parts of 
the constructions are concealed, the entire train of thought is lost. Such concealment leads 
at once to falsehood.” The work itself was enhanced “if each part of it makes its effect 
freely and without restriction in accordance with the general laws of statics (or appears so 
to do).” lxxxvii He called this visibility Anschaulichkeit- the legibility of the ontology of 
construction. 
Schinkel would pursue this as a conceptual idea at the Schauspielhaus in Berlin of 
1819. There he devised a system that he would continue to develop in the architectural 
plates of the Lehrbuch. Departing from the solid geometric compositions of early German 
Neo-Classicism, he developed a reticulated system of stripped pilaster supports and 
horizontal entablatures that interwove the two scales of the building, the colossal scale of 
its larger masses and the smaller scale of individual stories set as though within a frame. 
Forming continuous bands of fenestration, this structured grid dissolved the wall surface 
into a screen. Without giving expression to the buildings individual functions, the system 
gave expression to its elemental order, providing an overall harmonious image that 





Fig. 29 Image of Schauspielhaus Berlin 
 
Schinkel believed that public architecture should transcend the banal function of 
construction and program to express not only the higher functions of tectonic order, but 
also the higher ideal of its institutional purpose. This was reinforced by placing the 
theater on a massive rusticated podium. He justified it functionally as a place to make and 
house sets. But it had the aesthetic advantage of elevating the new Building above the 
everyday realm of the street and above the residential architecture of the district. Its Ionic 
portico, accessed by a steep broad flight of stairs that advanced into the space of the 
square, created a tauter and more dramatic dialogue with the porticos of the two flanking 
churches of the Gendarmenmarkt. The composition served to create a heightened sense of 
public ritual.  
It was the precision of the technical proficiency maximized for greatest aesthetic 
impact that was the underlying motivation and not the expression of a simple frame 
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structure. Schinkel would continue his study of trabeated construction in brick, most 
notably in his ideal churches, and his commercial and military structures of the 1820’s 
and 30’s.  
In his work, Schinkel sought the generation of form from structural law, but he 
believed those laws were observable in the dialectic of historical development. It was 
from this perspective that art and the formal impulse could be studied etymologically. For 
him, the modern subject while existing in the present was a by-product of the historical 
past. The expression of its continuity through time was an important aspect of tectonic 
expression. Once again, Schinkel found historical precedent in the work of Gilly. In the 
Monument to Friedrich the Great he had explored the development of tectonic 
expression, moving from a primitive form of masonry expression at its base to the 
refinement of the Doric temple at the top. In the 1820’s, Schinkel followed suit and began 
to explore the exposition of historical development in structures at Schloss Glienicke. 
This would eventually become explicit in his major works beginning with the Altes 
Museum in Berlin (1824) and culminating with the Court Gardener’s House in Potsdam 
(finished in 1836). 
In the Altes Museum, Schinkel takes us on an historical odyssey that begins in 
ancient Greece with the form of the Greek Stoa, which serves as the precedent for its 
façade. In Hellenistic style, it forms the edge of a public square, the Lustgarten that 
serves as its agora. This relationship provides the work with its monumental presence. 
The continuity of the colonnade is broken by a flight of steps eight column bays wide- the 
first and eighth sit on the projecting walls that define the flight of stairs. Behind these are 
six columns, the first and sixth are in antis, embedded in the back wall of the Stoa. This 
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entrance sequence is echoed in the raised central section of the roof, the equestrian 
statues on the corners accentuating the first and eighth columns. This alteration of the 
classical precedent provides the façade with focus and directionality. 
 
 
Fig. 30 Image of the Façade of the Altes Museum 
 
Once past the screen of columns one finds oneself still outside, but sheltered by the 
roof. A diagonal flight of stairs takes you to the second floor, the original location of the 
entry door. Here you encounter a balcony that provides a view past the screen of 
columns. The Stoa now frames a view of the city, recalling the historical significance of 
the relationship between architecture and the body politic. The Lustgarten originally 
contained a line of poplars, a view of which through the layers of columns of the stoa 
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would have recalled the historical argument that the ancient Greeks originally worshiped 
out of doors in sacred groves and that the origins of the temple colonnade lay in the 
trunks of trees.   
 
 
Fig.31 Image of Painting from the entry 
 
The entry sequence serves as a reminder of the origins of Western architecture in 
ancient Greece, but upon entering the museum we find ourselves in a vast central space, 
Schinkel’s homage to the Pantheon in Rome. Befitting the precedent, there is no 
indication on the exterior of the vast domed hall on the interior. But upon reflection we 
realize that Schinkel has foreshadowed the move. The projecting entry stairs, with their 
side walls, recall the typical Roman temple form. It should also be noted that the most 
common temple forms were the Peripteral (six columns across the front) and the 
Pseudodipteral (eight columns across the front).  
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The symbolism should not be lost. The Roman Temple, with its association with the 
ideal of civic religion is superimposed on the Greek Stoa, with its association with the 
ideal of civic life. One should also recall that it was in the Stoa that the Greek 
philosophers lectured on the virtues of reason. The work becomes a critical examination 
of the development of architectural form, one that symbolically combines the associated 
images of religion and reason for an art museum designed to house Greek and Roman 
Antiquities. For men like Goethe, Hegel and Schinkel, ancient Greek culture served as an 
ideal case study for Bildung precisely because they saw it as the culture that best 
balanced these three as vehicles to Truth.  
The example of the Altes Museum would not in and of itself suffice to indicate a 
considered approach to the use of history. But when placed alongside the projects at 
Potsdam we can see a consistent strategy emerge. It was at Potsdam that Schinkel would 
create an image and experience of the evolution of architectural form that stood as the 
logical successor to Gilly’s Monument to Friedrich the Great.  
Schinkel redesigned Schloss Charlottenhof (1826-1827) as a retreat for the Crown 
Prince and his wife in the picturesque gardens of Sanssouci Palace. The Main façade was 
a Neo-grec two story pavilion design, but the rear of the house was sited on an artificial 
earthen plinth. The open loggia and low hip roof gave it the feeling of a Grecian temple 
on the garden side. To one side of the raised parterre garden was a simple vine covered 
pergola. The main axis was terminated by an exedra covered in a velarium supported by 
iron chains strung from a central iron pole. Its tent-like appearance contrasted with the 




Fig. 32 Image of Schoss Charlottenhof from Rear 
 
Significant to the design were a series of water features that sat on the main axis and 
signaled a sequential, or historical, reading of the subject’s perceptions. The fountain in 
front was echoed in the interior foyer by another fountain of similar form. The portico on 
the rear façade looked out to a linear water feature that connected the open loggia with 
the exedra; at its center was another fountain of similar design. Like the use of the 
subjects gaze in the Altes Museum, at the Schloss Charlottenhof Schinkel directed the 
eye in a picturesque manner to draw out historic connections. Here the historical lineage 
is of simple tent form, primitive trabeated construction, Grecian temple and Neo-grec 
pavilion. 
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But one must not separate this project from the one that followed, the Court 
Gardener’s House (1829-1836), which sits in such close proximity to it. At the time, 
Schinkel had begun to prepare some of his Italian sketches to be engraved for the 
Lehrbuch. They analyzed the tectonic morphology underlying all architectural form and 
would have an impact on the project’s detailing. 
Upon approaching the compound, one is confronted with a perimeter wall whose 
random pattern of rustication is reminiscent of the Pelasgian stonework Gilly used in the 
base of the Monument. This gave way to the regular patterns of masonry rustication on 
the rear wall of the entry courtyard. The movement from rustic stonework to more refined 
masonry was echoed in the timber construction of the trellises. A vine covered trellis of 
rudimentary piers sat atop the perimeter wall, while the entry courtyard (between it and 
the rear masonry wall) was covered by a trellis carried in part by a row of squat Doric 
columns, with very simple capitols.  
 
 
Fig. 33 Image of entry court of the Court Gardeners House 
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As one passed through the rear wall into the parterre garden one noticed the teahouse 
to the right, which took the form of a porticoed temple, its’ squared piers little more than 
those of the trellis though changed in proportion and embellished with capitols in a 
proper architectural order. Behind the temple were two Doric aedicule, in the distance is 
the temple-like rear portico of the Schloss Charlottenhof sited atop its earthen plinth. It 
provided the final link in the chain of tectonic forms from rudimentary trellis piers to the 
principles of the classical order. Schinkel’s perspective, done from the roof of the Bath 
complex, illustrated his intention to link the forms of the Court Gardener’s House to 
those of Schloss Charlottenhof.  
 
 
Fig. 34 Image of View across the site 
 
The unfolding of historical development was not limited to trabeation. Schinkel did a 
perspective drawing showing the arrival to the bath complex by gondola. Here the path 
sequence was under a rudimentary barrel vault made of branches covered with vines. The 
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waterway led to the entrance of the baths, where one was confronted with an arcuated 
loggia. The interior of the bath complex was then decorated in a style reminiscent of 
Roman villas. The overall picturesque composition of the actual House of the Court 
Gardener recalled the images of Italian structures he had sketched on his trip through the 
Roman countryside that were the project’s inspiration.  
In the Potsdam projects, the architectural experience became didactic. It was in 
Schinkel’s etymological analysis of the Grundformen that an awareness of the underlying 
order of tectonic forms was revealed. At the same time the presentation of its diverse 
manifestations through history revealed the movement of the Spirit through time.  
Schinkel’s etymological study of the Trivialbegriff des Gegenstandes (its’ material 
and construction technology), revealed a necessary and non-arbitrary relationship 
between the detail, form and construction processes. For him, this implied an ethical 
imperative; a commitment to avoid false appearances where ornament masqueraded as a 
system of construction other than that actually used. As he claimed; “In architecture 
everything must be true, any masking, concealing of structure is an error. The real task is 
to make every part of the construction beautiful. In that word- Beautiful- lies the whole 
story, the whole nature, the whole feeling of conditions . . . Every perfect construction in 
a specific material has its decisive character and could not be rationally carried out in that 
same way in another material. . . . In an architecture with style, therefore every 
construction in a specific material must be complete in itself and whole.”lxxxviii  
Schinkel’s etymological study of the Artistischen poetischen Zwecken (the artistic or 
poetic aim of the object, its higher purpose), revealed that the replication of historical 
imagery, without its recognition as a product of a past civilization, only served to obscure 
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origins. The imitation of historical styles was wrong and unworthy of humanity, because 
it failed to consider the Ideals the original work expressed. Furthermore, the copy had no 
grounding in the Ideals and practical demands of the time. The imitation of historical 
styles not only limited the freedom of the artist, but it also hindered the development of 
the nation and the Spirit.  
Schinkel observed that modern construction practices had made it possible to imitate 
virtually any historical style. But that resulted in a disjunction between the exigencies of 
construction and the artistic motif. The result was the arbitrary application of form. His 
concern was summed-up in the following extensive paragraph from the Lehrbuch: “I 
observed a great vast store of forms that had already come into being, deposited in the 
world over many millennia of development among very different peoples. But at the 
same time I saw that our use of this accumulated store of often very heterogeneous 
objects was arbitrary. . . . what in its primitive manifestation in an ancient work produced 
a highly gratifying effect was often positively disagreeable to me when employed in new 
works of the present day.  It became particularly clear to me that the source of the lack of 
character and style from which so many new buildings seem to suffer is to be found in 
such arbitrariness in the use [of past forms].”lxxxix  
Like Goethe and Hegel before him, he openly rejected the theory of imitation. 
Nowhere was his critique more poignant than in his response to the book Baukunst nach 
den Grundsatzen der alten written by his teacher Alois Hirt (1759-1837).xc Published in 
1809, it had become the seminal text advocating Neo-classicism. In it Hirt supported the 
imitation of the ancients in an almost mechanical fashion. Schinkel criticized Hirt’s 
position in his notes for the Lehrbuch, “[imitation of past masters is] in no way historical, 
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but rather opposed to the historical. History has never copied earlier history, and when it 
has done so, then such an act is not to be accounted part of history, but rather in it history 
in a manner of speaking comes to a complete halt.”xci  As he had come to understand it, a 
truly historical understanding of architecture was the antithesis of the close imitation of 
past forms. The later marked the end of history, rather than a proper awareness of it. He 
would claim; “Why should we always build in the style of other times? If it is a worthy 
achievement to apprehend the essence of each style in its purity, so is it an even worthier 
achievement to arrive at a pure universal style which does not contradict the best that has 
been achieved in each of the other styles”xcii This was the real lesson of history and the 
essence of the historical styles. Schinkel would note; “To work historically, is to always 
have the new element at hand, to know that history is movement and to know how to 
continue history. It would be the most exciting thing if architecture, and the arts in 
general, became, like the sciences a field of experimentation.”xciii  True history, like 
culture, language and nature moved forward. He proposed a proscriptive theory of 
tectonics as opposed to a descriptive theory of architectural style. 
Like Hegel, he called for a new architecture, one that was a union of Greek and 
Gothic, of reason and emotion, of material and formal impulses, in a new form expressive 
of the new elevation of Spirit. As he noted; “Every principle age has left the marks of its 
style on architecture, so why should we not seek to discover a style for our own age?”xciv 
Schinkel now sought a ‘pure style of architecture’ freed from the ‘phantasm of history’. 
Inspiration for that new pure style would come from his studies of trabeation and brick 
construction techniques as well as, his exposure to new building typologies, notably the 
factory.  
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In 1821 Schinkel began the plates for the publication of Vorbilder fur Fabrikanten 
und Handwerker (Models for Manufacturers and Artisans) a book he was working on 
with his friend Peter Christian Wilhelm Beuth, the Director of the Technische Deputation 
fur Gewerbe.xcv  In its volumes they sought to show the latest production techniques and 
materials. The pedagogical intention behind their efforts appeared in Beuth’s preface. In 
it he wrote; “how necessary and useful it is to endow your work not only with technical 
excellence, but also with the highest perfection of form. Only work which combines the 
two can bring the work of handicraft close to the work of fine art, stamp it with a sense of 
refinement, and give it a more lasting value than the cost of its own materials.”xcvi It was 
a reassertion of the necessity to unite science and art.  
In 1826 Schinkel and Beuth began a series of trips to France and England with the 
intention of making industrial observations and taking industrial tours. Schinkel also used 
the opportunity to study art and architecture. Of particular note for him were the 
numerous foundries, factories and shipyards of the emerging industrial revolution. There 
is no doubt that he was fascinated with the new industrial society that was springing up in 
Europe, but it would be a mistake to see him as openly accepting the new industrial 
society and its capitalist economy without reservation. His comments on what he saw 
reveal not only a fascination with innovation and science, but a growing concern with the 
negative impact of these developments on society and the individual. Schinkel noted; 
“Since the war there have been four hundred mills constructed in Lancashire. One sees 
buildings in place that were once meadows three years ago, yet the buildings are so 
smoke- stained they appear to have been used for a hundred years- It gives one a 
frightfully sinister impression: colossal masses of building substance are being 
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constructed by builders alone without any regard for architectural principles, solely for 
utilitarian ends and rendered in red brick.”xcvii The industrial revolution appeared to 
render architecture nothing more than a mechanical pursuit. Schinkel would claim; 
“Among all the great productions undertaken, I saw very few imbued with the character 
of a monument; most of them present to view only the greatest necessary nudity arranged 
not by artists but by simple workmen.”xcviii They possessed no submission to a higher 
order of truth.  
Schinkel would seek to correct that in his later works where he pursued a new logic of 
construction. Most notable were the Friedrich-Werdre Kirche and his master piece the 
new architecture building for the Bauakademie in Berlin of 1836. Arguably his most 
original building, the Bauakademie became a sensation as soon as the scaffolding was 
first removed and to this day (despite its demolition) is still an important structure. 
Vaulted and constructed of brick, it was the first masonry framed structure built in 
Prussia and the first to be actually constructed as frame and infill. The colossal piers 
encompassing all four floors and the jagged courses of brick between the floors 
established a grid weave of verticals and horizontals that traced with great precision the 
internal frame of the brick piers and vaults on the exterior of the brick walls. Even the 
low segmental profiles of the interior vaults were echoed in the great windows spanning 
the bays between each of the massive piers. The pattern was broken only in the fourth 
story where trios of small vertical windows indicate the half floor under the roof that 
sloped inward to drain into the interior court. Every form of the building was derived 
from the direct elaboration of its fundamental structure. The entire repertoire of forms on 
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the richly polychromatic brick and terra cotta facades emanated from the nature of the 
brick frame construction.  
 
 
Fig. 35 Image of the Bauakademie 
 
The building also resolved the dialectic between the reality of structure and its artistic 
representation that Schinkel had been exploring in his public architecture since the 
Schauspielhaus. This was made all the more evident in the iconographic program of the 
decorative panels that accentuated the form. These terra cotta panels were found on the 
window sills and surrounding the entry doors. According to Bergdoll, the terra cotta 
panels around the doorway and across the façade are allegorical “keys to the way in 
which this startlingly original building was derived from the nature of its own materials 
and tectonic forms, and form the history of their uses by past civilizations.”xcix They 
depicted the history of culture and the development of architectural form. Around the 
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buildings front entrance the panels depicted the Vitruvian myths of the origins of the 
columnar orders.c No doubt the iconic program harkened back to Gilly’s insistence that 
architecture was the union of science and art. But it also revealed Schinkel’s progressive 
theory of history and its role in the pursuit of an architectural education.  
I would argue that Schinkel’s etymological study of architecture, both materially and 
formally, should be juxtaposed with that of Hegel’s study of architecture in the 
Aesthetics. Interestingly there has been no serious comparison of their ideas, but the 
similarity begs the question.  
In their respective studies of Classical and Gothic they interpreted the two styles as 
reflections of two distinct cultural predilections; one focused on reason and materiality; 
the other on expression and Spirit. Both saw Gothic as Spirit victorious over material, and 
an expression of multiplicities succumbing to a single upward vision. Each found 
Classical architecture to be the better example of sublation and, therefore a better case 
study for the true nature of architecture. Both found Classical architecture to display 
differences of kind in the elements of construction, whose forms were determined by 
their use, which in turn were shaped by artistic ends organically. From this each came to 
the conclusion that signification and meaning in architecture were self-referential; a 
paratactic system of arrangement controlled by rational ordering. Both believed that 
architecture was determined by the construction of the enclosing walls, and the 
construction of the ceiling. And each eventually called for the necessity to develop a new 
architecture of the age.  
The coincidence of their interpretations can be seen as a point of interest, but it is not 
the crucial intersection of their thought. After all, such interpretations were not limited to 
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them and were common to their intellectual circle. More significant was the intersection 
of their dialectical approach to history that underlay their mutual examinations.  
Hegel’s analysis of the movement of architecture provided us with an image of the 
oscillation between material and formal impulses. The lesson of history was that it must 
be mindful of the necessity of sublation. If architecture forgot this, it became (like Geist, 
which it manifested) either; the “Beautiful Soul” losing itself in mathematical abstraction, 
or it created the verkehrte Welt forgetting its own essence. It was in the comparative 
analysis between the styles that a theoretical understanding of how architecture as 
symbolic form emerged and advanced. 
For Hegel, such advance philosophically came in the form of submergence into the 
concrete. As we were told in the Phenomenology, such a movement was effected by 
Errinnerung, or Recollection. The Aesthetics provided just such an architectural 
recollection, recounting architecture’s history as a symbolic form. Hegel had attempted a 
philosophical inquiry that sought to move beyond the self-consciousness of architecture’s 
self-reference and parataxis toward a vision of architecture as a form of “Absolute 
Knowing”. But more importantly, it implied a framework for architectural theory, one 
that examined how the ideal was manifest in a form appropriate to material needs. It was 
the recollection of the necessity of sublation by recognizing that the truth of architecture 
lay in its ontology.  
I would assert that, Schinkel affected the same theoretical framework, but that his 
study was far richer. With the Grundfomen, Schinkel found the key to nature’s continuity 
in architecture’s construction. The analog to Goethe’s morphology, it contained not only 
the principle of architectural unity, but also the principle of its difference. He effectively 
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translated the idea of Poetic Unity, so central to Counter Enlightenment philosophy, into 
a systematic theory of architecture.  
His etymological study of the Grundformen became a demonstration of how 
architecture emerged and advanced. That study took two perspectives the Trivialbegriff 
des Gegenstandes- it’s the material and construction technology- and the Artistischen 
poetischen Zwecken- its higher purpose- comparative to the formal impulses. But unlike 
Hegel, whose recollection was essentially theoretical, Schinkel’s recollection included 
the practical. It affected therefore, a greater submergence into the nature of architecture’s 
materiality; into the concrete. It was that submergence that allowed him to make the 
cultural advance to a new form in the Bauakademie; to effectively create a new 
manifestation of Geist.  
Schinkel’s recollection and submergence into the concreteness of architecture was a 
search for a higher order of truth. Both Hegel and Schinkel pursued the same thing, one 
in the conceptual form of ‘Absolute Knowing” and the other in the concrete form of 
architectural theory and practice. But it was the latter that was the more compelling 
precisely because in its unity of theory and practice it was a true concrete universal.  
Schinkel proved to be an important prominent architect and theorist who directly 
influenced generations for some one hundred years. It was through that influence that 
ideas of the Idealist philosophers became a major component of modern architecture. If 
Hegel provided the theoretical framework for understanding architecture as a means to 
Absolute Knowing, it was Schinkel who gave it an ontological presence, one that would 
continue in the theoretical work of Hienrich Hübsch and Karl Bötticher.  
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“The indispensable main forms of a building are 
taken simply as a mechanical framework over 
which architecture proper in its role as a fine art 
should spread its veil of exquisite forms.” 
 
Heinrich Hübsch 
 Differing Views of Styleci 
 
Heinrich Hübsch and the ‘Technostatic’ Forces’ of Architecture 
 
Schinkel and Hegel were not the only theorists in the 1820’s to raise the specter of 
style within the discourse of architecture. In 1828 the architect Heinrich Hübsch (1795- 
1863) published the small book, In What Style Should We Build?, in which he chastised 
his contemporaries for imitating historical styles when they failed to meet contemporary 
building needs. “Most of them really believe that the beauty of architectural forms is 
something absolute, which can remain unchanged for all times and under all 
circumstances, and that the antique style alone presents these forms in ideal perfection.”cii 
He blamed this ‘sophistry’, as he called it, on an incorrect notion of beauty that took its 
authority from the decorative aspects of historical styles.  
In his earlier Über griechische Architectur (On Greek Architecture) of 1822, Hübsch 
dismissed the idea that the Greek temple was an imitation of earlier wooden prototypes, 
an assertion that had dominated architectural theory since Vitruvius. He went on to 
demonstrate that the Greek Style was a product of the structural laws and properties of 
the materials used in construction. He claimed this was what determined the major 
elements of the style. If the Greeks had invented a style of architecture that was refined 
and highly appreciated, it was because they developed these details in accordance with 
practical necessity in conjunction with the taste and ability of the individual artist. The 
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Greek ‘style’ was the necessary response to a series of given particulars, that may have 
produced something beautiful in its outward appearance, but that did not mean that it 
should be imitated.  
Like Schinkel, Hübsch argued that the application of principles learned from 
historical analysis was essential to the development of architecture. The imitation of 
historical styles was the result of a failure to recognize that the origins of details were 
rooted in true purpose. He called it the original sin of architecture. " First the elements are 
applied to places where true purpose does not call for them and where they serve a sham 
purpose only; then, even this fictitious purpose is dispensed with, and the architect rests 
content, as it were, with the sham of a sham: . . . In order to allay misgivings, a wholly 
conventional aesthetic forum is postulated, which supplies the argument that this or that 
essential form arises, at least initially, from some real purpose."ciii He saw the continued 
use of the traditional orders by the Romans after they had developed the new walling 
systems as an example of this sham architecture. In his mind this applied equally to 
contemporary architecture. Neo-Classicism contained no truth because it contained no 
true relationship to the original purpose of either ancient Greek architecture or 
contemporary construction. The continued adherence to convention and tradition, had led 
to a decline in architecture.  
According to Hübsch, architects had confused ‘Style’ with the production of the work 
of art. In a later essay from 1847 entitled Differing Views of Style, he claimed ". . . it is 
the poetic conception and organic presentation of the actual object and its artistic 
decoration that causes enthusiasm and delight, rather than the style, which concerns only 
the more general qualities of the work of art and in fact has to do with cold logic."civ 
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Hermann notes that, Hübsch’s ideas may have been influenced by a series of letters 
between Carl Friedrich von Rumohr and Johann Karl Schorn published in the 1825 
Kunst-Blatt. cv In the letters Rumohr outlined a clear distinction in architecture, between 
the material and ideas and their artistic representation. According to Rumohr, only the 
material and its treatment, was a subject of style. Ideas and their artistic representation 
were a separate issue. I would not disagree with Hermann’s assertion, but would add that 
the distinction was essentially that of the material and formal impulses that dominated 
Idealist aesthetics since Schiller. In the 1828 book, Hübsch’s intention was to focus on 
the principles that determined what he was referring to as ‘style’ and not the artistic 
representation. According to him, the principles of style were the product of four factors; 
climate, present need, material and technical experience. By relegating style to the 
technical sphere he, like Rumohr, made the claim that it was distinct from the 'aesthetic 
qualities' of the formal impulse. Thus style only addressed the material impulse.  
Hübsch, like Schinkel and Hegel, defined architecture as an enclosure whose essential 
components were the ceiling and its supports (which could include columnar supports or 
enclosure walls). These in turn shaped two general determinants of style; 1) the basic 
spatial component and 2) what he called the ‘technostatic’ forces of the individual 
components of the system. The first determinant, the enclosure, was manipulated by a 
given people in response to climate and need. It determined the general architectural 
form. For him, climate was a primary factor, because it determined the nature of shelter 
and protection. Steep roofs were necessary in the north to shed snow, while in the desert 
it was acceptable to have no roofs. Where it rained broad eaves were essential. Thus, the 
roof was a protective element, the windows and doors necessary for light and 
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accessibility. These were the elements necessary to satisfy the basic concerns of 
architecture.  
The second determinant, the ‘technostatic’ force, was the result of the material and 
technical experience. Accordingly, the proportions of a structure or its elements were 
determined by the statical stresses within the structure and the perceived abilities of the 
materials to carry them. Each material reacted to given situations of compression and 
tension in a specific fashion according to its own inherent strengths. Stone is stronger in 
compression, wood in tension. Therefore, a stone beam needs to be thicker than a wooden 
one and can only span a given dimension before it cracks under its own weight.  
Hübsch did not see the technostatic forces as fixed. They evolved over time with 
familiarity and experience, becoming lighter and more economical. Through time and 
experience those proportions changed as familiarity with the material or technical 
prowess advanced. The advance from say, Romanesque to Gothic, came about because of 
a developing familiarity with stone construction and the desire to use less material. The 
stylistic result was thinner, or elongated proportions, and a lighter structure. 
But we should be careful not to interpret him as a materialist, or rationalist. Style 
dealt with the building as a response to necessity, but the exact shape of a detail or part of 
a building or structure was not reducible to objective laws or conventional rules. In his 
words “Art would be destroyed if artists were to embrace the prosaic spirit and the coarse 
vision of the fickle and childishly vain world of modern materialism, which staggers from 
one extreme of bad taste to the other.”cvi A point made earlier by Gilly. As he claimed; 
“These formative factors, derived from function, are surely as objective and as clear as 
they could possibly be. Yet they do not determine the size and basic form of the essential 
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parts with any exactness. They present a path that is firm yet not too narrow: though 
clearly indicating the main direction, it still allows some latitude.”cvii The individual artist 
shaped these factors and it was their ability and taste that provided the work with its 
lively diversity, raising it to a higher purpose and making it a Poetic Unity in architecture, 
one that was discovered in historical recollection. 
Hübsch may not have been an important figure in the Counter Enlightenment, but his 
ideas were certainly influenced by it. In Differing Views of Style, he claimed; “There still 
exists, though small in numbers, an intellectual aristocracy that withstands the anti-
idealistic, onslaught of shallow, rational utilitarianism and materialistic 
Epicureanism.”cviii Like his Idealist contemporaries he defined man as ever changing, 
noting that in appearance, man “no longer has a ‘being’ but –in Hegelian terms- only a 
‘becoming’.”cix  
 
“Knowledge alone leads to conception; only 
imaginative inquiry inspires thought and invention.”  
 
Carl Gottlieb Wilhelm Bötticher  
The Principles of the Hellenic and Germanic Ways 
of Building cx 
 
Bötticher and the Ontology of Intelligibility 
 
Karl Gottlieb Wilhelm Bötticher (1806- 99), a student and admirer of Schinkel,cxi 
published three texts between 1840 and 1852 in which he elaborated his ideas on 
architecture.cxii In many ways, it was a continuation of Schinkel’s ideas from the 
Lehrbuch, but Bötticher’s theory was also revolutionary. He pushed beyond the issue of 
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style and the use of history and proposed a theory of metaphor as the basis of the design 
process.  
Bötticher dismissed the theory of imitation as counter intuitive to art and a negation 
of history. He claimed; “History itself has marked such an attempt as a destruction of 
everything that makes architecture into an art. Wherever it has made its appearance in 
architecture, it has signaled the death of the idea of form.”cxiii  Like the other Idealist 
thinkers, Bötticher saw art as an expression of a people. The transference of forms from 
one style to another denied their essence; their very uniqueness. It negated the realities of 
their construction and its’ development from the particularities of the culture they came 
from. The assertion of an ideal model, or era, meant the inherent negation of the value of 
other styles and eras. Art was produced in all times and in all cultures. How could only 
one be acceptable as a universally valid truth? cxiv Furthermore, this amounted to a 
negation of history; a condition he felt was also untenable. “We would find ourselves 
alone in an immense void, having lost all the historical ground that the past has provided 
for us and for the future as the only basis on which further development is possible.”cxv 
For him, the most troublesome outcome of the theory of imitation was the Greco-
gothic Ideal. By clothing the Gothic structural skeleton in Greek details it negated, the 
inviolable qualities of each. He claimed: “They really thought to take the perfect product 
of a time- honored art, which embodies and reveals the artistic awareness and practical 
ability of a great nation, and use it like a model to be dressed at will. This was a most 
wretched and foolhardy idea; it was eclecticism at its lowest, which every time it has 
appeared in history has signified the relapse of a generation from a higher plane of 
tradition into ignorance and license. While shamefully disfiguring one style by robbing it 
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of the inborn essence of its character, they violated the opposite style by forcing it into 
monstrous dress and cruelly degrading it into a buffoon of modern art. . . .Of course, 
something new would be produced, but also something monstrous: something possible as 
form, but lifeless and stillborn.”cxvi The inherent contradictions of such a hybrid only 
served to destroy each style in the process.  
Bötticher came to two conclusions regarding architecture’s relationship to history. 
The first; we must hold on to what has been directly handed down to us lest we lose the 
positive assets that we now possess, and second; it follows that we must not make use of 
tradition for its own sake. On the issue of the necessity of history Bötticher was emphatic; 
“To reject or negate tradition is as impossible as to reject history itself . . .”cxvii The 
negation of history in his mind only lead to the appearance of novelty, which in the end 
proved only to be misunderstood or misapplied traditional motifs. Conversely, the use of 
tradition and history for its own sake was to fall into the trap of nostalgia.  
The theory of imitation was problematic, because it clouded our ability to learn from 
the past. Both styles, Greek and Gothic were part of the collective experience of our 
world. The unity of that experience meant that there must be some continuity between 
them; a continuity that implied the possibility for yet another style to emerge. He would 
claim; “These two styles [Classical and Gothic] . . . are not opposites in the sense of 
being conceived or created in order to cancel or destroy each other, but opposites that are 
complementary and, within the vast framework of the history of art, are therefore always 
conceived together. They signify two stages of development that have had to run their 
prescribed course before a third style can see the light of day, one that will reject neither 
of the two preceding ones but will base itself on the achievements of both in order to 
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occupy at their stage in the development, a higher stage than either: a third style that is 
destined to be produced as a matter of historical inevitability . . .”cxviii If critics were 
arguing over which was the true style, then that was proof that ‘truth’ lay not in some 
synthesis, like the Greco-gothic ideal, but somewhere in the dialectic of their apparent 
opposition; in a resolution that allowed for the possibility for both to be valid. This was 
clearly an Hegelian proposition, one that he would consistently apply. 
It also implied the more teleological view of history as it was promoted in Idealist 
philosophy and aesthetics. Bötticher put this in decidedly practical terms. “Through 
scholarly research we must penetrate [architectures] spiritual and material qualities in 
order to arrive at an apprehension of the essential nature of tradition and an understanding 
of its forms. Only then will we be able to decide what part of tradition merely belongs to 
the past, was valid only then, and therefore must be rejected and what part contains 
eternal truth, is valid for all future generations, and therefore must be accepted and 
retained by us.”cxix The task of historical research was to identify the origins of styles and 
their underlying principles to determine which were still valid and where, and to be 
selective regarding their application as a means of allowing for further development.cxx 
Like Gilly, Schinkel and Hübsch, Bötticher saw the task of architectural research as 
the search for the unity in difference that was revealed in the history of style. He stated; 
“This would be true eclecticism, the eclecticism of the spirit that reigns throughout 
history and through which, in a gradually accelerating development, nature conducts the 
essence of each thing toward its supreme and ultimate goal.”cxxi He too, sought an 
architectural analogy to Goethe’s morphology, one that revealed the continual process of 
becoming that was the movement of Spirit.   
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Like Hegel and Schinkel, he asserted that architecture began with the covering of 
space and the creation of shelter, thus it was the roof structure and the subsequent means 
to support it that was the essence of architecture and each style. According to him; “The 
essence of architecture resides in its unique capacity to present the idea and set forth its 
theme through this structural- spatial combination, it follows that a work of architecture 
can be fully comprehended only if looked at and enjoyed spatially.”cxxii The idea of 
spatial covering combined with the available materials and technology resulted in the 
formulation of a system of supports, and their proper placement. The statical means by 
which the load of the sheltering roof system was carried down became the basis of the 
expression. Furthermore, each component of the system now was conceptualized as 
having a vital part to play both in the aesthetic harmony of the whole and the actual 
necessary construction of the system. According to him, these had never been seriously 
considered.cxxiii  This of course was not entirely true. It was a point made by both Hegel 
and Schinkel, and Bötticher’s approach owed much to them. But he may have felt they 
had not gone far enough in defining the design process as a generative principle. 
Bötticher focused on the way in which the material was transformed into the 
structural principle we call style. He claimed; “The covering reveals the structural 
principle of every style and constitutes the criterion by which to judge it. What comes 
first with any style is the development of a structural force that emanates from the 
material and, as an active principle, permeates the system covering.”cxxiv According to 
Bötticher, the materials ‘structural force’ was ‘aroused and compelled to demonstrate its 
structural strength once it has been given a form’.cxxv The architectural member, or detail, 
was the by- product of both the form and the expression of the latent forces within the 
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material. Thus the form was not an a priori idea copied onto the material. The material 
was an active player in the generation of the form. Exactly how Bötticher explained this 
was what was so unique to his theory.  
Consistent with Idealist aesthetics, it was the integration of material and form that 
created the structural principle. Bötticher would again express this in decidedly pragmatic 
terms that would prove to be the most direct translation of Schiller’s material and formal 
impulse into architectural theory to date. He referred to the manifestation of the structural 
force, the active material impulse, as the Werkform (Core-form). It had a technical 
purpose, but its principle was one invented for the situation. He referred to the form, the 
active formal impulse, as the Kunstform (Art-form). It too emerged from the situation. As 
Bötticher would claim; “architecture in all its different manners and forms emanates from 
the artistic consciousness of the generation that created it . . .”cxxvi Reminiscent of 
Schinkel’s Grundformen, it was from the interaction of the material and the collective 
consciousness- and its ability to imagine a new structural principle- that the Art-form 
emerged. Bötticher did not conceptualize the Core-form and the Art-form as independent 
or derivative. As he claimed; “The structural member and its art- form are initially 
conceived as a single whole . . .”cxxvii Like all works of art it was a unified whole. To use 
Hegel’s terminology, it was a concrete universal. 
For Bötticher, like Schinkel before him, the starting point of the creative process was 
the material. Not every material was equally strong in a given situation. “When using a 
material, the inherent force and its strength must be investigated. From this knowledge 
automatically follows that law that lays down how the material should be formed to fulfill 
its specified function. In this way the structural form of the architectural part is 
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determined, and the nature of the material is master and made useful.”cxxviii  Thus the 
particularities of the material should affect the final form if the work was to exhibit a 
relationship to reality and truth. This was what the proper historical study of Greek and 
Gothic architecture revealed. “It was through such a process that relative strength became 
the active principle of the Hellenic system of covering, and the reactive strength that of 
the vaulting system.”cxxix As building needs changed and material and technological 
advances occurred the Core-form was transformed, evolved, or a new one was generated.  
For Bötticher, the search for architectural truth was the search for the ontology of its 
intelligibility. But it would be a mistake to think that he defined it in terms of 
construction and the Core-form alone. He was by no means a materialist promoting the 
rational exposition of the statical forces- i.e. the Mechanism of Structure. His vision was 
broader. The mission of the poet and artist he claimed; was “not to serve a commonplace 
reality and remain within its confines but to follow a higher calling . . .”cxxx It was the 
dialectic of material and form that was the eternal law of architecture. The emergence of 
meaning from the manipulation of the material was an ever-continuing process of 
becoming, each detail only a particular manifestation of this universal law. The true 
ontological ground would have to be found in the dialectic of the Core-form and Art-
form.  
Rational tectonics assumed an ability to read the statical forces in the structural 
principle of architecture. But as Bötticher noted, the Core-form was an invention with no 
‘natural’ model. The question was ‘How did the intelligibility of the Core-form emerge in 
the first place?’ His answer was the Art-form, while also an invention it was taken from 
our experience of the outside world, from memory.cxxxi He explained it as follows; 
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“[Architecture] takes its symbols and art- forms only from those natural objects that 
embody an idea analogous to the one inherent in the members of the architectural 
system.”cxxxii Bötticher’s understanding of the creative process was metaphorical, one 
that started with the particulars of place and material and then searched for analogo
conditions already understood through experience. The Art-form troped what was known 
onto what was unknown, making it intelligible. By referencing previously experienced 
forms, the Art-form provided an allegorical explanation of the Core-form such that it 
could be read and understood. The resulting concrete metaphor maintained the reality of 
the material and the particularity of the situation while introducing a collective memory 
that allowed the subject to empathize with the condition and understand it. Bötticher 
came remarkably close to the ideas of Father Carlo Lodoli on this point. 
us 
Interchangeable from material to material, the Art-form preserved the memory of the 
historical development of construction practices, but also acted as a conservative force 
which balanced out the potentially more dynamic force of technological advance. For 
Bötticher this was important. Rapid developments in new materials could alter the Core-
form radically, making them alien to the society as a whole. The Art-form preserved 
architecture’s intelligibility in the face of innovation by providing an aesthetic key to 
reading the new form. Consequently, when the analogue of the Art-form no longer bore a 
relationship to the Core-form, intelligibility was lost. Under such conditions a new 
metaphor had to be found that generated a new Art-form appropriate to the material and 
construction technology.  
The problem with the theory of imitation was precisely in its maintenance of Art-
forms that no longer possessed an appropriate intelligibility. True methodological 
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research moved beyond the sensuous impressions of the details to an understanding of the 
creative process. Bötticher was clear on this point. “While penetrating in this way the 
essence of tradition, we simultaneously recapture an awareness of the principle, the law, 
and the idea inherent in traditional forms; destroy lifeless eclecticism; and once again tap 
the source of artistic invention.”cxxxiii Architectural knowledge must return to its original 
source; its arche, it should be apodictic; a demonstration of its own ontology.  
Bötticher’s discourse on Core-form and Art-form provided a framework for 
understanding architecture’s intelligibility that was both practical and theoretical. The 
core form could be rationally understood post facto through the analysis of the material, 
construction technology and the statical forces that moved through them. This would 
certainly provide a conception of the ‘structural principle’. But the creative process was 
not analytical. With the cognitive process of the metaphor, Bötticher had provided a 
theoretical framework for understanding how intelligibility and meaning were created in 
the design process. As he would claim; “Knowledge alone leads to conception; only 
imaginative inquiry inspires thought and invention.”cxxxiv It was not rationality, but poesis 
that was the generative principle of architecture. According to Bötticher; “. . . only when 
practice and learning are joined can a learned practice arise; and that alone is art.”cxxxv 
That learned practice was a dialectic; composed of the interplay of the Art-form (formal 






Architecture as Poetic Unity 
 
From Lodoli to Bötticher, the theorists of poetic tectonics all expressed concern over 
the direction of architectural theory and practice. Most notably, were what they saw as 
the inappropriate application of historical forms to contemporary construction and the 
instrumentalization of architectural theory brought on by the Mechanisms of Structure 
and Disposition. The concern over the use of historical forms grew out of the rise in 
eclecticism at the turn of the century facilitated by Subjective aesthetics, 
Associationalism in particular. The issue deepened as construction practices made it 
possible to apply any historical detail to virtually any building. The result was an increase 
in the arbitrary use of form and more significantly a severing of the relationship between 
construction and detailing. History had never copied earlier styles and architects 
questioned why they were doing so now.  
Their questioning followed developments in aesthetics, where theories of imitation 
were increasingly seen as fundamentally flawed. The inherent duality of image and 
original implied an opposition between what was perceived as truth and what was 
perceived as a lesser vehicle to it. In the specific case of the theory of ‘la belle nature’, 
Art was a vehicle to truth, but only by revealing the underlying rationality of Nature 
which served as its paradigm. In denying it any real autonomy, all theories of imitation 
had failed to address Art on its own terms as a human activity.  
In their place, the Idealist philosophers proposed that Art was an originary act, one 
that set in motion the process of self-actualization and the creation of a uniquely human 
worldview. Therefore, all symbolic forms, including architecture, had a cognitive 
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function that produced meaning and signification. They did so as an expression of a given 
people, in a given age and in a given location. They were in a word; historical, and their 
value lay in our ability to read in them the overlay of the human spirit on the material. 
For Architecture this meant the continued imitation of historical forms failed to 
acknowledge the ideals of the original work and those of the current age.  
The critique of imitation also called into question the cornerstone of rational 
tectonics; Laugier’s theory of the primitive hut, itself a product of ‘la belle nature’. But 
the real challenge to it came in a critique of its inherent instrumentalization. Derived from 
nature’s simplicity and functional efficiency, the primitive hut reduced architecture to a 
series of pure relations, a parataxis, which could be analyzed in accordance with the 
methodology of science. Architecture was reduced to two ‘analytical’ principles; the 
Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition that embodied the abstract reason so central to 
the epistemology of science.   
The Idealist philosophers had rejected abstract reason and the application of the 
methodology of science beyond the realm of the natural sciences, and its architectural 
theorists followed suit. The reduction of architecture to the rational expositions of 
function and utility rendered the profession a mathematical endeavor rather than an art 
form. No one was more adamant about the dangers of this than Friedrich Gilly. 
According to him, it placed a concentration on the scientific aspects of architectural 
knowledge at the expense of understanding the discipline as an art form. The result was 
specialization and the fragmentation of architectural knowledge. The task of Architecture 
was to respond to the greater issues and concerns of society and not just the practical and 
economical concerns of a specific project. His argument was echoed by those that 
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followed. The architectural theorists all warned that if architecture only addressed prosaic 
material concerns everything that made it an art would be destroyed.  
It was this critique that precipitated the necessity to develop an alternative framework 
for architectural theory. It should be no surprise that the method of theoretical 
investigation adopted in poetic tectonics followed that of the Counter Enlightenment 
philosophers, Vico and Hegel in particular.  
For Vico, true wisdom was a combination of what he termed coscienza and scienza. 
The object of coscienza was il certo, the knowledge of particular facts, customs, 
institutions etc, the pursuit of which was philology or history. The object of Scienza was 
il vero, the true; the eternal principles of common sense, the pursuit of which was 
philosophy. Vico’s New Science took as its methodology both pursuits: philology and 
philosophy. Its method began not with the classification of objects as universals, but with 
an investigation of the particular, as a given certain. It was then through the cross 
comparison of such particularities that one uncovered the principle of their coming into 
being. His method bore a similarity to that of Hegel in the Phenomenology. In it Absolute 
Knowing emerged from Erinnerung, or recollection, the power to create images (a Bild), 
to call them forth and to re-collect them into a totality; a conceptualized history (a 
Begriff). It too applied an historical comparison of particulars in the pursuit of the 
philosophical principles of being. In both instances, and for Idealism in general, the task 
of knowledge was first to grasp the world in its fullness as an ontological construction; as 
a poesis. And second to expose those constructions as the result of human praxis. 
Theoretical investigation proved to be the study of how praxis and poesis formed the 
unity of experience.  
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In line with this, poetic tectonics applied a method of investigation that incorporated 
both the historical and the poetical. History revealed the larger order of things. The 
poetical was the theoretical examination of poesis as both design process and cognitive 
structure. The Idealist philosophers saw poetry as the novum organum of philosophy. 
Therefore, it was here that architecture opened itself to philosophy.  
For the Idealist philosophers, architecture, like all the arts, was a symbolic form chief 
among which was language. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the pursuit of 
history followed that of etymology.cxxxvi This was most evident in the work of Schinkel. 
For the theorists, the study of architecture began with the study of the particular, the 
nature of the work itself. It then proceeded to a comparative history. The intention of 
which was to locate a common ancestral form and the principles of stylistic development. 
Lodoli was the first to attempt this when he organized his study of architecture 
sequentially by style, but the other theorists followed suit.  
The historical examination began with the question of origins. Rational tectonics had 
proposed a series of ideal type forms, such as the primitive hut, as the origin of 
architecture. But for the theorist of poetic tectonics these only served as a means to ends. 
While the use of means to satisfy ends tied architecture to materiality and the physical 
world, its importance as an art form was not solely dependent on it. While objectively 
related, the ends could be achieved by a myriad of other means. This meant that specific 
means, in any form- including the primitive hut- were philosophically inconsequential. Its 
rationality could not be the true origin of architecture. 
Central to Idealist aesthetics was the assertion that a work of art was a product of a 
human mind that provided its idea. It is therefore, not surprising to find that implicit in 
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poetic tectonics was the idea that the true motivator of architecture was its purposive idea 
(shelter, assembly, worship or nation). It was the act of marking a space with human 
signification; the creation of a genus loci.  
Micea Eliade has identified this action as the distinction of sacred and profane space. 
As he noted, it “reveals absolute reality and at the same time makes orientation possible; 
hence it founds the world in the sense that it fixes the limits and establishes the order of 
the world.”cxxxvii Like Vico’s ‘Imaginative Universal’, Fichte’s Anstoβ and Hegel’s 
Ansich, it was the result of Man’s confrontation with materiality that gave meaning to 
collective experience. Like Nature and Man, architecture emerged in the dialectic of self 
and other, caught up in the passionate historicity of experience and originary praxis. The 
‘founding of the world’ was the objective manifestation of the sensus communis, one that 
made possible the ontology of the absolute.cxxxviii The archai of Architecture was not 
ratio, but logos. 
Such ontological gestures, referred to by Gilly as Ur forms, and by Schinkel as 
Grundformen, were seen as poetic constructions; the product of a unique capacity to 
manifest an ideal within a spatial-structural combination. Basically schemata composed 
first and foremost of spatial configurations that were expressions of a higher independent 
purpose or ideal-, and secondly the real necessity of their structural support. They were 
ontological images of architecture.  
Most commentators have seen such images as extensions of the idea of type forms. 
But this is to overlook their epistemological significance. While both contain the 
concepts of ‘space’ and ‘parataxis’ they were defined differently. Within the Mechanisms 
of Structure and Disposition, ‘space’ was subservient to ‘parataxis’ itself a reflection of 
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functional and utilitarian efficiency. Therefore, their loci can be found in an a priori 
universal; Nature’s underlying rationality.  
In contradistinction to this, the loci of poetic tectonics could never be found in a priori 
laws, precisely because the genus loci from which its conception of both ‘space’ and 
‘parataxis’ emerged contained too many variables, which while coincident were not 
always commensurate. For this reason we can claim that the ontological image arises 
from the particular as opposed to the universal; a key epistemological point of Idealist 
philosophy. This point can be made clearer if we examine the concepts independently.  
While concepts such as shelter or worship may be construed as universal, their actual 
expression in a spatial configuration is not. In poetic tectonics, ‘space’ is the expression 
of an ideal by the sensus communis, itself the product of its unique ‘climate’ composed of 
the concrete particularities of place, time and historical condition. It is out of this always 
already present milieu that 1) the ideals and ends are determined- shelter, worship, 
national identity, 2) how they are defined- their organization as social institutions, 3) 
where they are located- the actual demarcation of sacred and profane space, and 4) how 
they are expressed- their actual spatial configuration resulting from 1, 2 and 3. The 
formal impulse cannot be a universal because it is site and culturally specific. It must 
therefore be considered a particular, thereby making it a noetic ontology.  
In poetic tectonics ‘parataxis’ was conceptualized as a true techne; a means that arose 
from and contained the inherent material contingencies of site, climate, material and 
technology (trabeation, vaulting or truss systems), making it too, a reflection of the 
particularities of place, time and historical condition. As opposed to a rational exposition 
of the statical forces or functional adjacencies, it proved to be a performative ontology.  
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In place of the ‘analytical’ principle of the primitive hut, the proponents of poetic 
tectonics proposed a new ‘generative’ principle; what I will refer to here as the dialectic 
of noetic and performative ontologies. The key to grasping its epistemological 
implications lies in recognizing the ‘and-ness’ of the dialectic.  
To grasp this we have to return to the noetic ontology and its origins in the ‘climate’ 
of the sensus communis. Whilst numbers 1) and 2) above are purely ideational, numbers 3 
& 4 contain a sensual or concrete dimension. Therefore, they require the active 
participation of the material impulse. The actual site conditions of geographic location, 
topography and atmospheric conditions all place limitations on the spatial configuration. 
Additionally, the structural force which emanates from the available material; its internal 
physical properties of strength, durability and workability, all play a part in the 
determination of what it can and cannot do in response to the spatial configuration. This 
establishes the parameters of the technology available. Hence the material impulse places 
both physical and conceptual limits on the spatial configuration of the formal impulse. 
Both ontologies emerge in tandem from their unique ‘climate’. The dialectic is therefore, 
a sublation of the formal and material impulses. It is what Hegel called a concrete 
universal. Concurrent with philosophy, architecture established a new theoretical 
framework; one that examined both the noetic and performative ontology of architecture 
as a Poetic Unity.  
For the theorists of the poetic tectonics, these ontological images were seen as the 
etymological roots of architectural languages, whose theoretical implications could only 
be grasped through a comparative history. The purpose of which was to determine the 
underlying principles of style.  
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According to the theorists, all building was building in materiality and therefore had 
to adhere to the laws of physics and the nature of the materials of which it was 
constructed. This constituted the material impulse, and served as the source of the 
performative element. Bötticher called this the Core-form.cxxxix The comparative history 
revealed that it resulted from a study of the characteristics of a particular climate, 
material and technology. It was the infinite combination of these variables that accounted 
for the diversity of performative strategies. Individual styles developed or changed over 
time in part, as changes in the variables lead to changes in materials and the introduction 
of new technologies that then altered or introduced new performative strategies.  
For the theorists, the comparative history revealed a necessary and non-arbitrary 
relationship between the stylistic motif and the nature of the materials. This proved a key 
principle central to poetic tectonics; the performative element was self-referential, hence 
the necessity of its legibility. The inappropriate use of historical forms, lead to false 
appearances that obscured architectures origins in the dialectic. This disjunct undermined 
architectures claim to truth. Therefore, to work historically was to always have the 
element of the new at hand. 
While the parameters of a given performative strategy were shaped by the statical 
stresses within the structure and the nature of the materials used, the comparative history 
indicated that its overall proportions and form evolved over time, often starting out more 
rustic and over time becoming more refined. With familiarity and experience they 
became lighter and more economical. This meant that the original configuration had not 
been entirely deduced from objective laws. It pointed to evidence of experiential 
knowledge, as a determining factor. An early lack of familiarity led to structural 
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overcompensation (heavier proportions) and more rustic craftsmanship, while greater 
familiarity led to an increase in economy (lighter proportions) and more refined 
craftsmanship.  
Hübsch had referred to the combination of the material factors and this experiential 
knowledge as the ‘technostatic’ force. Based as it was in the material impulse, it was still 
part of the performative element, but its presence indicated that the final form was to 
some extent culturally influenced. If it were not then the development of a style would 
show no regional variation, furthermore there would be no variation between independent 
cultures that used the same material and technology. Thus the final form of the stylistic 
motif had to be shaped by another influence.  
Bötticher referred to this influence as the Art-form, and it dictated the final form of 
the stylistic motif and its proportions.cxl It too, was evidence of an experiential 
knowledge, one based upon contemporaneous cultural canons and ideals; it was an 
expression of the ‘Fortgang’. It was in this way that the development from one motif to 
another, from one style to another, and from one culture to another, simultaneously 
revealed the movement of spirit through time. 
Serving as the noetic element within the stylistic motif, it constituted what might be 
termed an active formal impulse, similar to the active material impulse that permeated the 
original dialectic. This is so, because the determination of means and ends was rooted in 
human experience in the practical and cultural knowledge that constituted the ‘Fortgang’. 
It established both physical and conceptual limits on the performative element. Thus, 
both the noetic and performative emerged in tandem as a Poetic Unity. This was what 
Bötticher meant when he insisted that the Art-form and Core-form arose simultaneously. 
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The historical recollection reveals that the course of architecture is the continual re-
genesis of the original dialectic. As practical and cultural experiences accrete they 
challenge the structure of the existing aesthetic code. At such moments, the architect 
engaged in a critical practice must stop and grasp again its form; he/she must recollect. 
To do so is to submerge toward embodiment, and the concrete; to affect a renewed 
confrontation between architect and ever-changing ‘Climate’, between ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
Once again the task is to re-negotiate the contingencies of usage, material, technology 
and ideal, to determine their ability to provide an appropriate motif in accordance with 
functional and cultural needs. It is out of this action that new materials, technologies and 
ideas are introduced and new stylistic motifs are created. This act of recollection is what 
engenders the sublation of the material and formal impulses and the creation of a new 
image/Bild. The design process proves to be a calling forth of images in the historicity of 
experience. It is praxis that serves as the originary moment/movement of architectural 
poesis. 
But the recollection reveals more than just architecture’s self-actualization; it 
addresses its entire experience. It produces a Begriff, a conceptualized history; a vera 
narratio, that sacrifices the aesthetic characteristics of architecture for a fuller 
understanding of the generation of meaning and its rationalization.  
The new image/Bild now becomes a part of the experience of architecture as such it is 
destined to become an object for consciousness. It is this movement that engenders what 
we might liken to a doubling of the Ansich in Hegel’s Phenomenology.  The image/Bild 
becomes both ‘object’ and ‘object for the contemplation of the ‘I’’. This doubling affects 
a movement toward rationality as the image/Bild is conceptualized as thing and 
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properties. Architecture identifies its self-referential character within the parataxis of its 
performative element and affects a division between it and the noetic.  
The doubling now initiates an oscillation between the performative and noetic. The 
definition of architecture now swings between that of a rational science and a fine art; 
between the verkehrte Welt and the ‘Beautiful Soul’. It is this doubling that creates what I 
have referred to as rational tectonics. It is a form of forgetting. A forgetting that the 
performative ontology is really not distinct from the noetic ontology, that the two are 
mutually dependant.  
Poetic tectonics challenges this doubling, by redirecting theory towards architecture’s 
archai; the dialectic of noetic and performative ontologies. It is a form of Errinnerung, 
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“If by enlightenment and intellectual progress we 
mean the freeing of man from superstitious belief in 
evil forces, in demons and fairies, in blind fate- in 
short, the emancipation from fear- then 
denunciation of what is currently called reason is 
the greatest service reason can render.” 
 
Max Horkheimer 




The early nineteenth century saw a redirection of architectural theory as it responded 
to the growing critique of the epistemology of science. That critique, rejected the 
autonomy of reason and its assertion beyond the fields of science and mathematics. It 
also challenged the idea that nature was static and fixed. Simple observation of the world 
revealed it to be dynamic, diverse, and at times incommensurate and replete with 
difference, while our experience of it remained interconnected and continuous. The 
duality of the epistemology of science had lead to a breakdown of the orders of 
experience that denied that continuity. The epistemology of science had lead to a truth, 
but not the truth of human experience. That Truth would require a new epistemological 
structure.  
For Hamann, Herder and the Idealist philosophers, Nature was never fixed or 
absolute. Individual organisms in their particularity were rarely identical, sometimes 
similar and more often then not dissimilar in their outward appearance as they reflected 
the conditions of their ‘climate’. If the objects of nature were never unconditioned, then 
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there had to be something non-objective within it; an original productivity, that did not 
appear as itself, but was only manifest in the products of its existence. Nature proved to 
be a unity in difference; a continual dialectic of ever-changing material exigencies and a 
more formal morphology. It was that dialectic that kept it in a constant state of 
‘becoming’ preventing it from ever reaching the state of stasis proposed by science. The 
same proved true of Man. If the ‘conditions’ of our being did not persist then the self 
must be grounded in something other than its own particular individuality. It was Geist, 
the ‘absolute’ self that served as its constant productivity. Cognition required an object as 
its function and implied an opposition between that object and a knowing subject. The 
moment of cognition was therefore the generation of ‘this’ as ‘I’ and ‘this’ as ‘object’ for 
the comprehension of ‘I’. If this condition was always already present, then all forms of 
knowing had to contain a correspondence between intellection and materiality. Whether 
in the form of a particular living organism and its morphology, or self and Geist, Reality 
proved to be a continuous oscillation between two basic impulses; the material and the 
formal. Nevertheless, our experience of their dialectic was an integrated whole; a Poetic 
Unity, brought about by their mutual sublation.  
For the Idealist philosophers, this correspondence had its analog in poesis. In the 
work of art, the material may be given by Nature, but it was transformed by human ideals 
and values, by the will of man. Art was the reconciliation of the idea with a concrete 
particularity; as such it existed between materiality and intellection. The two impulses 
still exist, but in a dialectical relationship a true concrete universal; a Poetic Unity.  
Poesis proved to be the Novum Organum through which philosophy gained access to 
the nature and construct of being and it proved to be the key to Idealist epistemology. The 
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process of self-actualization and the cognition of reality was an originary creative act of 
the imagination that formed an image, a Bild, which lent signification and meaning to 
experience through the creation of symbolic forms. Thus knowledge began not with 
conceptual thinking, but by intuition, not in abstraction, but in sensual medium. The 
imagination proved to be a human faculty that provided access to a whole metaphysics.  
 
   
“Where there is no word there is no reason- and no 
world.”  




The Inseparability of Language and Thought 
 
 
In The New Science, Vico established a clear connection between language and 
human knowledge as history. According to Edward Said, “When Vico speaks of a mental 
language common to all nations he is therefore, asserting the verbal community binding 
men together at the expense of their immediate existential presence to one another.”iii 
This idea was also present in the German writers as well. Like Vico, Hamann asserted 
that language, art and thought were all intertwined as a medium of expression, relying on 
each other and developing as one with thought. It was the individual’s immersion and 
participation in this milieu, or ‘climate’, that Herder referred to as ‘belonging’.  It 
contained the central patterns by which each genuine culture was identified and the 
ground from which its symbolic forms emerged. This meant that the history of symbolic 
forms should reveal this organic relationship, including language and architecture. The 
inseparability of language and thought lay at the center of Vico’s courso e recourso in 
The New Science, Schiller’s outline of the development of Man in On the Aesthetic 
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Education of Man and Hegel’s experience of consciousness in the Phenomenology. 
Therein, lays the first parameter of poetic tectonics the inseparability of language and 
thought. 
This must be seen within the context of the critique of the epistemology of science. In 
Descartes metaphysics the cogito placed all aspects of thought in the mind (res cogitans). 
Language was located in the body (res extensa), and seen solely as an external means of 
expression that served to translate previously formulated ideas within the mind. The 
cogito effectively established a separation of language and thought. This separation was 
not limited to Descartes. Both rationalists and empiricists defined language as a tool, a 
transparent medium, to convey information. For the Port Royal, Bernard Lamy and 
Antoine Arnauld in particular, language functioned as a picture representing thoughts 
already formed in the mind. Locke defined language as an indicative sign that pointed to 
an a priori thought. For them the function of language was to convey the rational content 
of the cogito; that meant that its’ form had to correspond to the structure of reason. 
Language became rational, meaning it was to be demonstrative and derived from 
premises. Given their rejection of the cogito, it is no wonder that the Counter 
Enlightenment philosophers would question this separation.  
This was mirrored in architectural theory with the development of rational tectonics. 
The Mechanisms of Structure and Disposition were rational, demonstrative expositions of 
the performative aspects of the buildings design. They admitted no concern with pathos, 
with the emotive content of architectural iconography or the detail as an expressive 
element. In the case of Durand the detail was secondary to the rationality of the designs 
plan. Nowhere was this more evident than in his mechanism, the Grand Durand, admitted 
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no content other than the rationality of its own organization; the actual details mere after 
thoughts. Rational tectonics rendered the language of architecture apodictic, 
demonstrative of its performative elements. 
For Vico, this rational speech was indicative of an age dominated by what he called 
the Intelligible Universal; an age when men thought in abstract concepts. Here the 
function of the mind was to sort and analyze through a system of abstraction that searches 
for qualities common to various objects allowing them to be classified by class and 
genera. He called this age ‘The Barbarism of Reflection’, because its’ knowledge 
produced only an understanding of things, and not a true Wisdom in the form of self-
knowledge. He contrasted this to his Imaginative Universal, a basic cognitive faculty that 
translated sensory experience into mental images that were then given expression in the 
form of metaphors. Vico associated the first with science and rational logic and the latter 
with poesis and what he termed poetic logic.  
Schiller too, had postulated a similar distinction in his outline of the development of 
man in the form of the material and formal impulses. Like Vico, he saw man moving 
through various stages dominated first by the material and then by the formal. In the latter 
stage men adopted rigid principles, which they worshiped like idols, as if they came from 
some unquestionable authority. For him, this was a barbaric age that left Man only a 
fragment of his true potential. He called it the Vernuftstaat and associated it with the 
Enlightenment and the epistemology of science. Like Vico, he saw poesis as a form of 
resistance to it and a means to man’s further development.  
It is important to note, the identification of two distinct forms of language and 
thought was not limited to Vico and Schiller. A similar distinction can be found in the 
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writings of Victor Hugo who identified them metaphorically as ‘Architecture’ and 
‘Printing’.iv The idea can also be found in the writings of Mircea Eliade who referred to 
poetic language and utilitarian language.v Claude Levi-Strauss referred to them as the 
Bricoleur and the Engineer.vi Ernst Cassirer referred to them as intuitive and discursive 
speech.vii And more recently, Ernesto Grassi has referred to them as the speech of the 
archai and apodictic speech.viii Like Vico, each associated one form of thought and its’ 
expression with poesis and the other with ratiocination. Like the Idealist philosophers, 
they all held that understanding the relationship between the two was essential to any 
understanding of the human condition and self-knowledge.  
These two forms are two means of cognizing the world; of creating a symbolic order. 
Verene notes that each uses a different means of structuring the syllogism. The first is as 
an instrument of demonstration wherein the syllogism is a mode of formal presentation of 
thought, as is found in Descartes cogito. It is the speech of science, the definition of the 
syllogism per Aristotle. Its’ logic is the deduction of propositions from axioms. It is the 
speech of Vico’s Intelligible Universal. The second is as an instrument of intelligibility 
where the syllogism describes the means, whereby thought is formed. It is the definition 
of the syllogism found in Renaissance philosophy, in particular that of Giordano Bruno. 
As Verene describes it; “In this second sense of the syllogism, the middle term, is all 
important, because it is the commonplace, or topos, out of which the other two terms are 
drawn forth. The syllogism as the form of the creation of thought begins not with the 
problem of properly arranging premises and conclusions, but with the problem of 
creating premises- the problem of formulating an enthymeme and expanding it into a 
demonstration.”ix It is an originary form of thought, one that is generative as opposed to 
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analytical. As Verene points out, it is a form of poetic or mythic speech, the speech of the 
Vico’s Imaginative Universal. 
For Vico, while the two languages and corresponding forms of thought are essential 
to the development of the corso e ricorso of human history, they are not equivalent. As 
he claims, the language of the Imaginative Universal is far richer, more real and more 
expressive. "Languages are more beautiful in proportion as they are richer in these 
condensed heroic expressions; that they are more beautiful because they are more 
expressive; and that because they are more expressive they are truer and more faithful. 
And that on the contrary, in proportion as they are more crowded with words of unknown 
origin, they are less delightful, because obscure and confused, and therefore more likely 
to deceive and lead astray"x  What does Vico mean by this, how is the Intelligible 
Universal and ratiocination obscure? 
Grassi explains the philosophic problem in the following way. "We claim that we 
know something when we are able to prove it. To prove {apo-deiknumi}, means to show 
something to be something, on the basis of something. To have something through which 
something is shown and explained definitively is the foundation of our knowledge."xi He 
refers to this as ‘Apodictic’ speech. Like Vico’s Intelligible Universal, it is epistolary, 
mediating and demonstrative. Like the method of science that it reflects, it demonstrates 
through the tracing back to first principles, or archai. Following Aristotle, he identifies a 
problem in that these archai, by definition, cannot be ‘demonstrated’ to be true.xii We 
must simply accept them. A point made by contemporary theorists of science.xiii 
Therefore, the archai cannot be the ‘object’ of reason, of apodictic speech. If they could 
they would cease to be archai. Therefore, we are forced to acknowledge that the initiative 
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structure of knowledge is not restricted to the rational demonstration, or its system of 
logic.  
Apodictic speech is obscure, because it cannot explain its own origins. Grassi calls 
this the tragedy of modern metaphysics. “Outside the symbolic world of the system we 
have only silence and mystery.”xiv Philosophically speaking, reason can provide no real 
knowledge outside of itself. It provides no real access to the human condition or self-
knowledge. This is what Schiller meant when he claimed that in the Vernuftstaat, man 
can never develop the harmony of his being ‘instead of imprinting humanity on his 
nature, he becomes merely the imprint of his science.’xv  
Like Vico, Grassi postulates an originary speech, the speech of the archai.xvi 
According to him, the archai is purely indicative and this requires an imaginative 
transference of a signification, an application of meaning by the mind. “The ingenious act 
of imagination is original because the capacity to lend meanings (meta-phe-rein) -the 
imaginative activity- itself presupposes seeing similarities (similitudines) between that 
which the senses reveal and human needs that must be satisfied.”xvii The archai is a 
metaphoric trope that generates a symbolic order making the phenomenal world 
comprehensible. Thought is not derived from the rationality of the cogito; but from 
ingenium, the imagination and its ability to ‘see’ similarities. Within the originary speech 
of the archai there is no separation of language and thought.  
The originary speech of the archai, like Vico’s Imaginative Universal, is the 
metaphoric speech of poetic logic. Since the basis of rhetoric as it is defined in classical 
philosophy from Plato, through Aristotle, the Roman Rhetoricians and into the 
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Renaissance is metaphoric speech; we are forced to recognize that the primary speech of 
the archai, of the Imaginative Universal, is rhetorical.  
The epistemology of science not only prefaced the apodictic speech of the Intelligible 
Universal, it also rejected the metaphorical speech of the archai and the rhetorical 
tradition it was associated with. Once again the culprit was the cogito. Dana Kay 
Harrington notes the negative view of the body and the senses in the cogito proved 
antithetical to the rhetorical tradition, which drew on the sensual and imaginative 
faculties and assumed a necessary connection between the mind and body.xviii The 
establishment of the logos of reason in the mind effectively eliminated the role of the 
body in cognition. More significantly, it located the senses and all pathos, all emotive 
content, in the body, which was subsequently seen as a hindrance to the clear ideas 
implanted in the mind. Because the imagination relied on the senses, it too was located 
within the body, relegating it to a lower status as a cognitive faculty. As Descartes claims, 
the senses and the imagination are ‘confused modes of thinking arising from the union 
and, as it were, the commingling of the mind with the body.”xix His metaphysics and the 
epistemology of science associated reason with the ability to arrange one’s thoughts in a 
clear and distinct manner. In Discourse on Method Descartes redefined ‘rhetoric’ as a 
form of apodictic speech. “Those who possess the most forceful power of reasoning and 
who best order their thoughts so as to render them clear and intelligible can always best 
persuade one of what they are proposing.”xx This was also picked up by later writers, 
who began to insist that emotions and passions were a hindrance to ‘clear and distinct 
ideas’. The use of pathos, and emotive elements common to traditional rhetoric were 
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increasingly seen as ornamental to apodictic speech, and eventually rejected as 
unessential.  
Grassi notes, this shift effected a redirection from traditional rhetoric; what he calls 
rhetorica interna, where pathos was internal to the discourse of philosophy, to rhetorica 
externa where it was external, ornamental and unnecessary. But in doing so, Rhetorica 
externa maintained a separation of verba (language as a means of expression) and res 
(thought) and continued to deny thought access to that which was distinctively human. 
This was what Vico meant when he claimed it only provided knowledge of things and not 
a true Wisdom. Rhetorica externa can provide us with no more insight into originary 
thought and the archai of signification and meaning than apodictic speech.  
This concern was echoed in Piranesi’s critique of Laugier’s primitive hut. The 
reduction of architecture to the apodictic demonstration of the performative elements 
means that it exhibits no concern for its noetic elements, which were expressions of the 
pathos of the sensus communis. The architect is rendered nothing more than a decorator 
who applies pathos as externally applied ornament to the construction. His designs and 
plates in the Parere su l’architecttura showed the absurdity of this position, but its’ 
theoretical attach was aimed squarely at the separation of verba and res, of language and 
thought, affected by Descartes cogito. The critique was echoed a generation latter, when 
men like Schinkel argued that the organic relationship between construction and the 
detail had vanished making architecture arbitrary, obscured and deceptive.  
The apodictic speech of rational tectonics and its Mechanisms of Structure and 
Disposition had effected a separation of verba and res and transformed the noble art of 
architecture into a rhetorica externa. As Gilly noted, it was denied its rightful place as an 
 688
art form, as a manifestation of spirit and a means to truth, and denigrated to the science of 
construction. In architecture, as in philosophy, the answer came in a return to the archai. 
Like the metaphor, Gilly’s Ur form and Schinkel’s Grundformen contained both verba 
and res, architecture had to return to the archai of the dialectic of noetic and performative 
ontologies if it was to once again be a complete speech. 
I have attempted to show, the fundamental philosophical problem for many of these 
thinkers was the search for meaning: How does the mind have anything before it at all? 
And how does signification and meaning arise? Such questions should be seen as a 
response to the failure of the epistemology of science, with its inherent separation of 
language and thought, to answer such questions in the quest for self-knowledge.  
The answer came in the insistence on their inseparability. It was an affirmation of the 
necessity to recollect the speech of the archai: of metaphor and the originary act of poesis 
that creates a symbolic order and advances knowledge. This was what was meant by 
declaring poesis the Novum Organum. Vico’s Imaginative Universal, the sublation of 
Poetic Unity (found in Fichte’s Anstoβ, Goethe’s ‘morphology’, and Schiller’s definitions 
of man and art), and Hegel’s concrete universal are all a return to the archai: to the 














“The metaphor is not the enigma, but the solution of 
the enigma.” 
Paul Ricœur 
The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination and Feeling xxi 
 
 
Metaphor as Praxis: The Reasoned State or Capacity to Act 
 
 
The underlying premise of Idealist philosophy is what I have termed, Poetic Unity. 
Implicit within it is a return to the idea of metaphoric speech and the identification of 
metaphor as the fundamental cognitive function. Verene notes, for Vico “The metaphor is 
that by which identity is originally achieved in perception. It is the form perception most 
immediately takes.”xxii Admittedly, with the exception of Vico and his Imaginative 
Universal, none of the protagonists of Idealism address metaphor directly, instead 
referring to it as the fundamental strategy of poesis. Nonetheless, I would assert they all 
allude to it. It is evident in Fichte’s ‘Anstoβ’, in the idea that the confrontation of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’ initiates self-actualization and cognition. It is evident in the sublation within 
Poetic Unity found in the work of Goethe and Schiller. We find it in Hegel, who begins 
his thought with the Bild, the concrete universal. And it is present in the generation of the 
archai that leads to the dialectic of ontology in architecture. All of which, operate 
metaphorically through an originary juxtaposition of two disparate phenomena whose 
rapprochement engenders the manifestation of an identity.  
To be clear, the metaphoric action here embodied is not the literary process of 
transference.xxiii It is not a simple this is like that. Neither ‘self’ nor ‘other’ are ‘named’ 
prior to their metaphoric assimilation. Their ‘names’ arise, and are given meaning, within 
an existing cognitive gap. As Paul Ricœur has noted; “The metaphor is not the enigma, 
but the solution of the enigma.”xxiv Therefore, we should see metaphor, not as a passive 
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‘discovery’ of a similarity, but as the active identification of similarities that affects 
rapprochement and revelation. Metaphors form thought though a logic of correlation 
whose oppositions are not resolved into a synthetic order, nor are they dissolved into the 
category. As Verene notes, “The metaphor is always a unity-in-difference, which is 
different from an analogical combination of elements.”xxv It is the creation of the middle 
term, an ‘identity’ between elements that structures the orders of experience bringing the 
Poetic Unity into intelligibility. The ultimate middle-term of middle-terms is Vico’s 
verum- factum principle; the true is convertible with the made. In the New Science he 
argues, metaphor is not solely a means of thought for a given type, i.e. mythic mentality, 
but the ground of thought itself. This is what Grassi alludes to when he identifies 
metaphoric speech as the archai and what I would claim to be at the heart of Idealist 
epistemology. 
In classical rhetoric the search for the middle-term is called Topics, and it concerns 
itself with the theory of arguments or points of departure which have to be available in a 
concrete situation for a discussion. According to Aristotle, the function of rhetoric is not 
persuasion, but the detection of the persuasive aspects of each matter. “Rhetoric may be 
defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion.”xxvi The objective of the rhetorician is to establish the basis of argumentation 
for the justice of a given subject, to establish its’ admirability and its’ advisability.  
Quintillion claims that, in rhetoric “it is not the first conflict . . . but what comes out 
of the first conflict, namely the kind of question [that it raises]” that is the true subject 
matter. What we understand from him is that the subject matter does not consist of an 
existing state of affairs; instead it is composed of the entire questionable-ness of the 
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particular situation. Topics begins with the interrogation of the presuppositions of the 
given. This requires engagement and speculation. Before I can make an argument I must 
chose a position. This interrogative action is also true of the originary moment of 
consciousness. Our understanding of the world is what it is, because it is conceptualized 
as an answer to an unformulated question; ‘What is this thing I sense?’ ‘What is its 
purpose in terms of my will?’  
Grassi notes that, for the Greeks this questioning of phenomena was to ‘accuse’, to 
define being as one thing or another. Quintillion traces this to the word categoria. From 
this Grassi concludes, “if the specific situation of man consists of his having to define all 
that is ,i.e., of having to ‘accuse’ it in terms of categories, in order to set up a human 
order, then being can appear only as quaestio, and we can respond to it only as to 
something of concern to us.”xxvii It is this questioning that locates the topoi, the middle 
term of the metaphor. Both rhetoric and philosophy share this in common; they are both 
the art of the question. I would argue, so too is architecture. All genuine architecture 
begins with the ‘questioning’ of a given situation with the intention of finding premises. 
It is from these that one argues the merits of a given design solution. That solution 
presents itself simultaneously as both argument and image/Bild. Rhetoric and metaphor 
stand in a triangulated relationship to philosophy and art as the fundamental means of 
finding premises from which deductions are made and put into action. 
Aristotle refers to rhetoric as a techne; a form of practical reasoning, or phronesis.xxviii 
But to be clear this is not techne in the sense of poesis. It is not the production of an erga, 
a work. We are not talking about metaphor as a reasoned state of capacity to make. When 
we speak of metaphor as a cognitive function we are speaking of techne as a reasoned 
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state of capacity to act. Metaphor is the reasoned state of capacity to raise the question, to 
take a position, to formulate the premise, to construct the argument, and to persuade 
others to action. It is metaphor as a form of praxis.  
In classical rhetoric, the purpose of metaphor is ‘to make appear’, or ‘to bring forth’, 
the logos of a thing. This can be traced to Aristotle who noted that diction, elocution and 
style, the lexis to which metaphor belongs, makes discourse ‘appear’. It is through the 
action of the metaphor that meaning and signification are ‘revealed’ or ‘brought forth’. 
The Ancient Greek term for this is theorein. Therein lays the second epistemological 
parameter of poetic tectonics: the archai is a theory of metaphor as praxis: as a reasoned 
state of capacity to act.  
 
 
“As rhetorical man manipulates reality, establishing 
through his words the imperatives and urgencies to 
which he and his fellows must respond, he 
manipulates or fabricates himself, simultaneously 
conceiving of and occupying the roles that become 
first possible and then mandatory given the social 




Sensory Topics: The Body of the Sensus Communus 
 
 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle notes that Topics are the basis of dialectical reasoning. As 
such, they are lines of reasoning that emerge from the sensus communis as generally held 
beliefs, opinion or truisms. Aristotle provides a discursive definition of Topics, wherein a 
premise is transferred forming the topoi of the dialectic. This interpretation is backed up 
by Aristotle’s comment, “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else.”xxx It is based on the translation of the Ancient Greek metapherein as ‘to 
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transfer’. This places metaphor in the context of mimetic theory. Mark Johnson sees this 
as objectivist, in that the structure of metaphor is based on an objective reality out there. 
It assumes the similarity exists independent of the subject and are expressed in literal 
propositions.xxxi But this interpretation only holds sway under the suppression of 
Aristotle’s own assertion that metaphor makes discourse appear. Here the concentration 
is on the active drawing forth. In this interpretation, the purpose of metaphor is to make 
appear, or to generate, the logos of a thing. What is missing in Aristotle’s examination of 
Topics in the Rhetoric is the question; ‘How do such commonly held beliefs emerge in the 
first place?’  
This is precisely the question Vico asks in the New Science. In place of the Discursive 
Topics of Aristotle, he proposes Sensory Topics, an assertion that the topoi emerge from 
commonly felt unities; of sense, feeling and emotion. This common sense is the ground 
from which all symbolic forms of a given culture emerge. The origin of intelligibility lies 
in this sensus communis, as an originary speech common to all men that forms the 
common experience and cognition of the world. As Vico states; “common sense is 
judgment without reflection shaped by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation 
or the entire human race.”xxxii Our ability to communicate is based upon this lingua 
mentale comune. This is the third parameter of the poetic tectonics: the metaphor is by 
nature dialogic. 
This was also true for Hamann who saw the source of language as pathos, the 
recollection of images from passion and our response to external sensory experience. For 
him, our thoughts and beliefs were commonly held; they were the expression of a given 
people, in a given time. This collective pathos formed the stream of images within which 
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the individual was born and which constituted his/her sense of ‘belonging’, what Herder 
referred to as our common sense as a nation.  
Sensory Topics and the metaphor create ‘identities’ through the connection of two 
disparate phenomena without reduction or synthesis within a logic of correlation. This 
means the metaphor bears an ‘identity’ to its given particularity in time and space. To be 
clear we must distinguish between the ‘logic of correlation’, which is the stratagem of the 
metaphor, and the actual metaphor, the image/Bild, that is its’ result. The metaphor as 
image/Bild has ‘identity’ because it is tied to the particularity of a given situation. But the 
stratagem does not. Because of the inherent variability the logic of correlation and the 
dialectic that results must constantly be re-negotiated. This means that within the dialogic 
structure of the metaphor there is always a dialogue, between the particularity of the 
moment and all other subsequent moments. As Verene notes, the ingenious power of the 
metaphor is “the power of the subject to move from one act of formation of sense to 
others, to create further acts of formation and to have past acts combine and influence 
present ones. Ingegno arises from the fact that, in any act of forming sensation there is 
present all that is necessary to transform all of sensation into a world of meaning.”xxxiii 
This is evident architecturally in Gilly’s Ur form and Schinkel’s Grundformen, which, in 
their logic of correlation, bear no real identity outside of their manifestations within the 
particularities of time and space, as individual works and styles. 
Within the inter-subjective dialogue both the originary ‘identity’ and the sensus 
communis are coeval members of a collective ‘we’.xxxiv Because they are active co-
participants Sensory Topics resists both an errant individual subjectivity and sociologism; 
the tyranny of history. There can be no over determination of either. There is always an 
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interplay of speaking and answering (responding). Each new metaphor must anticipate a 
response. This response comes from the ground of the sensus communis and the existent 
stream of images that constitute its sense of ‘belonging’. Therefore, it must acknowledge 
the history of images that constitute its ground, without which no understanding can 
occur. Each new image/Bild takes on its meaning through its association with a previous 
image/Bild. As Bakhtin noted, “Language . . . is populated- overpopulated- with the 
intentions of others.”xxxv It must acknowledge the sensus communis from whence it is 
emerging. Thus all subsequent metaphors, all emergent images/Bild, maintain a sense of 
the originary ‘identity’ of the first moment of signification. This was what Bötticher 
meant when he stated the Art-form preserves the memory of historical development of 
construction practices, balancing out the potentially dynamic forces of technological 
advance. Metaphor and its subsequent image/Bild preserve the dialectical correlation, 
while acknowledging the dynamics of history.  
Because we always already exist within this stream of images, we can never return to 
the originary moment of ‘identity’, to the Imaginative Universal, to the archai or to the 
Ur form or Grundformen. Nevertheless, we are compelled to history and its development 
of symbolic forms. We must re-collect the archai; the metaphor and its topoi to re-initiate 
the dialectic of ontology. Verene notes to do this, is to move into the Ideal Eternal 
History, to the re-collected fantasia of the imagination. As a principle of memoria, it 
allows us to fix the particular of human history as certums, whose philological study 
allows us to fix points around which culture can be understood. The theorists of poetic 
tectonics did this when they identified classical architecture as self-referential and 
romantic architecture as an expression of spirit. Because each metaphor, each image/Bild, 
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initiates the verum-factum principle (the true is convertible with the made), the history of 
symbolic forms as a whole illustrate truths and patterns that are its philosophic truths. 
This is what Vico called providence, a total sense of the order of human consciousness. 
Vico’s corso e ricorso, Schiller’s progress of man and Hegel’s movement in architecture 
from symbolic, to classical, to romantic are all Ideal Eternal Histories.  
   
 “. . . there shall be a partnership between the 
formal and the material impulse, that is to say a 
play impulse, because it is only the union of reality 
with form, of contingency with necessity, of 
passivity with freedom, that fulfills the conception of 
humanity.” 
Friedrich Schiller 
 On the Aesthetic Education of Manxxxvi 
 
Metaphor and Design Cognition 
 
The Aristotelian and Humanist traditions, understood metaphor as a fundamental part 
of the cognitive process. The work of Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406) serves as a prime 
example. In his De Laboribus Herculis, he claims that scientia has its origins in 
metaphorical activity, which consisted of the discovery, or invention of similitudes 
(similitudines), which identify, on specific occasions, the constantly changing and 
differing meaning of being.xxxvii   
According to Salutati, the pursuit of knowledge originates in the passions. It is artistic 
Eros, the Muses Clio, Euterpe and Melpomene, that motivates the lover of wisdom, with 
their desires for glory, pleasure in learning, and perseverance. These three are then 
followed by three actions. For Salutati, the origin of cognition lies in sensory perception, 
in the appeal and our passionate response to the abyss of what is un-definable in the 
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phenomenal world. The passionate experience of the senses is the instigator of 
knowledge. But he points out passion and perception alone do not produce scientia, only 
its originary moment.  
True scientia requires the assistance of two more Muses, Mnemosyne and Erato, 
memory and the ability to identify similitudes. Memory is necessary because we need to 
be able to remember, to return and call forth the perceptions of sense. But this must be 
matched with the identifying of similitudes (similia inveniens). Grassi notes that the 
purpose of Erato, is “to provide a premise for the transfer of meaning, to discern the 
origin of metapherien . . .”xxxviii It is this discernment that leads to the creation of a new 
truth. For Salutati, the archai of scientia is metaphor as praxis; the identification of 
similarities.  
Salutati’s conception of scientia is encapsulated in Vico’s definition of memory 
which serves as a major centerpiece in the New Science. According to Vico, “Memory 
thus has three different aspects: memory when it remembers things, imagination when it 
alters or imitates them and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into 
proper arrangement and relationships.”xxxix This makes his work clearly part of this 
earlier tradition. But I would argue that Salutati’s description of scientia bears a strong 












“And human nature, so afar as it is like that of 
animals, carries with it this property, the senses are 
its sole way of knowing things.”  
Giambattista Vico 
New Science, par. 374 
 
 
1- Metaphor and the Body: The Reasoning from the Particular 
 
 
Salutati’s premise that knowledge originated in the body and sense perception– in the 
‘appeal’ and ‘response’- was part of a long standing tradition within rhetoric, dating back 
to Aristotle that was also a key component of Humanist Thought. As Grassi noted; “It is 
the sensory ‘veil’, as the Humanists say, that we make use of in metaphor and which in 
no way is a hindrance, but is rather the necessary and appropriate instrument for the 
realization of man’s existential act of ‘being-there’ (Dasein).”xl Vico continued this 
tradition. Paraphrasing Aristotle he claimed; “the human mind does not understand 
anything of which it has had no previous impression from the senses.”xli Our sole way of 
knowing things was from the senses and the body. The Imaginative Universal was the 
prime example of this concept, wherein knowledge of the body was metaphorically 
juxtaposed onto what was unknown in an attempt to understand it and apply meaning. 
For Vico, language and thought always bore this sense of corporeality.  
This idea was also essential to Hamann, who saw language (and by extension all 
symbolic forms), not as mere invention, but as a reminiscence of images created by 
passions, stimulated by external sensory experience. Language, thought, art and religion 
were our response to external stimulation from our continued dialogue with reality. The 
same was true of Herder, who argued that knowledge began in sense perception. For him, 
life was a unity of experience that included the passions, emotions, desires, feelings and 
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physiological reactions. These were the concrete facts of human experience and as such 
were the true basis of knowledge and reality. 
The idea of the ‘appeal’ and ‘passionate response’ of the body was also true, if less 
directly, of Fichte’s ‘Anstoβ’ and Hegel’s ‘Ansich’.  For Fichte, the originary moment of 
self-actualization arose from the confrontation of the body with the ‘other’, which then 
resulted in an emotional response. For him, I am who I am because I am responding to 
something outside me. The opposition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ was initiated by the body and 
sense perception. In Hegel’s Phenomenology consciousness began in sense-perception, 
the sensing of both the ‘this’ as ‘I’ and the ‘this’ as object for the contemplation of the ‘I’. 
For the Vico and the Idealist philosophers, knowledge emerged in metaphoric praxis the 
self-actualizing of ingenium. This action had its origins in the concrete experience of the 
lived world in the body and sense perception.  
This must be understood as the foundation of the Idealist critique of the epistemology 
of science. Descartes cogito asserted that knowledge began with ratio, in the universal 
concept implanted in the mind. The argument that the world as we come to know it arose 
from the concrete exigencies of the lived experience of the body inverts this, arguing 
instead that knowledge emerged from the particular. This was a key element in Hegel’s 
thought. For him, true reason, as opposed to the ‘Understanding’ of the Vernuftstaat, was 
the unity of thought and reality. In the Philosophy of Right he called this unity the 
concrete universal and it was an argument that all reason must be grounded in the 
concrete experience of the lived world. As he claimed, the philosophical idea was the 
union of the form, which in its most concrete signification was speculative knowing, and 
the content which was reason as the substantial essence of actuality.xlii The idea of the 
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concrete universal was also central to his theory of aesthetics and played a significant role 
in overturning the aesthetic traditions of mimesis and imitation. Therein lays the forth 
epistemological parameter of poetic tectonics: the reasoning from the particular.  
While the architectural theorists of poetic tectonics did not directly address the body 
and sense perception, they nevertheless asserted that architecture and architectural 
knowledge began with the particular, with the material and the given particularities of the 
site. But it would be a mistake to assume that the body and sensory perception was not a 
concern for them.  
Our interaction with architecture is inherently a sensed and haptic experience. The 
manipulations of material, texture, temperature, and light, all key components of 
architecture, are designed to affect the body and sense perception. If this was not 
specifically addressed by these theorists, it was certainly a major part of the 
contemporary architectural debates on tectonics as was the reasoning from the particular.  
It is important to note that the assertion that the origins of thought are in the body 
have once again gained status. Marcel Danesi has noted contemporary paradigm shifts in 
Linguistic Theory, Cognitive Science and Computer Sciences have trended toward this 
idea of metaphor as the basis of cognition and its basis in the body. Nowhere is this more 
evident then in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and their notion of 
experiential knowledge. They reject the rationalist theory of cognition, precisely because 
it posits a disembodied mind. Like the Idealist philosophers they claim, that we 
comprehend the world not solely by what is objectively in it, but by how we interact with 
the world given our bodies, our cognitive organizations and our culturally-defined 
purposes. That is to say that our grasp of reality is “defined not just by what is in the 
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world objectively-but by our nature as living beings and by our interactions within a real 
environment . . . Basic-level categorization points to an embodied, experientialist view of 
cognition, rather than a disembodied, objectivist view.”xliii In defining what he calls 
image- schemata, Lakoff asserts that abstract reason originates in bodily experience its 
“metaphorical projections from concrete to abstract domains. . . . the metaphors are not 
arbitrary, but are themselves motivated by structures inhering in everyday bodily 
experience.”xliv According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is responsible for the image-
schemata that make all cognition possible.  
 
 
“In metaphor discourse assumes the nature of a 
body by displaying its forms and traits thus is a kind 
of quasi-bodily externalization.” 
Paul Ricœur 
The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination and Feelingxlv 
 
 
2- A Theory of the Image: The Concrete-ness of the Metaphor  
 
For Salutati, true scientia required the assistance of Mnemosyne, memory, because 
we need to be able to remember and call forth the perceptions of sense. This 
remembrance was a conscious act, a form of praxis, the return to a previous experience, 
idea or image. Vico referred to this aspect of memory as imagination, which he claimed 
“is nothing but the springing up again of reminiscences” xlvi The word imagination comes 
from the Latin imago, or image, it is the ability to form mental images. Within the 
Aristotelian tradition the imagination was understood as a form of memory, the calling up 
of images immediate with sense perception, or with past sense perceptions which are then 
re-experienced. These images from sensation were then moved to the faculties of 
thinking and judgment. This was what Vico meant when he claimed thought had its 
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origins in fantasia: the imagination. As Verene claimed the ‘Imaginative Universal’ was 
basically a theory of image.xlvii 
The power of the metaphor consists in its ability to vividly ‘set before the eyes’ the 
sense that it displays. Ricœur has referred to this as a kind of pictorial dimension, or 
picturing function, of metaphorical meaning. To explain it in another way, the 
metaphorical process by bringing to the fore the stream of images blurs the distinction 
between Sinn and Vorstellung between sense and representation. This compels us to 
explore the borderline between verbal and non-verbal, between sensed object and 
representation to essentially confront and question the very ontology of meaning. This 
faculty is important to discursive thought, which needs the imagination to provide it with 
its content.  
The metaphoric image is the production of what Vico called a certum (a certain 
particular). This certum is not convertible with the verum (true), but they are held 
together in an indissoluble bond. As Verene has noted “What is made is not a single fact. 
The particular that is made manifests a universal element that connects it to all other 
particulars with a total mentality, which makes up its intelligibility, its dimension of 
verum.”xlviii This productive aspect of the metaphor means that it is not merely 
Vorstellung; a mental picture of something, but the actual display of relations in a 
depicting mode. It is in this sense more ‘concrete’.  
This is present in Vico’s concept of coscienza, and his emphasis on philology as a key 
component of his method. Beginning with Lodoli’s stylistic organization of architectural 
history, the philological ordering of history plays an important role for the theorists of 
poetic tectonics. But the idea of memory, of the image/Bild, as the concrete display of 
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relationships in a depicting mode is most notable in Gilly’s Friedrichsdenkmal and 
Schinkel’s Potsdam projects and his Altes Museum in Berlin. All are theaters of memory 
that re-collect architectural images from our cultural memory and place them in a 
depicting or didactic order.  
For Salutati, Mnemosyne must be followed by Erato, the identification of similitudes. 
It is here that the discernment of the metaphor leads to the creation of new truths. For 
Vico, this was memory as ‘invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into 
proper arrangement and relationships’. Throughout the New Science he used the terms 
invenzione and ingenio interchangeably. Both were part of the broader theory of Topical 
invention in classical rhetoric that carried over into Humanist aesthetic theory. Not 
surprising, this theory was rejected by the Port Royal and the proponents of the 
epistemology of science.xlix 
In the Ad Herennium, Cicero defined invention as the devising of matter, true or 
plausible, that would make the case convincing.l In the Fifteenth century, the 
Renaissance Humanist and architect Leon Battista Alberti used the term invenzione in 
reference to the selection of subject matter in painting. He advised the artist to take 
lessons from 'poets and orators' who knew how to choose subject matter.  
In Renaissance art theory ingenio was generally understood as the artist’s familiarity 
with both subject mater and techniques. This was assumed to come from both individual 
and cultural experience. In On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Vico pointed out that 
both ingenium and natura meant the same thing. He postulated that it was the nature of 
humanity to invent and to create. He asked "is it because just as nature produces physical 
things, so human ingenuity gives birth to mechanical things, and just as God is the 
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artificer of nature, so man is the god of artifacts?...Or is it because human knowledge 
consists solely in making things fit together in beautiful proportion, which only those of 
ingenuity can do?"li As he used the word it involved the innate capacity for insight, to 
find identities in diverse things, to synthesize and to invent.  
In Sixteenth century Venice, invenzione still referred to the subject matter, which the 
artist either chose himself, or which was presented to him by others. But it also began to 
imply the way in which that subject was translated into an image. As such, it represented 
a bridge between the subject matter (the content of the work, its res) and the image with 
an emphasis on its’ emotional character as a means of expression (its form or verba). 
Invenzione was the way in which an artist manipulated the image in such a way as to tell 
a story giving it a rhetorical quality. This was generally referred to in Italian art theory as 
the impresa and it played a significant role in humanist thought.  
 In 1556 Ruscelli set up the first rule of the impresa; that its meaning comes from the 
interrelationship of figure and motto. As such, it had a dialogic and metaphoric structure. 
By 1601 Andrea Chiocco defined it as; "an instrument of our intellect, composed of 
figures and words which represent metaphorically the inner concept of the 
academician."lii Its’ construct was one of images and words which when combined, 
expressed the conscious thought of the composer. For theorists like Ruscelli and 
Domenichi, words and mottos were not necessary to its function. By the time of the 
Mannerists the impresa was associated with the term concetto, meaning concept, opinion, 
notion or idea. This linked it with the art of rhetoric. The impresa, it should be noted, was 
not conceived as a visual representation of a concept, it does not contain a separation of 
verba and res. Rather it is the image of one; it is a thought-image. Klein explains it in this 
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way; "expression imitates the articulations of the thought, which are those of the object, 
and thus authorizes the logic of impresa; . . . [and] invention and representation re-create 
the concept within sensible matter, and this process founds not an aesthetic, but a techne; 
a science of the art of the impresa."liii  
The manifestation of the idea in a sensuous medium was central to Idealist aesthetics 
and poetic tectonics were it was subsumed under the idea of sublation. For Schiller, the 
work of art was the creation of a new reality that embodied both material and form (the 
expression of the formal impulse- verba), the latter a manifestation of the ideal. As such, 
it was the manifestation of a particular human potentiality as material reality was 
transformed through the formal impulse in the form of an idea. It was in this way that the 
work of art was a production of human world. It was the sublation of material (material 
impulse) and expression of the ideal as form (formal impulse) that was the Poetic Unity 
of the work of art.  
For Hegel it should be remembered, the work of art was a concrete universal. As he 
claimed; “. . . the concrete content itself involves the factor of external, actual, and indeed 
even sensuous manifestation.”liv It was the process of presencing the inner world in the 
world of appearance. As Desmond has noted, this was the objectification of the self, 
which for Hegel was arts fundamental role. “Art has no other mission but to bring before 
sensuous contemplation the truth as it is in the spirit, reconciled in its totality with 
objectivity and the sphere of sense.”lv It was important to note that for Hegel the ideal 
can only become manifest in the sensual, thus this transformation of the metaphor proved




what Hegel called the Bild. While He makes no overt reference to metaphor (because he 
does not ask how the Bild is formed), it was nonetheless, central to his thought.  
It is here that we see the manifestation of Vico’s verum-factum principle- the true is 
convertible with the made- as the metaphor moves from its noetic function as a cognitive 
process to its performative function. This is achieved through its sublation with material 
contingency, what Schiller referred to as the material impulse. This affects the 
transformation of the metaphoric image into sensuous form, making it a concrete 
universal. The product of the metaphor, the image/Bild, becomes a true poesis, the 
creation of a third element. This is the fifth epistemological parameter of poetic tectonics: 
the sublation is the transformation of the metaphor from a form of praxis; the reasoned 
state or capacity to act, to a form of poesis; the reasoned state or capacity to make. This 
process is the establishment of the dialectic of ontology.   
 
 
“Until we express the Ideas aesthetically, i.e. 
mythologically, they have no interest for the people, 
and conversely until mythology is rational 
philosophy must be ashamed of it.” 
 
Hegel, Holderlin, Schelling 
Systemprogrammlvi 
 
Bild/Bildung: The Construing and Constructing of Architecture 
 
 
In their critique of the epistemology of science the Idealist philosophers challenged 
Descartes cogito and its’ inherent separation of language and thought. In an effort to 
overcome the separation and the lack of pathos found in apodictic speech they turned to 
poesis; toward the speech of the archai and metaphor. Its’ combination of pathos and 
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logos made it a true and complete speech and a means of resistance to the epistemology 
of science and the Vernuftstaat.    
It is in the theoretical investigation of the archai that we come to recognize the 
indicative character of metaphor makes it a generative principle of cognition and the 
ground of phronesis, practical wisdom. Metaphor proves to be techne in both its’ forms; 
as the reasoned state or capacity to act and the reasoned state or capacity to make. As 
such, it serves as a hinge between art and philosophy making it the foundation upon 
which the unity of theory and practice must be built.  
Thought is born in poesis. But, it is not enough to recollect the originary power of the 
metaphor and the speech of the archai. To fully comprehend Poetic Unity we must 
recognize it as a moment of praxis; the conscious or unconscious collective activity of the 
sensus communis. Along side the study of the poetic, there must be the study of the 
historic. It is the dialectic of the noetic and performative aspects of metaphor; its 
movement between the dual forms of techne, that brings about an oscillation between the 
material and formal impulses. It is only through the recollection of the image/Bild that we 
bring about the submergence into the concrete and once again affect sublation and re-
cognize the world. This is the experience of consciousness, the endless cycles of 
oscillation, submergence and sublation.  
The true theoretical investigation must include the study of how poesis and 
recollection, as a form of praxis, form the unity of this experience. That requires the 
recognition of the mutual dependency of the Bild and the Begriff within the overall 
experience of consciousness. For the Idealist philosophers and the proponents of poetic 
tectonics this was the key to self-knowledge. There has to be sublation between the 
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metaphoric speech of the archai and the apodictic speech of the dialectic, between poetic 
and scientific speech.  
From this position, we can understand Humbolt’s claim that the union of art and 
science was the precursor to Bildung. It was what prompted Gilly to write “When science 
and art unite at a common central point, when they work in concert, and when they place 
equal reliance on the lessons of experience, then they will progress more swiftly toward 
their goal; and each stands to gain by mutual extension of their powers to encompass 
even the remotest social purposes.”lvii It was precisely this point that lead Schinkel to 
assert that the study of architecture required the poetical and the historical. It was why his 
etymological research included both the study of the Trivialbegriff des Gegenstandes (the 
science of architecture) and the Artistischen poetischen Zwecken (the art of architecture) 
and why he believed the study of both were essential to the search for a new style and the 
advance of architecture.   
In the New Science Vico stated; “Providence gave good guidance to human affairs 
when it aroused human minds first to topics rather than to criticism, for acquaintance 
with things must come before judgment of them. Topics has the function of making 
minds inventive, as criticism has that of making them exact.”lviii While the mind needs to 
be inventive, it also needs to be exact. We cannot, nor should we try to escape the 
dialectic and apodictic speech.  
The apodictic speech of science and rational tectonics makes the mind and reason 
exact. It allows for the clarification of and perfection of systems that lead to a necessary 
economy and efficiency. It serves to make architecture literate and useful. But, while 
necessary if we seek exactness in construction, it nevertheless contains an inherent 
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separation of verba and res, and lacks pathos. With its concentration on means as 
opposed to ends, it has a tendency toward technique, which, in its assumption of 
neutrality, denies ethos. As such it can possess no true or complete philosophical inquiry. 
To overcome technique, architecture turns to poesis and the recollection of the archai. 
But as Verene notes, we cannot return to the originary moment of the Imaginative 
Universal. We are always already born into the stream of images that constitute our 
‘belonging’. To create a true critical practice, architecture must submerge and once again 
engage in the art of the question and re-identify the topoi. Only in this way can it once 
again engage the dialectic of ontology and produce meaning and signification.  
But to be a means toward Bildung, architecture must relinquish its aesthetic 
component and sublate itself with philosophy. To be a means of true knowledge of the 
unity of theory and practice it must grasp the rational of the metaphor in its dual capacity 
as a techne; as both a means to praxis and a means to making. It must affect a theory of 
the archai as a means to both phronesis and poesis. In other words, we must re-collect 
archi-tectonike; the archai as a theory of metaphor as praxis and tectonike as the techne 
of poesis. Only then can we say with the authors of the Systemprogramm that she gains 
the higher dignity, becoming “at the end once more, what she was in the beginning- the 
teacher of mankind; for there is no philosophy, no history left, the maker’s art alone will 
















i Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, Continuum, New York, 1992, pg. 187. 
ii Hamann; Briefwechsel, edit. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, 1955-79: 
Insel, 7 vols. v 95.21. 
iii Said, Edward; Beginnings: Intentions and Method, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, pg 373. 
iv Hugo, Victor; see The Hunchback of Notre Dame. In the chapter entitled ‘This will Kill That’ Hugo 
claimed that the development of thought, language was simultaneous and interdependent. He used tow 
images ‘architecture’ and ‘printing’ as metaphoric tropes to address the broader philosophical issues of 
language, thought, expression and consciousness. He proposed that the shift from architecture to printing 
represented a fundamental shift in the means of expression and human consciousness. For Hugo, 
architecture stood for a form of thought that was based in the sensory experience of the body. In contrast 
printing stood for a form of thought that was systematic and abstract, wherein arbitrary signs stood for an 
absent present. 
v Eliade established the dichotomy of poetic and utilitarian language as the basis of this thesis of sacred and 
profane. Like Vico, the poetic is a form of mythical thinking that is related to both art and the creation of 
meaning. Eliade, Mircea; The Sacred and Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Trask, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, San Diego, New York and London , 1959, pg 16.  
vi Levi-Strauss argues that there are “two strategic levels at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry: 
one roughly adapted to that of perception and the imagination: the other at a remove from it.” He identifies 
theses two modes of coming to terms with nature as the Bricoleur and the engineer respectively. See Levi-
Strauss, The Savage Mind, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966, pp. 1-34, quote on pg. 15.  
vii For Cassirer, the distinction is related to two modes of conceptualization that lie at the heart of all 
symbolic forms the mimetic and indicative gesture. This distinction is a key foundational point in his theory 
of symbolic forms. See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I, chap. 2, Vol. II, chap. 1, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955. See also Cassirer Language and Myth, Dover Publications Inc., 
New York, 1946. 
viii For Grassi, the distinction is related directly to cognition and the source of reason. It is the failure to 
grasp their distinction that for him is the great scandal of modern metaphysics. See Grassi, Ernest; Rhetoric 
as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and 
London, 1980, pg 19.  
ix Verene, Donald Phillip, Hegel’s Recollection: a Study of the Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
State University of new York Press, Albany NY, 1985, pg 48.  
x Vico, Giambattista; The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Bergin & Fisch, Cornell University 
Press, Ithica and London, 1948. par 445. 
xiIbid., p. 19. 
xii See Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics, bk VI, chapter 3-6. Aristotle identifies scientific reasoning as being 
demonstrative and derived from universals. He claims that, the first premises of this demonstrative 
reasoning cannot be based in premises, but must be based in inductive reasoning.  
xiii This critique can also be found in theorists and historians of science such as Lakantos, Fyerabend and 
Kuhn, who argue that the core propositions upon which science are based are effectively beliefs that cannot 
be proved, at least not using the methodology of science. They argue that science sets up structures to 
protect the core propositions and shield them from interrogation. For them this is the greatest hindrance to 
its advance.  
xiv Grassi, Ernesto; Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition, The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, University Park and London, 1980, pg. 5. 
xv Schiller, Friedrich; On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 165, pg 40. 
xvi The idea can also be found in the writings of Mircea Eliade who refers to poetic language and utilitarian 
language,xvi and Ernst Cassirer who refers to them as intuitive and discursive speech,xvi Like Vico, all three 
associate one form of thought and expression with poesis and the other with ratiocination. Like the Counter 
 712
                                                                                                                                                 
Enlightenment thinkers they all hold that understanding the relationship between the two is essential to any 
understanding of the human condition and cognition.  
Eliade established the dichotomy of poetic and utilitarian language as the basis of this thesis of sacred 
and profane. Like Vico, the poetic is a form of mythical thinking that is related to both art and the creation 
of meaning. Eliade, Mircea; The Sacred and Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Trask, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, San Diego, New York and London , 1959, pg 16.  
For Cassirer, the distinction is related to two modes of conceptualization that lie at the heart of all 
symbolic forms the mimetic and indicative gesture. This distinction is a key foundational point in his theory 
of symbolic forms. See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I, chap. 2, Vol. II, chap. 1, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955. See also Cassirer Language and Myth, Dover Publications Inc., 
New York, 1946. 
xvii Grassi, Ernesto; Vico Verse Freud: Creativity and the Unconscious, Vico Past and Present, edit. G. 
Tagliacozzo, Humanities Press Inc. NJ, 1981, pp. 147. Also see Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, 
Heidegger and Rhetoric, edit. Verene, Peter Lang, NY, 1990.  
xviii Harrington, Dana Kay; Rhetoric, Composition and the New Science: a Study of the Changes in 
Disposition, Invention and Pedagogical Practices in the Early Modern, UMI Dissertation Services, Ann 
Arbor MI, 1994, pp 20-26. 
xix Descartes, Rene; Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation Six, in Rene Descartes Discourse on 
Method  and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Cress, Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. Indianapolis Ind. 
1993, pg. 99. 
xx Ibid. Discourse on Method, pg 4.  
xxi Paul Ricœur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling, On Metaphor, Edit 
Sheldon Sacks the University of Chicago Press, Chicago London, 1978. pg  144. 
xxii Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
1981, pg. 79-80. 
xxiii A common interpretation of metaphor is as a literary device of transference or deviance. This 
interpretation can be traced to Aristotle’s comment “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that 
belongs to something else.” (Aristotle, Poetics, 21. 1457b. 6-7) But there are several fundamental problems 
with this interpretation in general, and in terms of the Counter Enlightenment specifically. Mark Johnson 
sees this as objectivist in that the structure of the metaphor is based upon an objective reality out there. 
Furthermore, in this theory the similarity is presumed to exist independent of the subject. He claims that 
"the distinctive feature of comparison theories is their insistence that the similarities revealed through the 
metaphorical transfer exist objectively in the world and are expressible in literal propositions." (Johnson, 
Mark, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of meaning, Imagination and Reason, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987, pg 68.) For Karsten Harris, this interpretation places metaphor 
in the context of mimetic theories of language and art. He sees this as placing the telos of the metaphor 
beyond the poetic act. “In such a view metaphor has to open the work of art to a dimension that transcends 
it; thus it destroys our experience of the work of art as a self-sufficient whole.” (Karsten Harries, Metaphor 
and Transcendence, On Metaphor, Edit Sheldon Sacks the University of Chicago Press, Chicago London, 
1978. pg 72. ) He warns that given such an interpretation of metaphor, the work of art must resist it, if it is 
to be autotelic, a self-sufficient whole that carries its purpose in itself. Thus, the interpretation of metaphor 
as literary device is at odds with the aesthetic theory of the Counter Enlightenment, which asserted that the 
work of art was neither imitative nor objectivist, but an autonomous human activity.  
xxiv Paul Ricœur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling, On Metaphor, Edit 
Sheldon Sacks the University of Chicago Press, Chicago London, 1978. pg  144. 
xxv Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
1981, pg. 41.  
xxvi Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk 1chapt 2, 1355b, 26-7. 
xxvii Grassi, Ernesto, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition, The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, University Park and London, 1980, pg. 50. 
xxviii Throughout the Rhetoric Aristotle refers to it as an art, i.e. a techne, but distinguishes it from the other 
practical arts in that in its technical character it is not concerned with any special or defined class of 
subjects. Rhetoric Bk I Ch I 1355b 9-22 and Ch. 2 26-36. 
 713
                                                                                                                                                 
xxix Fish, Stanley, Rhetoric, in Critical Terms for Literary Study, edit. Lentricchia and McLaughlin, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990, pg. 208. 
xxx Aristotle, Poetics, 21. 1457b. 6-7  
xxxi Johnson notes; “the distinctive feature of comparison theories is their insistence that the similarities 
revealed through the metaphorical transfer exist objectively in the world and are expressible in literal 
propositions.” Johnson, Mark; The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and 
Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1981, pg. 68. Karsten Harries sees this as 
fundamentally problematic in terms of aesthetics. As he claims it places the telos of the metaphor beyond 
the poetic act. As he notes, “In such a view metaphor has to open the work of art to a dimension that 
transcends it; thus it destroys our experience of the work of art as self-sufficient, whole.” He warns that 
given such a definition of metaphor, the work of art must resist it, if it is to be autolelic, a self-sufficient 
whole that carries it s purpose in itself. See Harries, Karsten, Metaphor and Transcendence, in On 
Metaphor, edit. Sacks, The Univerity of Chicagp Press, Chicago and London, 1978.pg. 72. 
xxxii Vico, The New Science, trans. Bergin Fisch, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1968, par. 
142. 
 
xxxiii Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
1981, pg. 105. 
xxxiv For an explanation of the dialogic character of the metaphor see Hwa Yol Jung, Vico and Bakhtin: A 
Prolegomenon to any Future Comparison, in New Vico Studies, vol. 3, edit. Tagliacozzo and Verene, The 
Institute for Vico Studies, New York, 1985, pp. 157-165. 
xxxv Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikailovich, The Dialogic Imagination, edit. Holquist, trans. Emerson & Holquist, 
University of Texas Press, Austin TX, 1981, pg. 294.  
xxxvi Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, reprinted in Friedrich 
Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing 
Co. New York, 1965, pg 77. 
xxxvii For a complete explanation of Salutati’s argument see Ernesto Grassi, The Primordial Metaphor, trans. 
Pietropaolo & Scarci, Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, Binghamton NY, 1994, pp. 10-14.   
xxxviii Ibid. pg. 13.  
xxxix Vico, New Science, par. 819. 
xl Ernesto Grassi, Vico Verse Freud: Creativity and the Unconscious, Vico Past and Present, edit. G. 
Tagliacozzo, Humanities Press Inc. NJ, 1981, pp. 158. Also see Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, 
Heidegger and Rhetoric, edit. Verene, Peter Lang, NY, 1990. 
xli Vico, Giambattista; The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Bergin & Fisch, Cornell University 
Press, Ithica and London, 1948. par 363. See also Aristotle, On the Soul 432a 4f, “since according to 
common agreement there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the 
objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affectations 
of sensible things. Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (2) when 
the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like 
sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter.”  
xlii Hegel, The Philosophy of Right,  trans. Knox, Oxford University Press, London & New York, 1952, pg 
12. 
xliii Lakoff, George: Cognitive Semantics, Meaning and Mental Representations, edit. Umberto Eco, 
Santambrogio, Violi, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988, pp. 134-5. 
xliv Lakoff, George: Cognitive Semantics, Meaning and Mental Representations, edit. Umberto Eco, 
Santambrogio, Violi, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988, pp. 144. 
xlv Ricœur, Paul, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling, On Metaphor, Edit 
Sheldon Sacks the University of Chicago Press, Chicago London, 1978. pg 141-157. 
xlvi Vico, New Science, par. 699.  
xlvii Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithica and London, 
1981, pg 68. 
xlviii Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
1981, pg. 83. 
 714
                                                                                                                                                 
xlix Topical invention posed problems for the Port Royal, who saw it not only an inferior means of 
invention, but also one that ‘corrupted’ judgment, because it confined intellectual inquiry to the area of the 
probable as opposed to the certain. This mode of argumentation was seen as undermining and threatening 
the claims of ‘stable’ and ‘fixed’ truths by the epistemology of science. Harrington argues, the separation of 
language and thought led to new modes of invention that embodied Cartesian and Empiricist approaches to 
knowledge. As science gained in dominance, the topical definition of invention was replace by scientific 
definition derived from Bacon’s Novum Organum, one where invention was the observation and 
documentation of the new. The result was a rejection, by Descartes and others, of the writings of Ancient 
authors as authorities, believing that they could provide no new knowledge of the world. 
xlix Along with this came a rejection of the necessity to study language and philology in the pursuit of 
knowledge.  
l Cicero, Ad Herrenium, I.II.3 
liVico, On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, from Leon Pompa, Vico Selected Writings, pg. 70 
liiAs quoted by Robert Klien, in Form and Meaning, pg. 5 
liiiibid., pg. 12 
liv Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Arts, vol. I trans. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, pg 
71. 
lv Ibid., pg. 623 
lvi The reference here is to the text written by Hegel, Holderlin and Schelling in 1796 entitled the ‘Earliest 
System-programme of German Idealism’, see H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 
1770-1801, Oxford, 1972. 
lvii Gilly, “Some thoughts on the Necessity of Endeavoring to Unify the Various Departments of 
Architecture in Both Theory and Practice”, Sammlung, 1797, reprinted in Friedrich Gilly Essays on 
Architecture 1796- 1799, trans. Britt, Getty Center for the History of the Art and the Humanities, Santa 
Monica CA, 1994, pg. 172. 
lviii Vico, New Science, par. 498. 
lix The reference here is to the text written by Hegel, Holderlin and Schelling in 1796 entitled the ‘Earliest 
System-programme of German Idealism’, see H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 
1770-1801, Oxford, 1972. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PART I 
 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, trans. E. H. Plumptre  in Nine Greek Dramas, ed. Charles 
W. Eliot, LL.D. New York, P.F. Collier & Son Corporation, 1961. 
 
Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon, Random House, New York, 1941 
 
Aristotle, Physica Commentaria. trans. Charles H. Kahn, in Anaximander and the Origins 
of Greek Cosmography. New York. 1960.  
 
Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. Raffan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1985. 
 
Cicero, De Officiis, edit. Henderson, trans. Miller, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, London, 2001. 
 
Coulton, J.J.;  Ancient Greek Architects at Work Problems of Structure and Design, 
Cornell University Press, Ithica NY, 1977. 
 
Dertaine & Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. J. Lloyd 
Sussex, Harvester Press, 1974, originally published as Les Ruses 
d’intelligence: la Metis des grecs, Paris, 1974.  
 
Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Phronesis and Techne in Modern Philosophy and in 
Aristotle, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1993. 
 
Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996 
 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. & ed. by G. Barden and J. Cumming, London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1975. 
 
Grassi, Ernesto; Rhetoric as Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
University Park & London, 1980.  
 
Graves, Robert, The Greek Myths, Penguin Books, New York and London, 1960 
 
Kahn, Charles H., Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmography. New York. 
1960. 
 
Karvouni, Maria; “Tectonics of the Human Body and Architectural Embodiments”, 
printed in Constructions of Tectonics for the Postindustrial World, 
Proceedings of the 1996 ACSA European Conference, ed. Bahar Hess, 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, Washington D.C., 1997.  
 
Kostof, Spiro, The Architect, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977. 
 
 715
Kruft; A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present, Princeton 
Architectural Press, New York 1994. 
 
Hermann, Wolfgang, Review, Uber das Schickliche Studien zur Geschichte der 
Architekturtheorie I, in The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 
Vol. 28, No.2. (May, 1969). 
 
Hersey, George; The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1988.  
 
Hesiod. Theogony , reprinted in The Homeric Hymns and Homerica,  trans. Hugh G. 
Evelyn-White. Theogony. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1914. 
 
Hesiod, Erga (Works and Days), reprinted in The Homeric Hymns and Homerica,  trans. 
Hugh G. Evelyn-White. Theogony. Cambridge, MA., Harvard University 
Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1914. 
 
Heidegger, The Question of Technology, trans. Hosftadter, Harper & Row Publishers, 
New York, 1971.  
 
Homer, Iliad, trans. Fagles, intro. Knox, Penguin Classics Edition, New York, 1990. 
 
Homer, Odyssey, trans. Mandelbaum, Bantam Books, New York, Toronto, 1990. 
 
Horn-Oncken, Alste, Uber das Schickliche Studien zur Geschichte der Architekturtheorie 
I, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967, trans. Wolfgang Hermann The 
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 28, no. 2. (May, 1969) 
pp. 143-145. 
 
MacIntyre, Alastair; After Virtue: A Study in Moral Virtue, University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, London, 1984. 
 
McEwen, Indra Kagis; Socrates’ Ancestor: an Essay on Architectural Beginnings, The 
MIT Press, London, 1993.  
 
Murray, Alexander S.; Who's Who in Mythology A Classic Guide to the Ancient World, 
Wings Books, New York, Avenel N.J. , 1988. 
 
Muller, Ancient Art and its Remains, or a Manual of the Archeology of Art, trans. J. 
Leitch, London, 1847.  
 
North, Helen; Sophrosyne, Self- Knowledge and Self- Restraint in Greek Literature, 
Cornell  University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1966.  
 
Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Humphries, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1955. 
 716
Plato, Plato the Collected Dialogues, ed. Hamilton & Cairns, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ, 1961. 
 
Quintillion, Institutio Oratoria, trans. Butler, 1921, viii.2.1 
 
Ritschl, F.G.; Terrentii Varronis Disciplinarum libris commetarius, Bonn, 1845 as 
referenced by Onians in Bearers of Meaning, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1988,. 
 
Robert Scranton, “Vitruvius’ Arts of Architecture”, Hesperia, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Oct. –
Dec., 1974), American School of Classical Studies, Athens,. 
 
Frith, Stephen; ‘A Primitive Exchange: on Rhetoric and Architectural Symbol’, ARQ. 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2004, 41. 
 
Tatarkeiwicz, Wladyslaw, ‘The Great Theory of Beauty and its Decline”, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Winter, 1972). 
 
Vitruvius De architectura libri decem, trans. Granger, The Loeb Classic Library, ed. 
Goold, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. London England, 1999.  
 
Donald Phillip Verene, Philosophy and the Return to Self-Knowledge, Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London, 1997. 
 





SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PART II 
 
Alberti, Leon Battista Alberti On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, 
Neil Leach and Robert Tavernor, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994. 
 
Barasch, Mosche; Theories of Art form Plato the Winckelmann, New York University 
Press, New York & London, 1985. 
 
Barasch, Mosche; Modern Theories of Art I From Winckelmann to Baudelaire, New 
York University Press, New York & London, 1990. 
 
Benevolo, Leonardo; History of Modern Architecture, Cambridge Mass., 1971, vol. I. 
 
Benjamin, Walter; ‘The Work of Art in the Age of mechanical Reproduction’ 1936, trans 
Zohn, reprinted in Walter Benjamin Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 
Schocken Books, New York 1969. 
 
 717
Bennett, “Christopher Wren: The Natural Causes of Beauty”, Architectural History, 15 
(1972): 5-22. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah; The Roots of Romanticism, Princeton University Press, Princeton and 
Oxford, 2000. 
 
Blondel, Jacques Francois; Cours d’architecture, Paris, 1771- 1777, vol. 2,  
 
Boffrand, Germain, Livre d’architecture contenant les principles generaux de cet art, 
Paris 1745(facs reproduction with La figure equestre de Louis XIV [1743], 
Farnborough 1969). 
 
Burtt, Edwin A.; The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: a 
Historical and Critical Essay, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul ltd, 1967. 
 
Cassirer Language and Myth, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1946. 
 
Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms I.: Language, Yale University Press, 
London and New Haven, 1955.  
 
Cassirer, Ernst; The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Kollen and Pettegrove, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951. 
 
De Cordemoy, Nouveau Traite de toute l’ Architecture ou l’art de Bastir, Paris, 2nd ed. 
1714 facsimile reproduction 1966. 
 
Descartes, René, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, 3rd edit., 
trans. Donald A. Cress, Hackett Publishing Co. Indianapolis, 1993. 
 
Diderot, Denis; Essai sur la peinture, ch. VI, Oeuvres, x, 519. 
 
Durand, J-N-L, Jean- Nicolas-Louis Durand: Precis of the Lectures on Architecture, 
trans. Britt, Texts and Documents, The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles, 
CA., 2000.   
 
Egbert, Donald; The Beaux- Arts Tradition in French Architecture, ed. D. Van Zanten, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, 
 
Ellul, Jacques; The Technological Society, trans. Wilkinson, Vintage Books, New York, 
1964.  
 
Foucault Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon, Pantheon Books, New York, 1980. 
 
Frampton, Kenneth; Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Architecture, The MIT Press Cambridge & 
London, 1996.  
 718
 
Pierre Francastle, Art and Technology in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, trans. 
Cherry, Zone Books, 2000. Originally published in France as Art et Technique 
au XIXe et XXe siecles, Les Editions de Minuit, 1956. 
 
Kaufmann, Emil; Architecture in the Age of Reason, Cambridge, Mass. 195. 
 
Galileo, Le Opere Complete di Galileo Galilei, edit. Nationale, vols. I-XX, Firenze, 
1890- 1909,Vol. I, 42. 
 
Galileo, Dialogues Concerning the Two Great Systems of the World, trans. Salusbury, 
included in his Mathematical Collections and Translations, Vol. I, London. 
 
Galileo, Opera Galileo Galilei, 15 vols., Firenze, 1842, ff., Vol. IV. 
 
Goalen, Martin; “Schinkel and Durand: The case of the Altes Museum”, printed in Karl 
Friedrich Schinkel a Universal Man, edit. Micheal Snodin, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1991. 
 
Guarini, Architettura civile, Trattato III, Capo XIII, oss.1, The Gregg Limited Press, 
London, 1964. 
 
Habermas, Jungen; ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project”, in Habermas and the Unfinished 
Project of Modernity Critical Essays on the philosophical discourse of 
Modernity, ed. d’Entrevees and Benhabib, MIT Press Cambridge Mass, 1997. 
 
Heidegger, Martin; “The Question Concerning Technology”, lecture presented at the 
Technische Hochschule in Munich, Nov. 18, 1955, reprinted in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans Lovitt, Harper & Row, New 
York 1977. 
 
Herrmann, Wolfgang; The Theory of Claude Perrault, A. Zwemmer Ltd, London 1973,  
 
Herrman, Laugier and Eighteenth Century French Theory, A. Zwemmer, Ltd. London 
1962,  
 
Kenny, Anthony; The Oxford History of Western Philosophy, edit., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994. 
 
Horkheimer, Max; Eclipse of Reason, Continuum, New York, 1992 
 
Hume, David; Essays Moral Political and Literary, edit. Miller, Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 1985. 
 
Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Architecture, 
UMI, Ann Arbor Michigan, 1995.  
 719
 
Kruft, A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present, trans. Taylor, 
Callander & Wood, Zwemmer Princeton Architectural Press, Princeton, 1994. 
 
Kunze, Donald and Wei, Wesley; “The Vanity of Architecture: Topical thinking and the 
Practice of Discontinuity”, Via. 
 
Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Trans. Herrmann, Hennessey and Ingalls, Inc. Los 
Angeles 1977. 
 
Lavin, Silvia;  Quatremere de Quincy and the Invention of a Modern Language of 
Architecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge London, 1992. 
 
Middleton, Robin; “The Abbe de Cordemoy and the Graeco-Gothic Ideal”, Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institute, vol. 25 no. 3/4  July- Dec. 1962 pp. 278-320 
and vol. 26 no. 1/2 1963.  
 
Middleton & Watkin, Neoclassical and 19th Century Architecture I, Electra/Rizzoli 
Milan, 1980.  
 
Muller, Werner; “The Authenticity of Guarini’s Stereotomy in his Architettura Civil”’, in 
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, XXVII, 1968.  
 
Mumford, Louis; Art and Technics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1952. 
 
Mumford, Louis; Technics and Civilization, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York 
and London, 1934.  
 
John Nef, La Naissance de la Civilization, published in English under the title The 
Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization, Harper Torch 1960. 
 
Perez-Gomez, Alberto; Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge London, 1992. 
 
Charles Perrault, Parallele des anciens et des modernes, 2nd ed. 4 vols., Paris 1692- 1696, 
Vol. 4. 
 
Claude Perrault, Essais de Physique, Paris, 1680 & 1688, I, Preface, and IV,. 
 
Claude Perrault, Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of Columns after the Method of the 
Ancients, edit. Harry F. Mallgrave, The Getty Center for the History of Art 
and the Humanities, Santa Monica, CA., 1993. 
 
Quatremere de Quincy, Encyclopedie methodique, “extracts from the Encyclopedie 




Quatremere de Quincy,article; Dictionnaire histoique d’architecture, comprenant dans 
son plan les notions historiques, descriptives,archaeologique, biographiques, 
theoriques, didactiques et practiques de cet art. 2 vol.s Paris, 1832, translation 
Samir Younes republished in The True, the Fictive , and the Real The 
Historical Dictionary of Architecture of Quatremere de Quincy, Samir 
Younes, Andreas Papadakis , London, 1989.  
 
Robison, Elwin C., “Optics and Mathematics in the Domed Churches of Guarinio 
Guarini”, in Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 50, no. 4 Dec. 
1991. 
 
Rondelet, Traite, intro. P. XXVI, Paris 1830.  
 
Rondelet, Traite Theorique et pratique de l’art de batir. Paris 1802, Vol 1, p. v. 
 
Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses Jean- Jacques Rousseau, ed. Masters, trans. 
Masters, St Martin’s Press New York, 1964. 
 
Rowe, Character and Composition, Oppostions, 2, January 1974.  
 
Rykwert, Joseph; ‘The Ecole des Beaux- Arts and the Classical Tradition’, printed in The 
Beaux- Arts and Nineteenth- Century French Architecture, ed. Robin 
Middleton, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982. 
 
George Simmel, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ trans. Shils, 1903, reprinted in On 
Individuality and Social Forms ed. D.N.Levine, University of Chicago, 
Routledge and Kegan, 1971 
 
George Simmel, ‘Metropolis and Mental Life’ 1903, reprinted in Modernism: An 
Anthology of Sources and Documents, ed. Kolocontroni, Goldman & Taxidou, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998.   
 
Soo, Wren’s “Tracts” on Architecture and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998. 
 
Szambien, Werner; ‘Durand and the Continuity of Tradition, printed in The Beaux- Arts 
and Nineteenth- Century French Architecture, ed. Robin Middleton, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982,  
 
Van Doren, Charles; A History of Knowledge, Birch Lane Press Book, Carol Publishing 
Group, New York NY, 1991.  
 
Verene, Donald Phillip; Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
& London, 1981. 
 
 721
Vico, Vico Selected Writings, edit. Leon Pompa, Cambridge University Press, London, 
New York, 1982. 
 
Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Fisch and Bergin, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1944.  
 
Vitruvius, The Ten Books on Architecture, trans. Morris Hichy Morgan, Dover 
Publications, Inc., New York, 1960, see Bk III chap. III, chap. V, bk. IV chap. 
III. 
 
Vidler, Anthony; “The Idea of Type: The transformation of the Academic Ideal, 1750- 
1830”, Oppositions Reader, ed. Eisenman, Frampton, Gandelsonas, Vidler, 
Forster, Agrest, Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1989.  
 
Vidler, Anthony; “The Production of Types”, Oppositions Reader, ed. Eisenman, 
Frampton, Gandelsonas, Vidler, Forster, Agrest, Princeton Architectural 
Press, New York, 1989. 
 
Villari, Serio; J.N.L. Durand (1760- 1834) Art and Science of Architecture, Rizzoli, New 
York, 1990. 
 
Wittkower, “Guarini the Man”, Studies in the Italian Baroque, Westview Press, Boulder 
CO., 1975.  
 
Yim, Seockjae Imitation and Ideal Type: a Study of Eighteenth Century French. 
 




SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PART III 
 
Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon, Random House, New York, 1941. 
  
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikailovich, The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Holquist, trans. Emerson & 
Holquist, University of Texas Press, Austin TX, 1981.  
 
Barasch, Moshe, Modern Theories of Art, 1 From Winkelmann to Baudelaire, New York 
University Press, New York & London, 1990. 
 
Barasch, Moshe, Theories of Art from Plato to Winkelmann, New York University Press, 
NY, 1985. 
 
Bennett, Benjamin, Goethe’s Theory of Poetry, Faust and the Regeneration of Language, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1986. 
 
 722
Bergdoll, Barry, Karl Freidrich Schinkel An Architecture for Prussia, Rizzoli 
International Publications Inc., New York NY, 1994. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. Harvey, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton & Oxford, NJ, 1999. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah, Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann Herder. Edit. Henry 
Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2000. 
 
Bernstein, Richard, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971. 
 
Bitz, Architettura Lodoliana Topical Mathematics as Architecture. UMI Dissertation 
Services, Ann Arbor MI, 1989. 
 
Cassirer, Ernst, An Essay on Man, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1944. 
 
Cassirer Ernst, Language and Myth, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1946. 
 
Cassirer, Ernst The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1955.  
 
Danesi, Marcel, “Language and the Origin of the Human Imagination”, in New Vico 
Studies, vol. 4, Humanities Press International , Inc. Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 
1986. 
 
Descartes, René; Discourse on Method  and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. 
Cress, Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. Indianapolis Ind. 1993. 
 
Desmond, William, Art and the Absolute A Study of Hegel’s Aesthetics, State University 
of New York Press, 1986.  
 
Eliade, Micea, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Trask, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Publishers, San Diego, New York, London, 1959. 
 
Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Manschen: Samtliche Werke, ed. I.H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845- 6, 
vol. 2.  
 
Fichte, Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, trans. Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988.   
 
Fichte, Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin 1971, SW vii 35. 
 




Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Hegel’s Dialectic Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans Smith, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London, 1971. 
 
Goethe, “Baukunst”, 1795, in Goethe, vol. 19, Schriften zur bilden Kunst, Berlinger 
Ausgabe, 1973,  
 
Goethe, Conversations of Goethe with Eckerman, in Gespeache mit Goethe, trans. 
Oxenford, Everyman’s Library Edition 1930, E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc.  
 
Goethe, Dictung und Warheit, Weimar. 
 
Goethe, Goethe The collected Works Vol. 6 Italian Journey, ed. Saine & Sammons, trans. 
Heitner, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1989.  
 
Goethe, Metamorphosis of Plants, trans. Arber, Goethe’s Botany. 
 
Goethe, On German Architecture, 1772, repro. Goethe the Collected Works Essays on Art 
and Literature, edit. Gearey, Princeton University Press, 1986. 
  
Goethe, ‘On the Laocoon Group’, 1798, in Essays on Art and Literature vol. 3, ed. 
Gearey, trans. von Nardroff, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 1986. 
  
Goethe, “Simple Imitation, Manner Style”, 1789, in Essays on Art and Literature vol. 3, 
ed. Gearey, trans. von Nardroff, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
1986, pg. 72. 
 
Goethe, ‘Von deutscher Baukunst’, Werke XXXVII, 148 f. English trans. John Gearey  in 
Goethe The Collected Works Vol. 3 Essays on Art and Literature, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1986. 
 
Grassi, Ernesto, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition, The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, University Park and London, 1980. 
 
Grassi, Ernesto, The Primordial Metaphor, trans. Pietropaolo & Scarci, Medieval & 
Renaissance Texts and Studies, Binghamton NY, 1994.   
 
Grassi, Ernesto, Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, Heidegger and Rhetoric, ed. 
Verene, Peter Lang, NY, 1990. 
 
Grassi, Ernesto; “Vico Verse Freud: Creativity and the Unconscious”, in Vico Past and 
Present, ed. G. Tagliacozzo, Humanities Press Inc. NJ, 1981,  
 
Hamann; Briefwechsel, ed. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden and 
Frankfurt, 1955-79: Insel, 7 vols.  
 
Hamann; Samtliche Werke, edit. Joseph Nadler, Vienna, 1949-57, 6 vols. 
 724
Harrington, Dana Kay; Rhetoric, Composition and the New Science: A Study of the 
Changes in Disposition, Invention and Pedagogical Practices in the Early 
Modern, UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor MI, 1994. 
 
Harris, H.S., Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801, Oxford, 1972. 
 
Hegel: Hegel’s Aesthetics Lectures on Fine Arts, Vol. I & II, trans. T.M. Knox, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975.  
 
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford & 
New York, 1977. 
 
Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, Oxford University Press, London & New 
York, 1952. 
 
Hegel, Reason in History trans. Hartman, Prentice Hall, 1995. 
 
Herder, Herder’s sammtliche Werke, edit. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877- 1913, 
Weidmann, vol. v. 
 
Herrmann, Wolfgang, In What Style Should We Build? The German Debate on 
Architectural Style, Texts and Documents The Getty Center Publication 
Programs, Santa Monica CA., 1992. 
 
Horkheimer, Max, Eclipse of Reason, Continuum, New York, 1992. 
 
Horkheimer, “Vico and Mythology”, printed in New Vico Studies, vol. V,  
 
Horowitz, Irving Louis, The Renaissance Philosophy of Giordano Bruno, Coleman- Ross 
Co. Inc., New York, 1952.  
 
Humbolt, A.von, Cosmos, A Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe, vol. 1, 
trans. E.C. Otte, New York: Harper and Bros. 1863-64, xii.  
 
Jung, Hwa Yol, “Vico and Bakhtin: A Prolegomenon to any Future Comparison”, in New 
Vico Studies, vol. 3, 1985. 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, (1787), Frankfurt am Main 1980.  
 
Kant, Immanuel, Kant Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Political Thought, Cambridge, New York, 1970.  
. 
Kolb, David, Before Beyond Function, Bates College, 
HTTP://Abacus.bates.edu/~dkolb/bbfunction.html. 4/4/2010 
 
Kruft, Walter Hanno, “Goethe und die Architektur”, Pantheon XL, 1982.  
 725
 
Kruft, Walter Hanno, A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present, 
trans. Taylor, Callander & Wood, Zwemmer, Princeton Architectural Press, 
1994. 
 
Lakoff, George: “Cognitive Semantics”, in Meaning and Mental Representations, ed. 
Umberto Eco, Santambrogio, Violi, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
and Indianapolis, 1988. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson. The Body in the Mind, Johnson, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago & London, 1987. 
 
Leatherbarrow, David, “Friedrichstadt- Symbol of Toleration”, Architectural Design 53, 
no. 11/12, 1983.  
 
Lillyman, William J., “The Question of the Autonomy of Art: The Origins of Goethe’s 
Classicism and French Eighteenth Century Neo-Classical Architectural 
Theory”, The Goethe Yearbook, vol. 7, 1994,  
  
Mackowsky, Hans, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Briefe, Tagebucher, Gedanken, Berlin, 1922 
reprinted Frankfurt am Main, 1981. p.192.  
 
Muller Gustav, “Solger’s Aesthetics: A Key to Hegel”, in Corona: Studies in Celebration 
of the Eightieth Birthday of Samuel Singer, Durham, N.C. 1941.  
 
Neumeyer, Friedrich Gilly Essays on Architecture 1796- 1799, trans. Britt, Getty Center 
for the History of the Art and the Humanities, Santa Monica CA, 1994. 
 




Pilario, D.F., Back to the Rough Grounds of Praxis Exploring Theological Method with 
Pierre Bourdieu, Peeters Publishers, Leuven, 2006. 
 
Perez- Gomez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1992. 
 
Perrault, Ordonnance, trans. McEwen, The Getty Center Publications, 1993.  
 
Rand Carter, "Karl Friedrich Schinkel: The Last Great Architect", online at 
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~peikx001/rcessay.htm 4/4/2010, also in Karl 
Friedrich Schinkel Collection of Architectural Designs, trans. Karin Cramer, 
Chicago, Exedra Books Inc, 1981Facsimile reprint of 1866 edit.   
 
 726
Paul Ricœur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling”, in On 
Metaphor, Edit Sheldon Sacks the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
London, 1978. 
 
Rosen, Stanley, The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1989.  
 
Rykwert, Joseph, “Lodoli on Function and Representation”, in The Necessity of Artiface, 
Rizzoli, New York, 1982.  
 
Schiller, Friedrich, Friedrich Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
Letters, trans. Snell, Frederich Ungar Publishing Co. New York, 1965, pp. 89-
90. 
 
Schinkel, Das Architektonishe Lehrbuch, Karl Friedrich Schinkel: Das Architektonishe 
Lehrbuch, ed. Peschken, 1979. 
 
Schinkel, Sammlung architectonischer Entwurfe, Berlin 1819- 40. 
 
Schlegel, A.W., Kunstlehre, (1798-1813) Paderborn 1989,  
 
Schlegel, Friedrich, “Principles of Gothic Architecture”, in The Aesthetic and 
Miscellaneous Works of Friedrich Schlegel, trans. Millington, , Bohn’s 
Standard Library, Kessinger Publishing, 2006,  
 
Schwarzer, Mitchell, German Architectural Theory and the Search for Modern Identity, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1995. 
 
Snodin, Michael, Karl Friedrich Schinkel: A Universal Man, ed. Snodin, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London 1991.  
 
van Eck, Caroline, Organicism in 19th century Architecture: An Inquiry into its 
Theoretical and Philosophical Background, Architectura and Natura Press, 
Amsterdam, 1994.  
 
Verene, Donald Phillip, Hegel’s Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.  
 
Verene, Donald Phillip, Philosophy and the Return to Self- Knowledge, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1997. 
 
Verene, Donald Phillip, The New Art of Autobiography An Essay on the Life of 
Giambattista Vico Written by Himself, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1991.  
 
Verene, Donald Phillip, Vico’s Science of Imagination, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 




Vico, Giambattista, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, trans. Leon Pompa, in 
Vico Selected Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.  
 
Vico, Giambattista,  On the Study Methods of Our Time, (1709) English trans. Elio 
Gianturco, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990.  
 
Vico, Giambattista,  The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Fisch and Bergin, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1944. 
 
Vico, Giambattista, The New Science, trans. Bergin and Fisch, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1948. 
 
Vitruvius, The Ten Books on Architecture, trans. Morgan, Dover Publications, Inc., New 
York, 1914. 
 
 
 
